

BROOK HOUSE INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF LEE HANFORD

I, **Lee Hanford**, will say as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. I make this statement following the Inquiry's Rule 9 request dated 26 January 2022.

EMPLOYMENT

2. I graduated from the University of Swansea in 2010 with an Executive Master of Business Administration and achieved a Masters in Criminology and Penology from the University of Cambridge in 2018. I have been employed in the custodial sector since March 1991 when I first joined Her Majesty's Prison Service, now Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service ('HMPPS'). I spent a number of years as a prison officer, cognitive skills trainer and a manager. During my time at HMPSS, I gained a HMPPS JSAC accreditation at front line and senior operational management assessment centres.
3. I joined Premier Prison Services (now Serco) in 2003 and worked as an Assistant Director at HMP Ashfield. In 2004, I joined Securicor (now G4S) and began working as a Senior Manager at HMP/YOI Parc ('Parc'). During my time at Parc, I took on the role of Director (private sector equivalent to Governor) for brief periods.
4. I have been employed by G4S Care and Rehabilitation Services ('CaRS') since April 2004 (this is a business unit of CJS and used to be known as Custody and Detention

Services ('C&DS'). During this time, I have been employed in a number of roles such as:

1. Business Development & Bid Manager from 2006 until 2011. I managed the operational transition of Dungavel IRC from Serco to G4S during this period and supported the site as Mobilisation Director from August 2006 until February 2007. I also managed the bids for new prison contracts for G4S and maintained an operational Duty Director role at Parc during this period.
2. Business Development and Mobilisation, Transition and Transformation Director from 2011 until April 2014. I was involved in mobilising operational contracts following successful bid wins. I was also one of three G4S Gold Commanders.
3. Operational Development Director from April 2014 until July 2016. I was seconded as Director of Gatwick Immigration Removal Centres from 1 February 2016 until 30 June 2016. I covered this secondment as the Director had been seconded to Medway STC. I remained in my role as G4S Gold Commander.
4. Business Change Director from July 2016 until July 2019. During this period I was seconded as Interim Director of Gatwick Immigration Removal Centres following the airing of the Panorama documentary. I was in this role from 25 September 2017 until 24 September 2018. I remained in my role as G4S Gold Commander.
5. Operational Support Director between July 2019 and February 2021. I remained in my role as G4S Gold Commander.
6. Chief Operating Officer (CaRS) from February 2021. I also continue in my role as G4S Gold Commander.

APPOINTMENT AS INTERIM DIRECTOR AT GATWICK IRCs

5. The Director position at Gatwick IRCs became vacant due to the then Director, Ben Saunders, being seconded to another establishment. I was appointed as Interim Director on 1 February 2016 as I had previous management experience within the custodial sector and also experience of the IRC estate in my previous role as Operational Development Director (and in my previous deployment at Dungavel IRC) and role of Gold Commander. I also had a good working relationship with the Home Office, and had been working with them to address the Stephen Shaw recommendations.
6. I understood that the role was to take responsibility for the management of Brook House, Tinsley House and Cedars PDA (initially for a 3 month secondment, which was extended for a further 3 months) to ensure a safe and decent environment for both detainees and staff. It was also my responsibility to provide strategic and operational leadership to deliver the contract.
7. I left the role on 30 June 2016 when Ben returned from secondment, although I was reappointed on an interim basis (pending a full-time replacement) on 25 September 2017 following Ben's departure (Ben's departure is explained in more detail in paragraph 17 of the CJS corporate witness statement). I left on 24 September 2018 following the appointment of Phil Wragg.

SHAW REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

8. I am asked to confirm the extent of my involvement with the Shaw Report recommendations
9. I was not directly involved in the Shaw Report recommendations. I attended the knowledge exchange workshop on 27 June 2016 at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford. The meeting attendees included Stephen Shaw, Kate Lampard, Ed Marsden, Mary Bosworth and the representatives from service delivery providers

including G4S, Serco and academics. The session focused on the report and the learnings from the Verita review of Yarl's Wood IRC.

10. Prior to this meeting, the Shaw report recommendations were shared with Service Providers and a part of my role as the Operational Development Director was to support and monitor Contract Directors to improve service delivery across the G4S custodial estate, which from an IRC perspective, included supporting the Gatwick team to address and implement the recommendations.

INTERACTION WITH BROOK HOUSE DURING THE RELEVANT PERIOD

11. During 2017, I was Gold Commander for G4S. The role and responsibilities included being responsible and accountable for the management of serious incidents, strategic oversight and overall command and responsibility of such incidents. I would also contribute to any lessons learned post-incident. I would also set the tactical parameters and ensured that the Silver Commander managed the tactical decision-making for my approval. I identified the level of response required to resolve any serious incident and engaged with stakeholders such as the Home Office and HMPPS Gold Command to assist in resourcing the response if required. I also informed and updated internal and external stakeholders regarding any serious incidents.
12. I cannot recall any specific visits to Brook House during the Relevant Period. I would however normally attend approximately once per quarter, primarily to inform the operational solution regarding the rebid of Gatwick IRCs. I would attend following any serious incident. I would attend on other occasions such as to hear grievances and attend contract review meetings etc. and to support the Director and the senior management team.

13. I would have met the senior management team at trading review meetings. My role at those meetings was to analyse operational performance that was reported by the Director and the senior management team.
14. The Brook House senior management team would have met with the Home Office and other service providers such as healthcare and other contractors on a regular basis. The senior management team would also meet with the Home Office Monitors on a daily basis and the Home Office Area Managers on a monthly basis during MCRM (Monthly Contract Review Meetings) and quarterly at the QCRM (Quarterly Contract Review Meetings). I attended one QCRM during the relevant period on 20 April 2017.
15. I have been referred to document CJS004583 and asked to comment on how Brook House's performance was measured. The performance was typically monitored via the daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly review meetings. The example within the CJS004583 demonstrates how performance points were typically calculated. This is a Notice of Performance for August 2017, which describes the operational failures for the month. This captures the number of points allocated for each failure, resulting in a financial penalty against the contractual service delivery expectations. This would be presented by the Home Office following the monthly meeting, where each of the self-reported and identified failures and mitigations would have been discussed to understand the causation of the failures.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AT BROOK HOUSE

16. I have been asked to look at document CJS000494 and am asked to set out the management structure whilst I worked there.
17. During 1 February 2016 to 30 June 2016, Steve Skitt reported directly to me as Interim Director of Gatwick IRCs. Steve was Deputy Director and Neil Davies, Head of Security, Michelle Smith, Head of Care and Regimes and Juls Williams,

Residential Manager and Stacie Dean, Head of Tinsley House reported directly to him. Sarah Newland, Head of Cedars PDA, Michelle Fernandes, Head of HR, Kalpesh Mistry, Finance and Commercial Manager and Mike Bird, FM Manager also reported directly to me as the Interim Director of Gatwick IRCs.

18. During 25 September 2017 to 24 September 2018, Steve Skitt reported directly to me. Michelle Brown, Head of Security, Juls Williams, Residential Manager, Dan Haughton, Support Services Manager and Sarah Newland reported directly to Steve. Mark Demian was appointed as Head of Safeguarding in December 2017. Juls Williams was employed until July 2018 as Residential Manager and was later replaced by Mark Demian as Head of Residence and Resettlement, and Sara Edwards was appointed as Safeguarding Manager. Michelle Fernandes (HR), Kalpesh Mistry (Commercial and Finance) and Mark Francis (FM) reported directly to me as the Interim Director Gatwick IRCs.

STAFF MANAGEMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS

19. I am asked to explain my working relationship with, professional opinion of and knowledge of any grievances against various member of staff:
20. Ben Saunders: I maintained a good professional working relationship with Ben. Ben always endeavoured to deliver an effective and efficient service and focused a lot of his attention on managing upwards. He encouraged his senior team to manage failures in a robust style. At times, in my opinion he could be clumsy in his engagement with others whilst striving to deliver the service. This is evident in the number of grievances that Ben was subject to from his senior management team.
21. Ben had been subject to a number of grievances from senior managers reporting to him and I had been commissioned by Jerry Petherick (the MD at the time) to investigate the claims made by Wayne Debnam, Duncan Partridge and Stacie Dean. I conducted the investigations by interviewing the complainants and other stakeholders

and shared the findings with the Commissioning Officer, Jerry Petherick. I can not comment on the outcomes of the grievances as these were managed by Jerry.

22. Steve Skitt: I had a very good working relationship with Steve. I worked with him for a number of years when he was the Head of Security at HMP Birmingham. He was very competent in this role and delivered effectively. Steve then transferred to HMP Altcourse as Head of Security before being promoted to Head of Brook House and Deputy Director of Gatwick IRCs.
23. Steve's approach during critical business meetings was one of quiet counsel. However, he called on his prior knowledge and experience in order to deliver results. During my first period at Brook House, Steve would accompany me when walking around the centre and it was apparent that he had a good working relationship with the majority of the staff and managers. During my second deployment to Brook House, I could see that Steve was dealing with misdemeanours in a very robust style. I understand that the relationships between a number of senior managers had become quite chaotic igniting a number of grievances which inevitably set the tone amongst the staff groups.
24. I advised Steve that I wanted to invest in staff who had made mistakes by focusing on their development as opposed to taking an overly disciplinary approach, which seemed to have become the norm. Steve accepted the revised approach, which was to develop a learning and development approach. I believed that too much activity was flowing through Steve, hence me making changes to the management structure for Brook House and Tinsley House.
25. I am aware that Steve had been subject to a grievance submitted by DCO David Waldock. This grievance was submitted to the CEO of G4S and was conducted by the G4S Assurance Team. Whilst there were most certainly lessons learned from such grievances, it was apparent that Steve had managed this particular issue effectively. The complainant was not satisfied. However, I overturned a dismissal that Steve had

made and awarded a final written warning, as I believed there were some mitigating circumstances.

26. Sarah Newland: I had a very good working relationship with Sarah Newland. I had worked closely with her on a number of projects, including the re-role of Cedars PDA and the relocation of the PDA service from Cedars to Tinsley House. In my opinion Sarah was a competent manager who strived to deliver an effective service. She transferred from Head of Cedars to Head of Tinsley House and PDA. Whilst managing Gatwick IRCs in 2018, I submitted a business case to appoint Sarah as a second Deputy Director, Head of Tinsley House and PDA to work alongside Steve Skitt as Deputy Director, Head of Brook House. This appointment was made in 2019.. I am not aware of any grievances made against Sarah.

27. Sara Edwards: I maintained a healthy working relationship with her during her time as a manager at Tinsley House and when she was deployed to Brook House as the Interim Head of Safeguarding, a post to which I appointed her. I am not aware of any grievances made against Sara.

28. Juls Williams: I maintained a good working relationship with him. During my first period at Gatwick, I commended Juls for his management of a concerted indiscipline, where approximately 25 detainees refused to leave the exercise yard. Juls managed this effectively to a peaceful resolution. During my second period, it became apparent that due to increasing demands on service delivery Juls was struggling. Managers who were reporting to him reinforced this opinion. Areas of service delivery were failing and causing frustrations amongst staff and detainees. Juls was not embracing the investment that G4S was making towards his development, despite further support being offered and he left the company in July 2018. I am not aware of any grievances made against him.

29. Michelle Brown: I maintained a good working relationship with Michelle over a number of years including the periods prior to my time as Interim Director. When I

was first deployed to Gatwick IRCs, Michelle was absent from work due to work related stress. I invited Michelle to meet me off-site and we agreed on a back to work plan. I always admired Michelle's approach, as she was a manager who would attend the unit to identify the source of an issue when it arose. She had the ability to reflect and provide longer-term solutions. I am not aware of any grievances made against her.

30. Dan Haughton: I maintained a good working relationship with Dan. I was part of the interview panellists who promoted Dan during my first secondment to Gatwick IRCs. I am not aware of any grievances made against Dan.

31. Mark Demian: Mark commenced his employment as the Head of Safeguarding post-Panorama. Mark took to the role like a duck to water. His diligent approach was one that was identified as a critical skill to deliver the revised vision of the centre. It was an approach that focused on settlement, care and resettlement, and Mark was deployed to the role of Head of Residence and Resettlement. I am not aware of any grievances made against him.

32. Neil Davis: Neil was Head of Security during my first deployment to Gatwick IRCs. Steve Skitt was Neil's line manager and provided Neil with a lot of support to manage the function. Neil's confidence needed boosting following an escape at Brook House, which occurred in March 2016. Neil responded well to this incident and negotiated design changes in order to prevent a similar occurrence. I am aware that Neil was subject to a number of grievances although I am not aware of the details or the outcome and understand that he resigned in August 2016. Michelle Brown claims to have raised concerns with me about Neil (CJS0073671_3), but I cannot recall this, although I do recall a number of staff members had concerns about Neil's performance following the escape.

33. During a meeting that I chaired on 3 March 2016 (CJS000463, page 1), I stated that "*having no Head of Safeguarding at Gatwick is a big risk.*" I am asked to explain what prompted me to make this comment and how it was resolved. I had been at

Gatwick IRCs for just over a month when this meeting took place. I had met with all senior managers prior to this meeting individually. It was apparent that this role was stretched and had too many functions, which meant that they could not devote sufficient time and energy to the critical area of safeguarding. Michelle's recommendation was that a number of her direct reports would be best suited through a Support Services Manager. We therefore employed an additional manager, promoting Dan Haughton to this role and restructuring to enable Michelle to become Head of Safeguarding from 2 June 2016.

34. During the same meeting, it was agreed that "*changes should be immediate regarding the safeguarding structure*" (page 2). I introduced the new structure when I was the Interim Director during my first period of deployment to Gatwick IRCs. Michelle became the Head of Safeguarding. Sara Edwards was promoted to E1 Residential Manager at Tinsley House and Dan Haughton was promoted to E1 Support Services.
35. In a meeting that I chaired on 30 March 2016, I informed the Senior Management Team of a "*new proposed organisational structure for Gatwick.*" (CJS000495, page 1). The new proposed structure included the creation of a dedicated Head of Safeguarding. Once implemented this role was taken up by Michelle Brown as explained above. It also included the promotion of Sara Edwards, Residential Manager of Tinsley House and the promotion of Dan Haughton (Support Services Manager) was created to remove a number of functions from the previous role of Safety and Regimes.
36. In a meeting on 28 April 2016, it was recorded that there was a "*new procedure for Security DCMs*" (CJS000510, page 2) and that I was required to sign off the Terms of Reference. There is no correlation between these two actions. The new procedure for DCMs was a local decision by the Head of Security. The Terms of Reference action was related to the commissioning of investigations. It was my view that too many misdemeanours were being subjected to an investigation. I wanted to see all Terms of Reference prepared to triage whether they required investigation or could have been

dealt with via managerial intervention, training and support. I thought that only serious or repeated misdemeanours should be subject to investigation.

37. The comment (at page 3) "*managers need to be visible and showing support to staff*" was made by Steve Skitt. I supported his comment. Steve was keen for managers to spend more time on residential units, not only on the days that they were Duty Director. It was important for all managers to check-in on areas that they did not manage in order to challenge each other and to raise and maintain standards.

TRADING REVIEW MEETINGS

38. Trading Review Meetings were conducted monthly. They were chaired by Jerry Petherick. He was supported by Health and Safety, Commercial, HR, Audit and Compliance, Finance and Operational colleagues. The standard agenda was aligned to the representatives in the meeting. The Centre Director would present and was supported by the on-site team, including senior managers if issues in their department were flagged as areas of concern for review.

SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM MEETINGS

39. The purpose of the senior management team meetings was to provide a summary of the performance of departments and have an awareness of the interdependencies with other departments and were undertaken monthly.
40. The senior management team and functional managers prepared their reports prior to discussing at the senior management team meeting.
41. During my first period at Gatwick IRCs, the meetings would last approximately 2.5 hours and covered previous actions, departmental updates, audit and compliance, director and deputy director updates and AOB. During my second period at Gatwick IRCs, I amended the senior management team meeting agenda to align it with the

Trading Review agenda. I was then able to use it as a preparation for the Trading Review and ensured that all senior managers were aware of the content being reported within the organisation. We covered actions from previous meetings, the Director's executive summary, health, safety and environmental, financial performance, operational performance, incidents, violence and self-harm, assurance, HR, critical projects, commercials and sales pipeline, account management, use of force and AOB.

42. The meetings were effective. My view was that making use of the Trading Review format brought greater clarity. This ensured the whole of the senior management team were focused on critical issues within each department. For example, new members and roles were brought into the senior management team meeting, such as the Manager of Religious Affairs.

43. Actions were monitored regularly, as previous actions were discussed at the start of each new meeting. If actions were not achieving the desired outcome and this was reoccurring, we would discuss this with the person responsible for that particular action. We would try to understand the reasons for this shortfall and what extra support they required.

STAFFING LEVELS

44. Operational colleagues supported the HR team to conduct recruitment days. Whilst recruitment was challenging, the HR team were successful in attracting candidates. The main concern at Gatwick was the retention of staff, particularly during my second deployment and the large amounts of staff that left post-Panorama.

45. To overcome this, we engaged with staff and Trade Union to fully understand why we were experiencing such high levels of attrition. The findings showed that it was mainly due to long hours and limited support from line managers. I engaged with colleagues to increase the numbers of staff, managers and associated funding. This

ensured that there were at least three DCOs and one DCM deployed to each main residential unit. We also engaged with the Trade Union to reduce working hours, which they were, down to 40 without a salary reduction.

46. Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden found that there was a "*lack of senior management capacity*" at Brook House (CJS005923, page 77). They were comparing the number of senior managers at HMP Rye Hill but Brook House did not have the same structure or number of senior managers. There were many significant differences in funding for a long-term Category B prison and what the Home Office procured for the IRC estate. HMP Rye Hill had 17 senior operational managers. When the Verita review commenced, there were three operational senior managers and two middle managers to meet the contractual requirements. My initial view was that there was a lack of senior management capacity, we then recruited a fourth senior manager.
47. During a meeting that I chaired on 3 March 2016 (CJS000463, page 1), it was noted that "*there is no consistency in security, as staff are being taken away from their jobs to cover other areas.*" This was the second senior management team meeting that I had chaired following my initial appointment at Gatwick IRCs. I had spent a lot of time reviewing operational processes and found that there was an over reliance on managers to provide support to Tinsley House, particularly the Security, Health and Safety and Activity functions. My recommendation was that the DCMs allocated to Tinsley House needed to take responsibility for their own environment and be less dependent on Brook House staff conducting the security and health and safety risk assessments and the planning of the regime.
48. I am referred to my Verita interview where I noted that there were insufficient numbers of DCMs to act as "*frontline managers*" (page 11 and 18 of VER000266) and that this led to a situation in which I was "*allowing people of equal grade to try and manage one another*" and am asked to explain the impact of this 'missing part' and the steps taken to resolve it.

49. My response was that: *"I'm a firm believer in having DCMs because in the absence of a supervisor, everyone is of equal grade and then you will have some people who are really keen and will become natural leaders, where if we had more DCMs they might find their way into there. They start guiding people to get the job done and people feel aggrieved that somebody in their equal grade is trying to give guidance to get the job done."* I maintain that position.
50. What I was attempting to articulate was that in the absence of DCMs, there were often complex relationships when peers are attempting to manage their peers. My view was that there was a need to increase the number of DCMs (E2 Grade), which was introduced. This was initially self-funded before being funded by the Home Office as part of the contract extension.
51. When I was appointed Interim Director in late September 2017, I raised a concern in relation to DCM staffing numbers. It was apparent that DCMs were struggling with their workload and having to manage two residential units. This ultimately meant that they were spread too thinly to provide the necessary support to the two staff deployed to each residential unit. I engaged with G4S and the Home Office to increase the number of DCMs in the residential areas in order to enable the deployment of one DCM to each residential unit.
52. I shared my idea to increase the number of DCMs in the centre with G4S and the Home Office. I also informed Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden advising them of why I wanted a manager to be accountable for each residential unit. G4S approved the funding initially to ensure the staffing requirement was achieved. The Home Office then authorised funding as part of the two year contract extension. This was not an immediate fix, as we still needed to recruit DCMs whilst managing high levels of attrition. As a direct consequence of the high staff turnover, some relatively inexperienced team members were promoted to roles that ideally would have been filled with more experienced staff members. We invested in additional training to develop the newly promoted DCMs.

53. I am asked to explain the nature of the “*aggressive recruitment campaign*” that was in place to address the staff shortfall, which I referred to during a meeting (on 18 October 2017) of the Brook House Independent Monitoring Board (page 2 of IMB000031). I was conscious that whilst we had an annual recruitment plan, it became apparent that post-Panorama we needed something more. A number of staff members were suspended or dismissed and some left of their own accord. We needed a recruitment campaign that incorporated a concurrent recruitment and training programme to ensure that we could meet the increased staffing levels that the increased demands of three DCOs and one DCM per unit were generating.
54. I am asked to comment on the reports received by Ed Marsden and Kate Lampard that: (a) DCMs received no formal training for their role (page 82 of CJS005923); (b) DCMs were often unable to conduct their own duties due to the need to stand in for colleagues or to fulfil other operational requirements (page 80 of CJS005923); and (c) the demands of work meant that DCMs had insufficient time to devote to the Corndel apprenticeship programme (page 84 of CJS005923).
55. On point (a), I advised Ed and Kate that we were increasing the number of DCMs and we were engaging with an external organisation to introduce an enhanced training programme for new and existing DCMs. This was identified during our engagement with DCMs following Panorama.
56. On point (b) G4S made investments to increase the number of DCMs. This ensured that we had dedicated resources to each function and area of work. G4S also invested in additional training via an external agency, Corndel, to support them.
57. On point (c) I disagree with this statement. The Corndel apprenticeship programme provided development opportunities for both guided and self-directed learning relevant to their role and were supported via bespoke training sessions, which the DCMs were profiled to attend. Other elements of the programme were to be

conducted during their shifts, as the programme was related to 'on the job' learning. The apprenticeships offered, enabled people who may have been out of the education system for many years to develop and grow in a safe and supported way. It is apparent that this approach was successful. All but two participants completed the programme and achieved Level 3 and Level 5 awards.

STAFF TRAINING

58. I am reminded that during a meeting that I chaired on 20 June 2016, I stated that the Initial Training Course would be “*changed to realign with contract*” (page 3 of CJS000530) and I am asked to explain what these were, why they were necessary and when they were implemented.
59. There were concerns that the Home Office certification was taking place early, on Week 7. There was a need to conduct a review and ensure that submission for certification was aligned to the contractual requirements. Following a detailed review, it was discovered that it was not related to certification. A week's shadowing was planned to take place in week 6 before the final week of the course followed by a week's mentoring. This process changed prior to the next ITC in August 2016 so that shadowing took place following completion of the course.
60. The alternative model was to introduce shadowing during the course, as this allowed students to have exposure to the role of a DCO and take their learning back to the trainers. This approach was however stopped as it was not aligned with the contract which required full certification before entering the facility.
61. I am also reminded that during a meeting of the Brook House Independent Monitoring Board on 20 December 2017, I referred to the “*continuing absence of Mental Health training*” (page 1 of IMB000010) and I am asked to explain how and when this issue was addressed. The introduction of mental health training occurred as part of the Action Plan.

CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

62. I am asked to provide my opinion of the management and leadership culture at Brook House whilst involved there.
63. There was a very small senior management team at Brook House. The senior management team were all dedicated to providing a safe and decent environment for those in their care. I experienced the same values and priorities during both periods of my secondment to Brook House. Whilst I made changes to the structure, the changes were not related to the senior management team's lack of passion to deliver. It was related to competencies to provide the necessary support to the increased number of DCMs.
64. In my Verita interview, I stated that there had "*previously*" been "*some difficult dynamics amongst the senior team.*" (VER000266, page 13) As I have touched on earlier, it is apparent that there had been some difficult relationships with Ben and his senior management team due to the number of grievances that he had been subjected to. As also touched upon earlier, I had previously been commissioned to conduct investigations into the grievances and was aware that there had been some changes within the senior management team following these grievances.
65. I also described the current relationships between members of the team as toxic and compared it to Emmerdale (VER000266, page 15). I also said there was a culture of management by matrix. The matrix management I was referring to was that Brook House was not managed via a traditional organisational structure whereby an individual reported to a dedicated manager. As already described, DCMs were having to cover too many units hence the investment that was initially supported by G4S and then the Home Office ensured each unit had a dedicated shift manager.

66. The same blurred reporting lines occurred further up the line management structure, as there was an insufficient number of senior managers to manage the functions. The extended responsibility of the Health and Safety Manager and the Regimes function having to provide support to Tinsley House further blurred the lines. This matrix management approach was contributing to strained relationships across the team. My proposed solution to these findings had already been identified and was being shared with Ed and Kate.
67. In relation to my comment about Emmerdale, I was referring to the historic issues that would have been witnessed by staff. They were aware of the number of grievances that were being raised by senior managers against one another. Consequently, as explained above, some staff felt that raising a grievance was the course of action if things were not necessarily going the way that they wanted. The number of grievances raised against peers were much higher than I had experienced elsewhere.
68. Ryan Harkness said in his interview that there was a "*division between DCOs, DCMs and SMT*." I am unable to comment on Document VER000238 specifically, as this has not been disclosed by the Inquiry. I described the relationship as a "*difficult gig for the staff*." This phrase was first used by Kate during the interview. I used this term, whilst acknowledging the difficult role that staff experienced. There are no control measures like there are in prison, such as adjudication and incentives and earned privileges, thus lacking in the real structure that a prison environment provides. They will go on Rule 40 for a short period but this does not really protect the wider community. It is difficult to protect the majority when people have open access to all areas.
69. A number of people identified that the senior management team tended to suspend staff and investigate formal investigations in respect of performance issues. As already stated, there was most certainly an over-dependence on investigation and disciplinary procedures. The investigation culture was apparent and we worked to eradicate it. We worked on developing a learning and development culture. Unfortunately, there was too much emphasis on contract compliance and when there

were failures the senior management team dealt with it through investigation and disciplinaries as opposed to understanding the cause of the problem and taking time to reflect and learn. It seemed that by making an example of the person that failed, they thought this would improve performance.

70. I took a number of steps to change this culture. If any investigation was to be commissioned, it needed to be approved by me first. This inevitably reduced the number of investigations. We also introduced a position of candour amongst senior managers and encouraged them to seek support in areas where they felt 'stretched.' I believe that we definitely made some progress and began to focus more on learning and development.

71. I stated that the Home Office was critical of G4S staff for "*showing too much empathy, supporting detainees in their appeals and the likes*" (VER000266, page 22). My comment to Verita was based on an anecdotal comment shared with me by Ben Saunders following a visit from Home Office officials.

72. My personal view is that it is necessary to show empathy with the plight of people who are in our care.

73. During a meeting that I chaired on 30 March 2016 (CJS000495, page 1), it was noted that the improvements in Welfare have led to it being a "*victim of its own success*." The Welfare team were occupying an office in the main thoroughfare in the Centre. They were a dedicated team who provided an excellent and compassionate service addressing a vast array of issues. As a consequence, they were in demand. As it was a 'drop-in' centre not subject to a booking system, it created a 'hot-spot' as detainees were often clashing with each other as some were pushing in and intimidating each other to see the Welfare Officer. We decided to introduce an appointment system, which also caused some angst as the stronger detainees were intimidating those in the booked queue. Therefore, we moved the Welfare Office into the secure visits corridor to ensure fair and equal access.

FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

74. The Extra Beds Programme was introduced following a request from the Home Office in 2014 to increase the population at Brook House. The Programme of works being prepared included the decanting of units to enable works to be conducted. This Programme was presented to the Home Office and agreed, as they would initially need to reduce occupancy to enable the works to commence. An additional 60 beds were installed in Brook House by converting some rooms to 3-person rooms.
75. Initially the plan was for Dave Eldridge to Project Manage the Extra Beds Programme. Dave had experience of managing projects in the wider business, working closely with our Senior Project Manager. Dave had capacity and it seemed that he could take on this role without adding strain to the Senior Management Team. Dave left G4S employment prior to the work commencing, and this work was then project managed by Dean Brackenridge, who similarly had capacity.
76. The Home Office initially engaged directly with Ben Saunders and the Brook House team in 2014 regarding the Extra Beds programme. Ben and Kalpesh Mistry (Management Accountant and Commercial) prepared the initial solution, which was shared with the Central Team to conduct due-diligence on their proposal prior to responding to the Home Office. The decision to support Ben and the team was subject to governance. The governance for this stage of the submission process, was conducted by the C&DS Central Team; Jerry Petherick (Managing Director), Martyn Kenyon (Commercial Director), Alison Ashcroft (HR), Matthew Martin (Finance) and myself (at the time) as the Business Development & MTT Director.
77. The Home Office wanted to increase the population and it was a good opportunity for G4S. A key driver of the Home Office during negotiations was to reduce the blended rate of the cost per detainee place.

78. The rooms were large spaces. I recall a visit from MP Andrew Mitchell, who was concerned about the Home Office accommodating 3 people in one room initially designed for 2 people. During this visit, he engaged with a number of detainees residing in these rooms and found that they had no complaints. He also commented that the rooms were much larger than had been described to him. Ventilation in the rooms was mechanical, as the windows were sealed units to prevent noise pollution from the airport. The design of the rooms with a separate section for the toilet meant that there was more floor space compared with other custodial facilities.
79. There was no resistance to the Programme from a G4S perspective. This expansion was perceived to be an opportunity to respond positively to our customers' requests to increase bed spaces at Brook House and Tinsley House. Having experienced managing the facility with the additional places, all parties agreed it was not the preferred solution, hence, following the Stephen Shaw review, the Home Office representative, Ian Castle, wrote to G4S on the 24th May 2018 to discontinue using the 3rd beds in all relevant rooms.
80. Risk assessments were completed by G4S and the Home Office, which included surveys conducted by MoJ Estates Department on behalf of the Home Office.
81. The nature of due diligence I referred to in my Verita interview (VER000266, page 4) was in relation to the Home Office engaging with MoJ Estates Building Regulation, Health, Safety and Fire experts to assess the feasibility of increasing the number of people residing in the rooms that were going to accommodate the additional beds.
82. Prisons offer a constructive regime, as they are designed to accommodate people for significant periods of time. I think that detainees would get a better regime in prison. Prisons are designed to replicate society and encourage an individual to settle, reflect and develop within an agreed amount of time. A detainee is incarcerated via an administrative process with no agreed time period known to them. A prisoner can experience a regime that replicates what is available to us all in the community e.g. a

place to live, work and experience similar leisure activities. Whilst Brook House was designed to offer similar activities, there was limited access to work activities and leisure activities. IRCs are only designed to care for people for short periods of time.

83. As discussed with Ed and Kate, the amount of time that some detainees were remaining in Brook House coupled with the restricted space and limited regime was not sufficient for long term detention. I do not agree with the findings in the Lampard report that the provision of activities and entertainment was "poorly managed." The issue was that maintaining an adequate level of resource to offer a constant regime was difficult, despite staff being flexible to extend their attendance beyond contractual hours. This improved when we employed more DCMs to provide direct managerial support and reduce baseline contracted hours. This improved the staff retention rate and enabled better planning of the regime.

84. I stated that there was not sufficient activity space in Brook House for 448 detainees, let alone 508 (VER000239, page 16). The facility was not designed to accommodate people for long periods of time. There was not enough space to provide activities for so many people for long periods.

85. The design of Brook House was aimed at short-term detention. This aim was most certainly not fulfilled. In my personal opinion, the delay in resolving their cases, particularly for those who were detained for considerable periods, meant that many became frustrated. However, I do not believe this affected the way in which the Brook House staff treated those in our care.

86. In a meeting on 30 March 2016, it was noted that HMIP had recommended that the cultural kitchen should be "*opened to a wider audience and needs to be used more often.*" The cultural kitchen was one of the activities that enabled the detainees to make plans and engage with their peers. The senior management team were conscious of the need to deliver this type of activity on a more regular basis and as a consequence, they committed to opening this small facility 3 mornings per week. We

engaged with Aramark to ensure that they had sufficient resources to meet this expectation.

87. Whilst Aramark was generally compliant with its contract G4S/Aramark did from time to time incur penalty points. Cleanliness was always an agenda item during our meetings with senior colleagues from Aramark. Aramark were responsible for; core detainee catering, retail services and cleaning and laundry services. The cleaning services included detainee association areas, courtyards, staff toilets, medical rooms etc. and were conducted on a weekly basis. I engaged Aramark to extend their contractual commitments to include additional deep cleaning of the bedrooms. In addition I engaged with a further third party service provider to enhance the cleaning regime.

COMPLAINTS BY AND INCIDENTS INVOLVING DETAINEES

88. As a Gold Commander when I was not acting as interim director I was only cited on serious incidents involving detainees which required the Command Structure to be activated and the local Command suite being opened. Other serious incidents such as serious assaults or life-threatening acts of self-harm would be reported retrospectively to the Gold Commander via the internal incident reporting system.
89. I was the G4S Duty Gold Commander on 15 April 2017. I was contacted by the daily on-call Gatwick IRCs Duty Director (Silver Commander), Sarah Newland. I advised Sarah to return to Brook House and advise the Duty Manager to open the Command Suite. The incident was managed via the Command Structure and a peaceful solution was achieved.
90. The investigation into allegations made by a detainee regarding the alleged assaults in June 2017 was conducted by the Home Office PSU. The G4S EASS service involvement was also investigated by the G4S Investigation team. The findings were recorded and acted on.

91. The investigation into allegations made by a detainee regarding the incident on 6 June 2017 occurred prior to my management of Gatwick IRCs. I think PSU investigated the complaint and found that the issues raised by the complainant were unsubstantiated. As a consequence, I would not have been informed. During my time at Gatwick after 24 September 2017, I would have been copied into the findings, which were unsubstantiated. I would have advised that the outcome should have been recorded on a central log that captured all serious complaints.
92. The investigation into allegations made by D1538 related to a complaint that was lodged prior to me commencing duty at Gatwick IRCs. Page 56 of Document CJS001549 is an e-mail I received on my first day of duty. The request was for someone to check the grammar and the level of detail in relation to witnesses in the report. When I read the report, I advised Karen Goulder to refer it to the Home Office to decide whether they should investigate it or commission the PSU. The report alleged that a member of G4S staff had made derogatory comments. I also engaged with the Home Office Monitor and Head of Immigration Detention Services to advise that any future allegations made against G4S staff would be referred to the Home Office prior to any internal investigations taking place.
93. The investigation into allegations made by D377 was conducted by PSU. PSU found that after considering all of the concerns raised and based on the balance of probability PSU found that Officers Robinson and Yates acted in a professional manner and followed Home Office procedures and guidelines. No recommendations were made to G4S by PSU. My e-mail to Karen Goulder was to ensure the complaint was recorded and the outcome was included in the local register.
94. The investigation into allegations made by D642 was conducted by PSU. They found that the Use of Force was appropriate and the complaint was unsubstantiated. The management of the property was not appropriate and I agreed that the complainant should be compensated. I emailed Karen Goulder on 11 November 2017 to put the

actions and recommendations into the log and Steve Skitt to meet with DCOs Lunn and Albert to follow up on the actions.

95. PSU conducted the investigation into the allegations made by D87. The recommendation was that staff should be commended. This was added to the register and staff met to provide feedback.
96. The complaint for D276 commenced following a visit in July. The Head of Security had reasonable suspicion that contraband was received by the detainee during a visit which was not booked as a legal or professional visit. The security team had conducted a review of the incident and advised the visitors that they were not banned from visiting the facility but would have to visit via a closed visit for a fixed period.
97. The concern initially raised by Stacie Dean on 25 October 2015, was then raised with me on 16 June 2026, some 6 months into my deployment at Gatwick. I advised Stacie that it was worth conducting a fact finding exercise and to view the CCTV with those she had concerns about to gauge their reaction, albeit, I was conscious that the delay in her bringing it to my attention may mean that we could not access the footage. I believe that Ben Saunders commissioned a full investigation on his return to managing the Gatwick IRCs.
98. The investigation of the complaint made on 8 July 2017 was in relation to alleged inappropriate behaviour by staff. I encouraged all complaints of this kind to be forwarded to the Home Office for them to triage. It was then the decision of the Home Office to allocate the investigation to G4S or PSU but whichever route they chose, there was a clear record for all stakeholders to monitor progress and provide an outcome to the complaint.
99. The investigation into the complaint made on 21 August 2017 was lodged prior to me commencing duty at Gatwick IRCs. Page 56 of Document CJS001549 is an e-mail I received on my first day of duty at Gatwick IRCs. The request was for someone to

check on the grammatical content and the level of detail in relation to witnesses in the report. When I read the report, it related to a member of staff making derogatory comments. I advised Karen Goulder to refer it to the Home Office to conduct the triage and decide who should investigate this.

100. The investigation into the complaint made on 22 August 2017 was lodged prior to me commencing duty at Gatwick IRCs. I carried out the same steps, as detailed above.

101. In relation to the complaint on 23 August 2017, I encouraged all complaints of this kind involving inappropriate behaviour by staff to be forwarded to the Home Office. It was then the decision of the Home Office to allocate the investigation to G4S or PSU, but whichever route they chose, there was a clear record for all stakeholders to monitor progress and outcome to the complaint.

102. In relation to the complaint on 28 August 2017, I carried out the same steps referred to above.

USE OF FORCE

103. The reporting of Use of Force was not classified in the C&Ds incident reporting procedures, so they would not be reported to the Gold Commander. The Use of Force incidents were reported locally by the daily Duty Manager to the daily Duty Director, who would include such incidents in the daily reporting log and report to the Home Office. These incidents would be reported to the Director during the daily operations meeting.

104. On 30 March 2016, it was noted that "two individual issues" had been identified during two Use of Force incidents. I think these were related to incidents involving discipline moves that Brook House received from other establishments. There was one move from CSU in Heathrow IRC who was aggressive on transfer and remained

non-compliant. There were very limited places to manage him, as at that time there was a detainee conducting a dirty protest on Rule 40. The two incidents were raised as the Home Office were planning to transfer further discipline moves to Brook House who were being non-compliant at their current sites. The issues were raised with the senior management team and Head of Security, Neil Davies was tasked to engage with the Home Office to prevent the moves from Morton Hall and The Verne due to the discipline moves already received.

105. It was also recorded that "governance needs to be tightened" in relation to Use of Force meetings. This relates to my initial findings that there needed to be a consistent approach to Use of Force meetings with regular times and consistent agendas to ensure that the functional head and instructors were available. Improvements were made, albeit it is apparent that this was not sustained.
106. During the same meeting, I suggested that there should be a "dedicated MMPR Co-Ordinator." Staff working in the PDA were being trained in Minimising and Managing Physical Restraint (MMPR). MMPR is not relevant to Brook House. It is dedicated to the staff who work in the PDA, those that manage the facility that includes caring for children. As MMPR was due to go live, replacing Physical Control in Care (PCC), it was my opinion that we needed to appoint a dedicated MMPR co-ordinator.
107. It was agreed that the action was to be managed by Sarah Newland, as Head of PDA. It was agreed that the appointment would be made prior to MMPR going live however, as set out above, due to the low throughput in the PDA, this role was incorporated into the Trainers role with support from the National MMPR team.
108. The role was not a dedicated role albeit it was covered by one of the MMPR trainers in consultation with the HMPPS National MMPR team. MMPR was not related to Brook House, it was a restraint method for those working with children. The

low throughput of families in the PDA did not warrant a full-time co-ordinator, especially with the support of the National MMPR team.

109. There was no recruitment process for this role applicable to Brook House. There were no Terms of Reference for this role applicable to Brook House.

110. I did not advise Ben Saunders that there should not be a Use of Force coordinator. It was my view that due to local demands there was a need to have the Use of Force coordinator reporting to the Head of Safeguarding. There was capacity within this role to manage other activities, so long as they had direct accountability to the Head of Safeguarding.

111. During a SMT meeting on 23 August 2016, I stated that I planned to reduce the numbers of staff to be trained in MMPR. It was important that only staff recruited to work in the PDA would be deployed to the PDA, as it was a specialised area caring for families and children. I didn't want to dilute the professionalism of the team by training the wider workforce who could be deployed to this specialist area of work.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH DETAINED PERSONS

112. Detainee Consultative Meetings were planned and took place on a monthly basis. Attendees included G4S senior management, Home Office manager and other stakeholders such as IMB and Aramark. The meeting minutes were recorded and the action plan created. This ensured that new detainee attendees who had not been present at previous meetings could be updated on previous issues.

113. During a meeting that I chaired on 3 March 2016, I stated that I wanted more structure to detainee consultative forums and that there was a need to decide which managers should or should not attend. The forums and consultative meetings were the same. They took place on a monthly basis. Attendees included G4S senior management, Home Office manager and other stakeholders such as IMB and

Aramark. The meeting minutes were recorded and the action plan created. Staff and detainees managed the actions and often worked collaboratively to reach the desired outcomes.

114. I thought more structure was necessary and that only certain managers should attend in order to provide more consistency. This would enable trust to be built between attendees. My initial experience was that irregular attendees meant that issues were not getting resolved effectively.
115. My statement was acted upon. I experienced a buy-in from managers including Home Office representatives. This enabled a rapport to be built and provided confidence to achieve desired outcomes and to manage expectations.
116. My view on 'No-Notice Charters' was shared with a number of stakeholders including the Home Office, senior civil servants, the IMB and Verita. I felt that they were detrimental to the relationships between staff and detainees.. To be given a 3-month window caused anxiety amongst those in our care. Detainees became aware of the centre's demographics changing in preparation for a Charter. They would see a large increase of people from their country arriving and would become nervous about whether that meant there was a charter due to which they may be allocated. The Home Office advised that staff should not share this information and as a consequence, they would tread on eggshells and avoid responding to questions from detainees. When the removal failed and the detainee was returned to the centre, this had a negative impact on the relationship between staff and detainees.
117. After the Panorama documentary aired, staff became subject to increasing levels of verbal and physical abuse from detainees. Unlike other custodial environments, there wasn't a disciplinary process that detainees were subject to following such behaviour. In the event that there was a serious offence against a peer or a member of staff, we would seek support from the Home Office to use Rule 40 accommodation to protect the victim for a short period of time. We were unable to keep people separate

within a centre that had free movement for detainees. We would also engage with the police if there was an act of serious harm to a victim. Initially the Home Office was reluctant for the police to pursue any investigations, as this may disrupt the removal process however we engaged with the Home Office and encouraged them to enable us to co-operate with the police to pursue criminal charges for serious offences. We also engaged with the Home Office to seek a transfer, via the Home Office Disruption policy if the same individual continued to pose a threat to others.

118. Referral of the matter to the police and engagement with the Home Office to transfer to other IRCs was partially effective.. Whilst there was a violence reduction strategy in place and positive relationships were encouraged and supported, there was a small minority that needed to transfer back to the HMPPS estate as they were having a detrimental impact on the community within the IRC.

STAFF GRIEVANCES AND MISCONDUCT

119. I conducted the appeal hearing in relation to the disciplinary case involving Graham Purnell. Graham was appealing against his dismissal. His appeal was unsuccessful and it was found that his acts and behaviours were unacceptable. I supported the decision to dismiss.
120. I conducted the appeal hearing in relation to the disciplinary case involving Jack Davey. I overturned the original decision and reduced the sanction to a final written warning. Jack resigned as he had found alternative employment.
121. I had no direct contact with Lauren Morris. I was aware that Lauren was still on probation and during her period of employment there were a high number of SIRs submitted relating to her relationship with detainees and a view that she was being conditioned to bring in contraband. A number of support meetings were provided but Lauren did not act on these appropriately. Lauren's employment was terminated during her probationary period.

122. I met with Nicola Kaminski during the first two weeks of my first appointment at Gatwick IRCs. Nicola wanted to progress from an ACO role to DCO and she had been unsuccessful. Nicola raised concerns with Ben Saunders. I met with Nicola to discuss her concerns and offer her support. On my second appointment at Gatwick IRCs, Nicola raised a grievance against DCM David Killick in relation to issues occurring in August 2015, February 2016, May 2016 and January 2017, Unfortunately, Nicola left G4S before the investigation was concluded and we wrote to Nicola to advise her of the outcome. Nicola resigned and I recall her initially submitting a Subject Access Request and then withdrawing it. I do not recall any further engagement, as this matter was managed by G4S legal colleagues.
123. I advised on the grievance investigation that was conducted into Duncan Partridge. I also advised on the report that was submitted to Jerry Petherick.
124. I conducted Stacie Dean's first grievance investigation. I did not attempt to persuade Stacie to withdraw her grievance and provided the evidence to challenge this allegation. In relation to Stacie's second grievance, I confirmed to the Investigating Officer, Stephen Cotter that Stacie had raised the issue with me in June 2016. I supported Stacie to conduct a fact finding exercise. I was advised by the Investigating Officer Stephen Cotter that on his return, Ben Saunders removed Stacie from this exercise and commissioned James Begg to conduct the investigation. I was advised by the Investigating Officer that Stacie raised this and further issues with Jerry Petherick as part of a wider grievance. Jerry Petherick confirmed that he had commissioned me to investigate Stacie's grievance. I was asked not to look into these matters, as the purpose of the call that I had with Jerry was for him to question me on issues raised as opposed to asking me to conduct the investigation. I provided notes of the conference call to the Investigating Officer as evidence that this was not raised with me and this is supported in his findings.

125. I am asked about Stacie's suggestion that we were "*asking for money for 80 staff*". This seemed to suggest that G4S were seeking additional funding without incurring cost, which is not correct. Stacie was not involved in developing the full commercial proposal. Her comment did not take the overall management of the Centre into account, which required the re-grading of ACOs to DCOS, resources to offer a regime to the increased population, and staffing for the Borders and PDA accommodation.
126. Nathan Ward had left G4S employment prior to my secondments to Gatwick IRCs. I had interacted with Nathan during my wider roles within the organisation. For example, I had been Gold Commander when Nathan was Silver Commander managing serious incidents. I was interviewed by Stephen Cotter as part of the investigation that was commissioned following Nathan's attendance at the Home Affairs Select Committee.
127. I met with Dave Killick and his Trade Union representative to hear his grievance appeal. I acknowledged that the period of his suspension was disproportionate, as the investigation process had taken far too long, albeit I was satisfied that the outcome provided by Ben Saunders had appropriately answered the points raised during the initial grievance hearing.
128. David Waldock - When I returned to Gatwick IRCs in September 2017, I became aware that David had raised issues with G4S via the Speakout process on how he was being managed by Steve Skitt, following a complaint made by Home Office colleagues relating to David's behaviour towards colleagues in the Visits area. David also wrote to the G4S CEO raising his concerns, stating that he felt he was being bullied, and believed there were some unhealthy relationships between some G4S staff and the Home Office staff. David raised concerns about; Ben Saunders, Steve Skitt, Lorraine Higgings (Director's PA), Gayatri Mehra (DCO - colleague in Visits area), Vanessa Smith (Home Office), Nas Chowdhury (DCO), Hafeez Akutar (DCO) and Steve Payne (DCO). This was investigated by Richard Allenby and Stephen

Cotter (G4S UK & I Risk and Assurance), who found that elements of his grievance were substantiated, advising that the whole situation had been managed clumsily by senior managers at Brook House and should have been managed via a formal investigation. The findings were shared with David, but he remained determined that Steve Skitt should be charged with gross misconduct. I met with David, and he advised that he was concerned that he felt that some issues raised in his original grievance hadn't been closed off. I engaged with Richard Allenby to resolve this issue, who provided David with a response. I also engaged with his Trade Union representative to engage with him, as David had been having public conversations with others, where he was allegedly making some derogatory comments about Steve and Gayatri. The Trade Union representative advised Richard Allenby that David wanted to draw a line under the whole thing (as Gayatri had now resigned). Following this engagement, I met with David, who advised that he was content with the response he had received from Richard. I provided Richard with an update following this engagement, advising him that I had also updated the newly appointed Director, Phil Wragg on the background and outcome.

129. Shayne Munroe - Shayne was dismissed following a disciplinary hearing conducted by Steve Skitt, relating to allegations of inappropriate conduct and language towards a detainee. Shayne appealed, and I conducted the appeal hearing. Shayne felt that she had been overly punished, as she had admitted shouting at the detainee who had also been shouting at her. I concluded the hearing by supporting the original decision, advising that the behaviour displayed was not acceptable.

130. An anonymous report was made to 'Speak Out' by an employee on 23 October 2017. I would have invited the employee to come and see me. The fact that the employee asked to see me, confirms that I did arrange for this. At the time, she stated that she wanted a discussion and I wasn't aware what this discussion was about, as the report was submitted anonymously. Staff were aware that I had an open door policy. My records show that I met with Tamzine and I informed HR of this meeting. I advised that Tamzine was upset in relation to the incident but was continuing to work and even offered to work more hours after the incident. HR and I agreed that we

would liaise with First Assist the counselling provider to offer Tamzine support. Tamzine seemed satisfied with the support she was offered and Michelle Fernandes (HR) confirmed that she would engage with Tamzine to arrange counselling with First Assist.

131. The security team were monitoring Bonnie Spark, as there was intelligence that raised concerns about potential inappropriate behaviour, relationships and potential trafficking. The monitoring included a security timeline but following close monitoring of her activities in the centre, there were no findings to corroborate the information shared in the initial SIRs.

132. The security team were monitoring Luke Instone-Brewer, as there was intelligence that raised concerns of potential trafficking (as referred to in the SIR). The monitoring included a staff search but nothing was discovered. My recollection is that Luke resigned whilst being monitored by the security team.

PANORAMA BROADCAST AND AFTERMATH

133. I was very shocked after viewing the Panorama documentary. I had previously worked at Brook House and visited frequently thereafter. I was aghast.

134. I cannot explain the mistreatment shown on Panorama. It needs to be recognised that the majority of incidents that were captured by Callum Tulley were reported and dealt with appropriately prior to them being aired on Panorama. There were however some incidents that were not reported to senior managers, such as the assault witnessed by Callum Tulley and other colleagues. They had a duty to report such incidents and were employed and trained to do so. These incidents, if reported, could have been dealt with immediately by managers and would have prevented recurring incidents.

135. Senior managers are responsible and accountable for all that occurs within Brook House. There is a dependency on staff employed as DCOs who have been trained in accordance with the agreed Home Office approved training to self-report incidents that they have been involved in. Senior managers are accountable, but can only manage what they are informed of. G4S had an effective Speakout/Whistleblowing process which was known by staff at Brook House as it had been used regularly. It was extremely disappointing that an individual chose not to make use of this process to report any wrongdoing.
136. Everyone working at Brook House was responsible in some way for what was seen on the Panorama documentary. There were systems and processes in place that relied upon staff reporting incidents such as the ones seen in Panorama. Whilst this would not have prevented the behaviour, it may have prevented as many recurrences.
137. Following the Panorama broadcast, G4S commissioned two investigation teams to investigate and review each allegation. I was tasked with investigating the management of operational processes. The initial findings formed the Action Plan and these actions were monitored by a joint Home Office and G4S Project Board.
138. The Action Plan was agreed between Home Office and G4S and was subject to regular scrutiny with an interest from key stakeholders such as the Immigration Minister, Brandon Lewis and his successor Caroline Nokes. All visitors paid close attention to the culture within the Centre and all provided feedback that they had no concerns relating to the culture at Brook House. We made visitors aware of the issues relating to staffing the centre particularly during the immediate months after Panorama.
139. October 2017 to February 2018 were difficult staffing periods, as so many staff had been dismissed and suspended. Many also resigned. The Action Plan ensured that managers spent more time on the units engaging with detainees and staff in order to rebuild relationships. The relationship between staff and detainees had been

negatively impacted following Panorama. The detainees' legal teams also became involved and were challenging the conditions and duration of detention.

140. To prevent further de-escalation in relationships and to encourage detainees to have a voice, G4S worked with external agencies such as University College of London and the Jill Dando Institute of Security and their team, Nick Ross and Professor Richard Wortley. Nick and Richard were experts in relationships to build a better culture. This encouraged G4S to adopt a candour approach to understand how such behaviours had been untraced by the previously tried and tested system.

141. The feedback following visits from Nick Ross and Professor Richard Wortley did provide some reassurance that the measures that had been introduced post-Panorama was having a positive impact.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated herein are true.

I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:

Signature

Dated:

17 February 2022