1	Thursday, 31 March 2022	1	Q. When you talk about a project team, was a team
2	(10.00 am)	2	especially set up in order to deal with the matter?
3	THE CHAIR: Good morning, thank you very much.	3	A. Absolutely. The immediate actions and the action plan
4	Mr Altman, good morning.	4	were compiled by a specific project team immediately
5	MR GORDON COLIN BROCKINGTON (sworn)	5	after Panorama, amongst other things, which we look
6	Examination by MR ALTMAN	6	immediate action on.
7	MR ALTMAN: Thank you, Mr Brockington, give us your full	7	Q. Who headed the team; do you remember now?
8	name, please.	8	A. I believe initial investigations were taken place by
9	A. Gordon Colin Brockington.	9	Lee Hanford and Pete Small, and then the project team
10	Q. Mr Brockington, tell us, please, first of all, what your	10	was put together to develop the actions required, in
11	position is with G4S?	11	collaboration with the Home Office and others, and then
12	A. My current role is Managing Director of Justice and the	12	the action plan was then put in place and deployed.
13	Government Chief Commercial Officer.	13	Q. Who did the project team report to on the board?
14	Q. And since how long have you been in that role?	14	A. I believe that would have been Jerry Petherick at the
15	A. Since November 9, 2020.	15	time.
16	Q. You said that is your current role. How long have you	16	Q. But he left, didn't he?
17	worked with G4S?	17	A. Jerry Petherick?
18	A. I joined G4S in March 2015, and I have held a number of	18	Q. Yes. Didn't he leave G4S?
19	roles in G4S throughout that time.	19	A. He did, but not at the time, not immediately
20	Q. So you were an employee of G4S during the period that we	20	post Panorama.
21	are interested in, April through to August 2017. Where	21	Q. We will look at a document in a moment and I will ask
22	were you at the time?	22	you about it then.
23	A. At the time, I was the regional business development	23	At your paragraph 77 of your first witness
24	director.	24	statement, of which you made two we will come to that
25	Q. Head office?	25	in a second and I will ask the chair if we can adduce
	Page 1		Page 3
1	A Hand office comment	1 1	both of the statements manuatively <ciso074041> and</ciso074041>
1	A. Head office, correct.	1	both of the statements, respectively <cjs0074041> and</cjs0074041>
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2 3	Q. Which is where?A. Victoria.	2 3	<cjs0074043>, and you will confirm you made two witness statements to the inquiry, Mr Brockington: the first on</cjs0074043>
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1	report clearly that came some time after.	1	Jerry Petherick and Paul Kempster, G4S will have
2	Q. Yes, that was the final report was November the	2	replaced the entire management chain who may be regarded
3	following year.	3	as having presided over the Panorama events."
4	A. Yes, absolutely. So we broadly accepted the	4	This document is dated January 2019.
5	52 recommendations; that is correct.	5	Jerry Petherick, had he remained in post to help with
6	Q. When you say "broadly", what does that mean?	6	the post-Panorama fallout or had he gone fairly quickly;
7	A. In essence, we accepted the 52 findings. When it came	7	do you remember?
8	out in the final report some time after, of course,	8	A. Jerry was in post, post Panorama, absolutely.
9	I believe late in December 2018.	9	Q. No, but how long did he remain?
10	Q. Yes. Let's look at a document. It is dated	10	A. I am not sure of his exact departure date, but he was
11	10 January 2019, and it is one which has been disclosed	11	certainly in post for a period after Panorama.
12	to you, so I hope you have had an opportunity to look at	12	Q. Yes. With all of this in mind, Mr Brockington, can we
13	it <hom005917>. Chair, it's tab 29 30 for you,</hom005917>	13	look at your witness statement at paragraph 62. Your
14	sorry.	14	first witness statement. Perhaps we ought to start at
15	This is a Home Office document; headed "Shaw	15	paragraph 61. Let's put this up on screen <cjs0074041>,</cjs0074041>
16	Programme Board", 10 January 2019. It is in relation to	16	page 15.
17	the Verita report on Brook House. At the bottom, it	17	Right at the top:
18	gives a summary of it. We don't need to go through	18	"The Verita report noted that they had"
19	that.	19	And you quote here:
20	Over the page, under "The Recommendations", it tells	20	" 'cause to question the quality and content of
21	us:	21	some of the training offered to new recruits on the ITC
22	"There are 52 recommendations under seven broad	22	and to staff as refresher training. We found that not
23	headings. G4S have recently shared their internal	23	all those delivering the ITC and refresher courses were
24	response (attached at annex A)"	24	appropriately qualified'."
25	Although it is not attached to the document in your	25	That is a reference to paragraph 1.38 in the Verita
	Page 5		Page 7
1	bundle:	1	report.
1 2	bundle: " indicating that they have accepted all of the	1 2	report. You say at 62:
2	" indicating that they have accepted all of the	2	You say at 62:
	" indicating that they have accepted all of the recommendations. They are showing 40 as having been	2 3	You say at 62: "The company does not accept this conclusion."
2 3	" indicating that they have accepted all of the	2 3 4	You say at 62: "The company does not accept this conclusion." Why not?
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2 3 4 5 6	" indicating that they have accepted all of the recommendations. They are showing 40 as having been completed, with the other 12 either in progress or under consideration. "At face value their response appears appropriate	2 3 4 5 6	You say at 62: "The company does not accept this conclusion." Why not? A. So in relation to training, I think it is quite important to lay out the training protocols we had in
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	" indicating that they have accepted all of the recommendations. They are showing 40 as having been completed, with the other 12 either in progress or under consideration. "At face value their response appears appropriate although lacking in dates for actions that remain outstanding."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	You say at 62: "The company does not accept this conclusion." Why not? A. So in relation to training, I think it is quite important to lay out the training protocols we had in place at the IRC. The ITC, the initial training course, the contents were actually quite helpfully laid out in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	" indicating that they have accepted all of the recommendations. They are showing 40 as having been completed, with the other 12 either in progress or under consideration. "At face value their response appears appropriate although lacking in dates for actions that remain outstanding." And there is some further text there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	You say at 62: "The company does not accept this conclusion." Why not? A. So in relation to training, I think it is quite important to lay out the training protocols we had in place at the IRC. The ITC, the initial training course, the contents were actually quite helpfully laid out in the Shaw report of 2018 – I believe it is section 6 –
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1	then, the company accepted recommendation 9 and we'll	1	relation to the Stephen Shaw report stated we needed to
2	come to it in a second recommendation 40.	2	act and we needed effective training for Adults at Risk
3	Recommendation 9:	3	and that was incorporated into the consolidated action
4	"The SMT and G4S managers should undertake regular	4	plan of 2016. And the HMIP inspection of 2019 showed
5	and systematic evaluation and quality assurance of the	5	improvements and that was also reflected in the Shaw
6	training provided at Gatwick IRCs to ensure that staff	6	report.
7	receive training of a consistently high standard; that	7	We worked closely with the West Sussex Social
8	it meets the operational needs of the IRCs, trains and	8	Services Vulnerable Adults Board and, working with them,
9	develops staff appropriately and promotes appropriate	9	we developed annual refresher training. So, again,
10	values."	10	I think it is a sign of a healthy business, where we
11	So when Verita had cause to question the quality and	11	consistently review, based on external feedback, and we
12	content of some of the training, there is	12	adapt and change in accordance with that feedback that
13	a recommendation that deals with it. In your witness	13	we have received. So, again, that is where I conclude
14	statement, you say the company doesn't accept the	14	this position in the in my statement.
15	conclusion but it accepted the recommendation.	15	Q. The trouble is, Mr Brockington, that doesn't really
16	How does that work?	16	answer the question. My question is and I know you
17	A. I think it is a sign of a healthy business that we would	17	are the mouthpiece for the company, and you are here to
18	consistently review our training requirements. I take	18	answer questions on behalf of the company and you
19	some comfort although we have our own governance in	19	weren't directly involved in these matters, as you make
20	place, I take some comfort that the HMIP inspection of	20	clear, at the time, but here is the company accepting
21	2019 showed we had improved training in place, and	21	recommendations in the Verita report, and I've pointed
22	I would also say the Stephen Shaw findings of 2016, one	22	out, so far, two in particular. The Home Office clearly
23	of the recommendations said that we should deliver	23	understood, by January 2019, that G4S had not only
24	mandatory Safer Training on an annual basis, and we	24	accepted all of the recommendations without
25	included that into our annual training.	25	qualification, but was actioning them, and here you are,
23	included that into our annual training.	23	quantication, but was actioning them, and here you are,
	Page 9		Page 11
1	We also deployed annual refresher training in areas	1	in 2022, saying the company doesn't accept the positions
2	We also deployed annual refresher training in areas	2	
3	such as C&R, first aid, respiratory protective equipment	3	which I have just put to you. I think people will struggle to understand, although we hear your answer,
4	and equality and diversity, to name a few examples, so my personal view is I see this as a sign of a healthy	4	that the company listens to feedback and it does all of
5	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	5	these things, all fine and terrific, Mr Brockington, but
	business, that we consistently review our training, and we deploy our training the initial training course,	6	there seems to be, in the passage I've read so far
6 7	1 .	7	and I will come to another in a moment a resistance
	as explained in the Shaw report and in full sight of the	8	by G4S to accept what it accepted back in November 2018
8	customer, working with the customer to make sure the	9	
9	training is fit for purpose and then we deploy ongoing		or afterwards, once it received the final Verita
10	training on an annual basis in certain areas as well, so	10	report do you understand what I am saying?
11 12	that is where I conclude my position in the statement.	11 12	A. I do understand what you are saying but I disagree with
	Q. Let's look on to recommendation 40 on page 37 because		G4S's approach around the resistance.
13	this deals with the second criticism, which you say the	13	The level of activity taken post Panorama — and we
14	company doesn't accept, recommendation 40:	14	have to look at this in terms of the timeframe. The
15	"The SMT in consultation with the local safeguarding	15	Panorama programme was viewed, by us all, and the
16	boards must ensure that all staff receive appropriate	16	immediate action plan was taken was put in place and
17	annual safeguarding refresher training."	17	deployed. Those actions took immediate effect, and
18	That was accepted without qualification by the	18	I can talk about those actions at some length, but
19	company. So, again, one struggles to understand why, at	19	we took a number of management interventions
20	paragraph 62, you say the company didn't accept the	20	immediately, including the bringing in a new interim
21	conclusion that Verita had arrived at. It is the same	21	director; including increasing DCOs from two to three on
22	point, isn't it?	22	the wings; including increasing the DCMs on the wings;
23	A. So, with specific reference to safeguarding, the	23	bolstering the SMT; and improving the fabric of the
24	Stephen Shaw report of 2016 stated clearly that we	24	establishment. So we took a number of specific
25	needed to act sorry, the 2016 HMIP inspection in	25	management interventions immediately as part of the
		l	D 42
	Page 10		Page 12

1	Panorama action plan.	1	described.
2	Those then — as part of — a further action of the	2	So there is a recognition in our action plan that
3	Panorama action plan was to work with Verita, so but	3	there was a requirement to bolster both the DCO and DCM
4	Verita took a period to compile their report and then	4	resource within the establishment. I think it is quite
5	put out their recommendations, so we have to look at	5	important to add that G4S took that action and cost for
6	this in the context of the timeline. A number of those	6	the period up to the extension. That then translated
7	actions were already completed by the time that Verita	7	that profile then translated into the two-year
8	issued their report, so that is why, come January '19,	8	extension, which we delivered, and that also translated
9	40 of the recommendations had already been completed and	9	into the new tender in 2020, which is now being
10	12 were outstanding, of which, I believe, broadly five	10	delivered by the new provider.
11	were dependent on work the Home Office and ourselves	11	Q. Serco?
12	needed to do together. So that is our position.	12	A. Indeed.
13	But I categorically say there is absolutely no	13	Q. Let's look at what you say at 99:
14	resistance from G4S, as a business, to deliver what was	14	"The company does not fully accept the conclusions
15	needed to be done.	15	for the reason given earlier. A key point is that just
16	Q. I am just wondering, Mr Brockington, why wouldn't it	16	because senior managers (SMT) were not visible all of
17	have been easier for you to say that in your witness	17	the time did not take away the fact they were present.
18	statement, rather than saying, "The company does not	18	Notwithstanding, as already explained, the company does
19	accept the conclusions"?	19	accept that senior managers could have been more
20	A. If that was an oversight so, that is my position,	20	visible, but it does not accept that any lack of
21	that is the evidence I am giving the inquiry today.	21	visibility or actions discouraged staff from reporting
22	Q. It is not the only one because, if we look at your first	22	concerns. The Verita report does not fully set out the
23	witness statement at 98, for example, if we can put that	23	reasons as to why it reached this view and the company
24	up, please, <cjs0074041> at page 22, you then say at the</cjs0074041>	24	was not involved in the investigation. Nor does it have
25	top, paragraph 97:	25	knowledge or access to the underlying source material in
	Page 13		Page 15
	1 490 15		1 490 13
1	"The Verita report also concluded: 'The lack of	1	1 4 1 4 1 11 4 14 6 4 11
		1	order to understand or consider the point further."
2	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed	2	Who commissioned the Verita report?
2 3	•		*
	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed	2	Who commissioned the Verita report?
3	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed approach to performance issues, and a lack of confidence	2 3	Who commissioned the Verita report? A. We commissioned the Verita report.
3 4	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed approach to performance issues, and a lack of confidence in the arrangements for reporting and dealing with	2 3 4	Who commissioned the Verita report? A. We commissioned the Verita report. Q. And if we look at their first recommendation, if we go
3 4 5	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed approach to performance issues, and a lack of confidence in the arrangements for reporting and dealing with concerns, has meant staff have tended to rely on each	2 3 4 5	Who commissioned the Verita report? A. We commissioned the Verita report. Q. And if we look at their first recommendation, if we go back to the report, please, Zaynab, <cjs005923> at</cjs005923>
3 4 5 6	visible, supportive management, managers' heavy-handed approach to performance issues, and a lack of confidence in the arrangements for reporting and dealing with concerns, has meant staff have tended to rely on each other for support and guidance. These management	2 3 4 5 6	Who commissioned the Verita report? A. We commissioned the Verita report. Q. And if we look at their first recommendation, if we go back to the report, please, Zaynab, <cjs005923> at page 34, right at the bottom:</cjs005923>
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1	So I what I am saying, through my response, is we	1	were not required because these had been completed? Can
2	took a number of actions to address the findings. And	2	you understand that?
3	we took that, as it said, as a matter of urgency. That	3	A. I can understand the question. What I come back to is
4	was one of the initial actions which we took as part of	4	it was an independent report, albeit commissioned by
5	our action plan post Panorama.	5	ourselves and there is a lot of activity that happened
6	Q. I was going to ask you, because the Verita report, which	6	between Panorama and Verita conducting their review,
7	was commissioned, let's not forget and I have	7	which took a period of time, compiling their report and
8	reminded you, and you have agreed by G4S, your	8	issuing their recommendations. So and, as
9	company. Here it is, in recommendation 1, in its final	9	a business, we got on and did a lot of the actions that
10	report of November 2018, saying "(To be completed as	10	we were required to do and which we put in place as part
11	a matter of urgency)". Doesn't that suggest to you that	11	of the initial Panorama action plan.
12	it hadn't been done?	12	So I think, you know, we have to look at this in
13	A. No.	13	terms of the timeline, we have to look at this in terms
14	Q. It doesn't?	14	of at a moment in time and, when the actions, or the
15	A. No. What I tried to explain earlier, perhaps clumsily,	15	recommendations, for the Verita report were subsequently
16	was there was a timeline of activity between Panorama	16	issued in December 2018, as I said and, clearly, the
17	and the issuing of the Verita recommendations.	17	Shaw Programme Board review of 10 January 2019 clearly
18	The Panorama was the episode was shown, there was	18	states that we had completed, and it was agreed we had
19	an action group, a project group, which was put in place	19	completed, 40 of the 52 recommendations.
20	to develop an action plan. The action plan was deployed	20	Q. But that was January 2019.
21	and a significant number of management interventions,	21	A. Which is after the so one month after the
22	working collaboratively with our customer, working	22	recommendation.
23	collaboratively with the Home Office at the time were	23	Q. I accept that, it was two or three months after, at
24	deployed. As one of those actions, the Verita report	24	least, the date of this report which is November 2018.
25	was commissioned and the findings were subsequently	25	Let's turn then to a different matter, please. Back
			70
	Page 17		Page 19
1	released in December 2018, some 14 or 15 months after	1	to your witness statement, please, at paragraph 6. We
2	the viewing of the programme. A number of those actions	2	don't need it put it up on screen. But do you agree,
3	had been completed and, as you saw in your previous	3	Mr Brockington, under the heading "The Panorama
4	document which you just showed, which was the Shaw	4	programme" it says:
5	Programme Board of 10 January, 40 of the 52	5	"I do not believe the company is in a position to
6	recommendations had been completed by that stage. So we	6	comment or speculate on what the cause or causes of
7	had done a lot of this stuff.	7	behaviour of the staff shown in the programme was or
8	Q. Did G4S have any input to this final report before it	8	were."
9	went out, before it was published; in other words, did	9	Then you go on to express the company's views, that
10	Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden send it to G4S to say, "Do	10	what they did was inconsistent with the company's
11			
11	you have any comments on the final draft before it is	11	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and
12	you have any comments on the final draft before it is published"?	11 12	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and
12	published"?	12	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and were not the behaviours expected of staff, which was to
	published"? A. My only understanding of any intervention which we had		values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and were not the behaviours expected of staff, which was to act at all times with integrity, professionalism and in
12 13 14	published"? A. My only understanding of any intervention which we had was, I believe there was a slight redaction, due to	12 13 14	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and were not the behaviours expected of staff, which was to act at all times with integrity, professionalism and in accordance with trained and accepted practices.
12 13 14 15	published"? A. My only understanding of any intervention which we had was, I believe there was a slight redaction, due to GDPR, before G4S agreed to publish this document, and	12 13 14 15	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and were not the behaviours expected of staff, which was to act at all times with integrity, professionalism and in accordance with trained and accepted practices. You say:
12 13 14 15 16	published"? A. My only understanding of any intervention which we had was, I believe there was a slight redaction, due to GDPR, before G4S agreed to publish this document, and I have to say we agreed to publish in full, subject to	12 13 14	values, that the behaviours had never been condoned and were not the behaviours expected of staff, which was to act at all times with integrity, professionalism and in accordance with trained and accepted practices. You say: "Given that I have no personal knowledge as to any
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1 detainess between April and August 2017." 2 That is a speculation which you were not prepared to a speculate about, and I ample wondering why you have a florded yourself the Inxury of doing so at a paragraph 34, having said that you were not prepared to? 5 a paragraph 34, having said that you were not prepared to? 6 A. So I think I would like to just go back to your previous? 7 comments, in terms of the Panorama programme, and I want to go slightly further than what I put in the initial statement, in terms of, what we witnessed in the 10 Panorama programme and the actions of an soluted number of individuals was abhorrent. There was absolutely no place for that in society in general, let alone working 13 for GAS, so I do want to go a little bif further than 14 I said in my statement. 15 However, coming to your second point, I don't 15 helive there is a direct correlation between the 17 turnover of staff – profit, I think you stated – and 1 maintain "wholly" – inappropriately. Individuals at the individuals acting wholly – 18 and I maintain "wholly" – inappropriately. Individuals acting wholly – 18 the ITC programme, which I explained earlier is 20 helpfully laid out in the Shaw report, at section 6, the 24 detail of which is very visible, and we work 25 collaboratively with the Home Office on the contents of 29 Page 21 1 that. That then allows — through the fit and proper persons process, and the initial training, allows the individuals to do what they do and these individuals chose to act in the way that 4 the yold, so I see no correlation between staff turnover a and profit. 4 officers. 5 So I think we train the individuals to do what they do and these individuals chose to act in the way that 16 page 21 The company accepts that staffing levels and turnover at Brook House was an issue during 11 the relevant period. The reasons for that were 13 multi-factorial, and whilst it is accepted that they had 13 multi-factorial, and whilst it is accepted that they had 15 is multi-factorial, and whilst it is accepted t
3 A. Agreed. 4 afforded yourself the luxury of doing so at 5 paragraph 34, having said that you were not prepared to? 5 A. So I think I would like to just go back to your previous 6 A. So I think I would like to just go back to your previous 7 comments, in terms of the Panorama programme, and I want 8 to go slightly further than what I put in the initial 9 statement, in terms of, what we witnessed in the 10 Panorama programme and the actions of an isolated number 11 of individuals was abborrent. There was absolutely no 12 place for that in society in general, let alone working 13 for C4S, so I do want to go a little bit further than 14 I said in my statement. 15 However, coming to your second point, I don't 16 believe there is a direct correlation between the 17 turnover of staff — profit, I think you stated — and 18 the isolated incidents of individuals acting wholly — 18 and I maintain "wholly" — inappropriately. Individuals 20 are trained. The frontline staff, all the frontline 21 sheffully laid out in the Shaw report, at section 6, the 22 the ITC programme, which I explained earlier is 23 heffully laid out in the Shaw report, at section 6, the 24 detail of which is very visible, and we work 25 collaboratively with the Home Office on the contents of 26 Di think we train the individuals to do what they 27 do and these individuals chose to act in the way that 28 they did, so I see no correlation between staff turnover 29 persons process, and the initial training, allows the 3 individuals to get a certification and become frontline 4 officers. 5 So I think we train the individuals to do what they 4 do and these individuals chose to act in the way that 5 they did, so I see no correlation between staff turnover 5 and profit. 6 Page 21 1 that. That then allows — through the fit and proper 2 persons process, and the initial training, allows the 3 individuals to get a certification and become frontline 4 officers. 5 So I think we train the individuals to do what they 5 do and these individuals chose to act in the w
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the relevant period. The reasons for that were 12 the turnover, retention and recruitment. All of those
13 multi-factorial, and whilst it is accepted that they had 13 issues were part of the melting pot, to use your word
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an adverse impact on the centre and the regime, those 14 "multifactors", which you cannot divorce from the abuse
are entirely separate and unrelated when it comes to the 15 of those detainees within Brook House.
16 question of abuses." 16 Now, why didn't you know that?
17 How do you know that? 17 A. I hadn't read the report so
18 A. I have clearly done spoken to a lot of colleagues in 18 Q. You should have done, shouldn't you, Mr Brockington?
preparation for this hearing. I think we recognise 19 A. We work very closely with academia across our broader
and I say in my statement we are very clear that the 20 estates. Perhaps I should have read the report, and
21 design of the establishment in relation to activities, 21 I haven't read the report.
you know, it wasn't designed for a significant amount of 22 Q. Perhaps no, clearly not.
23 activities, and I think the turnover – this is an area 23 When you watched part of her evidence watched or
24 where, you know, I am not an expert, but I would say 24 read?
25 that, you know, certain activities – the whole process 25 A. I watched a small part.
Page 22 Page 24
6 (Pages 21 to 24)

1	Q. A small part.	1	A. Yes.
2	So she is one, as I say, of three experts who has	2	Q. Jerry Petherick, who was at Brook House, presumably,
3	told us that, really, just the whole environment, the	3	from time to time?
4	whole effect and impact, not only on the detainees but	4	A. He was from time to time. I think in his evidence he
5	staff, caused or attributed to what we are all here for	5	said that he was there he tried to get to all of his
6	now are you prepared to accept that?	6	sites monthly.
7	A. Sorry, can I expand	7	Q. It wasn't out of sight of other detainees. It wasn't
8	Q. Are you prepared to accept her evidence?	8	out of sight of other officers, because it was often
9	A. What I am what I say in my report is I don't believe	9	committed in front of other officers, DCOs and DCMs, and
10	there is a direct correlation between an isolated	10	it wasn't out of sight of Callum Tulley, because he was
11	instance of abhorrent abuse and the overarching	11	able to record it all from 24 April 2017 until he left
12	environment.	12	in early July.
13	Q. She is an expert and says that there is; you are not	13	What do you mean by "the small number of individuals
14	an expert, and you say there is not. Who do you think	14	concerned"? What do you regard as a small number of
15	the inquiry should listen to?	15	individuals?
16	A. That is for the inquiry to decide.	16	A. We witnessed on the Panorama programme a number of
17	My view is these were isolated incidents of dreadful	17	individuals who conducted themselves wholly
18	behaviour that is contrary to the training which G4S	18	inappropriately. I put that in the context of the many,
19	provided. It is contrary to the certification	19	many, many thousands of hours that colleagues within my
20	obligations under to the Secretary of State, in order	20	business deliver. We are a private you have heard
21	for their certification, so I believe they are.	21	from previous individuals giving evidence to the
22	My personal view is I don't believe there is	22	inquiry, we are a private sector company delivering
23	a correlation. I think that these isolated incidents of	23	public services. We deliver many, many, many thousands
24	abuse are are isolated.	24	of hours of public service to care for those individuals
25	Q. If we go back to your paragraph 34, let's, Zaynab, put	25	in our case.
	Page 25		Page 27
1	it back up on screen, <cjs0074041> page 9.</cjs0074041>	,	Comban I to the shoot of any all annuals and I must be the
	11 Dack up on scieen, \CJS00/4041/ bage 9.	1 1	So when I talk about a small number, I but it in the
		1 2	So when I talk about a small number, I put it in the context of, you know, thousands of colleagues on
2	It is the second part of that paragraph:	2	context of, you know, thousands of colleagues on
2	It is the second part of that paragraph: "The company's view is regardless of the number of		context of, you know, thousands of colleagues on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis, delivering care to
2 3	It is the second part of that paragraph: "The company's view is regardless of the number of staff on site the small number of individuals concerned	2 3	context of, you know, thousands of colleagues on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis, delivering care to those in our care. That is what I mean. We witnessed
2 3 4	It is the second part of that paragraph: "The company's view is regardless of the number of staff on site the small number of individuals concerned chose to conduct themselves as they did when they	2 3 4	context of, you know, thousands of colleagues on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis, delivering care to those in our care. That is what I mean. We witnessed a handful of people delivering abhorrent activities.
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1	A. I have.	1	going to provide the sort of information that was
2	Q. How many?	2	internally available to SMT members as early as 2014.
3	A. I couldn't say.	3	You are talking about 2019, you refer back to the
4	Q. No. You see, just if one reads that paragraph, the	4	relevant report that covers the 2016 period, but we are
5	company's view is:	5	not really interested in that, Mr Brockington. What we
6	" regardless of the number of staff on site the	6	are interested in is what G4S knew, and that is why you
7	small number of individuals concerned chose to conduct	7	are here.
8	themselves as they did when they thought they were	8	Have you heard the name Stacie Dean?
9	effectively acting 'out of sight'. If they were that	9	A. I have.
10	way inclined, they would likely have behaved in such	10	Q. So you will know that Stacie Dean in fact, together
11	circumstances irrespective as to the overall staffing	11	with Michelle Brown, but Stacie Dean in particular
12	profile or numbers."	12	first complained of the mistreatment of detainees some
13	It just sounds a little trivialising,	13	time before October 2014, and you should know that,
14	Mr Brockington. Presumably you don't mean that?	14	because of that, Jerry Petherick became involved
15	A. I couldn't I wholly disagree that that is	15	eventually. I am not going to go through the whole
16	trivialising this issue. This is a material issue and	16	history, some of it has been ventilated during the
17	we have taken it, as an organisation, incredibly	17	course of the inquiry evidence, but she made a witness
18	seriously.	18	statement to the inquiry fairly recently. If we can put
19	The immediate actions that we took post Panorama,	19	it up on screen, Zaynab, please, <inq000172> at page 2.</inq000172>
20	working with Sussex and West Sussex Police, working with	20	Tab 31, chair:
21	the Home Office, working with the IMB, developing the	21	"I have been asked whether I raised concern about
22	action plan, delivering a number of management actions	22	the treatment of detainees earlier than October 2014.
23 24	immediately and further actions ongoing, I don't, for	23	I can't recall when I first raised concern about the
25	one minute, see how you can conclude that we have taken	24 25	treatment of detainees formally. I know I raised the
23	it trivially. This is an incredibly important issue for	23	matter (along with the culture of staff bullying) in
	Page 29		Page 31
1	us, as an organisation, and we have taken it very	1	various meetings, as did other members of the SMT.
2	seriously indeed.	2	I have been asked whether I have any further in relation
3	Q. I mean the words "out of sight" are intended to suggest	3	to the complaint I made in 2015 and recall that
4	that the company, the senior management, never knew what	4	regarding DCOs Instone-Brewer and Fagbo, I raised
5	was going on; is that the intention behind the wording?	5	concern that it was a well discussed issue (at senior
6	A. That is not the intention behind the wording. I do	6	meetings) that assurances had been given that they would
7	agree with you that the senior management team were not	7	not be allowed to work together on the same wing and
8	sighted on these issues, otherwise, they would have	8	that they were bullying detainees, yet whenever I went
9	acted accordingly.	9	to Brook House, they were always rostered together.
10	Q. They had been going on since at least 2014. I know you	10	Other than that, I have nothing further to raise on that
11	tell us you didn't join the company until 2015, and you	11	point."
12	haven't been in the position you are in	12	At paragraph 8 on the next page she says:
13	before November 2020, but were you aware that the	13	"Both myself and Ms Brown"
14	mistreatment of detainees had been notified to the SMT	14	If we perhaps start at the beginning:
15	as early as 2014? Were you aware of that?	15	"I have been asked to respond to the point that
16	A. I wasn't aware of that. What I would say is, in terms	16	Ms Brown raised concern in a SMT meeting at which I was
17	of sort of constant failings, the HMIP inspection of	17	present. I do recall regularly that Ms Brown was one of
18	2019 did state that they had no evidence to suggest that	18	the SMT members who repeatedly raised concern about
19	the 2016 inspection that they had missed any issues	19	staff treatment of detainees. Both myself and Ms Brown
20	which were raised in Panorama.	20	were concerned that some members of staff, as well as
21	So whilst I don't take sole acceptance from HMIP,	21	detainees, were being regularly subjected to bullying
22 23	what I do take is a degree of assurance from	22 23	behaviour from some staff. The response of the SMT was
23	an independent inspection such as HMIP. Q. Yes, but, Mr Brockington, we all know that	23	consistently uninterested. I do not recall specific dates or times, but do remember the general approach to
25	an unannounced inspection of HMIP is not necessarily	25	any of us raising concern or complaint would be fairly
23	and analysis of the state of th	23	any or as raising concern of complaint would be fairly
	Page 30		Page 32

1	generic and non-committal and the lack of any action was	1	conclusion on any viewing of Panorama and the wider
2	frustrating. At times I think the view from some SMT	2	footage that has been provided by the BBC on the way
3	members was that the situation was amusing, so it was	3	staff treated detainees. The fact that officers such as
4	far from taken seriously."	4	DCO Instone-Brewer and DCO Fagbo, two officers accused
5	We know that she wrote an email dated	5	not just of mistreating detainees but also dealing
6	25 October 2015, both to Steve Skitt, who was the deputy	6	spice, were still in place by the relevant period is
7	director, and Ben Saunders, who was the centre director	7	damning. Stacie Dean had raised concerns about these
8	making similar complaints. Her complaints, in	8	officers to Ben Saunders and Stephen Skitt as early as
9	particular about mistreatment in relation to	9	2015."
10	Instone-Brewer and Fagbo, was goading and antagonising	10	That is the email I referred to a moment or two ago.
11	detainees.	11	Do you agree it is damning, Mr Brockington?
12	So it starts as early as around 2014, and certainly,	12	A. I cannot conclude either way. I have nothing more to
13	by 2015, Jerry Petherick was involved. So it is hard to	13	add to in relation to
14	say that the company didn't know or individuals higher	14	Q. Why not? You are the face of G4S. Why have you got
15	up the ladder didn't know; don't you agree? I mean,	15	nothing more to add?
16	this is a precursor to what we see in 2017.	16	A. I have no corporate memory or knowledge of these
17	A. I really cannot comment further on these, and I am	17	specific issues, so it would be inappropriate for me to
18	afraid I have nothing further to add on the evidence	18	add anything further.
19	which you have just put in front of me.	19	Q. Do you need corporate memory to apologise, for example,
20	Q. If we go to another statement, Nathan Ward that's	20	to say this should never have happened, to say the
21	a name that will be familiar to you, I suspect,	21	company knew that there were issues as long ago as
22	Mr Brockington?	22	2014/2015 and there is a causative link?
23	A. I don't know Nathan, but I do know the name.	23	A. In relation to the specific Panorama programme, of
24	Q. <dl0000154>, please, at page 2, and this is his second</dl0000154>	24	course, I am exceptionally sorry. I thought I was
25	statement made to the inquiry. At paragraph 5, he	25	pretty clear in my view a few moments ago when I said
	Page 33		Page 35
1	begins that paragraph by saying:	1	that the actions which we witnessed in Panorama were,
2	"Having reviewed the investigation"	2	quite frankly, disgusting. And as an organisation, and
3	Are you aware of the Cotter investigation?	3	as an individual managing director, I take full
4	A. I know of its existence. I nothing of its detail.		
-		1 4	responsibility for the actions of my business. I am
5		4 5	responsibility for the actions of my business. I am exceptionally sorry that those actions took place.
5 6	Q. Stephen Cotter, was asked to investigate any number of	5	exceptionally sorry that those actions took place.
6	Q. Stephen Cotter, was asked to investigate any number of issues and grievances which arose between members of	5 6	exceptionally sorry that those actions took place. But on the specifics of the emails and the detail of
6 7	Q. Stephen Cotter, was asked to investigate any number of issues and grievances which arose between members of staff, following Nathan Ward's not only his exit	5 6 7	exceptionally sorry that those actions took place. But on the specifics of the emails and the detail of which you have just put in front of me, I don't have
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1	You accept that, don't you?	1	in the course of their detainee survey. In particular,
2	A. No, I I responded to your question that I can't	2	on page 76, we have, under section 7, towards the
3	conclude either way.	3	bottom, beginning with question 43:
4	Q. Or you are just not prepared to, Mr Brockington?	4	"Do you have a member of staff at the centre you can
5	A. No, as I said, I can't conclude either way.	5	turn to for help if you have a problem?", and so on.
6	Q. Then at 72, at the top of the next page:	6	There are four questions in that vein, concluding at
7	"The company is not aware of any evidence that	7	question 46, at the top of the next page. And then
8	suggests that senior managers ought to have been aware	8	a new section, "Section 8: Safety":
9	of such mistreatment."	9	"Do you feel unsafe in this centre?"
10	Did you really mean that?	10	Yes, 37 per cent; no, 63 per cent.
11	A. I would say that if senior managers were made aware of	11	48:
12	mistreatment, they would have acted appropriately.	12	"Has another detainee or group of detainees
13	I can certainly refer to the business which I run today,	13	victimised, insulted or assaulted you here? "
14	and I would fully expect that, if any evidence of any	14	Yes, 71 per cent; no, 79 per cent.
15	suggestions of mistreatment occurred within the	15	Question 49, further questions about victimisation
16	establishments which I run, we would absolutely take	16	by detainees or groups of detainees.
17	immediate action to investigate.	17	But let's look at question 50:
18	Q. Well, let's look at what the company did know. You have	18	"Has a member of staff or group of staff victimised
19	referred to the HMIP report for signed off by	19	(['victimised' here meaning] insulted or assaulted) you
20	Peter Clarke in January 2017 but for the inspection	20	here?"
21	window of 31 October to 11 November 2016. <cjs000761>,</cjs000761>	21	Yes, 18 per cent; no, 82 per cent.
22	please, page 1 to begin with.	22	51:
23	This is one of the reports you referred to,	23	"If you have felt victimised by a member of
24	Mr Brockington, isn't it?	24	staff/group of staff, what did the incident(s)
25	If we then go to page 20, were you aware that the	25	involve?
	Page 37		Page 39
	IDATE	1	"Discoinal above their a his biological an accounted)
1	HMIP conducted a detainee survey?		"Physical abuse (being hit, kicked or assaulted),
3	A. I was aware, yes.	2 3	3 per cent." 52:
4	Q. Yes. If we look at 1.13 on page 20: "In our survey, 37 per cent of detainees reported	4	"If you have been victimised by detainees or staff,
5	feeling unsafe, 21 per cent of detainees reported	5	did you report it?"
6	other detainees and 18 per cent by staff. The Safer	6	Yes, 12 per cent.
7	Community team had provided information in different	7	Skating over 53, question 54:
8	languages to detainees about reporting concerns. Focus	8	"Have you ever felt threatened or intimidated by
9	groups had been held to discuss victimisation and	9	a member of staff in here?"
10	violence."	10	Yes, 12 per cent.
11	Then if we go to page 69, at the top, it is:	11	Now, presumably, senior managers not just at SMT
12	"Appendix IV: Summary of detainee survey responses"	12	level, but at board level, would be privy to the
13	and, at the foot of the page, under the heading "Survey	13	contents of a report like this?
14	response":	14	A. I would absolutely agree. I can't speak for my
15	"At the time of the survey on 31 October 2016, the	15	colleagues, but what I would say, in the business and
16	detainee population of Brook House was 392. Using the	16	the estate which I run, when we have an HMIP inspection,
17	[methodology they set out], questionnaires were	17	I would certainly read the contents of an HMIP
18	distributed to a sample of 209 detainees.	18	inspection.
19	"We received a total of 159 completed	19	Q. Yes. Well, this one, as I have told you, was signed off
20	questionnaires, a response rate of 76 per cent. This	20	by Peter Clarke, the chief inspector, in January 2017,
21	included one questionnaire completed via interview.	21	so a matter of three months before the commencement of
22	Nine respondents refused to complete a questionnaire and	22	the relevant period, for the purposes of this inquiry.
23	41 questionnaires were not returned."	23	Why doesn't a survey like this ring alarm bells,
24	Can we go on, please, to page 76. Here you will see	24	because here it is, writ large, that there are detainees
25	the questions and the responses which the HMIP received	25	who were prepared to take part in this survey and
	Page 38		Page 40

1	prepared to tell HMIP that they were being insulted or	1 over	rarching assessment of our establishment was
2	assaulted, in particular physically abused, being hit,		sonably good.
3	kicked or assaulted, and it had been reported.		ssume you will agree, Mr Brockington, that these
4	You cannot tell this inquiry, Mr Brockington, that	_	res are unacceptable?
5	the company didn't know that there were problems, can	5 A. I w	yould agree that we when we review these, we need
6	you?		ake action.
7	A. What I would say is the findings of Peter Clarke and his	7 A	ny form of any form of violence that is of staff
8	inspection team stated very clearly that the 2016	8 agai	inst detainee or prisoner is wholly that falls
9	report, issued in 2017, the establishment was allocated	9 outs	side of the formal training and process is wholly
10	a reasonably good overall assessment for the four and	10 una	cceptable.
11	healthy establishment tests.	11 Q. Yo	u made that clear, that under your tenure, if you
12	So whilst I agree there are specifics in there which	12 hear	d of that sort of thing happening, you would deal
13	would have formed part of the action plan, the overall	13 with	it. You said that earlier.
14	assessment was reasonably good.	14 A. I w	yould and I stand by that.
15	I would also go back to, and refer you to, the 2019	15 Q. Wh	nat was done about this? Forget HMIP and forget, if
16	report, which is clearly after the second inspection,	16 I ma	y say so, seeking refuge in the fact that
17	where HMIP also stated that there was no evidence to	17 Peter	er Clarke found the establishment "reasonably good",
18	suggest in the 2016 inspection that any that they had	18 what	t I want to know is what was done about even
19	missed any issues relating to what was subsequently seen	19 unac	cceptable figures of physical abuse of detainees
20	in the Panorama.	20 whice	ch was reported, what was done about it at the time?
21	Q. So the company takes comfort from two words, "Reasonably	21 A. I aı	m afraid I wasn't privy to the specifics at the time,
22	good" but, what, is prepared to excuse as acceptable the	22 so I	can't comment further on that specific question.
23	physical abuse even of 3 per cent of the detainee	23 Q. Wh	nat I am going to do, Mr Brockington, is to invite you,
24	population by staff?	24 after	r you have completed your evidence, to find out and
25	A. Sorry, that is not what I said.	25 prov	ride, if you would, a further statement to the
	Page 41		Page 43
	1 agc 71		1 age 43
1	Q. What are you saying, Mr Brockington, because it seems to	1 inqui	ry, please, telling us exactly what G4S did about
2	me, and it may seem to others, that you are sidestepping	2 the in	nformation in this detainee survey from 2017.
3	the issue. You are relying on what Peter Clarke said or	3 A. We	would be delighted to do that.
4	what HMIP said overall about the health of the	4 Q. Goir	ng back to your witness statement in May, please, at
5	establishment, but you are overlooking this detainee	5 parag	graph 21, you say, "In terms of lessons learned"
6	survey.	•	ragraph 21 on page 5, Zaynab:
7	A. That is not the case.		n terms of lessons learned, the company would
8	When we receive I can only talk for today, but	-	ot that the management team in place at the time
9	when we receive an HMIP inspection final report, we	•	t a significant amount of their time dealing with
10	would review it in detail, and that forms the basis of		rwork, leaving insufficient time to be proactive and
11	an overarching action plan to constantly improve our		ut and about' in the centre. This changed
12	establishments, because that is what we do.		wing the Panorama programme and the implementation
13	We strive to improve constantly. This would have		e Project Board Action Plan."
14	formed part of our thinking, undoubtedly at the time, so		22, you say:
15	I am not sidestepping it based on two words. What I am		Managers were not close enough to the day-to-day
16	actually saying is we hold HMIP inspections very, very		gs on, which led to individuals taking too much
17	seriously. They are absolute experts in their field,		tion from DCMs."
18	who have a full appreciation of both the custodial and		re you accepting, so that we are clear, that there
19	the detained estate, who periodically come and assess us		failures at senior management level at the time?
20	overall.		at I am saying is there was after Panorama, when we
21	So we do take what they say incredibly seriously.		ght in an interim an experienced interim director
22	We also take what the detainees say incredibly		the establishment, it was clear that there was
23	seriously. And this would form part of our overarching		connect between the SMT and the DCMs on site.
24	action plan. But I go back to the point that, whilst we		nk I mentioned earlier, but I will reiterate, as
25	and HMIP will have looked at this data very closely, the	25 part	of the action plan, under the leadership of the new
	Page 42		Page 44

1	interim director, we bolstered the SMT, we increased the	1	A. I think there was just a general feeling, is my
2	number of DCMs and we deployed training to the DCMs	2	understanding from the work that I have done and talking
3	through engagement with Corndell to ensure they had the	3	to colleagues. My understanding there was, as I say,
4	required training to deliver their role.	4	a disconnect between DCMs and the SMT on site and that
5	So we would accept, and I say in my statement, that	5	was picked up by the staff on site.
6	there was a disconnect between the SMT and the frontline	6	Q. Who are the colleagues that you spoke to in order to
7	management.	7	produce these words in this paragraph of this statement?
8	Q. So coming back to my original question, are you prepared	8	Who did you speak to? Who was your information from?
9	to accept that there were failures at senior management	9	A. I have spoken to a number of people within the
10	level at the time?	10	organisation.
11	A. What I am saying is there was a disconnect between the	11	Q. People who were at Brook House at the time?
12	two.	12	A. People who had an understanding of Brook House.
13	Q. Why won't you agree with me, Mr Brockington? Why are	13	Q. People who were at Brook House at the time?
14	you not prepared to agree with the word "failure"?	14	A. It depends which period you are talking about.
15	A. What I am saying is the the senior management team	15	Q. Well, the time is the relevant period for the purposes
16	were clearly focused in one area. There was as	16	of this inquiry.
17	I said previously, there was a clearly a disconnect	17	A. I have certainly spoken to the interim director who we
18	which was highlighted by the new interim director and we	18	had put in place.
19	took approach actions to close that gap.	19	Q. Who else?
20	Q. So are you saying it wasn't a failure?	20	A. The functional leads that were in post, not at
21	A. I am saying I am saying there was clearly a gap	21	Brook House but functional leads that have
22	between the frontline management and the senior	22	a recollection of that, the relevant period.
23	management team.	23	Q. You go on in that paragraph to say:
24	Q. So it is a "disconnect", it is a "gap", but the word	24	"This was limited to the staff members identified in
25	"failure" you cannot bring to say; is that it	25	the programme where processes and procedures were not
	Page 45		Page 47
		\vdash	
1	Mr Brockington? You are not prepared to characterise it	1	followed, namely, around the use of force, completing
2	as a failure?	2	paperwork correctly, and the treating of detainees with
3	A. I stand by what I have just said.	3	dignity and respect."
4	Q. You go on to say at paragraph 22:	4	So is it your suggestion that somehow Callum Tulley,
5	"There was a perception that this environment bred	5	on behalf of the BBC, conveniently managed to capture
6	bad habits and common practices developed which were not	6	the entirety of the bad practices and abuse at
7	acceptable."	7	Brook House at the time and that there was nothing more
8	Whose perception did you have in mind?	8	to see here; is that what you are trying to say here?
9	A. That would be the perception of the frontline staff.	9	It is limited to?
10	Q. By which you mean?	10	A. What I am saying is it is our understanding that these
11	A. DCOs.	11	were isolated incidents, and I take I make that
12	Q. So the DCOs perceived that the environment "bred bad	12	conclusion based on information which we have which
13	habits and common practices developed which were not	13	we have internally but also information which was
14	acceptable"? How did they breed bad habits? How did	14	provided to the organisation from the IMB and the
15	the DCOs breed bad habits, or are you saying the senior	15	Home Office, et cetera, so I think, you know, we are not
16	management bred bad habits?	16	running this establishment in isolation. There are
17	A. I am afraid I would have no sight of what was happening	17	a number of third parties on site, so we are, you
18	on site at that time.	18	know of which I have no recollection of, you know,
19	Q. Mr Brockington, these are your words. They are not my	19	those parties raising these issues.
20	words. I am just reading back to you what you were	20	So, you know, I think it is important to stress that
21	prepared to sign off as a statement of truth.	21	the centre did have a number of organisations on site,
22	So help us, why did you say this? What was the	22	both the IMB as I said, the IMB, the Home Office,
23	perception that the environment bred bad habits? That	23	amongst others.
24	is what I want to know. These are your words, what did	24 25	Q. So does G4S accept, or not accept, that these practices
25	you mean?	23	were ingrained and systemic?
_	Page 46	L	Page 48
			12 (Pages 45 to 48)

1	A. I do not accept that they were ingrained and systemic.	1	the establishments. The IRCs had a very different
2	Q. So, from your perspective, on behalf of the company,	2	complaints process to that of the custody estate,
3	what we are seeing are isolated instances of the abuse	3	whereas the Home Office run a complaints process for the
4	of detainees, all, as it happens, captured by	4	detainees.
5	Callum Tulley, but, for the rest, the inquiry shouldn't	5	In terms of our own complaints process and
6	be concerned that that kind of abuse, of that type, was	6	whistleblowing, we need to be very clear that, you know,
7	going on outside that period; is that what we should	7	we believe there was a robust process in place for staff
8	understand from your evidence?	8	to make complaints, but I also say in my personal
9	A. What I am saying is we believed these to be isolated	9	statement, which you may or may not come on to, that, in
10	incidents and we take a view, and that from our	10	this instance, it didn't work. The individuals who we
11	experience, from Home Office, IMB, other authorities, so	11	witnessed on the Panorama programme chose not to use
12	we believe that they were isolated incidents. I would	12	a whistleblowing process, which goes against the
13	agree with your comment in specific relation to the	13	training, which we trained through the ITC programme,
14	isolatedness.	14	and it also goes against their obligation to the
15	Q. You don't want to be agreeing with me, Mr Brockington,	15	Secretary of State under their certification.
16	because all I am doing is putting questions to you.	16	So it didn't work. We took a number of actions
17	Don't take from anything that I say that I am vocalising	17	it didn't work because they chose not to use it. We
18	an opinion.	18	took a number of actions post Panorama to reinforce the
19	Back to your statement at page 17, paragraph 73, you	19	whistleblowing process.
20	talk about the complaints system, and you say:	20	The whistleblowing process, just to be clear, was
21	"In light of the fact that the significant incidents	21	a process which G4S established, working very closely
22	broadcast by Panorama were not reported to senior	22	with Public Concern at Work, who were are deemed to
23	management by detainees or staff at the time, the	23	be experts in this field and, you know, advised BEIS(?),
24	company has been asked to comment on whether the	24	as an example, on whistleblowing processes, so we felt
25	complaints system and/or whistleblowing policy properly	25	this was a global process which was designed by experts
	D 40		D 51
	Page 49		Page 51
1	accounted for potential barriers to disclosure. It is	1	and implemented across our business. After Panorama, we
2	also the case that none of the matters appear to have	2	promoted it, we promoted it heavily, as part of our
3	been reported by any of the other multiple organisations	3	action plan, but, of course, these things are only
4	that were in regular contact with detainees (certainly	4	only work if people choose to use them. Why people
5	not in a way that would have permitted G4S to take	5	chose not to use them, which is contrary to their
6	action on the report). It is not entirely clear why	6	training, and is contrary to their obligations to
7	this is. It may however be a manifestation of a general	7	Secretary of State under their certification, is
8	lack of trust within the detained population towards	8	I can't conclude as to why that happened.
9	agencies of the state."	9	Q. So you cannot account for the fact that it wasn't being
10	At 74:	10	used to capture and investigate the serious abuses that
11	"The complaints system [which you explain further	11	happened at Brook House during the period that we are
12	below] but detainees had free and unfettered access	12	concerned with?
13	to the complaints system. The company believes that the	13	A. What I am saying is I can't conclude why the individuals
14	system itself was robust and transparent. The	14	who we witnessed on the Panorama programme chose not to
15	complaints system was however determined by the HO."	15	use a whistleblowing process, which is in contra to
16	In other words, the Home Office.	16	their training and contra to their obligation to the
17	Does the company, through you, Mr Brockington, take	17	Secretary of State under their certification.
18	comfort from the fact that, at least during the relevant	18	Q. I will come back to a couple of reasons in a moment.
19	period, there were no official reports of mistreatment?	19	Before we break, there is one further document I would
20	Is that what we are to understand from what you say,	20	like to show you. <hom0331707>, please. This,</hom0331707>
21	"We, the company, take comfort, our whistleblowing	21	Mr Brockington, is an internal memorandum within the
22	processes were robust, our complaints system was robust	22	Home Office. It is dated 22 March. It should be 2018.
23	and, therefore, the absence of complaints means there is	23	The name to whom it is sent is redacted, but I think
24	an absence of evidence"?	24	I am at liberty to tell you who the name actually is.
25	A. I just need to be clear on the process for complaints in	25	It is Patsy Wilkinson, who was the Second Permanent
	D 50		D 50
	Page 50		Page 52

1	Secretary, so this is as high up as this document went,	1	anything further to your line of questioning, I am
2	and there is a list of other people to whom this	2	afraid.
3	document went at the foot of it, which probably, in this	3	MR ALTMAN: All right, Mr Brockington. It is 25 past,
4	version, will be redacted, so we will not be able to see	4	chair. Can I suggest a 15-minute break and come back at
5	it.	5	11.40?
6	"Panorama allegations against G4S staff at	6	THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Thank you.
7	Brook House."	7	(11.27 am)
8	It is to do with a meeting, at paragraph 1, "to	8	(a short break)
9	discuss Professional Standards Unit investigations	9	(11.40 am)
10	and Brook House on 20 February". They undertook to	10	THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Please take a seat.
11	provide her "with a definitive account of what the	11	Mr Altman, thank you.
12	Home Office knew about the detainee custody officers	12	MR ALTMAN: Zaynab, could we put up on screen, please,
13	against whom allegations were made and the outcome of	13	Mr Brockington's first witness statement <cjs0074041> at</cjs0074041>
14	associated investigations."	14	page 11.
15	Paragraph 2:	15	Here you are dealing with policies and procedures.
16	"There were 17 members of G4S staff identified	16	At paragraph 45, you say:
17	within the material Panorama provided before the	17	"It is evident that certain staff members, and in
18	broadcast, or from the broadcast footage, details of	18	particular Mr Callum Tulley, did not report their
19	which were provided [separately]."	19	concerns on abuses and/or impropriety. This did put
20	Under the heading, "Prior allegations:	20	detainees at risk as it allowed abuses of the type shown
21	"Of these 17, seven had been the subject of serious	21	in Panorama to continue. Such abuses would have been
22	complaints in 2016 and 2017 and were investigated by PSU	22	prevented had prompt reports been made, as they would
23	[table provided below]. These investigations were prior	23	have been acted on by the company. Mr Tulley stated in
24	to and unconnected with the Panorama allegations. On	24	the programme that he did not report his concerns on the
25	the date on which we were made aware of Panorama's	25	basis that he did not believe that they would have been
	Page 53		Page 55
1	allegation (24 August 2017) there were six outstanding	1	taken seriously. The company does not understand the
2	investigations into the activities of five DCOs	2	basis of this assertion, given there was never any
3	(highlighted in [the table]). None of these	3	attempt by him to raise such concerns at any stage
4	investigations were based on allegations that	4	during his employment with the company through its
5	subsequently featured in the Panorama material."	5	whistleblowing policy or otherwise. The company is
6	So, of the 17 identified in the Panorama broadcast,	6	confident that, had he done so, such complaints would
7	seven of them had already been the subject of serious	7	have been treated seriously."
8	complaint in 2016 and 2017. Were you aware of that,	8	Were you aware that "Speak Out" posters had been
9	Mr Brockington?	9	defaced in parts of Brook House, or a part of
10	A. No, I wasn't.	10	Brook House that was accessible by staff members, upon
11	Q. Surely G4S must have been?	11	which was written words like "snitch" or "grass"; did
12	A. I would expect, but I can't wholly conclude I can	12	you know that?
13	come back to the inquiry, if that would be helpful.	13	A. I did know that.
14	Q. Yes, please. But if it is right, whether they are	14	Q. So anybody reading that would understand pretty readily
15	allegations substantiated or unsubstantiated, they are	15	that speaking out, even within the company's global
16	serious. If you look down the list, they are all	16	whistleblowing policy, would be met by difficulty, to
17	assaults, there are some sexual assaults, and one is	17	say the least, amongst one's colleagues; do you agree?
18	assault and neglect. And we will see that the greater	18	A. I think there were a couple of posters that were defaced
19	number are against a DCO by the name of Derek Murphy.	19	in that way, which is not acceptable.
20	Do you agree that G4S should have considered these	20	So, yes, I would say that it is not acceptable to
21	more closely before being exposed by the BBC? Or do	21	have that on the posters.
22	you	22	Q. Callum Tulley joined the company, if my memory serves
23	A. I am afraid, personally, I can't conclude either way on	23	me, in 2015, when he was 18, so by the time we are
24	that. What I have committed to the inquiry is we will	24	talking about, he was a young man of around 20.
25	respond, if that would be helpful, but I can't add	25	Ironically, as you probably realise, Mr Brockington,
	Page 54		Page 56
		-	-

1	he was influenced to go to the BBC Panorama production	1	should focus on more mature candidates."
2	team having watched, on 12 January 2016, the Panorama	2	If this sort of thing happened to somebody of the
3	expose into Medway?	3	seniority of Owen Syred, what confidence could anybody
4	A. I was aware of that point.	4	have that whistleblowing would make any difference other
5	Q. He was a 20-year old or thereabouts. But Owen Syred, he	5	than one which was to the detriment of the person who
6	wasn't you have heard the name Owen Syred?	6	made the complaint?
7	A. I have.	7	A. Clearly, that sort of behaviour is horrendous. And
8	Q. If we put up on screen what he told us in his witness	8	I would absolutely not accept that behaviour in the
9	statement please, Zaynab <inn000007> at page 30. He</inn000007>	9	estate, in the establishments which I am currently
10	was a mature man, a welfare officer, respected, listened	10	responsible for.
11	to, and under the heading in his statement "Disciplinary	11	Q. What is the answer to the question, Mr Brockington?
12	and grievance process", between paragraphs 125 and 127,	12	A. You would conclude that, clearly, on a personal level
13	he tells the story of how someone by the name of	13	and it is my personal view, in response to that
14	Sam Gurney said to him you can see about half a dozen	14	question that, you know, younger men clearly,
15	lines up when some of the detainees were being	15	Callum Tulley was influenced by this and he made it
16	demanding, "I bloody hate this lot, no wonder I'm	16	clear in his statement.
17	racist."	17	Q. Well, my question was, what confidence could anybody
18	He made some comment about that. A couple of weeks	18	have in making a complaint through the whistleblowing
19	later, he was in the wing office on C wing, talking to	19	hotline or process, if the result is nothing other than
20	another DCO by the name of Liam Sharkey, who was eating	20	detriment to the person who makes the complaint? That
21	a packet of plantain crisps, and he said:	21	is my question. The answer is surely none, isn't it?
22	"I asked Liam what they were and Sam interjected and	22	
23	•	23	A. We were very clear in our training, through the ITCs and
23	said 'they are crisps for niggers'. I couldn't believe	24	promoting the ITCs, that individuals should use the
	what he had said. I knew that I had to challenge the	25	"Speak Out" and they should absolutely in accordance
25	comment, but I didn't want to do it in front of the	23	with their obligation under the certification to the
	Page 57		Page 59
1			
1	detainees"	1	Secretary of State, they have an obligation to raise any
2	detainees" So two points. First of all, Gurney says what he	1 2	Secretary of State, they have an obligation to raise any concerns.
	So two points. First of all, Gurney says what he says. Mr Syred, very sensibly, did not want to		
2	So two points. First of all, Gurney says what he	2	concerns.
2 3	So two points. First of all, Gurney says what he says. Mr Syred, very sensibly, did not want to	2 3	concerns. So to be honest, I can't conclude either way. What
2 3 4	So two points. First of all, Gurney says what he says. Mr Syred, very sensibly, did not want to challenge the comment in front of detainees because, as	2 3 4	concerns. So to be honest, I can't conclude either way. What I can say is we trained our staff to speak out when they
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1	report to their line management, they can escalate that	1	wasn't raised to them either.
2	and I am very clear that anybody can escalate any issues	2	Q. Yes, because it was a culture of silence. That is the
3	to myself.	3	whole point, isn't it, Mr Brockington?
4	So whilst I can't comment on during this period at	4	A. As I said, I can't conclude. I would be surmising.
5	the IRC, what I can say is that is certainly the culture	5	Q. Let's turn to another paragraph of yours, please, in
6	which I have in my organisation.	6	your first witness statement, back to that, please,
7	Q. Owen Syred talks about the culture at paragraph 129	7	Zaynab, <cjs0074041> at page 35 and paragraph 173:</cjs0074041>
8	which is still on screen:	8	"All use of force incidents were reported directly
9	"The culture within the organisation was that they	9	to the Home Office as required under the terms of the
10	did not want to make waves and did not want to generate	10	contract."
11	publicity."	11	Do you want to rethink that sentence,
12	Is that right, Mr Brockington?	12	Mr Brockington? Is there anything about it that is not
13	A. As I said in my previous statement, I can't comment at	13	accurate, do you think?
14 15	that point in time, at that establishment. What I can	14	A. That is my understanding, when I submitted the statement
16	say is that is certainly not an environment which	15	to the inquiry.
17	I recognise in the establishments and business which I currently run.	16	Q. Well, what about the incidents which resulted in the
18	Q. If we go to what Callum Tulley had to say in his inquiry	17	strangulation of D1527 on 25 April, when there was
19	witness statement, <inq000052> at page 42,</inq000052>	18	a failure by anyone to bring to anyone's attention that
20	paragraph 168, and start at 167:	19	assault on him on that date, let alone forget the
21	"In the majority of examples outlined in this	20 21	Home Office, let alone to G4S. It is not right, is it, this sentence?
22	statement, members of staff were present during		
23	mistreatment of detainees and for admissions of abuse	22	You know what I am talking about, don't you?
24	and malpractice who were otherwise well behaving	23	A. Of course I do.
25	officers. This underlines the lack of confidence staff	24 25	Q. Yes, there was a complete cover-up, which involved every
23	officers. This underfines the fack of confidence staff	23	officer who was involved in the illegitimate use of
	Page 61		Page 63
1	had in raising complaints about such behaviour."	1	force on D1527 in room 7 of E Wing at around 7.00 in the
2	At 168:	2	evening on 25 April 2017. Callum Tulley tells us, and
3	"This culture of silence across the work force at	3	we have it on transcript, and on video, that after it
4	Brook House coupled with a lack of demonstrable	4	happened, Yan Paschali, who was the principal involved
5	oversight, interest and engagement from Ben Saunders and	5	in this, told Callum Tulley, "As it stands, no use of
6	his senior management team allowed the abusive culture	6	force". In other words, no report was to be compiled
7	in Brook House to fester and go unchecked. The	7	and, as you may know, if you had followed the evidence,
8	confidence that officers and managers had to, in front	8	Yan Paschali claims that he did complete an incident
9	of other members of staff, flagrantly brag and joke	9	report for the final of the three aspects of the
10	about abuse or speak in derogatory or even racist terms	10	incident with D1527 on 25 April, left it on a desk by
11	about detainees demonstrated their faith in the culture	11	a pigeon hole, but somehow, magically, it disappeared.
12	of silence which allowed the abuse to persist."	12	And his claim to this inquiry, at the beginning of this
13	Do you want to disagree with that?	13	set of hearings, was that Callum Tulley had, for reasons
14	A. What I would say to that point is we operated the site	14	of his own, made it disappear.
15	but not in a silo; we operated the site with onsite	15	In the end, there wasn't a single report that he had
16	engagement from the Home Office and IMB, amongst others.	16	been strangled on that evening by Yan Paschali, let
17	This was not raised to is my understanding it	17	alone that Paschali had whispered to him "You fucking
18	was not raised to the IMB, the Home Office or ourselves	18	piece of shit, because I am going to put you to fucking
19	during that period.	19	sleep".
20	So that is what I conclude from that. Clearly, this	20	Now, when you think about all of that, how does it
21	statement shows a culture of silence, but I wasn't privy	21	come about, Mr Brockington, that, at paragraph 173 of
22	to the site at the time, so I would be surmising to more	22	your corporate statement, you tell this inquiry, in
23	conclusively respond to your question. But I do	23	a witness statement said to be a statement of truth,
24	stand by what I say in terms of we were on site with the	24	that all use of force incidents were reported directly
25	IMB and the Home Office and, to my understanding, it	25	to the Home Office as required under the terms of the
	Page 62		Page 64
			1.(/D

1	contract?	1	Q. Did you appreciate that he identified 27 incidents of
2	A. The reports were made I would expect the reports to	2	use of force during the relevant period which, to him,
3	be made. In all honesty, I can't comment further on	3	were incidents of significant concern, in various ways,
4	what we have said. I understand the point that you have	4	in that they either involved an excess of the use of
5	made.	5	force, they were wholly disproportionate, or that they
6	Q. Yes. It is wrong, isn't it?	6	were provoking or punitive in nature; in other words to
7	A. I understand the point that you have made.	7	punish the detainee. Were you even aware of that?
8	Q. It is wrong, isn't it?	8	A. I wasn't sighted on that, no.
9	A. In that instance, that incident was not reported.	9	Q. Now you are, what do you think about it?
10	Q. The sentence is wrong, isn't it?	10	A. All our frontline officers are trained to deliver C&R.
11	A. I would agree.	11	And we, at the time, did we also did annual refresher
12	Q. Thank you. You see, if Callum Tulley, who you	12	training, so I would expect and certainly in the
13	criticise, had not filmed the event, no one would be any	13	establishments where that I currently run, we have
14	the wiser, would they?	14	very clear governance around the deployment of C&R,
15	A. For those specific incidents, they weren't the	15	reviews, feedback. What was happening at the time,
16	reports, for whatever reason, were not filed.	16	I can't comment on; what I can comment on is what we
17	Q. Do you not think, just standing back for a second,	17	currently have in place, and I have full confidence in
18	Mr Brockington, that in singling out Callum Tulley, as	18	my very experienced leadership teams that we have
19	you do in your witness statement, for criticism, in	19	governance structures in place to measure and monitor
20	fact, the only person who, in fact, did anything about	20	C&R.
21	the abuse on that day and other abuses; not just	21	Q. Well, presumably, if you'd sat here in July 2017, you
22	that, but this one in particular rather than any	22	would have said "I have full confidence in my senior
23	member of staff or management of G4S, don't you think	23	experienced leadership team". Presumably, you wouldn't
24	this continues to send out a signal as to how "snitches"	24	have had that level of confidence, had you sat here
25	or "grasses" will be treated by the company?	25	in July 2017, knowing what we now know?
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	Page 65		Page 67
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1	A. My response is we would expect all frontline officers	1	A. I would be speculating to answer that.
1 2	A. My response is we would expect all frontline officers — in fact, all staff, who have completed the ITC, to	1 2	A. I would be speculating to answer that.O. Yes. You deal with a particular issue, which you seem
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			<u> </u>
1	page was missing.	1	If we go on, please, to page 5, here we see
2	As to why they were missing, do you not agree that	2	a document which apparently was completed by Jo Buss,
3	all documents were preserved or should have been	3	who was the nurse, headed "Injury sustained and
4	preserved? What is your understanding of the	4	healthcare involvement". In the box "A F213 or
5	documentation from the period?	5	equivalent form was completed by" it says "Name:
6	A. My view is that	6	Jo Buss".
7	Q. Not your view. I don't want your view. I want what the	7	"Did the detainee sustain any injuries at the time?"
8	facts are, Mr Brockington.	8	and "Yes" is checked.
9	A. I can't conclude what happened at the time. I would be	9	Can we go on, please, to page 7. Here we find the
10	surmising. But what we have said in my statement is	10	annex A statement of Steve Loughton, a DCM who went to
11	that there were areas which were missing.	11	D1527's aid when he was alerted to the fact by a DCO
12	Q. You will agree with this, I hope, that all documents	12	that he had put a ligature around his neck. If we can
13	should have been preserved; do you accept that much?	13	go to the next page, we can see the narrative:
14	A. Yes, I do.	14	"At approximately 19.08 I was checking the daily
15	Q. There was a police investigation after all, which	15	food refusals and I was on Eden Wing. I was just about
16	started fairly swiftly?	16	to check a detainee by the name of who was currently
17	A. Correct.	17	on a constant supervision and rule 40 and was residing
18	Q. Lampard started, when, around November 2017?	18	in room E/007. I was told by the officer who was
19	A. That is broadly my recollection, yes.	19	watching him DCO Fraser that he had just gone into the
20	Q. Then there was a judicial review brought by two of the	20	toilet area and he couldn't see him properly. I entered
21	formerly detained people, which started in January 2018.	21	the room and called his name but had no answer, I then
22	So all the documentation should have been preserved.	22	went into the toilet area which is where I saw D1527
23	Have you any explanation for why it has not been?	23	curled up around the toilet area with what looked like
24	A. I don't.	24	a ripped T-shirt around his neck which he was holding on
25	Q. At your paragraph 186, which is still up on screen, you	25	to. I attempted to loose the ligature but D1527 was
	Page 69		Page 71
1	say:	1	holding on to it so I asked DCO Fraser to pass me his
2	"It is acknowledged that on some of the F213 forms,	2	fish knife and I managed to cut the ligature off,
3	sections 1 to 3 were not always completed, however, the	3	I then pulled D1527 out of the toilet area and asked him
4	information asked was duplicative of the information	4	to sit on the bed which he did and I called for medical
5	already set out and provided in the preceding DCF-2	5	assistance on my radio."
6	documentation. This information is not therefore	6	So all we have so far, would you agree,
7	missing from the pack."	7	Mr Brockington, is a narrative account from Loughton
8	Are you saying it didn't really have a separate	8	which says nothing about any injury. We have a check
9	purpose? What does the use of the word "duplicative"	9	box ticked which said that the detainee did suffer
10	mean?	10	injury, but no detail; do you agree so far?
11	A. What I am saying in that statement is that some areas	11	A. I would agree so far.
12	were duplicated in the F213 and the DCF-2, and that	12	Q. Right. If we go, please, to page 11 actually, back
13	might be one reason for them not being completed	13	to page 10, sorry.
14	correctly.	14	Here is the report of injury to detainee. This is
15	Q. I am going to put up an example, just so everybody can	15	the F213. Surname ciphered as D1527. Section 2(a),
16	see what I am talking about and what you were talking	16	time and date of incident, 25 April 2017 at 1900 hours.
17	about here in the witness statement.	17	The rest is not completed. Section 2(b), "Brief
18	Can we put up, please, Zaynab, <cjs005534>, starting</cjs005534>	18	report of circumstances in which injury was sustained.
19	at page 1.	19	(To be completed by the incident reporting officer)",
20	This happens to be in relation to D1527 for 25 April	20	completely blank. Could you scroll down, Zaynab,
21	but this is the first part of, in effect, a three-part	21	please? Do you agree, nothing there?
22	incident.	22	A. I would agree there is nothing there, yes.
23	You can see the time use of force commenced.	23	Q. Then, on the next page, section 3, "Healthcare report.
24	According to this document, 19.09 and completed at	24	(To be completed by medical staff)":
25	10 minutes past.	25	"Seen on E Wing room by RGN [I think it is] Jo."
		1	
	70		P = 50
	Page 70		Page 72

		1	
1	That must be Jo Buss:	1	picking up the numbers in the left-hand margin, you are
2	"Detainee had placed a ligature around his neck,	2	talking about contracts, and you say, towards the end of
3	removed by staff. After that he went to toilet and	3	that passage, "Rest assured, the vast majority of
4	attempt to self-strangulate [something] removed from	4	government tendering, regardless of whether it says it
5	his neck. Slightly redness noted on his neck."	5	is 50-50 price quality, it is price, let's face facts."
6	There we see, if we scroll down a little more,	6	Are you talking about what the focal point of any
7	an indicator around his neck, "Slight redness on his	7	government contract in this environment is?
8	neck", and let's just scroll back up.	8	A. No. I need to be really clear on this. When if
9	What this document doesn't tell you is how the	9	I can just explain the tendering process, if it might be
10	redness noted on his neck arose, because, first of all,	10	helpful for the inquiry, the when an organisation,
11	it refers to a ligature and then it refers to an attempt	11	a customer, whether in the private sector or public
12	to self-strangulate.	12	sector in this instance the public sector; the
13	The order of events here is important,	13	Home Office want to reissue a service, and they look
14	Mr Brockington, because the first of this three-part	14	to outsource, they issue an invitation to tender.
15	incident was the ligature, when indeed Steve Loughton	15	An invitation to tender is a set of criteria and
16	went in, being alerted to the fact that he was trying to	16	requirements that, in this instance, the private sector
17	strangulate himself with a ligature, and removed the	17	would then us and competitors would then respond to.
18	ligature with a fish knife. Matters then calmed down	18	When they set out that criteria and list of
19	when he placed in or around his mouth a battery from	19	requirements, they also set out the contract, they set
20	a mobile phone were you appreciative of that?	20	out KPIs, KPTs, they also set out how it is going to be
21	A. I was, yes. Or I was appreciative of the evidence that	21	measured; ie, is it going to be measured on the quality
22	was given in relation to that point.	22	submission, which is, "How are we going to do this?", or
23	Q. Yes, and then, as you will know, the third part of the	23	is it going to be measured on the price, ie what price
24	incident is when he attempted to self-strangulate with	24	we are going to deliver it for.
25	his hands.	25	What I can say, harping back to, probably, 2007,
	Page 73		Page 75
1	Tabiula disa adia ada	1	I 41:-1-41
1 2	I think reading this, then, probably the last words on that third line are "Hands removed from his neck".	2	I think there was a far bigger drive by government to
3	What this does not tell us is what Yan Paschali did; do	3	get a low price, which I would argue isn't necessarily
4	you agree?	4	value for money; I think that is a very different question.
5	A. I would agree, yes.	5	So the 50-50 ratio which I refer to is, when they
6	Q. What this doesn't tell us is the whole series of events	6	score the contract, they are scoring it half on the
7	that led to Yan Paschali doing as he did or, for that	7	quality of our solution and half on the price which we
8	matter, saying what he did; do you agree?	8	are prepared to deliver it for.
9	A. I do agree with that, yes.	9	So in that, what I was saying is different
10	Q. And then, if you read this at face value, "Slight	10	organisations apply different weightings to quality or
11	redness noted on his neck", you would have no idea	11	price.
12	minor injuries though they may be, you would have no	12	Now, whilst, in 2007, I believe the general thrust
13	idea whether those injuries might have been caused by	13	from government was to get a cheaper price, what I can
14	Yan Paschali digging his thumbs into his neck, would	14	say is that has demonstrably changed since that period
15	you?	15	and there is a far bigger drive by government for value
16	A. I agree with what you are saying, I do.	16	for money and quality.
17	Q. Yes. This is part of the cover-up that I was suggesting	17	Q. Yes, but therein lies the flaw with the contract under
18	to you a little earlier.	18	which G4S operated Brook House during the period,
19	Let me ask you now, please, something about your	19	because the focal point was on price rather than
20	interview with Kate Lampard, please. Can we put up on	20	welfare, wasn't it?
21	screen <ver000255>. This is your interview on</ver000255>	21	A. So I think a couple of points on that.
	9 March 2018. Was it just Kate Lampard or both her and	22	It was a contract which, yes, we ended up
22		I .	•
22 23	Ed Marsden?	23	delivering, but we lost at the tender process to GSL.
		23 24	delivering, but we lost at the tender process to GSL, and of course we inherited the contract through the
23	Ed Marsden?		and of course we inherited the contract through the acquisition, and it is set by government. It is set by
23 24	Ed Marsden? A. It was her and Ed. Q. If we go to page 10, you say at 121, and I am just	24	and of course we inherited the contract through the acquisition, and it is set by government. It is set by
23 24	Ed Marsden? A. It was her and Ed.	24	and of course we inherited the contract through the

1	the customer, the how they their list of	1	first"
2	requirements, their list of measurements and the ratio	2	And you say:
3	of how they decide to score it, so I think that is	3	"No, never, health and safety always comes first."
4	probably quite clear.	4	He says:
5	Q. Except this, we don't perhaps need to put it up on	5	"Okay, that's interesting, someone told me that."
6	screen now, but you will have seen a series of	6	You say:
7	presentation documents which were created, I think, by	7	"Never."
8	Mr Schoenenberger who became the head of the DEPMU in	8	At the top of the next page:
9	due course. Do you remember reading for the record,	9	"Interesting", he says.
10	chair, but I am going to deal with this through another	10	You say:
11	witness, <dl0000140> at page 47. The Home Office's own</dl0000140>	11	"Agenda point 1 on every ExCom is health and
12	internal assessment of the bids said and you will	12	safety."
13	remember this:	13	Explain what ExCom is?
14	"An ethos of cutting corners and meeting basic	14	A. It is the executive committee.
15	standards was evident from much of what we have read and	15	Q. What does the executive committee of G4S do, what is its
16	we are especially disappointed at the extended lockdown	16	raison d'etre?
17	hours proposed by these four bidders. This appears to	17	A. At the specific time, it was to manage the regional
18	be a desperate attempt to reduce costs at the expense of	18	business.
19	welfare."	19	Q. Yes. If we move on, please, to page 18.
20	GSL was one of the four bidders, wasn't it?	20	Says the questioner, at 241, who may be
21	A. It was, in my understanding, yes. In fact, they won it.	21	Kate Lampard:
22	Q. They did.	22	"Can I just ask you about the chain of reporting on
23	Therefore, it is not just about the Home Office,	23	all of this: you've described how trading reviews focus
24	because all four companies, including GSL, were cutting	24	on this matrix, balanced score card, all that sort of
25	corners in order to win the contract, weren't they?	25	thing, and then it gets up to ExCom and ExCom will drill
	Page 77		Page 79
1	A. I can't comment. I can't comment on the submission of	1	down if there are evident things that are out of kilter
2	a competitor at the time. What I can say is the process	2	and look absurd. By the time it gets to the board, one
3	for tendering is the authority the Home Office, in	3	question Ashley asked us is, you have HMIP reporting,
4	this case sets out the criteria and the private	4	you have local IMB reporting, you have trading reviews,
5	sector, in this case, responds with a solution which	5	why did nobody tell him that people were behaving like
6	needs to be sustainable on a number of metrics.	6	brutes in Brook House?
7	Q. And it wasn't just GSL, I mean G4S bid for the contract	7	"There are indicators for that, aren't there?
8	as well. So you were one of the four bidders who the	8	I can't write a thesis on what the line is, but
9	assessor was complaining about trying to cut corners?	9	understaffed place, staff under pressure, not enough
10	A. I really cannot comment on something back in 2007.	10	managers, not enough time off, not enough training and
11	Q. You have seen the documents, haven't you?	11	development, all of that stuff. What's your answer as
12	A. The tender documents	12	to why that didn't come through to your board?."
13	Q. Yes.	13	You answer:
14	A the specific tender documents? No, I haven't seen	14	"Clearly, something isn't working."
15	the specific tender documents, because they go back to	15	Then you say:
16	2007.	16	"We have whistleblowing"
17	Q. You haven't looked at them? Because they were in your	17	And you are asked:
18	pack. Have you not looked at them?	18	"Is that something that's on the metrics too, on the
19	A. Not in detail.	19	formal reporting?
20	Q. Any detail, by the sound of it, no.	20	"Yes, I don't see that but Peter sees every single
21	A. No.	21	whistleblowing."
22	Q. Coming back to your interview with Verita, which is	22	That's Peter Neden, presumably?
23	still up on screen, if we look down the page, please, at	23	A. Yes.
24	125, Mr Marsden is continuing:	24	Q. Who is the "Ashley"?
25	"In trading reviews, I think the financials come	25	A. Our chief exec.
	Page 78		Page 80
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1	Q. What was not working, do you think? What were you	1	indicators such as health and safety, the chances are
2	telling Verita wasn't working?	2	your profitability is going to be good as well, because
3	A. What I was saying in what I was trying to get across,	3	you are running a really good contract, you're a really
4	and it appears quite clumsy, was the the way that the	4 5	good management team. We measure lead indicators which
5	trading reports were you have heard of different		ultimately drive profitability. It is one component of
6	names for this through the inquiry — I have heard them	6	a few, all of which are linked, but clearly we want them
7	called "trading reports", I've heard them called	7	to make more money, not to the detriment of all the
8	"business reports". I personally call them "performance	8	other indicators."
9	reports", because they are absolutely I think	9	Then, just picking up on a few themes here,
10	"trading" builds a picture of just commercial view.	10	Mr Brockington, at line 157 at the bottom, you are
11	These were absolutely not that. These were business	11	asked:
12	reviews, where we looked at all aspects of health and	12	"But your recollection of the contract was that it
13	safety, but I include use of force, I include violence	13	was not financially troublesome?"
14	on detainee or violence on prisoner-on-prisoner, in	14	You say "No, correct."
15	my current business, self-harm, recruitment, HR, the	15	You also agree, on page 14, if we go over to
16	list goes on to cover all aspects of the business, and	16	page 14, at the top of 170, where you are asked:
17	we also at the end, we cover facilities management as	17	"I suppose what I am really asking you is, if you
18	an example and then on to commercials.	18	have any experience of the sort of pressure that that
19	So, you know, these are full business reviews and	19	person from the Home Office who sits on the ground at
20	I stand by, you know, in my current business, what	20	Gatwick and is the interface between the Home Office and
21	I review, with a very high-level of scrutiny and	21	the operation, if your experience is, as ours is, that
22	governance on a monthly basis with the the sites is	22	really the thing they are focused on is pleasing the
23	all these areas.	23	masters about people in and people out, and we have got
24	So and I stand by what I say, that the	24	the local person to admit that that is the case does
25	whistleblowing process, I think, Peter did say in his	25	that accord with your experience?"
	Page 81		Page 83
			9
1	evidence that he did see the whistleblowing reports.	1	-
1 2	evidence that he did see the whistleblowing reports. O. At page 12 at 148, you are asked:	1 2	You say:
2	Q. At page 12 at 148, you are asked:	2	You say: "Yes, I think so. I think they will be driving what
	Q. At page 12 at 148, you are asked: "I suppose what I am asking is not so much the		You say: "Yes, I think so. I think they will be driving what their boss is interested in."
2 3 4	Q. At page 12 at 148, you are asked: "I suppose what I am asking is not so much the actual mechanics of whether or not they breached	2 3 4	You say: "Yes, I think so. I think they will be driving what their boss is interested in." So let me ask you, against the background of those
2 3 4 5	Q. At page 12 at 148, you are asked: "I suppose what I am asking is not so much the actual mechanics of whether or not they breached a fundamental agreement, it is what sort of pressure are	2 3 4 5	You say: "Yes, I think so. I think they will be driving what their boss is interested in." So let me ask you, against the background of those questions and answers, and I am asking this on behalf of
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1	designed and established and set out by the customer,	1	prepared to accept even that much.
2	and we respond and we build a sustainable model and	2	A. If that is what has come across to the inquiry, that is
3	service delivery model to respond to ensure we deliver	3	wrong. I have said, as an organisation, and as
4	a service as required by the customer, and we also	4	an individual, as a responsible for this business
5	ensure our adherence to the specific KPT measures.	5	now, I would hold myself wholly responsible for these
6	Q. Secondly, do you accept that it is also essential for	6	abhorrent behaviours. I couldn't be clearer on that.
7	the Home Office to insist on adequate financial	7	I think the inquiry will, of course, deliver the
8	penalties to ensure that there is sufficient impact on	8	findings of the inquiry, based on the evidence that has
9	your profitability to incentivise the centre director to	9	been given, but I hope I am very clear in my openness to
10	take action?	10	the inquiry around the fact that we take these matters
11	A. In my experience over, say, a significant number of	11	incredibly seriously and have actioned a significant
12	years, bidding for work within the public sector, KPTs	12	amount of all the areas covered, and we will continue
13	are one measure that the authority measures us against.	13	to do so and continue to within the prison
14	The financial penalties vary between organisations,	14	environment now, clearly not the detained environment,
15	and the application of the quantum varies, depending on	15	because we no longer operate within that environment,
16	KPT and depending on customers.	16	but I hope my position is now clear.
17	So again, it is back to I am afraid it is back to	17	Q. A couple of final topics for you, Mr Brockington. First
18	the Home Office. They set the criteria in terms of what	18	of all, can we go back to your witness statement at
19	is to be measured and the final the financial penalty	19	paragraph 182, which is on page 36, and it is up on
20	regime which sits alongside that.	20	screen. You say:
21	Q. Who is ultimately responsible here, Mr Brockington, for	21	"Following a use of force event, detainees will
22	what happened?	22	sometimes be relocated to the CSU, if deemed
23	A. In terms of?	23	appropriate, usually as a result of continued aggressive
24	Q. In terms of the abuse? Who do you think is ultimately	24	behaviour (to staff or others). Removal was therefore
25	responsible?	25	either for their protection or that of others."
	•		1
	Page 85		Page 87
1	A As an augmination and in the augmination which I am	1	Voy on on to say at 192.
1	A. As an organisation, and in the organisation which I am	1	You go on to say at 183:
2	responsible for, in terms of our care and rehabilitation	2	"The Suicide and Prevention of Self-harm Policy
2 3	responsible for, in terms of our care and rehabilitation business, if this was to happen in the business that	2 3	"The Suicide and Prevention of Self-harm Policy would have been followed in CSU where appropriate,
2 3 4	responsible for, in terms of our care and rehabilitation business, if this was to happen in the business that I run today, I would be responsible.	2 3 4	"The Suicide and Prevention of Self-harm Policy would have been followed in CSU where appropriate, although this would not impact on the use of force event
2 3 4 5	responsible for, in terms of our care and rehabilitation business, if this was to happen in the business that I run today, I would be responsible. Q. Yes. Who was responsible, in your view, for what	2 3 4 5	"The Suicide and Prevention of Self-harm Policy would have been followed in CSU where appropriate, although this would not impact on the use of force event itself."
2 3 4 5 6	responsible for, in terms of our care and rehabilitation business, if this was to happen in the business that I run today, I would be responsible. Q. Yes. Who was responsible, in your view, for what happened between April and the end of August 2017?	2 3 4 5 6	"The Suicide and Prevention of Self-harm Policy would have been followed in CSU where appropriate, although this would not impact on the use of force event itself." Then, if we can go forwards, please, to
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1	duty manager, and we would call that a case of urgency,	1	designed for short-term holding of up to 72 hours, but,
2	the duty manager could authorise, initially, the	2	unfortunately, if that was the intention, it was never,
3	rule 40, and then be followed up immediately, pretty	3	or rarely, complied with.
4	much immediately, by the authority representative from	4	You know that?
5	the Secretary of State.	5	A. I was fully aware of that, yes.
6	So when we used rule 40 and rule 42, it was within	6	Q. Yes.
7	full sight of, and authorisation of, the Secretary of	7	The HMIP report for Tinsley House in 2018 confirms
8	State's representative within the Home Office.	8	that Tinsley House was closed for refurbishment
9	That was also I have referred on a few occasions	9	between September 2016 and May 2017 presumably you
10	to us not working in isolation at the immigration	10	know that?
11	removal centre, because, of course, we reported the use	11	A. I do.
12	of these to the Home Office on a daily basis at the 0800	12	Q. And a number of staff was transferred over to
13	meeting, daily reports, weekly reports and also to the	13	Brook House at the time, you will appreciate that too?
14	IMB.	14	A. I do appreciate that.
15	So what we did in those circumstances was fully	15	Q. Yes. In your second witness statement, paragraph 9, we
16	authorised by the Home Office on	16	don't need to put it up, perhaps, but you say this:
17	Q. Did you not realise that in a huge amount of cases, it	17	"I was not involved in any discussions around this
18	was DCMs themselves who were authorising in cases of	18	matter"
19	urgency; did you know that?	19	Now, the matter you refer to is the heading
20	A. It was our view that the duty manager would authorise.	20	"Increase in operational capacity":
21	Q. I know what was your view, but what I am asking you is	21	" but on 25 January 2017 [you say], the
22	whether you knew DCMs were, in fact, giving	22	Home Office issued a formal change request to CJS"
23	authorisation?	23	Which is Custodial and Justice Services?
24	A. I didn't know that, I wasn't around at the time, so	24	A. At the time, yes.
25	Q. Well, is this news to you now? Have you not heard this	25	Q. That is, what, part of the moniker of the company or the
-20	Q. Wen, is the new to you how They of hot heart this		Q. That is, what, part of the monater of the company of the
	Page 89		Page 91
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1 2	before? A. No. I am aware.	1 2	division? A. It was part of the division of G4S.
2	A. No, I am aware.	2	A. It was part of the division of G4S.
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1	A. So my understanding is we delivered to the contractual	,	concluded by the site team at the time that 60 with
2	•	1 2	concluded by the site team at the time that 60 with
3	requirements as set out in the contract, in terms of	3	the Home Office that 60 would be appropriate.
4	resourcing at that time. Q. So the answer is, what, you don't know or you cannot say	4	I am afraid I can't comment further because I was not privy to further conversations.
5	or there were no staff shortages?	5	Q. In a moment, I am going to invite the chair to see if
6	A. What I am saying is we fulfilled our contract.	6	she has any questions for you, Mr Brockington, but
7	Q. What does that mean?	7	before I do, I am going to invite you to consider
8	A. We so there is a minimum staffing level set out in	8	whether there is anything you want to say to the
9	the contract and we were broadly compliant to the terms	9	detainees, not only those who have given live evidence
10	of that contract.	10	before this inquiry, but those who were not able to,
11	Q. Let me ask it another way. Do you know whether G4S	11	those whose statements and other material was adduced
12	incurred any contractual penalties in that period for	12	before the inquiry in respect of the mistreatment,
13	failing to meet the minimum staffing requirements? What	13	physical and verbal, that was meted out to them during
14	are you referring to there, Mr Brockington? I see you	14	the course of the relevant period?
15	have got something in the witness box with you, is it	15	A. And I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of
16	an aide-memoire, of some kind?	16	G4S, to apologise for those who suffered mistreatment,
17	A. I have just got a couple of notes.	17	as witnessed in the Panorama programme. What we saw on
18	Q. It looks like a lot of notes from where I am standing.	18	the Panorama programme was, as I said previously,
19	A. It's just a couple of notes to help me answer your	19	abhorrent behaviour. We believe it to be isolated. And
20	questions fully. I cannot confirm, but I will make	20	we look forward to receiving the conclusions of the
21	a response to the inquiry to cover that point.	21	inquiry.
22	Q. Can you add this to it: how did staffing levels in the	22	MR ALTMAN: Thank you.
23	period, say, from about September to December 2016,	23	THE CHAIR: I have no questions. Thank you very much for
24	compare to staffing levels during the relevant period?	24	your evidence, Mr Brockington. Thank you.
25	Are you able to help us with that?	25	MR ALTMAN: Chair, it is 12.45. Rather than start the next
	•	23	
	Page 93		Page 95
1	A. Of course, we would be delighted to.	1	witness, can I suggest we have an early lunch and return
2			
_	Q. Let's just put up on the screen please, I think finally,	2	in an hour at 1.45?
3	Q. Let's just put up on the screen please, I think finally, the HMIP report, again, <cjs000761> at page 5.</cjs000761>	3	in an hour at 1.45? THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Thank you Mr Brockington.
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1	A. Managing Director of Facilities Management and Public	1	A. G4S is always trying to learn lessons.
2	Services.	2	Q. And is G4S Health Services committed to learning lessons
3	Q. Are you also director of G4S Health Services UK,	3	from what was shown on the Panorama programme?
4	Limited?	4	A. Yes, I believe it was. And continues to be so.
5	A. I am a director of G4S Health Services, but I also have	5	Q. And committed to learning lessons from this inquiry?
6	a managing director running the business.	6	A. Yes, where relevant.
7	Q. Thank you. What does that role entail?	7	Q. Because, of course, the importance of learning lessons
8	A. My role?	8	is to prevent past problems or failures occurring again
9	Q. Yes.	9	in the future?
10	A. I run a number of disparate businesses, including	10	A. Indeed.
11	Health Services for G4S.	11	Q. And in this case, that was that led to mistreatment
12	Q. You are the corporate witness that has been put forward	12	of vulnerable detainees. So important to prevent those
13	by G4S Health Services to provide evidence to this	13	failures and problems occurring again?
14	inquiry; is that right?	14	A. Indeed.
15	A. That's correct.	15	Q. Does your inability to comment in some of those respects
16	Q. You are here to answer questions on behalf of the	16	suggest that G4S Health Services has, or at least had,
17	company about the relevant period and about the current	17	no system in place to ensure that lessons learned were
18	position; is that right?	18	passed on from predecessors?
19	A. That's correct.	19	A. No, I think a considerable time has passed, it is five
20	Q. You say, at paragraph 2 of your statement:	20	years since the relevant period. I think businesses
21	"I have no personal knowledge as to any of the	21	evolve and change and I think that I would hope that
22	matters identified in the BBC Panorama programme.	22	lessons were learned, and I believe that they were, and
23	I also have no first-hand knowledge of the management of	23	I believe there was an intense period of reflection and
24	healthcare at Brook House between April and August 2017,	24	action immediately after the Panorama programme.
25	or about the contractual/commissioning arrangements	25	As such, I believe that processes are in place to
	Page 97		Page 99
	Tage 7/		1 age 77
1	between the Home Office, G4S and NHS England during this	1	continue learning and to continue to develop.
2	time."	2	Q. Are processes now in place to prevent the loss of
3	Is that right?	3	company knowledge that you have referred to in your
4	A. That's correct, I didn't join G4S until November 2017	4	statement?
5	and had no responsibility whatsoever for the	5	A. I think some of the questions here are so very specific
6	Health Services business until January 2019.	6	
7		1	to such very specific matters that it is difficult to
	Q. Yes. At paragraphs 30 and 101 of your statement, you	7	to such very specific matters that it is difficult to say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is
8	Q. Yes. At paragraphs 30 and 101 of your statement, you say that you are "unable to comment on lessons learned		• •
		7	say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is
8	say that you are "unable to comment on lessons learned	7 8	say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is so — such a detailed question that is being asked.
8 9	say that you are "unable to comment on lessons learned due to a lack of personal knowledge and a loss of	7 8 9	say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is so such a detailed question that is being asked. I think the general principles are understood and
8 9 10	say that you are "unable to comment on lessons learned due to a lack of personal knowledge and a loss of staff."	7 8 9 10	say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is so — such a detailed question that is being asked. I think the general principles are understood and hopefully have been commented on.
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	say that you are "unable to comment on lessons learned due to a lack of personal knowledge and a loss of staff." A number of other times in your statement you refer to a "loss" or a "lack" of knowledge in the company, at paragraphs 22, 105, 107, 112 and 172, to explain why you have been unable to answer questions posed of you by the inquiry. In those circumstances, how well placed are you to provide the corporate evidence on behalf of G4S Health Services to this inquiry? A. I think I am the best current employee of G4S to provide the corporate statement. However, I would imagine that the statements you have received from other people who used to work for G4S at the time will be more relevant to the period; which at the relevant period. Q. Is G4S Health Services committed to learning lessons as	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	say that you will not lose that knowledge, because it is so — such a detailed question that is being asked. I think the general principles are understood and hopefully have been commented on. Q. What about systems of auditing and documentation? A. I think that there were systems of auditing. I think that we constantly evolve auditing and documentation. And although there are some gaps that are talked about, I think there is a good quantity of documentation that is available and has been reviewed and submitted. Q. At paragraph 3 of your witness statement, you state that you have made the statement "on the basis of information provided by inquiries and/or of review of the company's documents and records." Have you spoken to people who were in post during the relevant period? A. I have spoken to Sandra Calver; otherwise, no. Q. Why not, other than Sandra Calver?

1 1 Sandra Calver. sources to the inquiry that various safeguards and 2 2 Q. You say that you have spoken to Sandra Calver. She policy implementation in relation to the safeguarding of 3 vulnerable detainees was failing. Do you disagree with 3 clearly had first-hand knowledge of the healthcare 4 provision in Brook House during the relevant period and 4 that evidence? 5 she provided written, and indeed live, evidence to the 5 A. I am not sure to exactly what you are referring. 6 inquiry. Did you review her statements? 6 Q. Maybe we will come to it in more detail in a moment. 7 7 Do you have any comment on the evidence that Jo Buss A. I did read her statements, yes. 8 8 gave that she had heard and not challenged and not Q. Did you listen to her give live evidence to the inquiry? 9 reported inappropriate behaviour by detention staff in 9 A. Not the entirety of it, but some of it, yes. 10 10 Q. Are there any aspects of her evidence with which you relation to the incident with D1527 on 25 April? 11 11 disagree? A. I -- that appears, as represented in the programme, to 12 12 be shocking and Sandra Calver appears to have said that A. Not that I recall specifically. 13 Q. At paragraph 14 of your statement, you say: 13 she was extremely shocked by Jo Buss's behaviour as 14 14 "This is a corporate statement for the company. It well. 15 15 would not therefore be appropriate to comment or Q. Jo Buss gave evidence that seemed to suggest that that 16 type of conduct by her and others was commonplace and speculate on the causes of behaviours of staff employed 16 17 by other organisations. It is also difficult for me to 17 that, effectively, staff had become, including her, 18 comment on the causes of staff behaviour in general 18 immune to it. Does that indicate a system or policy 19 terms. The conduct of different staff members will 19 failure in your view or does that still relate to 20 likely have been driven by different factors, causes and 20 individual conduct? 21 21 A. I certainly heard Jo Buss refer to it about her own considerations. Where appropriate, I comment below in 22 relation to particular staff and events." 22 behaviour. I don't recall her specifically suggesting 23 You did feel able to comment at paragraph 31: 23 that that was commonplace. 24 "The issues identified in relation to Ms [Joanne] 24 Q. We know from the BBC footage filmed by Callum Tulley, 25 25 including some that was broadcast on Panorama, that Buss were in connection with her personal conduct, not Page 101 Page 103 1 systems or policy failures. Nor, to the best of the 1 various staff members made mocking or derogatory 2 2 company's knowledge and belief, were there any issues comments in relation to detainees intoxicated by spice; 3 3 raised that extended to potential wider issues were you aware of that? 4 concerning the company's employees." 4 A. I have seen that comment. 5 5 Is that right? Q. And that -- that is not just by one individual, Jo Buss, 6 A. That is what is stated, certainly. 6 it was by other members of healthcare. Again, does that 7 7 Q. Did you listen to Jo Buss's evidence to the inquiry? indicate a more widespread culture or systemic problem 8 8 at the time? 9 Q. Have you listened to Dr Hard's evidence to the inquiry? 9 A. It certainly is inappropriate behaviour; whether that 10 10 A. Not all of it. indicates that's a systemic problem or a lack of 11 Q. But some of it? 11 understanding of the impact of somebody's behaviour or 12 12 comments on other people, whether that is a systemic A. But some of it. 13 Q. Have you read his two reports? 13 failing, I think I couldn't comment on, I wasn't there. 14 14 A. Yes. Q. Paragraphs 43 to 45 of your statement, you state that 15 Q. Do you still think -- having listened to and heard that 15 staffing levels, turnover and the use of agency staff 16 evidence and read his reports, do you still think that 16 didn't contribute to the mistreatment of detainees. 17 17 there were no systems or policy failures leading to the How were you able to come to that view, given that 18 mistreatment of vulnerable detainees in Brook House in 18 the company and its senior management were not aware of 19 19 the mistreatment at the time? 20 A. I am not a medical expert, and I wasn't there in 2017. 20 A. I have talked to the current leadership of our medical 21 I think it is very difficult for me to conclude whether 2.1 business about the way in which contracts, including 22 what Dr Hard is saying from his desktop review in 2022, 22 ones like this one, are staffed; and I understand that 23 is correct or incorrect with regards to exactly what was 23 it is commonplace across all NHS contracts, including in 24 going on in 2017. 24 the NHS itself, for a core of permanent staff to be 25 Q. There has been a large amount of evidence from various 25 supported by bank and temporary staff, and in this Page 102 Page 104

1	environment, of course, people couldn't just come in off	1	used.
2	the street to work, they would have to be inducted	2	Q. We will come to it perhaps in a little more detail in
3	anyway, in order to work in a secure environment.	3	a moment, but at paragraph 75 of your statement, you
4	Q. At paragraph 67, you state that training failures didn't	4	state that no management failings contributed to the
5	contribute to the mistreatment of detainees. Again, how	5	mistreatment of detainees. Again, how were you able to
6	were you able to come to that view?	6	come to that view?
7	A. I think there is a variety of insights into what was	7	A. I think, with regards to the incidents shown in the
8	how the facility was being run at the time. I think	8	Panorama programme, I don't believe that there has been
9	that you would have the IMB report and the Her Majesty's	9	question with regards to Sandra Calver in particular and
10	Prisons' report supported by the CQC, and I would have	10	her oversight of Nurse Buss. She appeared to have been
11	expected, particularly in that case, that the CQC would	11	incredibly shocked by her behaviour and I don't believe
12	have talked and required action, if they felt training	12	that any other issue had been raised with regards to
13	to be inadequate. I don't believe that there was any	13	Nurse Buss. Thereby, I think that is how I would
14	inference from the HMIP report at the time that there	14	conclude that it didn't appear there were any management
15	was training inadequacies and there was certainly no	15	failings around that matter.
16	specific action with regards to improving training.	16	Q. Are you now aware of Dr Hard's evidence that management
17	Q. Dr Hard, in both of his reports, and in his live	17	failings led indirectly to the mistreatment of detainees
18	evidence, confirmed that in his view, there were various	18	through the failure of the safeguards under rules 34
19	inadequacies in the training regarding the Adults at	19	and 35. Do you have any comment on that?
20	Risk policy rule 35, ACDTs and the use of force which	20	A. I am not a medical expert and I wasn't there at the time
21	led to failures in the safeguards, leading to detainees	21	but, as I have said, it would appear that rule 34 and 35
22	remaining in detention subject to segregation,	22	weren't entirely clear at the time and Dr Hard's view,
23	committing acts of self-harm and having force used	23	at this time, may or may not have been in line with the
24	against them, including, for example, in D1527's case,	24	view that anybody may have held at that time.
25	the assault by Yan Paschali. Doesn't that indicate	25	Q. Coming, then, to rules 34 and 35, specifically, do you,
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1	training failures at the time in 2017, would you agree?	1	as a result of your preparation for this inquiry, have
2	A. Not sure that Dr Hard taking a desktop view, in 2022, of	2	an understanding of the interaction between the two
3	a situation in 2017 necessarily leads directly to that	3	rules?
4	conclusion. I would have thought that if there were	4	A. I have read a variety of documents and tried to
5	significant failings in the view of the NHS, the	5	understand and listen to Dr Hard and read relevant
6	Home Office, the IMB, and HMIP, that training was such	6	documents at the time. I think I have a desktop
7	a problem that, in one way or another, there would have	7	understanding, but I am not a medical expert and
8	been a significant impact and requirement for the	8	I wasn't there at the time, so my understanding will be
9	business to change the training methods or improve it.	9	very limited compared to many other people who would be
10	Q. Sandra Calver gave evidence that the training in	10	able to provide a view.
11	relation to rule 35 wasn't sufficient and that she had	11	Q. Rule 34 requires that every detainee have a medical
12	pushed for more training at the time; were you aware of	12	examination, a physical and mental examination, within
13	that?	13	24 hours of admission to a detention centre. You are
14	A. From the research that I have done with regards to this	14	aware of that?
15	hearing, it seems to me that rule 35 is a very complex	15	A. I am.
16	area and there are many opinions around the way in which	16	Q. And rule 35(1) requires a report on anyone where
17	it, at the time, was being implemented and the way that	17	detention is likely to injuriously affect their healthy,
18	it should still be implemented today. I am aware,	18	including their mental health, are you aware of that?
19	obviously, that there was discussion around the training	19	A. I am.
20	and I am also aware from the evidence that I have seen	20	Q. In relation to rule 35(2), that requires a report on
21	that the doctors were keen to discuss rule 35 with the	21	anyone suspected of having suicidal intentions; are you
22	Home Office and to make sure there was clarity in its	22	aware of that?
23	implementation and training.	23	A. Yes.
24	So it was clearly an area that wasn't totally	24	Q. Where those thresholds are met, a rule 35 report should
25	crystal in the way in which it was to be implemented and	25	be completed as a direct consequence of the rule 34
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1	examination at the outset of detention; are you aware of	1	a rule 35 report to be completed in appropriate
2	that?	2	circumstances, as a result of the rule 34 appointment,
3	A. Yes.	3	in order to safeguard vulnerable detainees by
4	Q. And so, in that way, the two rules are meant to work	4	identifying them to the Home Office at the outset of
5	together to safeguard vulnerable detainees at the outset	5	detention; that's right, isn't it?
6	of detention; is that your understanding?	6	A. If that is the case, as your reading of the rule
7	A. Yes.	7	suggests, then I find it interesting that, still to this
8	Q. Sandra Calver accepted in her evidence a failure of	8	day, Sandra Calver gave the evidence that there still
9	rule 34, her explanation being that, largely, there were	9	are only ten-minute appointments five years later.
10	inadequate resources allowed to give everyone the kind	10	Q. Indeed, but the rule clearly was being breached at the
11	of examination required by the rule, and in particular	11	time, and may well still be being breached now. That is
12	that the appointment was very brief, being only five	12	the significance of that evidence, isn't it?
13	minutes long.	13	A. If the interpretation of the rule is correct, then of
14	Are you aware of that evidence that she gave?	14	course it is. But I guess what I struggle, as a layman,
15	A. I am aware of that evidence. I think at the time, from	15	to work out is, why, five years later, with all of the
16	what I have read, the interpretation shown by Dr Hard	16	focus on this area that there has been and with all
17	and talked about in this inquiry of a substantive mental	17	of the interested bodies that are engaged in this, why
18	assessment of every individual arriving at the IRC does	18	would a change not have been made if that interpretation
19	not seem to be consistent with what the NHS were talking	19	of the rule is, in fact, accurate and the way in which
20	about at the time, a needs assessment, where they even	20	it should be implemented?
21	commented that the need to see a GP for every detainee	21	Q. So, Dr Oozeerally had confirmed that the rule 34
22	entering may be putting an unnecessary burden on GPs, so	22	appointments were not leading to rule 35 reports;
23	I find it difficult to square that the NHS, who	23	instead, as you have said, there was a period where, if
24	commissioned the service, were suggesting that there was	24	a disclosure was made or another concern was raised
25	an unnecessary burden, first, as Dr Hard is suggesting	25	about a vulnerability, a further appointment was booked
	an american, saraen, mon, as 21 mara is suggesting		accara ramenaj, a maner appointment has econor
	Page 109		Page 111
1	that there should have been a full mental health	1	for a rule 35 assessment and that built in delay, and he
2	assessment of every detainee, so I wasn't there and	2	described it as being almost like triage. Does
3	I can't quite understand how those two things mesh	3	G4S Health Services consider there were adequate
4	together.	4	GP resources provided at the time to fulfil the
5	Q. It is not Dr Hard who was suggesting there should be	5	requirements of rule 34?
6	a mental and physical examination; it is the wording of	6	A. I think that the resources provided were in line with
7	the rule, isn't it?	7	the contract let by the NHS and were in line with the
8	Rule 34 requires mental and physical examination of	8	resources available in the wider IRC estate pardon
9	every detainee within 24 hours of arrival at the IRC; is	9	me and met the needs as people appeared to see them
10	that your understanding?	10	at that time. That may not be the need as you are
11	A. My understanding is that, within 24 hours, the detainee	11	defining rule 34 at this time, but appear to be
12	should see a GP.	12	consistent with it across the whole estate.
13	Q. For a mental and physical examination.	13	Q. Dr Oozeerally gave evidence that there was one rule 35
14	A. For a mental and physical examination.	14	appointment available a day. Again, did
15	What I am unclear of, or what I kind of look at and	15	G4S Health Services consider that to be adequate at the
16	try to process is, what was the intention and how long	16	time, in order to fulfil the requirements of rules 34
17	should that appointment have been; was it not to assess	17	and 35 working together?
18	whether any further assessment was required and it would	18	A. It would seem that there was considerable discussion
19	appear to me that that was what they were trying to	19	around rule 34 and 35 at the time; that there was active
20	achieve in seeing someone to assess whether they felt	20	comparison between Brook House and other IRCs and that
21	that a further follow-up appointment was required to	21	the approach was consistent and typical of the wider
22	assess their potential to need to put a rule 35 report	22	estate.
23	together.	23	Q. The G4S document, at the time, on detainee reception
24	Q. That is clearly what was happening in practice on the	24	procedures, was inaccurate in suggesting that detainees
25	ground in 2017. What the rules require, though, is for	25	must require or request to see a doctor within 24 hours.
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1	Would you agree that that is not in accordance with	1	level of conversation was or wasn't going on with
2	the rule and, therefore, that document was inaccurate	2	regards to those specific matters in 2017. Obviously,
3	and therefore inadequate?	3	there were a number of reports produced and reviews
4	A. Sorry, I believe the document that you describe is	4	undertaken and I don't remember in my reading of any of
5	inaccurate; my understanding of the process was that	5	those reports it to have been something which was of
6	a detainee on arrival would be seen by a nurse and that,	6	significant concern, or record, that created substantive
7	at that point, the nurse would make an appointment for	7	action. Therefore, I am not sure that it would
8	them to see the doctor.	8	necessarily have been something which was high on the
9	So if the document did not reflect that process,	9	agenda for discussion at a senior level.
10	then it would appear that the document was not	10	Q. Stephen Shaw had, in his January 2016 report, looked at
11	reflecting what was done at the time.	11	rules 34 and 35 and had noted that they were intended to
12	Q. Yes.	12	be a key safeguard in ensuring that vulnerabilities were
13	There was some evidence the inquiry has heard from	13	identified in detainees to the Home Office, but that it
14	Medical Justice, from their case work experience, that	14	was abundantly clear that rule 35 was not fit for
15	detainees were not always seen for a rule 34 appointment	15	purpose and was failing to protect vulnerable people who
16	within 24 hours and that, sometimes, even where	16	find themselves in detention.
17	a disclosure, such as being a victim of torture, was	17	Was G4S Health Services, at a senior management
18	made, a rule 35 assessment was not booked for them.	18	level, aware of those findings in the Shaw report at the
19	Again, that would have been inadequate at the time	19	time?
20	to comply with the rules, wouldn't it?	20	A. I, unfortunately, wasn't there at the time of the Shaw
21	A. If the detainee wasn't seen within 24 hours, indeed the	21	report, and I haven't been able to speak to anybody who
22	rule does say "within 24 hours". In terms of if someone	22	was there to know the answer to that question.
23	has disclosed torture, I am not clear that that	23	Q. Do you know if anything was done by G4S Health Services
24	necessarily directly leads to a rule 35 assessment,	24	to respond to the failures that a rule 34 and 35 process
25	because, if there is no fear of the mental wellbeing of	25	identified by Mr Shaw in that review?
23	because, it there is no rear of the mental wendering of	20	identified by the state in that to the tr
	Page 113		Page 115
1	the individual from their behaviour and state, would	1	A. I don't know with specific reference to the Shaw review.
2			
2	that necessarily lead there? I am not an expert,	2	I do, of course, know from Dr Oozeerally's evidence that
3	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would	3	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss
4	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would necessarily happen.	3 4	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss the effectiveness of rule 35.
4 5	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would necessarily happen. Q. If someone had disclosed they were a victim of torture,	3 4 5	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss the effectiveness of rule 35. Q. He is not senior management in G4S Health Services
4 5 6	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would necessarily happen. Q. If someone had disclosed they were a victim of torture, you don't think it was necessary for them to be assessed	3 4 5 6	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss the effectiveness of rule 35. Q. He is not senior management in G4S Health Services though, is he, Dr Oozeerally?
4 5 6 7	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would necessarily happen. Q. If someone had disclosed they were a victim of torture, you don't think it was necessary for them to be assessed under rule 35(3) at the time?	3 4 5 6 7	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss the effectiveness of rule 35. Q. He is not senior management in G4S Health Services though, is he, Dr Oozeerally? A. No.
4 5 6 7 8	I wasn't there and I am not sure that that would necessarily happen. Q. If someone had disclosed they were a victim of torture, you don't think it was necessary for them to be assessed under rule 35(3) at the time? A. My understanding of rule 35 and it may be my	3 4 5 6 7 8	he was trying to engage with the Home Office to discuss the effectiveness of rule 35. Q. He is not senior management in G4S Health Services though, is he, Dr Oozeerally? A. No. Q. Do you know of any action taken by senior management in
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1	and assess, in his medical opinion, the intent and	1	Were you aware of that?
2	likelihood of further harm from such action.	2	A. I think, as I say, this is a complex area. I am not
3	I believe that that is what I refer to in my	3	an expert in the area and it is difficult for me to make
4	statement, this point.	4	clear commentary on it. All I can say is that, as
5	Q. If we could show on screen, please, <cjs006120>, these</cjs006120>	5	an observer, and listening to Dr Oozeerally, he seemed
6	are the Detention Centre Rules. If we could go to	6	to have the opinion at the time that completing a part C
7	page 11, please. Rule 35 is in the middle. At	7	and sending it to the same Home Office inbox as
8	rule 35(2):	8	a rule 35, that it would be read by the same person and
9	"Requires the medical practitioner to report to the	9	generate action.
10	manager on the case of any detained person he suspects	10	Obviously, I can fully understand that there is
11	of having suicidal intentions."	11	a different interpretation and a requirement of action
12	The rule requires only a suspicion of suicidal	12	from rule 35 as talked about here. I guess there is
13	intention, doesn't it?	13	a difference of interpretation versus practice at the
14	A. It does.	14	time and I would normally have expected engagement
15	Q. Your statement, at paragraph 181, that the majority of	15	between the Home Office, the NHS and other bodies to
16	self-harm incidents did not meet the threshold for	16	have brought that to the fore, and brought that as
17	rule 35(2) of real suicidal intent, doesn't, though,	17	an improvement point which didn't appear to be happening
18	address the very low numbers of rule 35(1) reports, does	18	for some reason.
19	it?	19	Q. What evidence are you aware of that senior management at
20	A. And the fact that they would be injuriously affected by	20	G4S Health Services were raising that issue with anyone?
21	continued detention, no.	21	A. I am not aware.
22	Q. Because rule 35(1) only requires a likelihood of harm,	22	Q. Sandra Calver accepted that, regarding rule 35(1) and
23	not even actual harm, to have been caused, and we see	23	rule 35(2) that there should have been significantly
24	that from the rule, don't we?	24	more of both of those types of reporting in 2017 and
25	A. We do.	25	that the safeguards had failed; do you agree with her?
	Page 117		Page 119
	0		0
1	Q. We know that there were only eight rule 35(1) reports in	1	A. I don't recall that particular piece of Sandra's
1 2	Q. We know that there were only eight rule 35(1) reports in 2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there	1 2	A. I don't recall that particular piece of Sandra's evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations
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2	2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there	2	evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations
2	2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there were no rule 35(2) reports at all in 2017, and we know	2 3	evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations being taken here, that it would be reasonable to have
2 3 4	2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there were no rule 35(2) reports at all in 2017, and we know that, despite high-levels of self-harm and a large	2 3 4	evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations being taken here, that it would be reasonable to have expected higher numbers. As I said, it would appear
2 3 4 5	2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there were no rule 35(2) reports at all in 2017, and we know that, despite high-levels of self-harm and a large number of open ACDTs, 248 in 2017, evidence heard by the	2 3 4 5	evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations being taken here, that it would be reasonable to have expected higher numbers. As I said, it would appear that the numbers that were reported at Brook House were
2 3 4 5 6	2017, only two in the relevant period, and we know there were no rule 35(2) reports at all in 2017, and we know that, despite high-levels of self-harm and a large number of open ACDTs, 248 in 2017, evidence heard by the inquiry from Sandra Calver indicated that she, and	2 3 4 5 6	evidence. I can certainly see, from the interpretations being taken here, that it would be reasonable to have expected higher numbers. As I said, it would appear that the numbers that were reported at Brook House were not inconsistent with the numbers reported across the
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1	the reporting under rule 35(1) and rule 35(2) to the	1	A. I am not sure.
2	Home Office?	2	Q. Are you aware now as to whether, at the time, in 2017,
3	A. By the definitions of which you are interpreting those	3	senior management in G4S Health Services were indeed
4	rules, I can see how you reach that conclusion. I find	4	aware of the low numbers of 35(1) reports and that there
5	it difficult to understand why, if those rules were	5	were no rule 35(2) reports undertaken? Are you able to
6	being so blatantly missed, why is it that the	6	say whether they were or were not aware?
7	inspections of the IMB, Her Majesty's' Inspectorate and	7	A. I don't know.
8	the CQC did not raise these as being serious failings at	8	Q. Your explanation for the lack of those reports was that
9	the time? I would have fully expected that level of	9	there was an understanding by those at the time,
10	oversight and the regular reviews that we undertake on	10	accepted in the knowledge of the Home Office, that that
11	a quarterly partnership and the quality meetings to have	11	is the way it was done and so it wasn't a problem?
12	been raising those as serious issues.	12	A. That is the only inference that I can take from the lack
13	So the sheer fact that so many other modes of	13	of it being raised through any other channel as being
14	oversight were not raising it, makes it, for me, as	14	an important matter to resolve, because, otherwise, as
15	a layman, at this time a confusing picture to try and	15	you suggest, it looks obvious that there was a problem,
16	dissect.	16	but if there was a problem of the scale that has been
17	Q. The statement that the majority of self-harm incidents	17	described, I continue to struggle to understand why it
18	in 2017 didn't meet the threshold criteria for	18	wasn't being brought to the attention of everybody as
19	rule 35(2), doesn't address the fact that there were, in	19	a serious failing, because there was no lack of
20	fact, no rule 35(2) reports in 2017, does it? You are	20	oversight, of detailed reporting and of review of what
21	not suggesting that there were no detainees in 2017 in	21	was going on in the establishment at the time.
22	Brook House about whom there was a suspicion that they	22	Q. If senior management weren't aware of the low numbers
23	had suicidal intentions, are you?	23	indicating a lack of compliance with the rules, they
24	A. No, I don't believe that Dr Oozeerally suggested that.	24	should have been, shouldn't they, at the time?
25	I believe that he suggested, from what I have seen in	25	A. As I said, I would expect that they would have been, but
	Page 121		Page 123
1	his avidance that held rather use part C and as you	1	Loan't avidence whether they did or whether they
1	his evidence, that he'd rather use part C, and as you	1	I can't evidence whether they did or whether they
2	are saying, that may not have been the intention of the	2	didn't. I don't know what reports they read or what
2 3	are saying, that may not have been the intention of the rules at the time, but appears to have been how he	2 3	didn't. I don't know what reports they read or what level of insight they had into the detail of what was
2 3 4	are saying, that may not have been the intention of the rules at the time, but appears to have been how he interpreted it.	2 3 4	didn't. I don't know what reports they read or what level of insight they had into the detail of what was going on at Brook House at the time.
2 3 4 5	are saying, that may not have been the intention of the rules at the time, but appears to have been how he interpreted it. Q. Because we know there were a number of detainees who the	2 3 4 5	didn't. I don't know what reports they read or what level of insight they had into the detail of what was going on at Brook House at the time. Q. Some responsibility for compliance with the rules by
2 3 4 5 6	are saying, that may not have been the intention of the rules at the time, but appears to have been how he interpreted it. Q. Because we know there were a number of detainees who the inquiry has heard about for example, D1527, D1914 and	2 3 4 5 6	didn't. I don't know what reports they read or what level of insight they had into the detail of what was going on at Brook House at the time. Q. Some responsibility for compliance with the rules by those on the ground rests with senior management of the
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1	have thereby flowed from it. I am not sure that I can	1	rule 35(2) reports and only eight rule 35(1) reports in
2	infer, due to the lack of action and required action	2	the whole of 2017, does it? Does that suggest a failure
3	from any of those oversights, that I would expect there,	3	of that oversight mechanism of the contract compliance
4	therefore, to have been any action taken by the senior	4	in relation to the GPs at Brook House in 2017?
5	leadership of health services.	5	A. No, I don't think it does. I think it further points to
6	Q. Wasn't it senior management's responsibility,	6	the interpretation of rule 35 at the time, across the
7	irrespective of what any other body was doing, to ensure	7	whole estate, because what if, as you suggest, there
8	that its staff were complying with their statutory	8	was such a failing, I cannot see how the CQC, the NHS or
9	obligations under the rules?	9	Her Majesty's Inspectorate, none of them decided that
10	A. Yes, of course. But if, at the time the rules were	10	there was a significant failing that required action in
11	being interpreted and enacted in a certain way across	11	this matter.
12	the whole IRC estate, which was understood from forums	12	They were also aware of the number of reports, as
13	and other actions, then that would have been the	13	they were of the number of reports across the wider IRC
14	interpretation of the rule at the time.	14	estate, and I understand that the number that were
15	If, with hindsight, and five years on, we now	15	quoted out of Brook House were not untypical.
16	consider that to be an incorrect interpretation, that	16	In fact, in the wider use of rule 35, I believe that
17	could well be so, but that was not necessarily the view	17	Brook House had more reports converted into detainees
18	taken by any organisation at that time.	18	being released than anywhere else.
19	Q. Did G4S Health Services monitor the training being given	19	Q. You say, at paragraph 56, that any significant
20	to staff on rule 35?	20	performance issues or complaints concerning GPs were
21	A. I believe that there was a training matrix and that, as	21	referred to the company's medical director. Were there
22	in all medical settings, training was important, and	22	any complaints about Dr Oozeerally or Dr Chaudhary
23	I would believe that rule 35 training would have been	23	concerning rule 35 reports or the lack thereof?
24	monitored in the same way as other training.	24	A. Not that I am aware of in the relevant period.
25	Q. Was there any monitoring from senior management of	25	Q. Was it picked up as a performance issue by senior
	Page 125		Page 127
	1 age 123		1 age 127
1	compliance with rule 35? Was that audited at the time?	1	management at G4S Health Services?
2	A. I haven't seen the detail of any audits documents.	2	A. As I reiterate, I don't believe it was picked up by
3	Q. How, then, were the senior management of	3	anybody as being a failing.
4	G4S Health Services ensuring that the legal duties under	4	Q. But it should have been by senior management, shouldn't
5	that rule were being complied with on the ground?	5	it, they did bear some responsibility for those on the
6	A. I don't know.	6	ground complying with their obligations under the rules?
7	Q. You say, at paragraph 57 of your statement, that there	7	You can't just blame it all on everyone else.
8	were no contract compliance issues with	8	A. I am not blaming everyone else. I am trying to consider
9	DoctorPA Limited, who provided the GP services in	9	the environment, that if the way in which the rule at
10	Brook House at the time.	10	the time was interpreted was consistent with as was
11	Did G4S Health Services review DoctorPA or the GPs'	11	expected by the oversight bodies and as was expected and
12	compliance with rule 35 at the time in 2017?	12	seen in the wider IRC estate, then why would we then
13	A. I believe there was a close working relationship between	13	seek to interpret it in a different way? It is clear
14	DoctorPA and the Health Services business, that there	14	that there was discussion about rule 35, and that
15	were daily reviews of practice, that there were	15	Dr Oozeerally gave evidence talking about wanting to
16	quarterly quality reviews and there were quarterly	16	engage with the Home Office about rule 35, so there was
17	partnership reviews which were attended by oversight	17	clearly some issue and discussion around it.
18	bodies.	18	So on the basis that there was issue and discussion
19	I am not aware as to across all of those	19	around it, and that there was training which was
20	different reviews and audits, as to what specifically	20	subsequently provided in 2018, it is obvious there was
21	was reviewed with regards to rule 35. It would be	21	engagement and there was real discussion happening. So
22	surprising if it wasn't covered in some way through that	22	in that sense, it would suggest that there was action
23	amount of oversight and engagement.	23	and awareness.
24	Q. Because it doesn't appear, that oversight and	24	As to exactly how that was being interpreted, and
25	engagement, to have picked up a complete lack of	25	how that was being reported and whether that, therefore,
	Da ~ 124		Dama 120
	Page 126		Page 128
			32 (Pages 125 to 128)

1	could create an inference that there was a failing, I am	1	A. That Sandra has talked about it in the manner in which
2	not sure that I can join the dots that create a failing	2	she did. And that she felt the need to create the
3	from that, because there was so much talk around it. It	3	document, to bring, again, consistency. It was
4	is not like it was ignored, is what I am saying.	4	obviously a point of discussion.
5	Q. But that didn't result in compliance with the rules;	5	Q. She accepted in evidence that it didn't comply strictly
6	would you accept that?	6	with the rule because it built in a delay in reporting
7	A. As the rule is defined today, in 2022, and as it can be	7	with a step of a nurse referral prior to a GP being seen
8	read	8	seven days after the detainee was put on an ACDT.
9	Q. It has not changed, since 2017.	9	Were you aware, as were G4S Health Services' senior
10	A. No, but we are now in version 7 of a document that was	10	management aware at the time, that that pathway didn't
11	in version 4 in 2017, so there is clearly a lot gone on	11	comply with the wording of the rule?
12	around the whole rule 35 thing and continues to be so,	12	A. I don't know. But I think it is taking the rule
13	and the fact we have been talking about it for so long.	13	strictly I can see how you suggest the pathway
14	Q. But the wording of the rule remained the same in 2017 as	14	doesn't apply to the rule. However, if the individual
15	it does now, and whatever discussion there was between	15	is already on an ACDT, and is being or is under
16	senior management and any other body, it didn't result	16	constant supervision, then I guess that, from what I can
17	in compliance with the rules, did it, in 2017?	17	understand from the intent there was, was to understand
18	A. I think it is about the way in which the rule was being	18	whether the individual was at genuine risk of a suicide
19	interpreted and implemented. I think, from what I could	19	attempt.
20	infer, that from Dr Oozeerally's evidence, as I saw	20	And I don't think it was strictly seven days, was
21	it, he talked about the use of part C. Now, that may	21	it? It was up to seven days. It was trying to assess
22	not have been appropriate, that may not have been in	22	the individual, from my reading of that, but my reading
23	line with the rule, but that would appear to be the way	23	may be wrong and I may have misinterpreted it.
24	in which he interpreted it in what he did.	24	Q. Can I look at the use of force, please. At
25	Q. Do you think senior management in G4S Health Services	25	paragraph 172 of your witness statement, you deal with
	D 400		75 404
	Page 129		Page 131
1	was aware of that practice at the time?	1	the F213 form and that some forms were missing or not
2	A. I couldn't conclusively evidence that to be the case.	2	completed during the relevant period, and you speculated
3	However, there was a close working relationship between	3	there as to the possible reasons for that.
4	G4S and DoctorPA and I would be surprised if they	4	Has G4S Health Services taken any steps to ascertain
5	weren't aware of that.	5	the actual reasons that they were missing or not
6	Q. Sandra Calver gave evidence that, along with herself as	6	completed at the time? Was there any investigation of
7	head of healthcare, the Home Office bore some	7	that?
8	responsibility for failings within the rule 35 process,	8	A. No, I don't believe there was.
9	in that they had been aware of the practice being	9	I think we are of course, as we have said in
10	undertaken in Brook House through her involvement with	10	there, we are five years on, and they are documents
11	the IRC forums, as you have alluded to.	11	amongst many and, as I understand it, of all the
12	Do you agree with her that the Home Office bears	12	documents requested by the inquiry in terms of the F213,
13	responsibility as well?	13	less than ten were missing, so it wouldn't suggest that
1.4		l	there was a serious issue of a complete lack of
14	A. I think this is a complex matter and I think the lack of	14	there was a serious issue of a complete fack of
15	A. I think this is a complex matter and I think the lack of clarity has certainly it certainly didn't help.	14	documentation.
	•		documentation.
15	clarity has certainly it certainly didn't help.	15	•
15 16	clarity has certainly — it certainly didn't help. Q. Sandra Calver gave evidence that, as a result of the	15 16	documentation. Q. Has there been any audit of the use of force paperwork
15 16 17	clarity has certainly it certainly didn't help. Q. Sandra Calver gave evidence that, as a result of the lack of rule 35(2) reports being completed, she created	15 16 17	documentation. Q. Has there been any audit of the use of force paperwork undertaken to ascertain if healthcare were completing
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	clarity has certainly — it certainly didn't help. Q. Sandra Calver gave evidence that, as a result of the lack of rule 35(2) reports being completed, she created a rule 35(2) pathway document, and that she brought that to the attention of the Home Office and IRC forum, who approved it. Was senior management at G4S Health Services aware of the use of that pathway at the time? A. I can't evidence that to be the case but I would assume so.	15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	documentation. Q. Has there been any audit of the use of force paperwork undertaken to ascertain if healthcare were completing the forms on all occasions? A. I don't know, that would have been done by CJS. Q. Or as to the quality of the entries? A. Again, I don't know. Q. Because isn't the healthcare aspect of those forms important and the responsibility of senior management of G4S Health Services, as opposed to Care and Justice?

1	is important. It is to do with an individual's welfare	1	Q. It certainly goes beyond expressing a concern or
2	and, as such, of course it is important.	2	a contraindication, a reason not to use force, doesn't
3	Q. So wasn't it important to audit the quality of those	3	it? Yes?
4	entries? The healthcare entry on the use of force form?	4	A. Yes.
5	A. I am sure that the quality of all health documentation	5	Q. Indeed he doesn't raise any concerns or
6	is important, and I would be surprised if it wasn't	6	contraindications, reasons not to use force.
7	audited in some way, shape or form.	7	Was senior management in G4S Health Services aware
8	Q. In the minutes from a meeting on 27 October 2016, it was	8	of that practice by GPs in 2017, that there was
9	stated that rule 42s and 213s are still not being	9	an effective approval of use of force on detainees?
10	completed on all occasions; are you aware of what action	10	A. I don't know.
11	G4S Health Services took as a result of that being	11	Q. If they were, would that have been of concern?
12	minuted in that meeting in relation to a failure to	12	A. I guess I don't understand the context in which the
13	complete the forms?	13	letter was written. I don't see what questions were
14	A. Sorry, October sorry, can you just repeat that?	14	asked and I don't know what he was responding to. So in
15	Q. In the minutes of a meeting from 27 October 2016, it was	15	the context in which you ask the question, yes, of
16	stated that rule 40s, rule 42s and 213s are still not	16	course it is concerning; but, not understanding the
17	being completed all occasions; I was asking whether you	17	wider context around why was that written in that way at
18	were aware of any action taken by G4S Health Services in	18	that time with respect to that particular individual,
19	relation to the failure to complete those forms?	19	I don't know.
20	A. No, unfortunately, I wasn't around in 2016.	20	Q. Have you reviewed the evidence of Dr Bingham and Dr Hard
21	Q. And there is no documentation available as to what	21	on this issue to this inquiry?
22	action, if any, was taken by G4S Health Services, as	22	A. I can't bring it immediately to mind.
23	a result of it being recorded in a meeting that that was	23	Q. They certainly said that this went beyond what was
24	the case?	24	appropriate for a doctor and that here, Dr Oozeerally
25	A. I don't remember reviewing documentation from 2016.	25	should have been raising concerns and contraindications
	D 400		D 425
	Page 133		Page 135
1	Q. Dr Oozeerally, on 27 May 2017, within the relevant	1	due to both his physical and mental health history. You
2	period, completed a fitness-to-fly letter in relation to	2	were not aware of that?
3	D1914, and in that letter he stated:	3	A. No, obviously they are qualified doctors, providing
4	"The above detainee is fit to fly and fit for	4	medical opinions about another doctor. I haven't seen
5	detention. He will need a medical escort due to the	5	the detail. I don't know what detail they have seen to
6	nature of his medical condition. I am happy for	6	have reached that conclusion either.
7	reasonable force to be used (C&R) in order to facilitate	7	Q. Are you aware of how many times the medical emergency
8	the removal."	8	hands off instruction was used by healthcare staff in
9	Was the senior management of G4S Health Services	9	2017?
10	aware of the practice of GPs in providing such letters	10	A. No.
11	to the Home Office in 2017?	11	Q. Why not? Was that not something you expect to be
12	A. I don't know the specifics of operational detail at that	12	recorded?
13	level.	13	A. I don't know whether it was recorded. I certainly
14	Q. That would have been a concern at the time, wouldn't it?	14	haven't seen any registers as such. I am aware it was
15	A. In what way?	15	the action that was expected to be taken if there was
16	Q. Wouldn't it be important for senior management at	16	a problem with use of force.
17	G4S Health Services to be aware of the practice of GPs	17	Q. There wasn't any audit of how many times and in what
18	of completing such letters for the Home Office in	18	circumstances those instructions were required to be
19	relation to patients?	19	being used by healthcare staff in 2017?
20	A. I don't know.	20	A. I don't know.
21	Q. Dr Oozeerally, as I have said, stated there that he was	21	Q. What action did senior management in G4S Health Services
22	happy for reasonable force to be used, which,	22	take to follow up on such an instruction, having been
23	effectively, approves or sanctions the use of force on	23	given during a use of force?
24	D1914 to effect his removal; would you agree?	24	A. I understand that there would have been a debrief and
25	A. That could be inferred from what you read.	25	a review.
	Page 134		Page 136

1	Q. What action would senior management take as a result of	1	As far as you are aware, at the time, was that what
2	that?	2	happened?
3	A. I don't know what specific action they would have taken.	3	A. I haven't seen anything to the contrary.
4	I don't know because I haven't got any record of it	4	Q. In what circumstances would it have been impractical to
5	happening or what action would have been taken.	5	seek authorisation or authority from the Home Office?
6	Q. Are you aware of any other support other than the	6	A. I don't know. I am not aware of just how close and
7	debrief being offered to healthcare staff who were	7	available the Home Office was to the day-to-day
8	required to issue such instructions, at the time?	8	operation.
9	A. No, I do remember some reference to it in a document,	9	Q. Do you have an understanding of who would seek such
10	but I don't recall the detail of that. I am sorry.	10	an authority from the Home Office?
11	Q. How was G4S senior management learning lessons from such	11	A. No.
12	situations?	12	Q. Was it your understanding that detention centre managers
13	A. I don't know how senior management were learning	13	could authorise force, removal from association and
14	lessons. Sandra Calver comes across to me as being	14	temporary confinement under these rules?
15	a very credible and caring manager and I would have	15	A. As you have just read them, yes, I believe that to be
16	thought that, as the manager on site, and with the	16	the case, if there was a particular and immediate
17	regular reviews of her staff and continual development	17	immediate.
18	of them, that there would have been discussion around	18	Q. You state in your second witness statement, at
19	those areas, and I think we probably saw it in some of	19	paragraph 4, that three different organisations bid for
20	the minutes of some of the staff meetings, about talking	20	the GP contract, and that the doctors to be provided by
21	about a variety of issues.	21	DoctorPA were the same doctors who were delivering
22	Q. Was any training provided to healthcare staff about	22	services within Saxonbrook, so this provided for
23	their particular role in a use of force by	23	an element of consistency and continuity of service; is
24	G4S Health Services?	24	that right?
25	A. I think this is an area that we relied on CJS to provide	25	A. Yes.
	Page 137		Page 139
1	training and insight into. As I recall from the	1	O. What other factors influenced you in choosing that bid?
1 2	training and insight into. As I recall from the information, that that is the way in which individuals	1 2	Q. What other factors influenced you in choosing that bid? Or influenced G4S Health Services, I should say, at the
2	information, that that is the way in which individuals	2	Or influenced G4S Health Services, I should say, at the
2 3	information, that that is the way in which individuals would have been trained, would have been to have been	2 3	Or influenced G4S Health Services, I should say, at the time?
2	information, that that is the way in which individuals would have been trained, would have been to have been trained by CJS.	2 3 4	Or influenced G4S Health Services, I should say, at the time? A. I wasn't there and I don't know the detail of the
2 3 4 5	information, that that is the way in which individuals would have been trained, would have been to have been trained by CJS. Q. But they are not healthcare professionals with	2 3 4 5	Or influenced G4S Health Services, I should say, at the time? A. I wasn't there and I don't know the detail of the tender. I know there were two other organisations that
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1	G4S Health Services about giving the contract to the	1	Q. On some of the footage we have seen, both on Panorama
2	company owned by the two existing GPs in Brook House at	2	and on the unbroadcast footage, there was evidence of
3	that time?	3	a mocking and derogatory attitude by some healthcare
4	A. I am not aware that it did, no, remembering those GPs	4	staff towards detainees who were unwell, particularly
5	were not just working in Brook House, but were working	5	intoxicated with spice, and Sandra Calver certainly
6	in the wider IRC estate.	6	accepted in her evidence that those comments were
7	Q. Should that have been a concern, in awarding them the	7	inappropriate.
8	contract, what the IMB have recorded there?	8	Was G4S Health Services senior management aware of
9	A. As I have said, I don't think, from what I have read and	9	that type of behaviour from some members of healthcare
10	understood, that the practice was inconsistent with the	10	towards detainees in 2017?
11	practice in the wider IRC estate at the time. Whether	11	A. I can't comment on whether it was aware. It was clearly
12	it was right or not, obviously, we are discussing and	12	unacceptable.
13	I don't know, but if it was consistent with the wider	13	Q. Some formerly detained persons have given evidence to
14	practice in the wider IRC estate, then I am not sure why	14	the inquiry of rude or dismissive or abusive attitudes
15	it would have been a cautionary point with regards to	15	by healthcare staff to them; do you have any comment
16	the appointment of the doctors.	16	upon that?
17	Q. You mentioned earlier in your evidence that there was	17	A. I think there is no place for unacceptable behaviour by
18	clearly a reliance upon the IMB not raising concerns,	18	healthcare staff in towards any patient. I think
19	and we see that they did, in fact, raise concerns,	19	that the line that must be drawn, however, is the
20	didn't they?	20	concept around dismissive or brusque; that could be
21	A. They raised a note of surprise, didn't they, that that	21	regarding a style rather than an actual intent. So
22	is somewhat short of raising a direct concern around the	22	I think anything that is rude is and inappropriate,
23	performance of the organisation.	23	is completely unacceptable.
24	Q. Are you aware of whether or not that note of surprise	24	However, I think the inference about somebody who is
25	was raised at all with the GPs from DoctorPA Limited by	25	busy, who is trying to do many things, appearing to be
	Page 141		Page 143
1	G4S Health Services at the time?	1	brusque, is not, maybe, the best example of how you
2	A. I have no evidence to suggest whether that was true or	2	would hope that somebody would conduct themselves, but
3	not. I would be very surprised if a report of that type	3	isn't necessarily a reference to their intent or ability
4	not. I would be very surprised it a report of that type		
•	wasn't raised in both the quality the quarterly		·
5	wasn't raised in both the quality the quarterly	4	to deliver a healthcare service.
5 6	quality meeting and the partnering meeting, especially	4 5	to deliver a healthcare service. Q. Did G4S Health Services, at the time, seek to
6	quality meeting and the partnering meeting, especially with the wider attendance at the partnering meetings,	4 5 6	to deliver a healthcare service. Q. Did G4S Health Services, at the time, seek to investigate the nature of detainees' complaints to
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1			
-	know whether that was the case in 2017. We obviously	1	A. No.
2	had a managing director in 2017, a different managing	2	Q. The RCA was belatedly carried out by two other senior
3	director in 2019, who, unfortunately, passed away, and	3	members of staff arbitration a report dated May 2019 was
4	we were on the third leadership at the time, so it may	4	submitted.
5	be something that was done and had passed. I know that	5	Was that the only review carried out by
6	following that report, a full review was taken of the	6	G4S Health Services as a result of the Panorama
7	complaints process and a number of items that have been	7	programme?
8	brought up on that report have since been rectified and	8	A. I don't know. I do find it very surprising that Ms Hill
9	the whole complaints procedure across the business has	9	didn't do the RCA, but obviously we cannot evidence it
10	been changed.	10	because we cannot find the document. So I don't know
11	Q. The report says that there wasn't any formal collation	11	what other reviews may or may not have been undertaken.
12	of complaint outcomes and triangulation with patient	12	Obviously, health services were involved in all of
13	safety and patient experience data; is that something	13	the activities in G4S with regards to reviewing the
14	that has changed now?	14	Panorama programme and actions afterwards.
15	A. I believe so. That report does not make good reading.	15	Q. The RCA report found that contributory factors to the
16	I believe that the only thing I took from reading that	16	failure to treat detainees with respect and dignity
17	report was that, actually, Gatwick was probably the best	17	included lack of attention to dignity and respect
18	performing of our establishments with regards to	18	systemically across the IRC, and it identified root
19	complaints.	19	causes as staff cultural institutionalisation across the
20	Q. At paragraphs 21 and 22 of your statement, you deal with	20	IRC more widely led to patients not being treated with
21	the root cause analysis investigation that was carried	21	dignity and respect. Staff were not supported to
22	out following the Panorama programme, and you say that	22	deliver safe and compassionate care. There was
23	the company was required to submit a root cause	23	a failure of speaking up and reporting concerns or
24	analysis, which is an NHS-led document reporting tool	24	complaint systems and a dysfunctional atmosphere and
25	designed to capture serious incidents:	25	culture that enabled bullying and blame systemically
	Page 145		Page 147
1	"Its purpose is to demonstrate good governance and	1	across the IRC.
2	safety and to also demonstrate lessons learned."	2	Does the company accept the findings of the RCA?
3	The report was delayed, because of the ongoing	3	A. The RCA was conducted in 2019 by two senior managers who
4	police investigation, and you then say:	4	I think were seeking to do well, the mode of the RCA
5	"Due to loss of knowledge, and healthcare's limited	5	took a much wider review of both the healthcare and the
6	role in the police investigation (which was led	6	functioning of the IRC from what I can see through
7	primarily through CJS), the company is unable to say	7	interviewing everybody. It is clear that its view about
8	when clearance to proceed was given, but following this,	8	the wider IRC, and where it was, was an important
9	Ms Hill was commissioned to conduct the required RCA	9	observation and I believe action followed.
	investigation. However, following her departure from	10	Q. The question was, does the company accept the findings
10			
10 11	the company, it was identified that this did not appear	11	of the RCA?
	the company, it was identified that this did not appear to have been done."	11 12	
11			of the RCA?
11 12	to have been done."	12	of the RCA? A. I think we accept the findings. I think it is in the
11 12 13	to have been done." Ms Hill, was she the director of nursing?	12 13	of the RCA? A. I think we accept the findings. I think it is in the context of it being an RCA that I struggle with.
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to have been done." Ms Hill, was she the director of nursing? A. She was. Q. Do you know when she was commissioned to undertake the RCA investigation? A. No, I don't. Q. What were her qualifications and experience? A. I am afraid I don't know. Q. She left the company in November 2018. She reported to Tom Tuppen(?), who was the managing director at the time; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. Why didn't he follow up on the RCA before she left; do	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	of the RCA? A. I think we accept the findings. I think it is in the context of it being an RCA that I struggle with. Q. It went wider than just looking at the particular incidents? A. Yes. Q. But the findings were nevertheless accepted? A. I believe so. Q. What action was taken to address those contributory factors and root causes by the senior management of G4S Health Services as a result of that RCA? A. I believe Mr Cook continued to work with Sandra regarding the outcomes, but, to be honest, I can't remember in detail.

1	G4S Health Services, in 2017, have any system in place	1	Q. In 2016, the HMIP report, at paragraph 1.71, stated that
2	for documenting and monitoring the staffing levels in	2	the rule 35 reports they reviewed did not provide
3	healthcare in each separate institution?	3	an adequate safeguard for detainees with post-traumatic
4	A. They there is a document that has been submitted that	4	stress disorder and no formal assessment of PTSD had
5	showed the rostering by staff type in Tinsley and	5	been carried out in any case. And a recommendation was
6	Brook House, if that is what you mean?	6	made at paragraph 1.80 stating that, where a detainee
7	Q. Was there a system for auditing or monitoring the care	7	claims that they had been tortured, the rule 35 report
8	and treatment received by detained people by agency	8	should include an assessment of PTSD.
9	nurses as opposed to permanent members of staff?	9	Were you aware of that finding and recommendation?
10	A. I don't believe so.	10	A. Not in detail.
11	Q. In 2017, some nurses didn't have training on the role of	11	Q. On page 36, at paragraph 2.37 in that same report, it
12	a nurse during control & restraint because the	12	was stated that complaints about health services were
13	instructors of those courses had been suspended or	13	submitted through the general centre system and
14	dismissed because of their conduct captured in the	14	forwarded to NHS England, which then returned them to
15	Panorama programme.	15	healthcare for investigation. This compromised medical
16	Did any review take place of whether those who had	16	confidentiality and led to unnecessary delays in
17	received that training from those people who had been	17	responses, so that some detainees had left before the
18	suspended or dismissed take place to see if they needed	18	responses arrived, and a recommendation was made in that
19	repeat training?	19	regard, on the same page, at paragraph 2.42, stating
20	A. I don't know, I do remember, from some minutes	20	that the healthcare complaint system should maintain
21	in October 2017, that the deputy director of the prison	21	medical confidentiality.
22	undertook some training with all of the healthcare	22	Were you aware of that finding and recommendation in
23	staff.	23	the 2016 report?
24	Q. That was Steve Skitt, the deputy director; is that	24	A. Not in detail.
25	right?	25	Q. On page 36 at paragraph 2.38, it was stated there was no
	D 440		D 454
	Page 149		Page 151
1	A. I believe so.	1	centre wellbeing strategy, but health promotion
1 2	A. I believe so.Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give	1 2	centre wellbeing strategy, but health promotion information was displayed in the health centre, largely
	Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give		2
2		2	information was displayed in the health centre, largely
2 3	Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give that training, in your view, given he is not a qualified	2 3	information was displayed in the health centre, largely in English:
2 3 4	Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give that training, in your view, given he is not a qualified nurse or a use of force instructor?	2 3 4	information was displayed in the health centre, largely in English: "We were told that some information could be
2 3 4 5	 Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give that training, in your view, given he is not a qualified nurse or a use of force instructor? A. I don't know. I think he was trying to fill a gap, because there was a gap, because of the people that had 	2 3 4 5	information was displayed in the health centre, largely in English: "We were told that some information could be provided in other languages. There was no self-care and wellbeing guidance in the library in any language."
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Was the deputy director sufficiently qualified to give that training, in your view, given he is not a qualified nurse or a use of force instructor? A. I don't know. I think he was trying to fill a gap, because there was a gap, because of the people that had been suspended and left the organisation. And 	2 3 4 5 6	information was displayed in the health centre, largely in English: "We were told that some information could be provided in other languages. There was no self-care and wellbeing guidance in the library in any language." And a recommendation was made:
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24 Q. On page 62: 25 "Detainees who do not speak or read English well Page 153 Page 155 1 should have reasonable access to translated information about health services and health and wellbeing." 2 about health services and health and wellbeing." 3 Again, "partially achieved". 4 Again, in those circumstances, is it really correct to say, as you do at paragraph 126, that all actions from both reports have been completed? 5 from both reports have been completed; 6 that she wouldn't speak to the detained person that made the cearly didn't reach the level at which the IMB expected us to have reached in completing that. 10 However, as you have commented on, the company had completed leaflets and made sure that both translation services were available. I guess that that would be the company's interpretation at the time versus the expectation to meet the need. 11 expectation to meet the need. 12 A. No. 13 Q. Do you think that is an appropriate way to conduct complaints in westigations? 14 A. I think, depending on the nature of the complaint, two where, if it is a complaint that just requires the review of some decumentation, or an approach, then it may be appropriate, but I can imagine, in many cases, that there would be very useful. 24 Would there also have been occasions when there was a genuine need for the assessment and treatment of detainees? 25 A. Indeed, and I think the doctors were trying to meet the	22	Were you aware of that?	22	THE CHAIR: Good idea.
Page 153 Page 153 Page 155 Asold have reasonable access to translated information about health services and health and wellbeing." Again, "partially achieved". Again, in those circumstances, is it really correct to say, as you do at paragraph 126, that all actions from both reports have been completed? A. Well, I guess, in terms of the last one, the company clearly didn't reach the level at which the IMB expected us to have reached in completing that. However, as you have commented on, the company had completed leaflets and made sure that both translation services were available. I guess that that would be the company's interpretation at the time versus the expectation to meet the need. A La paragraph 122 of your first statement, you say: "Some detainces would seek to get fast tracked through the NHS to get on to a hospital waiting list for treatment, on the assumption that being on such a waiting list would prevent deportation until the treatment had been provided and/or seek to stay in the UK until the treatment had been provided." A Indeed, and I think the doctors were trying to meet the page 1. A Indeed, and I think the doctors were trying to meet the	23	A. Yes.	23	MS SIMCOCK: Can I say 3.35, please?
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1	responded to any of those to Medical Justice?	1	somebody else.
2	A. No, I don't know.	2	Q. I see. I just want to ask you, lastly, a couple of
3	Q. Do you know if G4S Health Services ever approached	3	questions about E wing and the use of segregation.
4	Medical Justice as an organisation to discuss any aspect	4	You said in paragraph 161 of your statement that
5	of the recurring issues that arose in those letters of	5	E wing and CSU were generally quieter due to having less
6	medico-legal reports?	6	people and they were therefore better suited for those
7	A. No, I don't know.	7	requiring constant watch due to suicide or self-harm
8	Q. If they didn't, would you have any knowledge of the	8	risk.
9	reasons why they didn't?	9	Did you understand that E wing was used for
10	A. No, I would have no knowledge at all.	10	segregating violent detainees or refractory detainees
11	Q. Brook House was, and indeed is, a closed institution,	11	and those resisting their removal?
12	so, of course, Medical Justice wouldn't have any access	12	A. That was certainly part of E wing, wasn't it?
13	to documentation at Brook House, including medical	13	Q. The inquiry has heard a considerable amount of evidence
14	documentation, beyond the individual cases that they	14	that E wing wasn't a very quiet place. Why did you
15	were involved in, would they?	15	consider that it was, given you weren't there at the
16	A. I believe not.	16	time?
17	Q. I just want to ask you what you mean, at paragraph 147	17	A. I understand that the wider IRC was very busy and very
18	of your report, by saying the company would have	18	noisy. E wing was a much smaller facility with far less
19	welcomed such input, meaningful input, from external	19	cells in it and far greater oversight from both the
20	bodies, which would have improved effective oversight	20	custodial services and the health services, and
21	and governance, and it is disappointing that such	21	I believe that they also had better vision into the
22	bodies, in which you included Medical Justice, didn't	22	cells, such that it was a place that was better
23	provide any such meaningful input.	23	controlled, maybe not ideal, but probably the best
24	What input could they have given in the	24	option in the establishment as it was configured.
25	circumstances that would have been more meaningful than	25	Q. Did G4S Health Services give consideration at a policy
	Page 157		Page 159
	1 agt 137		1 age 137
1	what they were already doing?	1	level to the impact of segregation on a detainee with
2	A. I don't know.	2	mental illness at the time?
3	Q. You say, at paragraph 155 of your statement, that there	3	A. I couldn't evidence whether they did or they didn't.
4	was a disconnect between Medical Justice statements on	4	Q. Does healthcare have a responsibility to assess the
5	fitness for detention and observed behaviour of	5	likely impact of being in CSU on a detained person, as
6	detainees; what do you mean by that?	6	far as you are concerned?
7	A. I think that an opinion provided by Medical Justice	7	A. I think that healthcare has got to be concerned and
8	wasn't consistent with the opinion provided by the	8	medical professionals are, in my experience, extremely
9	doctors.	9	concerned about the wellbeing of individuals.
10	Q. Do you mean that, from their behaviour, detainees seemed	10	I guess it is the choices that have to be made about
11	well, but Medical Justice were reporting that they were	11	what the best balanced options are in the environments
12	unwell?	12	in which they exist and, thus, although not ideal, my
13	A. I am not sure that it is about well and unwell, is it?	13	understanding is that the decisions were made on the
14	I think it is about fitness to detain somebody may	14	basis that E wing was a better option than leaving
15	not be completely well but they could still be	15	individuals out in the wider establishment, which could
	not be completely well, but they could still be	1	
16	perfectly fit to be detained, is my understanding.	16	be noisy, busy, and not necessarily have the oversight
16 17		16 17	be noisy, busy, and not necessarily have the oversight you would hope for for the individual.
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17	perfectly fit to be detained, is my understanding. Q. You are not implying any level of dishonesty on the part	17	you would hope for for the individual.
17 18	perfectly fit to be detained, is my understanding. Q. You are not implying any level of dishonesty on the part of Medical Justice, are you	17 18	you would hope for for the individual. Q. What was your understanding of the role of a GP under
17 18 19	perfectly fit to be detained, is my understanding. Q. You are not implying any level of dishonesty on the part of Medical Justice, are you A. No.	17 18 19	you would hope for for the individual. Q. What was your understanding of the role of a GP under rules 40 and 42 in relation to removal from association
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1	if, in any case, the medical practitioner so advises on	1	First of all, what is your role at PPG?
2	medical grounds."	2	A. So I am the service director for our health industry
3	That was a role of a GP, wasn't it?	3	service line.
4	A. Yes.	4	Q. What does that role entail?
5	Q. And under subsection 9:	5	A. Ultimately, responsible for the operations of the
6	"The manager, the medical practitioner and, at	6	services that we have got across England, so we run
7	a contracted-out detention centre, an officer of the	7	healthcare in 50 prisons and immigration removal centres
8	Secretary of State, shall visit all detained persons who	8	or places of secure secure environments.
9	have been removed from association at least once each	9	Q. Who do you report to?
10	day for as long as they remain so removed."	10	A. I report to the managing director for our primary care
11	So a medical practitioner had to visit every day if	11	business.
12	a person was on rule 40. Again, that is a rule	12	Q. And he reports, I think, to the chief executive?
13	particular to a GP in an IRC, isn't it?	13	A. That's correct.
14	A. Yes.	14	Q. In the context of the IRCs at Gatwick, you line manage,
15	Q. The purpose of those visits and there is a similar	15	I think, the regional director for the south region of
16	provision under rule 42 was to ensure the detained	16	which that service forms a part; is that right?
17	person's welfare, so a safeguarding role, would you	17	A. That's correct.
18	agree?	18	Q. You say that you have worked in the Health in
19	A. Yes.	19	Justice sector since 2007, and have held a number of
20	Q. How was G4S Health Services senior management monitoring	20	management and leadership roles during this time. Just
21	whether the GPs in Brook House were fulfilling that	21	very briefly, what type of roles have you had over that
22	safeguarding of the detainees' welfare under those rules	22	period of time?
23	in 2017?	23	A. So all operational roles, so heading up services,
24	A. I don't know. However, I do know there were daily	24	regional management roles, regional director roles and,
25	meetings between healthcare and the doctors. I would	25	more latterly, my current role as service director.
	9		
	Page 161		Page 163
1	h	,	O. W
1	have assumed it was covered in that.	1	Q. You say you joined PPG in June 2016, and you commenced
2	MS SIMCOCK: Thank you. Chair, I have no further questions	2	in your current role in January 2021; is that right?
2 3	MS SIMCOCK: Thank you. Chair, I have no further questions for this witness. Do you have any questions?	2 3	in your current role in January 2021; is that right? A. That's correct.
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1 1 A. In most instances, yes. employed GPs. 2 2 Q. So the role of healthcare in an IRC is, therefore, not Q. But, at the moment, they are still the subcontracted GP 3 3 service; is that right? just to provide primary healthcare to detainees, but 4 also to provide important clinical safeguards which 4 A. That's correct. 5 identify who is vulnerable to harm in detention and to 5 Q. And, as you say, you will take a phased approach to, 6 notify the Home Office of those people, so that their 6 first of all, employing some GPs but also subcontracting 7 continued detention can be promptly reviewed and that 7 8 they might be removed from detention; is that right? 8 A. Yes, that's correct. 9 9 Q. Just pausing there, for a moment, what are the reasons A. That's correct. 10 10 Q. You, in terms of the company, were reliant upon the for moving towards employing GPs directly rather than 11 subcontracting that service, what are the benefits to 11 existing healthcare staff transferring over from 12 G4S Health Services to PPG when you took over the 12 doing that? 13 contract in relation to Brook House; is that right? 13 A. I think, organisationally, that is always our 14 A. So, for staff that are specifically delivering service 14 preference. I think we tend to find that GPs that we 15 15 on the ground, yes, largely that is the case, supported employ directly can, at times, be more engaged with 16 16 by a team of bank and agency staff as well. services, they certainly feel more embedded at times 17 17 Q. At paragraph 9 of your witness statement, you say: with the team. I also think it helps us in terms of 18 "The most senior individual employed by PPG based at 18 supporting their professional development, we invest 19 the IRC in Gatwick is the head of healthcare ... who is 19 heavily in our GP workforce, so, when it comes to things 20 also the CQC registered manager responsible for the 20 like training, it offers us a greater flexibility to 21 service. This individual holds primary responsibility 21 support them with that. 22 for the running of the service and partnership working 22 Q. I see. But, currently, at any rate, and for the 23 with the operator and the Home Office, taking the lead 23 immediate foreseeable future, the current arrangements 24 on local meetings and daily briefings." 24 for healthcare provision by PPG have been informed by 25 25 both Sandra Calver, as head of healthcare, and by Is that right? Page 165 Page 167 A. Correct. 1 Drs Oozeerally and Chaudhary as DoctorPA Limited; is 1 2 O. That was -- as it was in 2017, that is now 2 that right? 3 3 Sandra Calver; is that right? A. That's correct. 4 4 Q. The inquiry has heard evidence from the three of them. 5 5 Q. And so she holds primary responsibility for making sure Did you hear their evidence? 6 that PPG complies with the safeguards required to be 6 A. I have heard Sandra Calver's evidence, but I didn't hear 7 7 operated in Brook House; is that right? either of the GP evidence. 8 A. Yes, not in isolation, so there is obviously a team that 8 Q. Why not? 9 support her with that, but, yes, primarily speaking, on 9 A. Largely because, when we originally were invited to give 10 10 a day-to-day basis, that would be Sandra. evidence, we decided to split down our evidence, so I am 11 Q. In relation to the GPs, DoctorPA Limited, who PPG 11 here for more of an operational perspective and my 12 12 colleague Dr Sarah Bromley(?) is here from more of subcontracts to provide primary care services, those are 13 the same now as they were in 2017, Dr Oozeerally and 13 a medical perspective, so it felt more suitable that we 14 14 Dr Chaudhary; is that right? divvy out the evidence -- observing the evidence --15 15 A. That's correct. They don't -- they only provide the GP O. So if there are --16 16 part of the primary care service, though. The rest of A. -- on this (overspeaking). 17 17 it would be provided directly by our employed nurses. Q. -- points that come directly out of their evidence that 18 18 you cannot answer, then she will be able to answer those Q. You say in your statements that you are transitioning 19 19 away from subcontracting to DoctorPA Limited to for us? 20 20 a mixture of both subcontracted and employed doctors; is A. Hopefully so, yes. 21 that right? 21 Q. Does -- given you have heard the evidence of 22 22 A. Yes, so I think the intention is to take a phased Sandra Calver, does her evidence cause you any concern 23 23 approach to this, whereby, over time, we would reduce on the part of PPG about her continuation as head of 24 the involvement of DoctorPA within these services, with 24 healthcare at all? 25 an aim to eventually run the services with full-time, 25 A. No, I think it is clear from Sandra Calver's evidence Page 166 Page 168

1			
_	that there is some work that needs to be done, certainly	1	I think the notion that to carry out an assessment on
2	around things such as rule 35. However, as	2	somebody within their first 24 hours when they are
3	an individual, I believe Sandra Calver is a registered	3	likely to be very vulnerable, very emotional and have
4	clinician. We have had no concerns in terms of her	4	a lack of a lack of trust, really, in people of
5	professional practice. She appears, from what we have	5	authority, I would suggest that is quite a difficult
6	known of her for a very short period of time, to be	6	assessment to do in such an early point in which
7	quite caring and compassionate and seeks to do the right	7	somebody has been detained, but, yes, I understand that
8	thing in the interests of our patient group.	8	is the purpose and that was the thinking behind the rule
9	Q. You have confidence in her to fulfil her obligations and	9	being written.
10	responsibilities in relation to her role in Brook House?	10	Q. Yes. You will be aware from listening to
11	A. Yes, I think, obviously, with training and support	11	Sandra Calver's evidence but we heard from her that the
12	for additional training and support from the wider PPG	12	GP appointments carried out within the first 24 hours
13	organisation.	13	were, at the time, five minutes long and are now
14	Q. You yes, so let's look at, please, then, rules 34	14	ten minutes long, and that that really is not enough
15	and 35 of the Detention Centre Rules. Are you aware of	15	time to do a fully-compliant rule 34 medical
16	the content of those rules?	16	examination, which requires a full physical and mental
17	A. Yes.	17	examination. Would you agree with that?
18	Q. Rule 34 requires a physical and mental examination, used	18	A. I think it is a very difficult question to fully answer.
19	to identify vulnerabilities in detainees and it could,	19	I think the wording of the rule is not very specific
20	and should, result in a rule 35 report, where	20	around the extent to which an assessment is required.
21	appropriate, so that the Home Office is notified	21	So, for example, for a mental health assessment, that
22	promptly, at the outset of detention, of those	22	could involve a whole hour's appointment with
23	vulnerabilities and that detained person's detention	23	the psychiatrist, for example, that is one extreme, so
24	reviewed. Is that your understanding of the rule?	24	I think it is unclear and I think it is fair to have
25	A. Correct.	25	heard evidence over the last few days that there is
	Page 169		Dage 171
	1 age 109		Page 171
1	Q. That is particularly important as a rule because the	1	a bit of a lack of understanding around the purpose of
2	Home Office doesn't have any pre-detention medical	2	rule 34.
3	screening tool to identify vulnerabilities before	3	Q. Dr Oozeerally also said in his evidence that it was not
4	detaining a detained person; would you agree with that?		
5		4	possible to do the sort of physical and mental state
	A. Largely speaking, the Home Office may not. We may	5	possible to do the sort of physical and mental state examination required at that initial GP appointment and
6	A. Largely speaking, the Home Office may not. We may sometimes have prior information based on depending		1
6 7		5	examination required at that initial GP appointment and
	sometimes have prior information based on depending	5 6	examination required at that initial GP appointment and he described it as being really only triage. Would you
7	sometimes have prior information based on depending on where the detainees come from. So, for example, if	5 6 7	examination required at that initial GP appointment and he described it as being really only triage. Would you agree with that?
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1	complied with, so that a rule 34 rule 35 report can	1	within the constraints of the service.
2	be done immediately as a result of that appointment?	2	Q. So it is still a case of trying to manage those people
3	A. So I think our understanding previously would have been	3	in detention, as opposed to using the statutory
4	that the spirit of rule 34 was around identifying	4	mechanism to have their detention reviewed by the
5	immediate risk and then ensuring that there is follow-up	5	Home Office; is that right?
6	action to be taken.	6	A. Yes, I think it is around the delivery of healthcare
7	I think, when you consider the evidence of Dr Hard,	7	rather than just the Home Office process, that's
8	whereby he stated that these would need to be	8	correct.
9	significantly longer appointments, at the moment, within	9	Q. Is the Home Office aware from PPG that only ten minutes
10	the service, we would not have the capacity to do that	10	are allocated to those rule 34 appointments?
11	to any great extent, so I think, operationally, we are	11	A. I could neither confirm nor deny what they are or are
12	trying to make the best we can of the safeguards we have	12	not aware of. My understanding is they are very closely
13	got within the resources available to us.	13	involved with the service, so I would be very surprised
14	Q. Those initial appointments, as Dr Oozeerally confirmed	14	if they didn't, but that would probably need to be
15	in his evidence, are clearly not leading to rule 35	15	a question for the Home Office.
16	reports directly as a result of those first	16	Q. Have you raised with them that those appointments are
17	appointments. Do you accept that at least one reason	17	only ten minutes and, therefore, cannot comply with the
18	for that is that they are so short? It is simply not	18	rule 34 full mental and physical examination,
19	possible to complete the examination and a report within	19	potentially leading to a rule 35 report?
20	a ten-minute appointment?	20	A. No, I personally haven't, no.
21	A. I am not sure I completely agree with that. I think,	21	Q. Have they ever raised any concerns with you or PPG, to
22	for me, there is clearly learning to be done around	22	your knowledge, about the length or the provision
23	rule 35, and I think, with better education and	23	generally of those appointments?
24	understanding around rule 35, whilst the current process	24	A. I don't believe so, no.
25	may not be ideal, it would still serve a purpose, given,	25	Q. Are you taking any steps to allow for more time to be
	Page 173		Page 175
	1 age 1/3		1 age 1/3
1	as I have already said, the context of the resources	1	afforded to those initial appointments?
2	available to us and the volume of patients that we would	2	A. So we are currently in the process of undertaking
3	be required to see.	3	a review of our pathway for rule 35. So that is a piece
4	Q. But it does build in delay, doesn't it? The Home Office	4	of work that will take place in April.
5	are certainly not being informed, at the outset of	5	Obviously, from that, we will make decisions around
6	detention, about these people; they are continuing to be	6	what we need to do if we need to extend those
7	detained because their detention is not being reviewed,	7	appointments, and that may need to be a conversation
8	there are effectively delays built in to those	8	that we have with NHS England as our commissioning body.
9	arrangements, aren't there?	9	Q. Yes, because PPG subcontracts the GP services to
10	A. Yes, so a follow-up rule 35 appointment would be roughly	10	DoctorPA Limited, so it would be within PPG's power to
11	two days, so I accept that creates an element of delay.	11	obtain more resources from them, in terms of either the
12	But, as I mentioned before, I think, to some degree,	12	time the GPs who are there are using to undertake those
13	there is also some benefit in having a slight time lag	13	appointments or to require more GPs to carry out the
14	between people arriving and that assessment taking	14	service?
15	place, if needs be, because it allows you to try and	15	A. So I believe there is scope within the contract for us
16	build up a greater level of trust with the individual so	16	to negotiate around the amount of time that the doctors
17	you get a more open and honest and transparent	17	would spend on site, yes.
18	consultation.	18	Q. Has there been any review of the contract in order to
19	Q. That might occur in some cases, but there is at least	19	make compliance with rule 35 and 34 something that is
20	also the possibility, isn't there, as the rules are	20	front and centre in the contract in terms of being a KPI
21	designed to prevent, that someone remains in detention	21	or having penalties applied if those rules are not
	5 1	1	complied with?
22	and deteriorates during that time, isn't there?	22	complied with?
22 23		22 23	A. So, at this stage, no. We are seeking to engage with
	and deteriorates during that time, isn't there?		•
23	and deteriorates during that time, isn't there? A. Yeah, that is absolutely possible and there are other	23	A. So, at this stage, no. We are seeking to engage with
23 24	and deteriorates during that time, isn't there? A. Yeah, that is absolutely possible and there are other safeguards in place to try and identify those	23 24	A. So, at this stage, no. We are seeking to engage with DoctorPA, so, as I said, there is a workshop that

been invited to attend that, so we would like to use some of their knowledge as well, in terms of informing our pathway and our processes, in order to develop a PPG, I suppose, operating procedure, really, around rule 3 and rule 25. Once that piece of work has been conducted, then, if needs be, we can review the contract with Decript Ay, sely, and I think we would keek to work in the spirit of partnership with them and try to work and educate them rather than impose financial plenalties. Q. Has the been, or in their included to be, any eviews and whether Discardy A I similar, in the form of Decreatily and Chandrugy should retain the contract and should continue to be working at Brook House at all? At At this stage, no. At I said, we would seek to work with the decreas inwheed. I think it is fair to say— as I said, there has been quite widespread missunderstandings, shall we say, around the application of those particular rules and, therefore, I think we of those particular rules and, therefore, I think we of these particular rules and, therefore, I think we of these particular rules and, therefore, I think we of these particular rules and, therefore, I think we of the subcontracting services. In relation to the follow up those processes. Page 177 1 there consideration being given to employing them directly in PPG, in the dature, in Brook House, deciration being given to employing them of these particular in the subcontracting services. In relation to the deciration. She accepted that the was somethine that they were keen to explore further with us. Page 177 1 there consideration being given to majolying them of the particular that was a supplying too high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that be a high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that be a high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that be a high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that be a high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that be a high a diverball. She gaves some evidence that a high a diverball she was a profession of the services				
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a PPG, I suppose, operating procedure, really, around rule 34 and rule 35. Once that piece of work has been conducted, then, if necks be, we can review the contract with DoctorPA, yes, but I think we would seck to work in the spirit of partnership with them and try to work and educate them rather than impose financial penalties. Q. That is a concern, ion't it, if it is still a continuing stratution? A. Ves, and, as I said, that is why we have put in place plans to mitigate that risk. So, organisationally, we want to take an organisational position rather than this be based on the experience of one or two individuals. I think, as I said, it does appear, from having 12 Drs Ovezenlly and Chaudhary should retain the contract 13 and should continue to be working at Brook House at all? 14 A. At this stage, no. As I said, we would seek to work 15 with the doctors involved. I think it is fair to say— 16 as I said, there has been quite widespread 17 misonderstandings, shall we say, around the application 18 of those particular rules and, therefore, I think we 18 pone to seek and clarity a PPG position first, and then, 29 you know, have very clear expectations with the doctors 20 follow up those processes. 21 Q. Vou mentioned that there is going to be a phasing out of 22 that work in the service that they would be expected to 23 follow up those processes. 24 O. You mentioned that there is going to be a phasing out of 25 individuals, though, Dr Ovezeenlly and Dr Chaudhary, is Page 177 1 these consideration being given to employing them 2 deceived in PPG, in the future, in Brook House 2 page 179 1 these consideration being given to employing them 3 deceived in PPG, in the future, in Brook House 2 possess that the world have explored that 4 option with both GPR prior to the service going live. 5 I don't believe that that was something that they were 6 lecen to explore further with us. 9 Q. I see. In relation to rule 35, Sandard Calver accepted 10 table very the processes and the proper stating 21 debenium. She acc	2	some of their knowledge as well, in terms of informing	2	A. Well, I was, at the point at which that evidence was
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1	their role in safeguarding vulnerable detainees by	1	Q. You have talked about developing the pathways in
2	rooting them out of detention where they are likely to	2	order and liaising with the Home Office in order to
3	be harmed by detention?	3	address this issue. Is there anything else that PPG is
4	A. I wouldn't say they are more important, because I think,	4	doing to ensure that reports are being completed when
5	if you are running a service that purely only manages	5	they should be under the rules, in circumstances where,
6	risk and isn't effectively treating people, then it is	6	even up to January of this year, they are not being?
7	reasonable to assume that people will deteriorate;	7	A. So I think, once the pathway is agreed and is
8	therefore, that is not good for their health either. So	8	formalised and we are not a particularly bureaucratic
9	I think both need to be taken in equal measure.	9	organisation, so that shouldn't take a significant
10	Q. What action does PPG intend to take, in particular in	10	amount of time we are quite confident, after the
11	relation to the rule 35(2) pathway drafted by	11	workshops are held, that can be written up. The
12	Sandra Calver?	12	expectation would be that that would be audited so that
13	A. The purpose of the workshop is to agree what our	13	we can ensure compliance.
14	pathways will be going forward. So a new policy will be	14	Q. And audited how and by whom?
15	written around that. That will be a national policy and	15	A. Primarily, audits would be undertaken by the site. But
16	we will expect the service (inaudible) at Gatwick to be	16	I think, given the significance of the rule 35 and the
17	compliant with that policy.	17	level of scrutiny it has come under, then it may well be
18	Q. Is there a need for a pathway when the rules are clear	18	that we decide to audit that at a regional level with
19	themselves, the rules require notification under the	19	the regional medical lead who is a GP responsible for GP
20	three different limbs when the threshold is met?	20	services within that region.
21	A. So yes, I think there is a need for a pathway, and the	21	Q. In paragraph 15 of your first witness statement, you say
22	reason for that is that rule 35 you know, the	22	that provision is made for two rule 35 appointments per
23	process, itself, is probably more simple, but actually,	23	day, then that is over and above the provision that PPG
24	as we have heard in evidence, it requires staff	24	has made for primary care services.
25	identifying patients and making the GPs aware of them,	25	Do you consider that to be sufficient provision?
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	Page 181		Page 183
1		1	A Tabinhahad desiring has been beened on the municipal
1	so this is not just about a simple process with the	1	A. I think that decision has been based on the previous
2	Home Office, it is about trying to change a culture and	2	ways of working and interpreting those rules. It may
2	Home Office, it is about trying to change a culture and change the attitude and beliefs of the people that work	2 3	ways of working and interpreting those rules. It may well be that we do need to review that following the
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1	day?	1	further and report back to the inquiry.
2	A. Yes, I think the challenge is what is practical as well,	2	Q. Thank you. Would you accept, though, that whether it is
3	so, obviously, not every patient that is reviewed under	3	one or two appointments a day, given the prevalence of
4	rule 34 will need a rule 35. Therefore, it is	4	the conditions we have just talked about and their link
5	an ineffective use of a GP's time for a rule or	5	with vulnerabilities and, therefore, the necessity for
6	an appointment length that would facilitate a rule 35	6	the safeguards to apply, that that is likely to be
7	appointment to be offered to every single individual and	7	inadequate provision going forwards, in terms of rule 35
8	that, I think, is the balance that we are trying to	8	appointments?
9	understand and work through.	9	A. Yes, as we discussed, there are certain elements of the
10	Q. Would you agree that a high proportion of detainees in	10	rule 35 that appear to be non-compliant at this moment
11	immigration detention have clinically significant levels	11	in time. Therefore, that may increase demand for that
12	of depression, PTSD and anxiety as Dr Bingham gave	12	particular part of the service.
13	evidence about?	13	Q. Yes. Were you aware of the IMB report of 2021 that
14	A. Yes.	14	reported on the year from January 2020 to December 2020?
15	Q. And are you aware that PTSD is frequently linked with	15	A. I have seen that report, yes.
16	a history of torture or other forms of serious	16	Q. Appreciating that that was before PPG took over the
17	ill-treatment?	17	contract because you started, as you said,
18	A. Yes, I am.	18	in September 2021, it would have been important for PPG
19	Q. Would you agree that detention is likely to precipitate	19	to understand what the situation had been in the period
20	significant deterioration of mental health in the	20	prior to taking over, wouldn't it?
21	majority of cases?	21	A. Yes.
22	A. I would have to be led by experts in that area but it	22	Q. That report described the lack of any rule 35(2) reports
23	seems reasonable to me that detention could pose as	23	to be puzzling in the light of the scale of self-harm
24	a trigger for patients who have a diagnosis of PTSD,	24	and suicide threats made during the latter part of 2020,
25	yes.	25	when there were compressed charter flights and the IMB
	Page 185		Page 187
1	Q. And detention can also, for example, increase self-harm	1	said, "We cannot reconcile the evidence of frequent
2	and suicidal ideation?	2	suicidal ideation with there being absolutely no
3	A. Yes.	3	rule 35(2) reports". You would agree that is of
4	Q. Given the high prevalence of people with PTSD and of	4	significant concern?
5	people who are likely to have a history of torture, and	5	A. I would agree that is of significant concern, yes.
6	who are therefore likely to be harmed in detention,	6	I don't believe that IMB report was made available to us
7	their prompt identification to the Home Office is	7	as part of the tendering process, though, so normally
8	essential?	8	you would receive a health needs analysis that is
9	A. Yes. I would agree.	9	commissioned by NHS England that would indicate the
10	Q. Because prompt identification can lead to rule 35, which	10	current level of provision and gaps in service
11	might may lead to their release from detention?	11	provision. I can't absolutely categorically state, but,
12	A. Yes.	12	from memory, I don't recall any documentation to suggest
12 13	A. Yes.Q. Dr Oozeerally gave some evidence that there are	12 13	from memory, I don't recall any documentation to suggest that that provision was inadequate at the point at which
		1	
13	Q. Dr Oozeerally gave some evidence that there are	13	that that provision was inadequate at the point at which
13 14	Q. Dr Oozeerally gave some evidence that there are currently delays in getting through the number of	13 14	that that provision was inadequate at the point at which we were tendering for the service.
13 14 15	Q. Dr Oozeerally gave some evidence that there are currently delays in getting through the number of rule 35 reports that need to be done and there is	13 14 15	that that provision was inadequate at the point at which we were tendering for the service. Q. PPG statistics on ACDTs indicate that 73 were opened
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
1	that period so in the period from September 2021	1	would be provision for extra mental health resource,
2	to December 2021 despite the 45 constant watch ACDTs.	2	which could allow focus on preventative measures to
3	Dr Oozeerally, as I have mentioned, gave evidence	3	alleviate stress and anxiety. The response, in other
4	that he is still not completing rule 35(2) reports, and	4	words, from the Home Office, was that healthcare staff
5	he gave evidence now over two weeks ago. Has PPG taken	5	had not requested any additional resource. Does your
6	any steps immediately to address that discrepancy?	6	existing contract allow you to ask for more resources if
7	A. No, I think we took a conscious decision that we wanted	7	you need them?
8	to ensure that we had a full and robust process and	8	A. So we can ask for more resources if we need them, yes.
9	policy in place rather than just making an immediate	9	That would be via NHS England rather than the
10	snap decision to put something right. As I said,	10	Home Office because they are responsible for
11	I think this is about a whole system approach review	11	commissioning and funding the provision of healthcare,
12	rather than just putting in place, for want of a better	12	but what I would say is I think our model is different
13	phrase, a sticking plaster over an issue.	13	from the model that was previously on offer under the
14	Q. Isn't the risk of that, though, Mr Wells, that detainees	14	previous provider and I think we have already built into
15	are remaining in detention with suicidal ideation,	15	that an element of delivering proactive healthcare, so
16	meaning the threshold for a rule 35(2) report has been	16	things, for example, such as talking therapies, our
17	reached but hasn't been completed, exposing them to	17	Making Sense Programme, which is a trauma-informed
18	a risk of further harm in detention because their case	18	programme aiming to support people with low-level
19	has not been notified and, therefore, reviewed by the	19	anxiety, managing low-level mental health conditions.
20	Home Office?	20	So I think we have already made provision for that
21	A. I accept that, and I think, as I said, the lack of	21	within our existing contract, but if we felt that that
22	rule 35 doesn't necessarily mean that they are not	22	was not sufficient, then we would engage in
23	receiving any healthcare provision or any treatment, but	23	a conversation with NHS England to explore that further.
24	in terms of their detention or their potential release	24	Q. What about exploring further resource for the rule 34
25	from detention, that is currently a gap that we are	25	and 35 appointments in circumstances where reports still
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
	Page 189		Page 191
1	seeking to address.	1	are not being completed under two limbs of the rule in
2	Q. At paragraph 32 of your witness statement, you say:	2	circumstances where there are high-levels of self-harm
3	"Due to the nature of how IRCs operate, high volumes	3	and suicidal ideation?
4	of patients arriving at once, especially during the	4	A. So that may well be a route that we need to take.
5	night, can place a strain on staffing levels, however we	5	I think, obviously, we are conscious of use of the
6	have in place appropriate mechanisms to support our	6	public purse and we would look to seek to understand
7	staff during such peak periods of demand by utilising	7	what else we could do to redesign our services to
8	a shortened version of the initial reception screen."	8	accommodate that. So, for example, I do believe that
9	Again, in relation to that, isn't there a greater	9	there is more that the nursing team could do to take
10	risk that that will contribute to further delays in	10	some of the workload away from the GPs. We also have
11	identifying vulnerabilities.	11	a nurse that is undergoing advanced clinical practice,
12	A. No, I don't believe so. I think there are a couple of	12	so we will be able to deliver a significant chunk of
13	observations on that particular point. Firstly, since	13	what currently sits with the GP. So it may be that we
		14	can reconfigure some of our existing services, but if we
	we took over the service we have actually incressed the		
14 15	we took over the service, we have actually increased the		
15	staffing on a night from that of the previous profile so	15	have reached the point whereby the service is no longer
15 16	staffing on a night from that of the previous profile so we have an additional nurse that works over at	15 16	have reached the point whereby the service is no longer tenable in that regard, then we would be having
15 16 17	staffing on a night from that of the previous profile so we have an additional nurse that works over at Tinsley House.	15 16 17	have reached the point whereby the service is no longer tenable in that regard, then we would be having conversations with NHS England about that.
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1	report was at a time when there were substantially fewer	1	incidence of use of force being used to deal with
2	detained people at Brook House. In quarter 3 in 2020,	2	incidents of self-harm. Were you aware of that?
3	there were 339 detained persons, and in quarter 4, 254;	3	A. Yes.
4	whereas, in 2021, in the same period, there were 574 and	4	Q. And they also noted proportionately large numbers of the
5	464 detainees respectively.	5	use of rule 40 and constant watch to manage vulnerable
6	Again, the problems are likely to be compounded, are	6	detainees; were you aware of that?
7	they, with greater numbers of detained people in	7	A. Yes.
8	Brook House?	8	Q. Sandra Calver confirmed in her evidence that use of
9	A. Yes, absolutely. That is common sense really. I think	9	force is still used for relocation of detainees to
10	what we would say is our experience of the service thus	10	E wing and segregation is still used for managing mental
11	far has been on a significantly lower operational not	11	health issues, suicide risk and for detainees on
12 13	capacity, I can't think of the word I am looking for,	12	a constant watch, and there is no clinical risk
13	but the role, in essence, has been lower. Therefore,	14	assessment for those not going to the CSU but going to
15	that has been our experience thus far, but we are very	15	segregation on E wing. Are those matters for concern for PPG?
16	adapt to changing services when the need arises. So, for example, if a — a change of purpose in two of our	16	
17	prisons, for example, where courts have been closed and	17	A. They are, yes. I think warrant further exploration,
18	we have had to take significantly more new arrivals, we	18	yes. Q. Use of force risks exacerbating and damaging further the
19	have the ability to amend our services at relatively	19	mental health of a vulnerable detainee; do you agree
20	short notice.	20	that use of force shouldn't be occurring in relation to
21	Q. Is that also a consideration that PPG are planning to	21	vulnerable detainees unless it is immediately to prevent
22	review the allocation of resources to the rule 35	22	a risk to life?
23	process, given an uptake in the number of detainees?	23	A. I think if it is a planned use of force, then there
24	A. Yes, so as part of our modelling, as I have said,	24	should be a discussion that is held in conjunction with
25	I think we need to understand the process that we are	25	healthcare so that the centre management can make
23	1 think we need to understand the process that we are	23	iteatificate so that the centre management can make
	Page 193		Page 195
1	endorsing, first of all, in conjunction with the	1	a decision as to the appropriate way forward with our
1 2	endorsing, first of all, in conjunction with the Home Office, and then we would need to look at what	1 2	a decision as to the appropriate way forward with our advice. I don't think it could ever be categorically
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1	deficiencies in the safeguards, so people are being	1	believe is happening is that that is triggering
2	manage indeed detention and not rooted out of detention	2	a further rule 35 review in most cases at least.
3	because of delays in the rule 34 and 35 process, and	3	Q. So does PPG plan to address that gap?
4	where there is use of force and segregation to manage	4	A. Yes. So as part of the rule 35 pathway review, that
5	incidents of self-harm, there risks a situation like	5	will also consider what work needs to be done to
6	there was in late 2020 which the IMB described as	6	understand there are regular follow ups or reviews.
7	subjecting the whole detainee population to inhumane	7	I think there are already processes in place to flag
8	treatment?	8	whereby we have concerns around an individual, we run
9	A. So I think I would go back to my earlier comment really	9	a multi-professional complex case conferences on a
10	around rule 35, so accepting that there is an element of	10	weekly basis. Those kinds of things could be discussed
11	non-compliance with rule 35, and that does present	11	there, but also we have things like a duty mental health
12	a risk, I still think that there are safeguards in	12	worker who could flag any immediate concerns and bring
13	place, ie we understand these patients, we understand	13	those to the attention of the head of healthcare and, if
14	their needs and therefore we should still be in position	14	necessary, the GPs.
15	to advise detention officers on the appropriate use of	15	Q. Yes.
16	force.	16	Did you watch the Panorama programme?
17	Q. That situation that the IMB found, that Brook House	17	A. I did watch it, yes.
18	wasn't a safe place for vulnerable detainees and that	18	Q. You are aware then of the involvement of some healthcare
19	the circumstances there amounted to inhumane treatment	19	staff in making derogatory and mocking comments about
20	of the whole detainee population, happened under the	20	detainees. You would presumably agree that those types
21	watch of Sandra Calver as head of healthcare and of the	21	of comments have no place from healthcare staff in
22	doctors that you subcontract to currently. Isn't that	22	an IRC?
23	of concern to you?	23	A. I agree with that question.
24	A. So, yes, I think it is.	24	Q. And with Sandra Calver that they are completely
25	I think what I would say is inhumane is subjective.	25	inappropriate and would be of concern if you were aware
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1	I do believe that vulnerable — you know, an Immigration	1	of them?
2	Removal Centre is probably not the right location for	2	A. That's correct.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Removal Centre is probably not the right location for certain vulnerable individuals in general. So I don't believe these people should be there to start with. I am not sure quite how much of that realistically is within our gift to manage. I accept that there is more work we can do in that regard. Q. In particular in relation to rule 34 and 35? A. Correct. Q. The IMB recommended a systematic and ongoing review of vulnerable detainees to monitor the effect of continued detention on their wellbeing. Dr Hard gave some evidence that it was his opinion that there was a need for such a system of ongoing review of vulnerable detainees in detention. Has there been the introduction of a systematic and ongoing review of vulnerable detainees in detention? A. So vulnerable individuals would be reviewed as part of the delivery of healthcare services. So, for example, those with severe mental health would be assigned a caseworker within the mental health team that would meet with the individual regularly and, obviously, as part of their assessment would understand if people were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. That's correct. Q. Does it concern you that at the time, as head of healthcare, she was unaware of them? A. So I think it is — it is a difficult question to answer in some ways. Can we hold an individual, even though they are the head of healthcare, responsible for the actions of individuals? Some would argue yes; some perhaps no. I think the reality is that — I think in evidence Sandra Calver said she was very surprised about that. It is a very small team who work in a very small and confined environment and by virtue of the fact it is a secure environment that means that people are pretty much on top of each other, if I am honest. So I would have been very surprised, having got to know Sandra a little bit since she has joined the organisation, if she had any concerns or suspicions that the behaviour of staff was not in line with what she would expect, that she wouldn't have addressed that. Q. What steps have or are PPG taking with regard to ensuring a culture of dehumanising and degrading detainees doesn't persist in Brook House? A. There are a couple of things really.

1	clinical supervision is embedded with our clinical team.	1	of force and that has been ruled out across our whole
2	That is not just to review incidents, it is about	2	organisation. I think it is about to commence in a site
3	talking around reflective practice, having discussions	3	and will be on a phased roll out.
4	around things like compassion fatigue and, really,	4	Q. Yes, because it is clear they didn't understand that in
5	having a safe space for people to be honest about some	5	2017; would you agree?
6	of the things that they are struggling with and the	6	A. Either they didn't understand it or chose not to enforce
7	challenges that they have.	7	their role, yes.
8	I think on a broader scale we are currently working	8	Q. And appreciating that force is of course used sometimes
9	·	9	in prisons, the difference in the population is that you
10	with an external organisation to look at how we better	10	1 1
11	embed trauma informed care within that service and there	11	have a particularly vulnerable population in IRCs in terms of underlying mental ill-health or experiences of
12	are four themes to that really: one is around a general	12	
13	level of training that you would expect anybody to have,	13	trauma, particularly in relation to being victims of torture, would you agree?
14	if I am honest even the detention custody officers we	14	
15	are very happy to open up that training to them. That	15	A. I don't think it is always unique. So, for example,
	is around basic awareness of trauma informed, looking at		HMP Huntercombe, which is a prison, is used to house
16	things like adverse childhood experiences, those kinds	16	foreign nationals. So I think there are definitely some
17	of things.	17	transferable skills within the prison estate that we can
18	The second is around a more detailed training that	18	bring to the Immigration Removal Centre setting.
19	is given to healthcare professionals so they can	19	Q. But those aspects of the population certainly need to be
20	understand or better identify signs of trauma but also,	20	particularly considered in relation to training in
21	working within the course of their general duties, be	21	relation to use of force, would you agree?
22	able to assess for trauma. So that is another point.	22	A. So every prison is unique, or every Immigration Removal
23	I think there are some bigger ambitions that we have	23	Centre is unique, and it needs to cater for the needs of
24	but that will require further work with Serco, as the	24	the people that are detained there.
25	operator, for us to implement. So that will be around	25	Q. Would you agree with Dr Hard that there needs to be
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1	the leadership team unitedly challenging things like	1	better training in relation to healthcare's role in the
2	language and behaviours, and then the fourth element,	2	ACDT process, and in particular that there needs to be
3	which is quite aspirational but nonetheless is one that	3	some understanding of the link between those who are on
4	we want to pursue, is around understanding what elements	4	ACDTs and the safeguards under rule 35 applying?
5	of detention can re-trigger people around their trauma	5	A. So I don't necessarily agree that there needs to be
6	and trying to avoid those.	6	further ACDT training. My understanding is that is
7	So it is a four-pronged approach that we are looking	7	an annual training programme that is delivered by Serco,
8	to develop to try and prevent the exact scenario that	8	who are the operator, and the feedback is that that
9	you would have seen on the Panorama documentary.	9	generally appears to be very good and comprehensive. I
10	Q. I just want to finally then ask you about some of	10	think the issue is around the link to rule 35 and it is
11	Dr Hard's recommendations, particularly in relation to	11	really training around rule 35 that we need to resolve.
12	training and various aspects.	12	Q. That would address that link?
13	Would you agree with him that better training is	13	A. Yes.
14	needed for both detention and healthcare staff in the	14	Q. Including in relation to food and fluid refusal and the
15	use of force?	15	link between those who refuse food and fluids and,
16	A. Yes, absolutely. In fact we have also taken steps to	16	potentially, the applying of the safeguards under
17	address that ourselves.	17	rule 35?
18	So for the last year because use of force is	18	A. Yes.
19	equally used within our prison establishments, so the	19	Q. Would you agree with him that training ought to be
20	principles are exactly the same. So we have been	20	provided aimed at addressing compassion fatigue and
21	working with there is no off-the-shelf training, it	21	desensitisation of staff as to what they encounter at
22	is very clear. So we have been working with our	22	Brook House?
23	director of nursing, consulting with colleagues who	23	A. Yes, as I have already said, I think that will be
24	offer things like C&R training, for example, so nurses	24	included in the trauma informed training that we are
25	are absolutely clear what their role is within any use	25	looking to roll out.
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1	Q. You have already addressed that there should be better	1	currently being offered, you said that you would need to
2	training in relation to rule 35, as Dr Hard also agrees.	2	seek further clarity from the Home Office before making
3	Do you consider it is PPG who should be supplying	3	a commitment around the level of resource that might be
4	that training or some other organisation?	4	required to offer more than a ten-minute appointment.
5	A. I think it is a joint responsibility. I think it is	5	Do you intend to have that conversation with the
6	really evident that there is a lack of clarity around	6	Home Office?
7	rule 35. Therefore my view is that there should be some	7	A. Absolutely. My understanding is the Home Office have
8	training that is delivered by the Home Office, as it is	8	already suggested locally to Brook House that there
9	a Home Office policy or ruling; but that equally should	9	needs to be some form of either further training or
10	then be followed up as I said, it is not just around	10	review of that, so I would expect that is a good forum
11	the process for rule 35, it is a whole system approach	11	in which we could explore further discussion around what
12	around the identification of people and the pathway then	12	exactly is involved or what is their understanding of
13	that those people need to go through in order to get	13	what exactly is involved by the term "assessment" within
14	their appropriate assessment.	14	that ruling.
15	So I think it is a joint responsibility and it has	15	THE CHAIR: Okay, thank you.
16	two elements to it.	16	Then finally, again, Ms Simcock asked you some
17	MS SIMCOCK: Thank you.	17	questions around this, the discrepancy in the numbers of
18	Chair, those are all the questions that I have for	18	people on constant watches towards the end of 2021, in
19	this witness. Do you have any questions?	19	contrast to the lack of rule 35(2) reports and,
20	THE CHAIR: Thank you, Ms Simcock.	20	obviously, I understand, from what you have told us
21	I do have a couple of questions for you, Mr Wells,	21	about some of the reviews, that you are going to be
22	thank you.	22	commencing and looking at that as an issue, and your
23	Questions from THE CHAIR	23	answer to Ms Simcock was you didn't want to make any
24	THE CHAIR: I wonder if you could tell me a little about the	24	immediate snap decisions around that.
25	timeframes for the review of the pathway, the rule 35	25	Have you given any consideration to the potential
	1 3/		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
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1	pathway that you are undertaking?	1	issue that there are people now in detention currently,
2	A. When you say	2	who are not going to be going to be referred for
3	THE CHAIR: The timeframe, so when did you start it, when	3	rule 35(2) appointments where there has been suicidal
4	will it be concluded?	4	ideation expressed?
5	A. It is commencing on 20 April.	5	A. Yes, I think so. I have discussed that with Dr Bromley,
6	THE CHAIR: The 20th?	6	and I think our view is clear, whilst we accept that
7	A. Yes.	7	there is an element of risk within that, I think there
8	THE CHAIR: When is it due to conclude?	8	is also an element of risk, in terms of bringing in
9	A. We haven't got obviously, it depends what falls out	9	a series of changes to working practice which can be
10	of that event. As I said, we are not particularly	10	confusing to staff and, given that this is
11	bureaucratic, so I would hope that we'd have	11	a long-standing issue, it is not a new issue that has
12	a better-informed policy, at least, within a few weeks	12	been operating for some time, I personally am in favour
13	of that taking place. Obviously, depending on what the	13	of an approach whereby we take a very clear approach.
14	findings are from that particular piece of work, if that	14	Whilst that will involve, you know, roughly a three- or
15	does involve, you know, service redesign or	15	four-week wait, I think it is a much better way forward
16	conversations with our Commissioners, then that could	16	than us to go out with a number of different directives
17	extend that period.	17	to the team that are trying to deliver these services.
18	So it is a little difficult to give you	18	THE CHAIR: Thank you. I have no other questions, I am
19	a definitive, but I would expect, at least, that we	19	grateful for your evidence and I am sorry we have kept
20	would have a policy on it by the end of the month.	20	you a little late, but it has been important to hear
21	THE CHAIR: End of?	21	from you, so thank you.
22	A. End of April, sorry.	22	A. Thank you.
23	THE CHAIR: End of April. Okay, thank you.	23	MS SIMCOCK: Chair, in the evidence of Mr Dove, I neglected
24	In response to one of the questions that Ms Simcock	24	to ask for his second witness statement to be adduced,
	•		
25	asked you around the ten-minute appointment that is	25	so I just do that now, it is at <c3500 4042="">.</c3500>
25	asked you around the ten-minute appointment that is	25	so I just do that now, it is at <cjs0074042>.</cjs0074042>
25	asked you around the ten-minute appointment that is Page 206	25	Page 208



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