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1	Monday, 4 April 2022	1	front of you which will be on green the whole time, but
2	(10.00 am)	2	if you can raise your voice a little bit?
3	THE CHAIR: Good morning. Thank you. Take a seat,	3	A. Sorry, is that clearer, Mr Altman?
4	Mr Riley.	4	Q. At the moment, yes. I will remind you if it isn't.
5	MR PHILIP JAMES RILEY (sworn)	5	How long have you been in your current position?
6	Examination by MR ALTMAN	6	A. I took up my post just over three and a half years ago
7	THE CHAIR: Mr Altman.	7	now, so from September 2018.
8	MR ALTMAN: Give us your full name, if you would, please,	8	Q. Yes, and did you take over that position from
9	Mr Riley.	9	Clare Checksfield?
10	A. Sorry, yes, my full name is Philip James Riley.	10	A. There was a short period where Alan Gibson was the
11	Q. Mr Riley, can you confirm, please, that you have	11	acting director between Clare moving into a new role and
12	provided two witness statements to the inquiry, the	12	myself taking up post, but pretty much so, yes.
13	first dated 12 November last year, and your more recent	13	Q. Yes. In your paragraph 5 of your first witness
14	statement, 3 February of this year?	14	statement, you talk about, having rewatched the Panorama
15	A. Yes, Mr Altman, I can confirm that I have submitted	15	documentary, you shared the shock felt by your
16	those witness statements.	16	Home Office colleagues, predecessors and ministers at
17	I would also like to take the chance, in addition to	17	the treatment of people detained at Brook House by some
18	the witness statements, to apologise to the people at	18	G4S staff. How many times, in fact, did you watch
19	Brook House in 2017 who suffered the distressing	19 20	Panorama?  A. I have watched it in full three times now, so I watched
20 21	incidents we saw in Panorama.	20	· ·
22	You know, I have reflected over the period and, you know, the failures in the contract, in the level of	21 22	it, you know, in preparation of the statement, I watched it this weekend just gone, and I watched it before
23	Home Office supervision, you know, are deeply	23	I applied for the job of Director of Detention and
24	distressing for everybody and I would like to open today	24	Escorting Services.
25	just to apologise about that.	25	Q. So you will remember, Mr Riley, by way of example, on
23	just to apologist about that.	23	Q. 30 you will remember, the react, by way of example, on
	Page 1		Page 3
1	Q. Thank you for that.	1	25 April 2017, Yan Paschali, with his hands around the
2	Just coming back to the formalities	2	throat of a detainee ciphered as D1527, a vulnerable
3	A. Sorry, sir.	3	man, verbally abusing him and threatening to put him to
4	Q. Did you annex to your second witness statement	4	sleep. And the same man being called a "idiot" and
5	a document which sets out the Home Office's response to	5	a "tool" and suchlike by another G4S staff member, or,
6	various recommendations by various reports?	6	for example, on 13 May 2017, D687, also a mentally
7	A. Yes.	7	fragile man, threatening to kill himself to avoid
8	Q. Chair, those are respectively <hom0332005>, that is the</hom0332005>	8	a transfer, while securing his neck by a ligature to
9	first statement; <hom0332051, is="" second="" td="" that="" the="" witness<=""><td>9</td><td>a bracket over a lavatory before force was used on him,</td></hom0332051,>	9	a bracket over a lavatory before force was used on him,
10	statement; and <hom0332050>, which is the annex which</hom0332050>	10	and he was one of those who should never have been there
11	I just made mention of.	11	because he should have been released under rule 35(1)
12	THE CHAIR: Thank you.	12	in other words, continued detention was injurious to his
13	MR ALTMAN: Mr Riley, tell us something about yourself to	13	health, and under rule 35(2), because he held ideas of
14	begin with, please, what position do you occupy within	14	suicide.
15	the Home Office?	15	But you will appreciate he was not released and the
16	A. I am the Director of Detention and Escorting Services,	16	use of force that was used on him ought not to have been
17	so I am responsible for the operation of immigration	17	used in the way it was because, according to the expert,
18	removal centres in-country and overseas escorting, the	18	matters should have been de-escalated by talking to him
19	procurement of new operating contracts and, at the	19	more.
20	moment, for the next couple of weeks, the six secure	20 21	That is another example that you will have been
21	processing hotels.	21 22	familiar with by watching the programme, presumably?
22 23	Q. Now, it may just be me, Mr Riley, I am struggling to hear you. Can you move a little forward in your seat?	23	A. I remember the incidents from the programme, Mr Altman.  I am not sure I have seen the detail of the rule 35(1)
23	A. Of course, of course.	24	and rule 35(2) reports on the witness, so I couldn't
25	Q. And, obviously, you have got those two microphones in	25	judge whether or not he should have been released or
	Page 2		Page 4

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1	not.	1	undercover reporter is expressing concern about that
2	Q. On 17 May, a C&R instructor advising that a man	2	man, D1914, returning, Dan Lake saying "Give him a right
3	protesting on the netting being advised by the	3	hook, mate". Does that shock you?
4	instructor, the junior officer being advised by the	4	A. Yes.
5	instructor, to call him "nigger" and how they would	5	Q. On 14 June, Dan Small, another officer at G4S a G4S
6	assault him; do you remember that?	6	officer at Brook House, saying that he didn't like
7	A. Again, I remember the clip from the documentary, yes.	7	London and, when asked why not, saying "Spot the white
8	Q. Finally, just an example from the documentary on 14 June	8	person when you go to London". Racism.
9	a man, stupefied by taking spice that had been clearly	9	A. Yes.
10	smuggled into the IRC, being called a "div" and	10	Q. The same man, on the same day, reportedly saying, in
11	a "scrotum" by the DCM?	11	response to hearing about the Grenfell Tower fire, "Oh
12	A. I remember the clips yes.	12	well, that is less a few less foreigners in England",
13	Q. Do you agree, therefore, just by those examples and	13	and then saying that he thought the country would be
14	clearly by the apology you made at the beginning of your	14	better off without foreigners and that the job in
15	evidence, Mr Riley, that we all need reminders of the	15	other words, the job of working at Brook House had
16	awfulness of that place during the relevant period?	16	made him racist. Were you familiar with that?
17	A. I say, Mr Altman, I apologise for what was happening and	17	A. No.
18	the distress those individuals suffered at the time.	18	Q. On the next day, 15 June I am just giving you some
19	You know, there were failings, as I say, in our	19	examples, all of which have come out in the evidence,
20	supervision of the contract and in the way the contract	20	Mr Riley
21	itself was written.	21	A. Hmm.
22	Q. Yes, we will come back to that in due course.	22	Q Sean Sayers, talking to staff members about
23	Do you agree, in the position you now occupy,	23	an incident earlier that day with another detained man,
24	Mr Riley, that it is necessary to avoid the risk that	24	D313, during which he is alleged to have assaulted him,
25	focus on the management and oversight processes relevant	25	saying, "Literally, picked him up off his feet, took him
	D 5		D 7
	Page 5		Page 7
1	to the running of Brook House shouldn't mask the human	1	to his room, threw him onto his bed, I slipped,
2	suffering and distress that we have witnessed when we	2	accidentally landed on him and then accidentally helped
3	view all of the underlying footage?	3	myself up off his face"; were you familiar with that?
4	A. Yes, I do. If I understand your question correctly,	4	A. No, I wasn't, Mr Altman.
5	yes, I do. I think we cannot forget the underlying	5	Q. These are all instances which were not screened on
6	human suffering that was exposed in Panorama, but we	6	Panorama but they have filled our time not all of it,
7	can't ignore the underlying individuals in detention at	7	but some of our time during the course of these
8	any stage, I think is your question.	8	hearings. Were you unfamiliar with these?
9	Q. Have you, yourself, watched any of the disclosed but	9	A. I haven't got the exact phrases and words. So my team
10	unbroadcast footage or have you limited yourself to the	10	provide me with a daily summary of the hearing, but, you
11	Panorama documentary?	11	know, that is all I intend to watch more of the
12	A. I have limited myself to the documentary, sir.	12	evidence when I get the chance. It is a particularly
13	Q. We have lots of examples, all of which have come out in	13	busy operational time at the moment, as we prepare for
14	the course of the evidence, and hopefully some of this	14	this year's small boat arrivals, put our contingencies
15	is familiar to you. On 27 May, Dan Lake saying of	15	in place and look to reprocure the operating contracts
16	D1914, "If he dies, he dies" were you familiar with	16	for Derwentside and Heathrow, so I have to prioritise my
17	that?	17	time between business-as-usual activity and keeping in
18	A. No, no.	18	touch with the inquiry.
19	Q following a discussion about this man being removed,	19	This week alone, despite being here today and in
20	he already having had three triple heart bypasses and	20	Derwentside, actually, on Thursday, I still have 40-odd
21	a heart attack, and he wasn't the only one to use the	21	other meetings this week to undertake, so I rely on
22	phrase, "If he dies, he dies". Were you familiar with	22	Richard O'Connor and the team to provide me with the
23	that phrase at all?	23	summary, and that summary doesn't always include every
24	A. I remember the individual in the documentary, yes.	24	bit of detail of the evidence, I am afraid.
25	Q. The next day, when Callum Tulley he is the BBC	25	Q. Well, let me give another example from the evidence.
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1	On 19 June, Sean Sayers, another employee of G4S,	1	capability, capacity, to absorb that much hits a buffer
2	calling D720 a "cunt" and a "fucking dick" and saying	2	at some stage, and if I needed to prioritise a different
3	"I am going to skull fuck you" saying to this man,	3	order, then I apologise, but it wasn't through lack of
4	"I am going to skull fuck you like the little bitch you	4	effort on my behalf.
5	are", in the presence of other staff members and	5	Q. One could question why you left it until Saturday?
6	detained people. None of it's acceptable, is it?	6	A. I have been reading
7	A. No. And you know, as I have already said, Mr Altman,	7	MR BLAKE: Sorry, chair, that document was only notified to
8	I apologise for the distress that the people at	8	the Home Office on Saturday, so that is an unfair
9	Brook House suffered at that time.	9	complaint. If Mr Altman would like this witness to look
10	What you are saying, you know, are more and more	10	at that document, we can take five minutes and we can
11	examples of the behaviours we saw in the documentary	11	look at that document. We have the whole day, there is
12	that are unacceptable, and I accept that.	12	no rush, and I don't see why he can be criticised for
13	Q. Moving slightly away from footage that you haven't had	13	a document that was notified to him on Saturday.
14	the capacity to watch and were unfamiliar with, are you	14	MR ALTMAN: Yes, when we were asked if there were any
15	aware of and this has also come out of the evidence,	15	further documents only on Friday.
16	but this isn't footage are you also aware of a man	16	I am not going it take the time to ask Mr Riley to
17	who was a DCO but acted up as a DCM by around 31 July of	17 18	look at it. I am simply questioning what he has looked
18	2017 by the name of Derek Murphy? Does that name ring		at, and why, when we were asked if there were extra
19	any bells with you?	19	documents, and a table of extra documents of which there
20	A. It doesn't, no.	20	were about half a dozen were sent on Saturday morning,
21	Q. He punched a detained person, D2953, on three occasions	21	Mr Riley didn't look at one of the documents which was
22	in June 2017 on the 10th, 11th and 16th to various	22	put in that list. It is as simple as that.
23	parts of his body. D2953 made various complaints about	23	THE CHAIR: Thank you.
24	these matters in that month, including a formal	24	MR ALTMAN: Did you listen, Mr Riley, to the evidence of
25	complaint on 23 June. But these matters were not	25	Gordon Brockington on Thursday last, on 31 March have
	Page 9		Page 11
1	invested by the PSU until October 2017.	1	you had an opportunity for that?
1 2	invested by the PSU until October 2017.  You should have seen some documentation to this	1 2	you had an opportunity for that?  A. No, I have looked through the transcript of his
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1	Brook House at the time or his personal view, but	1	going on, certainly G4S knew about it in 2014 and, if
2	I would take a different view if I were faced with such	2	they did, should they have brought it to the
3	an allegation.	3	Home Office's attention?
4	Q. If you look at your paragraph 7 of your first witness	4	A. I would expect a supplier to bring a concern like that
5	statement, at page 3, you say:	5	to the Home Office, and I think, as Mr Hewer made clear
6	"Even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not	6	on Friday, you know, culturally, Serco feel that they
7	consider that there had been any indication that the	7	would do that if that were to occur now.
8	abuses in question were in any way inevitable."	8	Q. In that same paragraph of your witness statement, do you
9	What do you mean by that?	9	see where you say:
10	A. What I mean was that, you know, I don't think that they	10	"The absence of obvious, visible warning signs may
11	were bound to have happened and that we could have	11	also account for Home Office staff not reporting any
12	predicted they were going to happen and taken taking	12	apparent abuses during the relevant period."
13	corrective action at the time. So, as I go on to say	13	Presumably, you mean the front line Home Office
14	here, you know, I am reminded of the Brook House report,	14	staff in Brook House at the time?
15	that the board has seen and heard nothing. There were	15	A. That's correct, yes.
16	no obvious visible warning signs that may account for	16	Q. You add:
17	the Home Office actions. So we hadn't seen, at that	17	"I believe that had any Home Office staff seen
18	stage, Mr Altman, you know, to the absolute benefit of	18	anything of concern during the relevant period, they
19	my knowledge, and I have spoken to staff who were there	19	would have reported it. As a senior leader in the
20	at the time, we hadn't seen the warning indicators that	20	organisation for three years, who spends much of his
21	might have instigated a further, more in-depth review by	21	time inside our IRCs, I am very confident that, were
22	Home Office staff at the time.	22	Home Office officials to become aware of any
23	Q. The report that you are referring to is the IMB report	23	reoccurrence of this kind of treatment, it would not go
24	for 2017.	24	unchallenged."
25	A. Hmm.	25	Out of interest, how much time have you spent in
	Page 13		Page 15
1	O <ver 000138=""> at page 4 and perhaps we can put it up</ver>	1	Brook House since you have been in post. Mr Riley?
1	Q. <ver000138> at page 4, and perhaps we can put it up,</ver000138>	1 2	Brook House since you have been in post, Mr Riley?
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2 3	Zaynab.  The passage I suspect you had in mind is that which	2 3	A. I visited Brook House a number of times and Tinsley House next to it as well. I was last in
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1	perhaps, than your predecessor's? Do you know if they	1	we have reasonably have predicted that this would have
2	were more frequent than your predecessor's?	2	happened? And, you know, not as I say, but, with
3	A. I think they were more frequent than my predecessor, for	3	hindsight, perhaps our assurance measures should have
4	various reasons. You know, Clare had some mobility	4	been better.
5	problems and she, you know, when she went out to the	5	Q. You continue:
6	centres, she perhaps didn't, you know, go out and about	6	"There were clearly organisational failings on the
7	as much as I do. I have a different leadership style to	7	part of the Home Office, mostly in the areas of
8	Clare. It is not to say mine is better or her's is	8	performance management and assurance which subsequent
9	better but we have different styles.	9	reports into our oversight at Brook House have rightly
10	I you know, I spent 20-something years in the	10	highlighted. I imagine that the inquiry is likely to
11	Prison Service, and I am used to operating in a closed	11	hear evidence of a combination of factors that created
12	institution. I feel comfortable going out on my own and	12	the very challenging operational environment of
13	speaking to residents, and there is a degree of	13	Brook House at that time (including a high proportion of
14	usefulness on being on my own, without supply or	14	particularly challenging time-served foreign national
15	Home Office staff, and just sitting there sometimes and	15	offenders, and the proliferation of dangerous
16	talking to residents and having a cup of tea with them	16	psychoactive substances). Nonetheless, whilst I accept
17	and listening to their experiences. Not just of	17	that the environment at this time was a very challenging
18	detention, but of their experiences in general.	18	one for staff, I do not accept that there was any excuse
19	Q. When you go, as you seem to be forgive me as you	19	for some of the appalling behaviour perpetrated by
20	seem to be implying, do you go around the whole	20	certain individuals in the documentary."
21	building, for example, do you go on the residential	21	That is your position, Mr Riley, and one assumes you
22	wings, all of them, the E wing, CSU or are your visits	22	have not changed your mind?
23	limited?	23	A. No.
24	A. They vary depending on the time I've got, what is	24	Q. Paragraph 6, if you just go back, of your first witness
25	happening. Over the last couple of years, on Covid, you	25	statement.
	Page 17		Page 19
1	know in the units the outbreak I have had to take	1	A Vos
1 2	know, in the units, the outbreak, I have had to take	1 2	A. Yes.
2	a decision whether or not I have gone on it. Sometimes	2	Q. I may have a wrong reference I just thought it was
2	a decision whether or not I have gone on it. Sometimes I see specific units, sometimes I take the whole tour,	2 3	Q. I may have a wrong reference I just thought it was paragraph 6, I may be wrong. Somewhere, you say you
2 3 4	a decision whether or not I have gone on it. Sometimes I see specific units, sometimes I take the whole tour, sometimes I just go where it takes me, at times.	2 3 4	Q. I may have a wrong reference I just thought it was paragraph 6, I may be wrong. Somewhere, you say you may remember this that you remain clear in your
2 3 4 5	a decision whether or not I have gone on it. Sometimes I see specific units, sometimes I take the whole tour, sometimes I just go where it takes me, at times. They are not particularly pre-planned when I visit	2 3 4 5	Q. I may have a wrong reference I just thought it was paragraph 6, I may be wrong. Somewhere, you say you may remember this that you remain clear in your opinion that the misconduct in question was perpetrated
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1	conduct of certain G4S employees."	1	Q. She attended C&R training, on 22 February 2018, with G4S
2	You may be aware that the inquiry has heard a good	2	and other staff. Perhaps unknown to her, she was also
3	deal about lack of leadership, failures of oversight,	3	attending with charity workers from an organisation
4	about what that means for institutional practice, and	4	known as Hibiscus. This was five months after Panorama,
5	culture on the ground, and about how behaviour and	5	when, I am sure you will agree, it might reasonably be
6	attitude cascades downwards.	6	expected that greater care would have been shown
7	Are you aware of those themes which have littered	7	especially around issues of use of force.
8	through the hearings?	8	Can we just look at a document which is in your
9	A. Broadly, Mr Altman, broadly.	9	bundle, Mr Riley whether or not you looked at it,
10	Q. Paul Gasson, is that a name that is familiar to you?	10	maybe you will tell us when we put it up on the screen.
11	A. Yes.	11	A. Is it in the first bundle?
12	Q. The Home Office compliance manager, he was a little	12	Q. Don't worry about the bundle, I am going to put it up on
13	reluctant to accept that, as the Home Office and the	13	the screen. <hom005908> page 9, please, and perhaps the</hom005908>
14	detaining body with responsibility for detention, he set	14	first page first, Zaynab. You will see it is
15	the standards and tone.	15	an immigration enforcement document:
16	What do you think about that?	16	"An investigation into alleged misconduct by
17	A. Well, I cannot comment on Mr Gasson's personal view, but	17	Vanessa Smith, and if we go to page 9, please, these
18	I do know that the current head of operations,	18	summarise what the allegations were:
19	Michelle Smith, who, I think, submitted a witness	19	"Allegation 1: in reference to an incident on Monday
20	statement, and the current service delivery manager at	20	night where an officer had punched a detainee in the
21	Gatwick, Simon Murrell, are very clear about role	21	face (several detainees had barricaded themselves in
22	modelling behaviours.	22	their room and had weapons and had made the floor wet
23	It is something I believe strongly in, that the	23	and soapy. An officer was apparently the last one
24	senior leaders should role model the correct behaviours.	24	standing and punched one of them), Vanessa from the
25	And give that leadership to the staff and that is not	25	Home Office said he deserved it and 'had it coming'.
	Page 21		Page 23
1	just at that level, it is at my level as well. And	1	[Someone] then said 'We don't say that, Vanessa'.
2	I have been very clear, since taking up post, to send	2	"For the reasons given above, I find that on the
3	out weekly messages to staff, setting out important	3	balance of probabilities, there is a case to answer."
4	messages from myself, which I think are key, I have	4	There was a second allegation, which Mr Norton, the
5	staff, staff calls, I have done a lot of work on staff	5	investigation manager, investigated:
6	culture with my oversight team, both operational and	6	"Allegation 2: Vanessa from the Home Office seemed
7	non-operational staff, to make sure that, you know, that	7	to have a very negative attitude towards detainees.
8	messaging is there and the expectations of senior	8	This was shown through laughter at comments made,
9	leaders are clear to staff at all grades, both	9	comments she made herself and her general attitude to
10	operational and non-operational, in Detention Services.	10	violence, eg 'I'd go to town on them'.
11	Q. He did concede that he was at least part of the culture,	11	"For the reasons [which are given throughout the
12	but are you agreeing that the onsite Home Office	12	report], I find on the balance of probabilities, there
13	official contributes to the institutional tone and	13	is no case to answer."
14	culture, and helps set it?	14	So did you manage to see that document when you did
15	A. I think it is far easier now to do so, that we have	15	your reading?
16	a stronger team and a better delineation of	16	A. No, I didn't see this one, Mr Altman.
17	responsibility but, equally, yes, I think all leaders	17	Q. In relation to that second allegation, it was
18	have a responsibility to set the tone, but, you know,	18	substantiated by G4S in an investigation they had
19	I refer later in my statement, I know, to the increase	19	conducted previously, albeit, as we see, not by the
20	of staff we put in there, at Brook House and other IRCs	20	Home Office, if we go, please, to a different document,
21	and to have a team dedicated to the compliance and the	21	<hom005901> first of all at page 1, "Investigation into</hom005901>
22	relationship with the supplier. I think that also goes	22	the inappropriate behaviour and language used by C&R
23	to set the tone of what is expected as well.	23	instructors during ITC training at Brook House IRC".
24	Q. Are you aware of the Vanessa Smith case?	24	If we go, please, to page 8, we will see allegation
25	A. No, sir.	25	12 there were several allegations against several
	D 00		D 0:
	Page 22		Page 24

people during the course of this investigation,  Mr Riley, but allegation 12:  "Vanessa from the Home Office seemed to have a very negative attitude towards detainees. This was shown through laughter at comments made, comments she made herself and her general attitude to violence"  As we saw in the Home Office document "I'd go to town on them":  "All three of the Hibiscus staff reported a significant level of concern around the behaviour of Vanessa which will be raised by the investigating officer with her immediate line management at the Home Office on the 1st of March 2018 (substantiated:  yet Vanessa Smith didn't report any of the lang attitudes that she was clearly privy to, which, would surely be contrary to your expectations A. As I say, Mr Altman, I am disappointed in my judgment, from what I know of Paul G I think is, you know, an incredibly valued to staff, and the team that were there then an that are there now, in particular, who I kn I speak to regularly, it is my judgment that something like that, they would report it, a	ainers who at through of them, aguage or again, s? n that, because Gasson, who
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Home Office on the 1st of March 2018 (substantiated: 13 I speak to regularly, it is my judgment that	d the team
	ow and
14 yes)." 14 something like that, they would report it, a	t if they saw
	and I am
Presumably, Mr Riley, none of that is anything that 15 <b>disappointed by this.</b>	
you would expect of a Home Office officer? 16 Q. If we go back to the other document, the Hor	me Office
17 <b>A. No, it isn't.</b> 17 document, investigation report, I previously p	out up
18 Q. Do you think that undermines your confidence in 18 <hom005908>, page 7, and the second parag</hom005908>	graph, with
19 Home Office attitudes or a willingness to report things 19 regards to the first allegation. This is an inter	view
20 or do you think this is just a one-off? 20 with Ms Smith which look place on 6 April	- again,
21 A. I would hope that that is a one-off. As I say, I am 21 accepting, Mr Riley, you were not in post at the	he time,
confident in the teams that we have in the IRCs, the 22 but with regard to that first allegation, four lin	nes
numbers of the teams and the fact that, you know, there 23 down:	
24 are multiple levels of cover, including, you know 24 "Vanessa confirmed that she made the com-	ment alleged
25 <b>excuse me first-line and second-line assurance now</b> 25 by Hibiscus staff but, by way of context, advis	sed that
Page 25 Page 27	
1 that Home Office teams raises. 1 she was responding in kind to the language use	ed by
2 As I have said, Mr Altman, we have done an awful lot 2 trainers and some delegates throughout the day	•
of work over the last four years three years, four  3 So whereas you would expect a Home Office	
4 <b>years in learning from the Wendy Williams report,</b> 4 in whichever post that person whichever post	-
5 from what has happened at Brook House, and generally 5 or grade that person occupied, you would expect	-
6 <b>about our cultural attitude to how we treat people.</b> 6 person, rather than to be influenced and encour	
7 Only last year, we were doing cultural awareness 7 to play along, to do the opposite and report?	
8 workshops where we looked at our own culture and our 8 A. Yes, I accept that, Mr Altman.	
9 <b>beliefs and our ethical boundaries, and staff of all</b> 9 Q. It must be clear, Mr Riley, that before you wro	ote either
grades were invited on that and worked in groups, both 10 of your witness statements, you were completely	
operational and non-operational, to share experiences 11 of this?	
12 from each other. 12 A. I was unaware of this, yes.	
13 I cannot I can't be complacent and, as my team 13 Q. And you are still unaware of it today?	
will tell you, I believe that learning and development 14 A. Yes. And as I say, it is incredibly disappoin	nting that
is a continual process and, once you stop trying to  15  a Home Office member of staff behaved in the original staff behaved i	_
improve, then you are at risk of going backwards. So,	• .
you know, I am trying to instigate a learning culture 17 we have done over the last four years, and co	
where we keep developing and keep learning in new ways, 18 do, and have planned over future years, all do	
but that is not the kind of comment I would expect from 19 mitigates the risk of this reoccurring, because	
20 a Home Office member of staff and I am disappointed by 20 continually stress to the staff what is approp	
21 it. 21 role model those behaviours.	
22 Q. I mean, we won't go through the report, in the interests 22 So I am disappointed, but I would hope the	nat this
23 of time, Mr Riley, but it might be worth you looking at 23 wouldn't happen now because staff are far n	
24 it when you get a moment 24 are, as I say, our training is such and our cul	
25 A. Yes. 25 awareness is such that we are working all th	
	-
Page 26 Page 28	

1	these kind of issues.	1	2007/2008 and G4S took over from GSL, they acquired them $$
2	Q. The worry, and you will understand why I bring it to	2	and the contract was novated to G4S.
3	your attention, Mr Riley, again emphasising you were not	3	So:
4	in post at the time, but this is several months after	4	"The Home Office went into the Brook House contract
5	Panorama and, although this might be just an example,	5	with their eyes wide open about the poor quality of GSL
6	and maybe it is a one-off, but it rather suggests people	6	provisions and the potential effects this could have on
7	are not listening or learning lessons.	7	detainees, including for their safety and welfare.
8	A. I think it suggests that this individual behaved	8	I have had sight of the Home Office's internal
9	inappropriately here. I am not sure whether it is	9	evaluation of contractor proposals for schedule D of
10	an indication of something systemic, but, as you rightly	10	Brook House, which my solicitors have provided to the
11	suggest, I need to review this evidence when I have the	11	inquiry. The regime proposed by GSL with a lengthy
12	time and, as I said before, if there was a flag that	12	lockdown time was recognised by senior Home Office civil
13	there is an issue, then it is right that we follow that	13	servants, John Thomson, Phil Schoenenberger, and
14	up, you know, and reassure ourselves that it is not	14	Marina Enwright"
15	something wider or systemic. But, you know, I know the	15	They were assessors for the bid at the time?
16	staff that work at Brook House, I have seen the work	16	A. I believe so, yes.
17	that they did, especially during the difficult times in	17	Q. " as a 'desperate attempt to reduce costs at the
18	the second half of 2020 with the small boat cases and,	18	expense of welfare'; as 'excessive and not in keeping
19	you know, the empathy and compassion and professionalism	19	with the ethos of the rest of the estate: 21 hours -
20	they showed is completely out of line with the comments	20	08 hours the proposals give no justification for
21	I see here.	21	such a lengthy period of non-association'"
22	Q. Let's move away from that then, please, Mr Riley, and	22	I think that should read "21 hours to" in other
23	give some consideration to the original contract. You	23	words, 9.00 in the evening until 8.00 in the morning:
24	deal with this in your first witness statement and there	24	" a period of non-association' and were
25	is a section which begins at paragraph 21, but can	25	'rather harsh'. GSL proposals for activities during
	Page 29		Page 31
1	I invite your attention to paragraph 24, where, at the	1	association were also described as 'extremely poor,
2	foot of the page, if your print version is the same as	2	there was no programme, the incentive scheme lacked
3	mine, you say:	3	imagination'"
4	"I would submit that a principal failing of the	4	Then paragraph 87:
5	contract was its inflexibility in not allowing the	5	"The Home Office had significant concerns about
6	Home Office to categorise the abuse perpetrated by G4S	6	staffing levels, noting that 'We are seriously concerned
7	staff in Panorama as a contract failure."	7	at the GSL proposal to reduce DCO levels at [9.00 pm
8	You call it a "principal failing"; what were the	8	through to 8.00 am] which has clearly been done in order
9	others that you had in mind?	9	to accommodate the lock down hours which are at the same
10	A. That we had no real escalation issues for minor	10	time. The Centre after [9.00 pm] will be staffed by
11	infringements, and that the way we operated the	11	[redacted] DCO trained officers and this includes
12	contract, we were focusing on outputs, you know, the	12	[something again redacted] duty managers. We do not
13	number of table tennis tables, rather than the impacts	13	consider this to be an adequate number of staff as the
14	of the contract on residents and the whole-centre	14	centre is still likely to be receiving detainees into
15	approach which we are trying to adopt now.	15	the early hours of the morning and discharging a good
16	Q. Can we put up on screen, please a statement of	16	number of detainees throughout the night. Their ability
17	Nathan Ward <dl0000141>. You know who Reverend</dl0000141>	17	to address standard operational functions such as
18	Nathan Ward is, I assume, yes?	18	constant watches and RFA/TC has not been addressed
19	A. Yes.	19	during the night hours'. GSL's staffing levels
20	Q. If we go, please, to page 28, and look at paragraph 86	20	overnight were deemed to 'border on the unsafe'. The
21	at the foot of the page:	21	Home Office described the proposals by GSL (and others
22	"The Home Office [he says] went into the Brook House	22	that had provided similar bids) as follows: 'An ethos
23	contract with their eyes wide open about the poor	23	of cutting corners and meeting basic standards was
24	quality of GSL"	24	evident from much of what we read and we are especially
	1	1	•
	Because, as we know, GSL won the bid back in	25	disappointed at the extended lock down hours proposed by
25	Because, as we know, GSL won the bid back in	25	disappointed at the extended lock down hours proposed by
	Because, as we know, GSL won the bid back in $\label{eq:page 30} Page \ 30$	25	disappointed at the extended lock down hours proposed by  Page 32

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1	these four bidders. This appears to be a desperate	1 2	which have a greater scope for amendment during the life
2	attempt to reduce cost at the expense of welfare'."		of the contract.
3	Then paragraph 88: "The Home Office's concerns about GSL's bid are	3	Finally, I am not sure the comments here from
4		4	Mr Thomson and Mr Schoenenberger and from Ms Enwright,
5	self-evidently stark but were not enough to dissuade	5	I am not sure at what stage of the review of the bids
6	them from agreeing the contract given the extremely low	6	that it was, because it goes through certain iterations
7	cost of the bid and it is clear the bid was won on the	7	and, again, at the moment, we have a — we have the
8	basis of 50 per cent of the evaluation being based on	8	negotiation during the contracts where, if there are
9	commercial interests. It is all the more concerning	9	areas we are concerned about, which we think barely meet
10	that the Home Office's concerns about the bid all came	10	the specification, we can go back and challenge it
11	to pass with the HMCIP from 2010 repeatedly criticising	11	before the final bids are put together. So it would be
12	the unsafe, harsh regime and poor conditions. These	12	helpful, for context, to understand at what stage of the
13	same basic problems were evident when I was working	13	procurement process these comments were made.
14	there in 2011-2014 to a greater or lesser extent and	14	But, you know, more widely, I accept the comments in
15	were the same concerns repeated by HMCIP in 2016,	15	terms of the 50 per cent costs, the 50 per cent value,
16	Stephen Shaw in his report in 2016 and 2018 and by	16	the quality on there and, again, we have moved away from
17	Kate Lampard in 2018. Lampard documented significant	17	that in our new generation of contracts now and the
18	concerns about the dangerously low staffing levels and	18	costs are only 35 per cent of the assessment process,
19	inadequate activity provision in breach of rule 17 of	19	and quality and social and value are the other
20	the Detention Centre Rules 2001. This led her to	20	65 per cent.
21	conclude that the physical constraints, lack of	21	Q. So it was too heavily weighted?
22	facilities and environment made it 'unsuitable to hold	22	A. At the time, yes, if I was asked for my opinion, but
23	the number of detainees it does' and 'unsuitable to hold	23	I don't know how and why the contract was designed and
24	any detainee for more than a few weeks'."	24	what the Cabinet Office rules were at the time. And it
25	Any disagreements there, Mr Riley?	25	could well be, if we investigated, that the Cabinet
	Page 33		Page 35
1	A. Sorry, in what way, Mr Altman?	١.	
	A. Soffy, iii what way, Mr Aithian:	1	Office rules may have said at the time, for contracts of
2	Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original	2	Office rules may have said at the time, for contracts of this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it
2 3	•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original	2	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it
3	Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?	2 3	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.
3 4	<ul><li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li><li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is</li></ul>	2 3 4	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the
3 4 5	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of — you</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken,
3 4 5 6	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of — you know, government procurement rules are very clear that</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken, because that is the a document entitled "Brook House
3 4 5 6 7	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of — you know, government procurement rules are very clear that we need to score the contract and, if a contract is</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken, because that is the a document entitled "Brook House operating contract commercial evaluation". It is dated
3 4 5 6 7 8	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of — you know, government procurement rules are very clear that we need to score the contract and, if a contract is compliant with the specification, then we need to award</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken, because that is the a document entitled "Brook House operating contract commercial evaluation". It is dated 7 December of 2007. If we put up on screen <dl0000140>,</dl0000140>
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of you know, government procurement rules are very clear that we need to score the contract and, if a contract is compliant with the specification, then we need to award the contract to, you know, the top-scoring, compliant</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken, because that is the a document entitled "Brook House operating contract commercial evaluation". It is dated 7 December of 2007. If we put up on screen <dl0000140>, page 1, to begin with, please.</dl0000140>
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	<ul> <li>Q. Any of what he says, about the flaws in the original contract?</li> <li>A. I think there is probably context, you know, that is worth adding to this, you know, but at the end of — you know, government procurement rules are very clear that we need to score the contract and, if a contract is compliant with the specification, then we need to award the contract to, you know, the top-scoring, compliant bid, and that is Treasury Cabinet Office rules, which we</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	this size, they had to be 50 per cent on cost. So it will probably need some further reading on that.  Q. We can look at the document from which, certainly, the quotation at the bottom of paragraph 87 is taken, because that is the a document entitled "Brook House operating contract commercial evaluation". It is dated 7 December of 2007. If we put up on screen <dl0000140>, page 1, to begin with, please.  These were exhibits and there were several of them</dl0000140>
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1	Can we turn it on its side, please, Zaynab thank	1	Q. Yes.
2	you. You see the paragraph beginning "At this	2	A. What we wouldn't want to do then, I would speculate,
3	stage"	3	I guess, Mr Altman, is reprocure it for two further
4	The last three lines:	4	years at significant cost. There is a contract in
5	"An ethos of cutting corners and meeting basic	5	place, that we were satisfied met the specification at
6	standards was evident from much of what we read and we	6	a price we were satisfied with, with the parameters at
7	are especially disappointed at the extended lock down	7	the time, and we awarded it against that and GSL and
8	hours proposed by these four bidders. This appears to	8	G4S, you know, deliver that.
9	be a desperate attempt to reduce costs at the expense of	9	You know, there would obviously need to be if
10	welfare."	10	
11	That is where this comes from. Why I ask you about	11	I were to speculate further, I would need commercial advice on the novation of contracts and contract exit.
12	• • •	12	Q. Can we just go back in the document, please, to page 62.
13	it is because Philip Schoenenberger gave evidence to the	13	You will see at the top:
13	inquiry, as I am sure you appreciate, on 23 March, and he was, as is clear from Reverend Ward's statement, one	14	"Initial assessment.
		15	
15	of the three officials who analysed the bids for the	16	"The initial assessment of the six responses to the Brook House ITT, schedule D, was assessed by
16	contract to run Brook House, as we see, in 2007, before		
17	the contract was awarded to GSL in 2008.	17	John Thomson, Phil Schoenenberger and Marina Enwright
18	What we know is G4S also bid for the contract, I am	18	between 20 August and [it says here] 7 September 07.
19	sure you are aware of that. I have already indicated	19	The bids were assessed in the following order: Serco,
20	it, GSL1, G4S buys GSL and the contract is novated to	20	GSL, Reliance, GEO, Kalyx, and G4S. Twenty-two aspects
21	them.	21	of performance were examined by the team with four
22	What do you think about that? G4S was one of the	22	specialist areas namely being marked by catering
23	bidders, they don't win the bid, GSL does and then G4S	23	healthcare health and safety and fire prevention
24	come in and buy the successful bidder.	24	measures"
25	What process goes on to ensure that the unsuccessful	25	That was the way that the bid was initially
	Page 37		Page 39
1	bidder who takes over the successful bidder, can run the	1	assessed. If you go to the final assessment on page 70
2	contract in the way that the government was happy GSL	2	please, at the top:
3	was able to?	3	"The bids were remarked in the light of the
4	A. I was these bid processes are extremely confidential	4	clarification responses from the bidders between
5	and commercially sensitive. However, I am aware that	5	20-25 September"
6	the takeover of GSL by G4S was referred to the Office	6	And the document provides comments included in the
7	for Fair Trading who reviewed it and decided it wasn't	7	summary of each bidder's response. Then they made
8	restrictive commercially and didn't refer it any	8	a series of points about staffing, post clarification,
9	further.	9	and then on to page 71, "Conclusions":
10	So there was external scrutiny of the G4S takeover	10	"In the main, clarification improved the quality of
11	of GSL, but any further detail or any Cabinet Office	11	each bid and it was especially worthy of note that Serco
12	involvement, I am not aware of.	12	offered two additional DCO posts during the night-time
13	Q. So, what, the process is, other than it went to the	13	hours at no additional expense. On the other hand, the
14	Office of Fair Trading at the time but that was about	14	G4S explanations did not greatly improve the clarity of
15	the acquisition of GSL. What I have in mind is how the	15	their responses and in particular the staffing proposals
16	Home Office looks at the contract which, having gone	16	are still shrouded in mystery. Some bidders have sought
17	through a bid process, it is awarded to GSL, only for	17	to provide reassurance about the time that lock down
18	G4S to come in and take GSL out of the market.	18	commences but this is not borne out in their original
19	So I am just wondering if you are able to help us	19	staffing tables.
20	with what kind of process goes on there at the contract	20	"To reflect the decision by the Project Board not to
21	level?	21	pursue the option of a contact management service and to
22	A. At a contract level, we have a contract with GSL to	22	withdraw a mark for staffing levels from the operational
23	supply. If that contract is novated to a new supplier,	23	response it has been necessary to take out those
24	then we would expect them to deliver against the	24	sections from the table"
25	existing contract.	25	Which is produced on the next page and which,
			<u> </u>
	Page 38		Page 40

1	perhaps, we don't need to look at. It is this sort of	1	as not compliant.
2	thing really which I had in mind, Mr Riley, because, you	2	So, you know, it I am working through this now
3	know, at the time of the original bid, staffing levels,	3	and there are some, you know I am surmising some
4	or staffing proposals, which is a serious issue in terms	4	parts, but understanding how this process works, then
5	of running an IRC, as far as G4S's bid is concerned, it	5	the bid must have been compliant from GSL and it was
6	was still shrouded in mystery.	6	that compliant GSL bid that G4S adopted.
7	A. Mmm-hmm.	7	Q. If we go back to 69 just to remind ourselves about what
8	Q. Would that mystery have been interrogated at all, once	8	the assessor said in general terms about the ethos of
9	G4S took the contract over from GSL? Can you help us?	9	cutting corners, and so on. Philip Schoenenberger,
10	A. My understanding and, again, this is my knowledge of	10	during the course of his evidence to the inquiry, agreed
11	commercial management, as someone who manages a number	11	that that was at odds with the requirement in the
12	of contracts is that G4S took over the GSL bid. They	12	Detention Centre Rules, rule 3, which says:
13	didn't impose their own bid and their own staffing	13	"The purpose of an IRC is to provide for the secure
14	levels, so the bid they took over would not have been	14	but humane accommodation of detained persons in
15	the one that's described here as "shrouded in mystery",	15	a relaxed regime, with as much freedom of movement and
16	but they would have taken on the winning GSL bid, which	16	association as possible, consistent with maintaining
17	was judged, by ourselves and our Home Office procurement	17	a safe and secure environment and to encourage and
18	teams, to be the best bid in terms of cost and value	18	assist detained persons to make the most productive use
19	when scored against the Cabinet Office markers.	19	of their time, whilst respecting in particular their
20	I am not sure I seem to recognise, is it possible	20	dignity and the right to individual expression."
21	to move that up one page? I think there was a comment	21	So his view, and he was one of the initial
22	in there about staffing.	22	assessors, was that there was a tension, if not
23	That is the one there, "Post clarification	23	a conflict between their findings of these general terms
24	comments."	24	about the bids back in 2007, and the fundamental rule of
25	Q. Yes. Well, under the heading "Staffing":	25	the Detention Centre Rules, rule 3. Do you agree with
	Page 41		Page 43
1	"In assessing the bidders' staffing levels, the	1	that?
2	assessors have had to make a judgment about the staffing	2	A. As I say, Mr Altman, we there was a very clear
3	levels. We are satisfied that all the bidders have	3	framework toward contracts at this level which we must
4	proposed adequate staffing levels during the unlock	4	abide by as a department, and that is set by the Cabinet
5	hours taking account of the potential workload and the	5	Office and Treasury and that sets out how bids are
6	regime they intend to operate. The major concern	6	scored and judged.
7	relates to the lock down hours and, as indicated earlier	7	Our role is to set a specification that the bidders
8	in the report, these vary considerably from bidder to	8	bid against. You know, I can only surmise that the bids
9	bidder. The assessors looked at the workloads at	9	met that specification, or else they would be not
10	Colnbrook, Campsfield and Oakington IRCs during the	10	compliant, in the bidding process.
11	night hours and have assessed on a workload of	11	Hopefully, we can get the chance to discuss, at some
12	approximately 20 admissions and 10 discharges during the	12	stage during today, what the steps we have taken under
13	lock down hours with attendance required on each	13	the new contract that is reoccurring
14	accommodation unit, in RFA and/or TC, a constant watch	14	Q. We are going to look at the new contract towards the
15	and/or bed watch. In making a judgment, the assessors	15	end?
16	have concluded that DCO staff should be allocated as	16	A. So it is not as if we are not aware of it ourselves. As
17	a minimum to the following duties"	17	I said in my apology at the start, the contract itself
18	Is that what you wanted to look at?	18	was by 2017, wasn't suitable for what we were asking
19	A. Thank you, Mr Altman, yes. It is clear from this that	19	the centre to deliver, so I have already acknowledged
20	the procurement team went for clarification to all of	20	that.
21	five bidders and did some benchmarking of two other IRCs	21	What I am saying is, at the start of 2007, we hadn't
22	as well to do so, and they must have been satisfied, at	22	got the full freedom to award the contract as we saw fit
23	the end of this, that the GSL bid, which was the one	23	because there are very clear government procurement
24	that G4S adopted, you know, was satisfactory to provide	24	rules we have to abide by.
25	both day and night cover, otherwise it would be marked	25	Q. One understands all of that, Mr Riley, but this inquiry
	D 42		D 44
	Page 42		Page 44
			11 (Pages 41 to 44)

1	is examining what went wrong at Brook House.	1	A. It was clearly an issue in the bidding process, yes,
2	A. Yes, and as I said, Mr Altman, by 2017, you know, there	2	and, you know, the way the bid was put together.
3	were insufficient staff within the centre to operate	3	I don't how that demonstrates to action on the
4	this and, you know, we have recognised that and we have	4	landings, I couldn't comment on, because it predates me
5	hopefully moved on from it.	5	by a long way, but it is very clear, from the documents
6	Q. He also accepted, did Mr Schoenenberger, that the bid	6	you have shown me, that the staff assessing the various
7	was assessed on the basis of short-term accommodation	7	bids were concerned about it and, as we will no doubt
8	only and that this contradiction between the welfare	8	discuss later, that has been one of my major priorities
9	levels in the bids and rule 3 would be even starker,	9	since taking up post, to make sure that we respond to
10	were people to be held for long periods.	10	that and make sure that we have fit-for-purpose welfare
11	Do you understand what he is saying?	11	seven days a week at Brook House.
12	A. Yes, I am there is a question that seems to keep	12	Q. Let's just go back to page 44 in this document, please,
13	reappearing here about what Brook House was designed for	13	because here we see the weighting split, which you say
14	and the length of stay that I have not, myself, been	14	has changed:
15	able to nail down this view that it was only ever	15	"The evaluation was weighted and split in the
16	designed for a 72-hour stay, which is patently incorrect	16	following areas:
17	and that IRCs have always had people for longer than	17	"Quality"
18	that.	18	And we can see operational delivery is 25 per cent,
19	Mr Tulley, I think, mentioned it during the Panorama	19	staff 15 per cent, maintenance 10 per cent, which adds
20	documentary and I don't understand where this has sprung	20	up to 50 per cent, and commercial which, what, means
21	from, but, you know, it is incorrect and, you know,	21	price?
22	I would like to put that on the record.	22	A. I assume so, yes.
23	Q. So every time the inquiry has been told that these are	23	Q 50 per cent, making up the 100 per cent:
24	short-term holding facilities, that is, what, a sort of	24	"This split was agreed with the Procurement Board
25	fiction which has just snowballed out of control?	25	and ensures a balance between the costs and quality
	Page 45		Page 47
1	A. It seems to be some sort of an urban myth, Mr Altman.	1	elements of the bids."
2	Short-term holding facilities are completely different	2	If we move on to page 47, at the top:
3	environments, governed by the Short-term Holding	3	"The Brook House tender has delivered significant
4	Facilities Rules, and the length of stay there is	4	(35 per cent) cost savings compared to the original
5	limited not to 72 hours, but to seven days.	5	budget and is below the current average cost per bed
6	There are non-residential, short-term holding	6	when compared like for like on 2009 projections."
7	facilities which have a different set of rules and they	7	So it appears, do you agree, Mr Riley, that these
8	are staying up to 24 hours.	8	presentation documents show that Brook House the
9	There is nothing in the immigration enforcement		
		9	tender for Brook House delivered a 35 per cent cost
10	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does	9	tender for Brook House delivered a 35 per cent cost saving compared to the original budget?
10 11			•
	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does	10	saving compared to the original budget?
11	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the	10 11	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.
11 12	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the years, that I can hopefully quash here.	10 11 12	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.  Q. Mr Schoenenberger told us that he didn't know at the
11 12 13	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the years, that I can hopefully quash here.  Q. If we go to page 73 of this document, first of all, we	10 11 12 13	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.  Q. Mr Schoenenberger told us that he didn't know at the time how much the budget was or, when noting the
11 12 13 14	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the years, that I can hopefully quash here.  Q. If we go to page 73 of this document, first of all, we see, as I have already indicated, the marking of the	10 11 12 13 14	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.  Q. Mr Schoenenberger told us that he didn't know at the time how much the budget was or, when noting the cost cutting, that the Home Office had, in essence, more money available, but in the end, and I think you agree
11 12 13 14 15	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the years, that I can hopefully quash here.  Q. If we go to page 73 of this document, first of all, we see, as I have already indicated, the marking of the final assessment, GEO, GSL, Serco, and G4S was fourth.	10 11 12 13 14 15	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.  Q. Mr Schoenenberger told us that he didn't know at the time how much the budget was or, when noting the cost cutting, that the Home Office had, in essence, more
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11 12 13 14 15 16	portfolio that has a 72-hour length of stay and it does seem to be an urban myth that has grown up over the years, that I can hopefully quash here.  Q. If we go to page 73 of this document, first of all, we see, as I have already indicated, the marking of the final assessment, GEO, GSL, Serco, and G4S was fourth. And then, the two other bidders, fifth and sixth.  Just below that table:  "The assessors are satisfied that GEO offers the	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	saving compared to the original budget?  A. That is what it says here, yes.  Q. Mr Schoenenberger told us that he didn't know at the time how much the budget was or, when noting the cost cutting, that the Home Office had, in essence, more money available, but in the end, and I think you agree this, certainly looking at the presentation documents for the bid and for the contract which was finally
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1	but, yes, I accept it encourages people to put in	1	contract didn't provide the level of staff it needed by
2	a cost-efficient bid, because that drives down the cost	2	2017. I have already said that and apologised for it.
3	and pushes up the score.	3	It was just the terminology that I argue with, rather
4	Q. Whether it was Treasury led or Home Office led, you are	4	than the general thrust.
5	speaking on behalf of the Home Office?	5	Q. We hear what you say.
6	A. I accept that, but I don't want to speculate, if it was	6	Are you prepared to agree, as we have gone through
7	out of the Home Office control and the Treasury	7	these documents, that it compromised welfare?
8	Q. I understand what you are saying, but Mr Schoenenberger	8	A. I I think it had the potential to compromise the
9	was a Home Office official. I don't know about the	9	operations. Whether that is welfare or whether that is
10	other two, but he was one of the assessors of all of the	10	other operational delivery, depends on how the staff
11	bids, and this was going to be a contract run by the	11	were deployed. Again, the issue with this contract
12	Home Office, even though Treasury Rules underlay the	12	and I have a personal issue with contracts is that it
13	nature of the procurement process, I am sure we all	13	didn't mandate the staffing levels. What it mandated
14	understand and accept that, but there is no question	14	was a number of staff in the centre, and it was up for
15	if you can just take off your Home Office hat for	15	the supplier to deploy those staff.
16	a moment, Mr Riley, there is no question that the bids	16	That could have impacted on welfare, it could have
17	cut corners; that is what the assessment says?	17	impacted on reception times or discharge times, or it
18	A. I am not sure I would use the word "cut corners",	18	could have impacted on catering or other things. How it
19	Mr Altman, but I the bids have done all they can to	19	impacted was not clear in what I have seen so far, and
20	minimise costs, including staffing costs overnight.	20	that is why, now, we mandate the staffing levels in
21	I accept that. But I wouldn't use the word "cut	21	certain areas of the site and in certain facilities,
22	corners" because I don't know what the specification was	22	such as welfare, to make sure it cannot be impacted.
23	and, until I know what the specification was, I couldn't	23	But just because there are a the numbers of staff
24	say whether it was corner cutting and it may sound	24	at night are low, that doesn't mean, necessarily, that
25	semantics, but they are quite emotive words and that is	25	it impacted welfare. You know, one does not necessarily
	Page 49		Page 51
1	not what I would use.	1	follow the other.
2	Q. Maybe not what you would use, but if we go back to	2	Q. Well, we saw on page 47, if we just go back to that,
3	page 69, these are the words the assessor used these	3	about the tender, the Brook House tender, delivering
4	are not my words.	4	significant cost savings, 35 per cent. Whose budget was
5	A. That is Mr Schoenenberger's view, but my view is that,	5	this money coming out of?
6	if we set a specification for a bidder to bid against,	6	A. It was coming out of the Home Office budget, which we
7	then we encourage the behaviours, and they have bid on	7	bid for to Treasury every period in the spending review
8	the basis that costs will be scored highly by reducing	8	process.
9	their night staffing. But they must have bid against	9	Q. And who would have had the decision, who made the
10	a specification that we set them, and I do think that,	10	decision, do you think, to weight the split, the
11	you know, saying "cutting corners" is an emotive term in	11	evaluation between commercial and quality as to
12	this, when we set the specification and they delivered	12	50 per cent each, who
13	it against it.	13	A. I don't know whether that was a Home Office or Cabinet
14	Q. Well, emotive or not, they are the words, "and the ethos	14	Office decision. I would assume it would have been
15	of cutting corners". Would you have expected the	15	a Cabinet Office decision because they set parameters
16	assessors to be aware of the specification when marking	16	for contracts of this type.
17	these bids?	17	Q. And when an assessment like this is finalised, who makes
18	A. Yes, that is what they mark them against.	18	the ultimate decision to award the contract and to whom?
19	Q. So if Mr Schoenenberger and his colleagues decided to	19	A. The SRO of the project.
20	use the words "cutting corners", being alive to and	20	Q. What does that mean?
21	understanding the specification they were working	21	A. The senior responsible officer for the project, so the
22	towards, whether you find it emotive or not, that was	22	senior civil servant in charge of the project which,
23	how they viewed it?	23	for the current procurement, is currently myself
24	A. And I say that is what he says and, you know, I think,	24	would have made the decision. I don't know who it was
25	as I say, Mr Altman, I accept that, you know, the	25	in 2007/2008. Then there are internal approvals within
	Page 50		Page 52

1	the Home Office and then external approvals within	1	"The former director [so that was Saunders] told us
2	Cabinet Office and Treasury before the contract is	2	that Home Office managers he dealt with during his time
3	awarded.	3	running Brook House up to September 2017 had been
4	Q. You have made mention more than once of the new	4	primarily concerned with how G4S supported the
5	contract, which has changed a number of things. We have	5	immigration removal process."
6	had quite a bit of evidence about it so far.	6	I just quoted from what he had to say. Then over
7	Do you think the Home Office understood or	7	the page, for example, at 14.41 at the bottom:
8	appreciated that the contract was flawed from the	8	"The Home Office service delivery manager (who has
9	outset?	9	overall responsibility for contract compliance and
10	A. There were patently concerns from those who were	10	performance at Gatwick IRCs) also acknowledged that the
11	assessing the contract, that it was that it was	11	Home Office had been more focused on those aspects of
12	cheap, whether or not that meant that they understood	12	the contract with G4S that supported the delivery of
13	there were flaws in it, I don't know.	13	immigration objectives. She told us:
14	Q. So it may not be a question of direct evidence but one	14	"I think there is a real distinction between
15	of inference?	15	contact and doing contract and compliance activity and
16	A. I think so.	16	where we have a combined team, and there is so much
17	MR ALTMAN: Yes. And, chair, if I may, just for a few more	17	drive on operational contact, we never got around to
18	minutes, be permitted before we have our break to	18	doing compliance work; that is the honest truth. It is
19	complete this topic?	19	always the kind of thing that ends up being left'."
20	THE CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Altman.	20	Do you agree that the effect of the contract was
21	MR ALTMAN: We have heard evidence from witnesses that	21	that it set a culture, as it were, where people
22	suggest that the contract, that previous contract, and	22	believed, as clearly they told Verita they did, that
23	the approach to its enforcement, emphasised immigration	23	immigration removal was the key priority, whereas
24	throughput, rather than welfare; and we have had	24	welfare was not?
25	witnesses say so. I can put it up on screen, for you,	25	A. I think that there are two things here, Mr Altman,
	D 52		D 55
	Page 53		Page 55
1	Mr Riley, but to save time you may have seen this.	1	becoming slightly conflated.
2	Ben Saunders, who was the centre director let me give	2	Taking 14.41 first, because that is on the screen,
3	the reference. It is <ver000226>, at page 11, and</ver000226>		
	the reference. It is VEROUUZZU, at page 11, and	3	and the service delivery manager, I think what she is
4	answer 129. He said:	3 4	and the service delivery manager, I think what she is saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that
4 5	7 1 6		
	answer 129. He said:	4	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that
5	answer 129. He said: " Their primary focus was all about the removal	4 5	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they
5 6	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about	4 5 6	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions
5 6 7	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about the welfare and at different degrees, but, yes, their	4 5 6 7	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions and the serving of papers against compliance, meant
5 6 7 8	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about the welfare and at different degrees, but, yes, their primary focus was the removal process."	4 5 6 7 8	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions and the serving of papers against compliance, meant that, because the serving of papers was time critical
5 6 7 8 9	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about the welfare and at different degrees, but, yes, their primary focus was the removal process."  And Lee Hanford, who came in as interim director, in	4 5 6 7 8 9	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions and the serving of papers against compliance, meant that, because the serving of papers was time critical and as is induction, for her and her team, there was
5 6 7 8 9	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about the welfare and at different degrees, but, yes, their primary focus was the removal process."  And Lee Hanford, who came in as interim director, in his Verita interview <ver000239>, page 11, answer</ver000239>	4 5 6 7 8 9	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions and the serving of papers against compliance, meant that, because the serving of papers was time critical and as is induction, for her and her team, there was a prioritisation of that over making sure the contract
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	answer 129. He said:  " Their primary focus was all about the removal process. Absolutely right. Of course, they care about the welfare and at different degrees, but, yes, their primary focus was the removal process."  And Lee Hanford, who came in as interim director, in his Verita interview <ver000239>, page 11, answer 113 said:</ver000239>	4 5 6 7 8 9 10	saying, my understanding of what she is saying is that only having one Home Office team on site, and they having to prioritise the operational work, so inductions and the serving of papers against compliance, meant that, because the serving of papers was time critical and as is induction, for her and her team, there was a prioritisation of that over making sure the contract was operating.
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1 I think it is 14.46, at the top: 2 "The Home Office on site team enter the centre 3 regularly and have regular contact with detainces, staff 4 and managers. We believe they should take greater 5 responsibility than they appear to have done in the past 6 for monitoring the overall experience of detainces at 7 Brook House and whether G4S is providing detainces with 8 enough to occupy their time and are adequately ensuring 9 the overall welfare of detainces." 9 the overall welfare of detainees." 10 So it certainly seems, from Verita's point of view, 11 that there was a concern, even with the staff on the 12 ground, that welfare was not being prioritised? 13 A. 1 agree on that, that comment from Kate Lampard, that, 14 you know, the Home Office team, as I have said myself, 15 we were too focused on delivering, you know, serving of 16 papers and doing the returns-focused work. We should 17 have, as Kate puts it, taken more responsibility for 18 monitoring the overall experience of detainees. That is 19 what we are doing now, it is not just about the 20 management of the contract, but it is the impact of the 21 contract on the life of residents in centres that is 22 more important now. 23 So I do accept that.  Page 57  1 THE CHAIR: Thank you. 24 MR ALTMAN: Can I suggest back just a little after 11.45? 25 I THE CHAIR: Thank you. 26 MR ALTMAN: Can I suggest back just a little after 11.45? 27 Dr Bhui, and I go back many years. 28 A. Yes, Dr Bhui and I go back many years. 29 A. Yes, Dr Bhui and I go back many years. 29 A. Yes, Dr Bhui and I go back many years. 29 A. Yes, Dr Bhui and I go back many years. 29 A. Yes por Bhui and I go back many years. 29 A. Yes por Bhui and I go back many years. 20 A. Yes por Bhui and I go back many years. 21 A. Yes por Bhui and I go back many years. 22 A. Yes por Bhui and I go back many years. 23 Bruidence to the inquiry on 24 March, and he was asked about this. And the question put on behalf of the inquiry to him was: 29 "Understanding came from, that it was designed to hold detainees fo
regularly and have regular contact with detainees, staff and managers. We believe they should take greater responsibility than they appear to have done in the past for monitoring the overall experience of detainees at Brook House and whether G4S is providing detainees with enough to occupy their time and are adequately ensuring the overall welfare of detainees."  So it certainly seems, from Verita's point of view, that there was a concern, even with the staff on the ground, that welfare was not being prioritised?  A. I agree on that, that comment from Kate Lampard, that, you know, the Home Office team, as I have said myself, we were too focused on delivering, you know, serving of have, as Kate puts it, taken more responsibility for monitoring the overall experience of detainees. That is more important now. So I do accept that.  Page 57  3. Q. — at HMIP, do you know him?  4. A. Yes, Dr Bhui and I go back many years.  Q. He gave evidence to the inquiry on 24 March, and he wa asked about this. And the question put on behalf of the inquiry to him was:  asked about this. And the question put on behalf of the inquiry to him was:  "Question: We have heard this a number of times in this inquiry. Do you recall, thinking back to then [in other words to this report in 2010], of where that understanding came from, that it was designed to hold detainees for no more than 72 hours?"  He said:  "Answer: I assume that we would have been told by the Home Office and/or G4S, or the contractor at the time."  Obviously you were a twinkle in the eye of Detention and Escorting Services at that time, Mr Riley, but, you call it an urban myth, HMIP stuck it in their 2010 report?  A. Yes, I see that, Mr Altman.  12 I am really clear that we have not had a 72-hour facility for as long as I know, and, you know, prior to being a twinkle in the immigration enforcement eye, I was the head of foreign national offenders for the  Page 59
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2 MR ALTIMAN: Can I suggest back just a little after 11.45? 2 know, absolutely, to the extent of my knowledge, we have
2 THE CHAID. The description of the last of the state of
3 THE CHAIR: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Riley. 3 never designed a type of facility for a 72-hour length
4 (11.32 am)  4 of stay. We have either got immigration removal centres
5 (A short break) 5 or short-term holding facilities and nothing in between.
6 (11.49 am) 6 Q. Let me ask you another question: if that's right, what
7 THE CHAIR: Thank you, please take a seat. 7 is the Home Office's position on how long people should
8 MR ALTMAN: Mr Riley, a few moments before the break, you 8 be detained in a facility designed as a category B
9 characterised the 72-hour short-term holding as 9 prison but without the facilities which would accompany
10 "an urban myth" 10 a category B prison? What is the Home Office's position
11 A. Indeed.
12 Q as far as detention centres are concerned. Can I put 12 A. Well, you know, speaking on behalf of the Home Office,
up a document for you to consider, please. You will not  13 I don't agree that it is designed as a category B
have seen this before. It is <dl0000167> at page 1, and prison. You know, I note the evidence from Dr Bosworth</dl0000167>
you will see this is a Brook House inspection report by  15 Mary, on that. The living accommodation is built to
the HMIP for the period between 15 and 19 March 2010, so 16 a standard that is category B, category C secure, there
it is of some vintage. If we go to page 7, under 17 is very little difference, in practice.
18 "Brief history": 18 But the regime there, and the culture is anything
19 "Brook House opened in March 2009 and is but prison-like, it is designed on purpose to
20 a purpose-built immigration removal centre with a prison 20 differentiate between an immigration removal centre and
21 design. The centre was designed to hold detainees for 21 a prison. So, you know, the staff carry different PPE,
22 no more than 72 hours." 22 they don't carry batons or PAVA spray, residents have
23 If it is an urban myth, it is an urban myth of some 23 <b>free movement, they have mobile phones. The regime</b>
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	p. p. a	,	A Table II and I
1	adjudication, so there is no additional days given by	1	A. It is difficult, actually, because it you know,
2	a visiting judge, there is no incentive for privileges	2	almost arguing against myself here, Mr Altman,
3	where negative behaviour can have you on a basic level	3	short-term prison sentences are time bound and some
4	of regime.	4	people's detention was ruled by a at times, it was
5	So, you know, yes, the rooms themselves are built to	5	prolonged.
6	category B/C standard, but I don't believe it is	6	But yes, I accept that and I accept that in 2017,
7	a category B prison environment myself.	7	you know, the level of welfare education, activity and
8	Q. That is not an answer to the question, though. My	8	other things, wasn't as expansive as it is today. It
9	question, Mr Riley, was, what is the Home Office's	9	must have felt more difficult.
10	position on how long people should be held there? If it	10	Q. Let's look at staffing levels, please. Can we put up
11	is not a 72-hour, short-term holding facility, what is	11	the IMB 2016 report.
12	the Home Office's position? Mary Bosworth you made	12	<imb000121>, at page 17, please. If we go, please,</imb000121>
13	mention of her talks about the "prisonisation" of the	13	to in fact, 5.82. In the course of that paragraph,
14	place?	14	you will see the words "During the year", do you see,
15	A. She does, indeed.	15	about six lines down, towards the end of the line:
16	Q. It was built to the specification of a category B	16	"During the year, there have been times,
17	prison, although, of course, it isn't a category B	17	notably July and August"
18	prison. As I say, we were told Jerry Petherick told	18	And this report relates to the 2016 period from
19	us this, it doesn't have the extra facilities that you	19	1 January to end of December:
20	would expect, so my question is: what is the Home Office	20	" where officer numbers have fallen, increasing
21	expectation of how long people should be held there?	21	pressure on those on duty and impacting adversely, not
22	Because it seems indefinite.	22	only on staff motivation but also on the operation of
23	A. Well, it is not indefinite. And again, that is you	23	the centre. The board acknowledges the difficulties of
24	know, I repeat my phrase that is another urban myth.	24	planning staffing for temporary wing closures during the
25	We don't have indefinite detention.	25	build upgrade and then the closure of Tinsley House.
	Page 61		Page 63
1	So, you know, we detain people for the shortest	1	Problems were increased by the knock-on effects of the
2	period possible, and as you must know yourself,	2	escape"
3	Mr Altman, under the Hardial Singh principle, people can	3	Which we were told happened in the early part of
4	only be detained when there is a reasonable prospect of	4	2016:
5	removal and within a realistic timeframe, and that is	5	" courtyard closures and short-term loss of the
6	what we aim to do.	6	director in the aftermath of the Medway scandal."
7	So in 2021, which is the last figures I have seen,	7	That is when Ben Saunders was parachuted back into
8	to the end of '21, I think it is 86 per cent of people	8	Medway for about six months from the beginning of the
9	were detained for 28 days or less and 97 per cent of	9	year to around June:
10	people for four months or less. And 95 per cent of	10	"Nevertheless the board noted a period from August
11	cases being managed by immigration enforcement are	11	when officer numbers were a matter of concern."
12	managed in the community.	12	Do you accept the Home Office had to know about
13	So sorry, it is a slightly long answer to your	13	those problems?
14	question. The intention of the Home Office is to detain	14	A. I would hope that the team locally recognised the
15	people for as short a period as possible at Brook House	15	staffing levels because they should have been monitoring
16	and any other immigration removal centre.	16	them, yes.
17	Sorry if that was fast.	17	Q. Although we were told monitoring the contract was
18	Q. I suspect you are prepared to accept, though, there are	18	a problem.
19	exceptions?	19	A. Although, my understanding again, it predates me,
20	A. There are outliers, yes.	20	Mr Altman, so apologies. But my understanding, as well,
21	Q. Yes. And for those outliers, are you prepared to agree	21	is that there was self-reporting from G4S on staffing
22	that some of them end up spending time in Brook House,	22	levels, as well, to complement the monitoring that our
23	and did, during the course of 2017 and we can look at	23	staff took undertook.
24	the figures, if needs be which must have felt very	24	Q. Insofar as the building itself is concerned, I have
25	much as if they were short-term prison sentences?	25	already touched on this, and so have you, she told us in
	Page 62		Page 64
	1 450 02		16 (Pages 61 to 64)

1	evidence, and you will have read this, on 29 March, that	1	10 or 15 years after Brook House was designed, we looked
2	the prison-like nature of Brook House affected the	2	at how we could design somewhere that was category B
3	treatment of detainees, so she took it further. It	3	or C secure but had a softer environment, and it was
4	wasn't just a question of the 72-hour detention issue,	4	difficult, and we looked at the communal areas and what
5	which we have already been over. She said it is the	5	we could do.
6	symbolism of locking up people in a building that looks	6	So I am not agreeing disagreeing with Mary, and
7	like a prison, together with other features. The	7	I really welcome her point of view on this, but at the
8	training materials, which she said originated from the	8	same time, I am saying it has to be balanced against
9	prison estate, the mixing of TSFNOs and what she called	9	security and safety for everyone there, and that cannot
10	"prisonisation", which is a term you will have read.	10	necessarily be done in somewhere that is not secure to
11	What is your response, that she when I asked her	11	a prison specification.
12	about the treatment of detainees, she was very clear	12	Q. Let me ask you about the bed situation, because
13	that the nature of the environment, the physical	13	Brook House was originally designed for 426 men and, as
14	environment, was causative or contributory.	14	I am sure you know, in 2013, 22 extra beds were added to
15	A. I have incredible respect for Dr Bosworth and her views	15	make it 448. And in or around the end of 2016, for
16	and, you know, I have asked her to come in and look at	16	roll-out some time in April 2017, another 60 beds were
17	the culture in certain areas since I have taken up post,	17	added to Brook House to make a total of 508.
18	and I know my predecessor did as well; because I think	18	Do you think it is fair, or unfair, comment to
19	it is important to be challenged by alternative views.	19	suggest that the Home Office appears to have been
20	And my opinion on the prisonisation aspect is that we	20	squeezing value out of the estate in order to meet
21	have to balance safety and security with the environment	21	changes in policy?
22	that Mary advocates.	22	A. Again, I am not sure that "squeezing value" is the right
23	When you look at, you know, when Brook House was	23	term to use, Mr Altman.
24	built for example, it was built on the back of what was	24	I am not aware of the operational environment at the
25	happening in Yarl's Wood in 2002. We attempted there to	25	time. You know, in massive detail, but if we needed
	Page 65		Page 67
	1 age 03		1 age 07
1	build a centre with a different environment, with	1	additional beds, then, you know, there are a number of
2	a different physical structure, that wasn't a cat B or	2	ways of providing them and I am sure that would have
3	cat C-type, prison-built environment and, within three	3	been reviewed and risk assessed and considered and, you
4	months of it opening, it had burnt down. The	4	know, very much as we very much as the Prison Service
5	Home Office's favourite independent observer,	5	and other closed environments have done, sometimes
6	Stephen Shaw, came in and completed the review of the	6	adding additional beds is the only answer to the
7	Yarl's Wood fire and his view was clearly that, if you	7	question.
8	are going to detain people, you need a physical	8	Q. What was the question?
9	infrastructure that is capable of doing so.	9	A. Do we need if additional capacity is needed, how can
10	So there is a balance to be struck between listening	10	we provide it?
11	to what Mary says and taking her views on board and	11	I don't think it is necessarily a case of "squeezing
12	making sure that we have an environment that is as soft	12	value", it is providing the required capacity.
13	as possible, but, at the same time, having somewhere	13	Q. The three-bed-to-a-room arrangement was reversed. Why
13 14	as possible, but, at the same time, having somewhere that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if	13 14	Q. The three-bed-to-a-room arrangement was reversed. Why was it reversed?
	•		-
14	that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if	14	was it reversed?
14 15	that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if there is concerted action.	14 15	was it reversed?  A. In light of Stephen Shaw's second review, in 2018, we
14 15 16	that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if there is concerted action.  So it is not a simple question or a simple picture,	14 15 16	was it reversed?  A. In light of Stephen Shaw's second review, in 2018, we considered how we were using the estate and we made
14 15 16 17	that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if there is concerted action. So it is not a simple question or a simple picture, Mr Altman, I am afraid.	14 15 16 17	was it reversed?  A. In light of Stephen Shaw's second review, in 2018, we considered how we were using the estate and we made a number of changes. We took the third beds out of
14 15 16 17 18	that is safe for residents and staff and secure, if there is concerted action.  So it is not a simple question or a simple picture, Mr Altman, I am afraid.  Q. But you are not necessarily disagreeing with her, are	14 15 16 17 18	was it reversed?  A. In light of Stephen Shaw's second review, in 2018, we considered how we were using the estate and we made a number of changes. We took the third beds out of centres, Gatwick and Heathrow, we closed
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1	to 11 November 2016 inspection and if we go to page 5,	1	other centres as well, and in previous I have
2	you will see the penultimate paragraph there reads:	2	attended inquests in the past and from historic cases
3	"This report makes a number of detailed	3	and apologised for the same issue: we didn't have the
4	recommendations about the treatment of detainees and the	4	right number of staff on site and the staff we did have
5	conditions in which they are held. I would add	5	were focused on two different competing jobs.
6	a cautionary note on an issue that is not the subject of	6	So, you know, that is a clear failing and, you know,
7	a specific recommendation but has the potential to	7	I put my hand up to that.
8	adversely affect the conditions in which some detainees	8	Q. Why do you think it was that there were insufficient
9	are held: the proposal to bring into use the third bed,	9	staff on site at Brook House during the relevant period?
10	which has been installed in 60 of the two-person cells.	10	Was it about money, other resources, or just no vision?
11	Many staff and detainees were of the view that this	11	A. I don't think it was any of those, I don't think we had
12	would lead to a decline in living standards. This is	12	recognised at the time the potential impact of competing
13	a view shared by inspectors."	13	priorities.
14	And you will know that Peter Clarke, if you just	14	Q. Yes.
15	scroll down, signed off this report in January 2017 but	15	A. And learning from the reports and from what has
16	he wasn't the only one because, back in January 2016,	16	happened, then, we surged the staffing. But at the
17	which was the time of the first Shaw report, he was	17	time, I guess I would characterise it as an unknown
18	clearly dead against it.	18	unknown.
19	Why do you think the Home Office went ahead,	19	Q. Sorry, what was the word you used, "We [something] on
20	regardless of Stephen Shaw's view expressed in his first	20	staffing"?
21	report in January 2016 and in light of the comments made	21	A. We surged the staffing.
22	by Peter Clarke in the report dated January 2017?	22	Q. "Surged"?
23	A. I don't know, Mr Altman, because I wasn't there at the	23	A. "Surged", significantly increased the number of
24	time but, anyhow, I can speculate that, you know, extra	24	Home Office staff on site.
25	capacity was needed and that options were reviewed.	25	Sorry, it is not clear.
	capacity, was needed and time options were remembered.	20	2011,9, 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	Page 69		Page 71
1	Q. Did you regard it as a mistake to have added 60 beds to	1	I think at the time it was an unknown unknown.
1 2	Q. Did you regard it as a mistake to have added 60 beds to Brook House?	1 2	I think at the time it was an unknown unknown.  I don't think that people realised what the impact of
2	Brook House?	2	I don't think that people realised what the impact of
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Brook House?  A. I couldn't characterise it as a mistake, no, because I don't know what the options were at the time. If you were faced with a number of options, it may have been the best option, it may not have been. I simply don't know.  Q. In terms of detainee welfare, Mr Riley, do you accept that any failure to focus on detainee welfare is a fundamental failure that the Home Office has to take responsibility for?  A. Sorry, in what way? Sorry, it is a slightly large question. Sorry, Mr Altman, but I am not understanding it properly.  Q. Any failure do you accept that any failure to focus on detainee welfare is a fundamental one, that the Home Office ultimately has to take responsibility for?  A. Yes, I am clear that, you know, I am responsible for the welfare of those in detention, so, yes, I accept that.  Q. Have you considered why it might be that the Home Office onsite staff were so oblivious to the ill-treatment and abuse that was going on there?  A. I think, you know, I have touched on this in what I have said and my apology at the top. We didn't have enough	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I don't think that people realised what the impact of having that number of staff would be until it became clear, and it goes right through my statement, you know, the Home Office staff on site and the Home Office leadership did not realise what was happening.  Q. And I am sure you are prepared to agree that they ought to have done?  A. I think locally, we — I don't hold the local staff to blame for that because I don't think we gave them sufficient resource and the job we gave them was, in hindsight — and it's a lot easier to look at this in hindsight five years later — the job was too demanding. Whether or not that could have reasonably been recognised at the time, I don't know, I wasn't in post.  Q. No, but the Home Office leadership — that is really what I am driving at, not the staff so much but the Home Office leadership — they ought to have known what was going on; it was their job to, surely?  A. I am not sure — there are times, I think, Mr Altman, you know, is it reasonable to expect it and I am not sure it was.  They thought that the staff were doing the job to the best of their abilities and they had the competing

1	Home Office leadarship is what we saw that when the	1	leadership, the culture, you know, we have moved things
	Home Office leadership is what we saw, that when the		1, ,,
2	problem became apparent they acted decisively in dealing	2	on incredibly quickly in a small number of years and
3	with it.	3	I think we have taken every step we could take
4	Q. Yes, but you will agree, won't you, Mr Riley, that	4	proportionately to deliver a safe environment.
5	mistreatment of detainees was nothing novel in 2017?	5	Q. Let me move on to another topic. You deal in your
6	There had been mistreatment in other centres, so the	6	witness statement, Mr Riley, don't you, with the use of
7	Home Office must have alive to the fact that staff	7	rule 40 and rule 42.
8	members of private contractors, which is what we are	8	At paragraph 46 of your first witness statement, if
9	dealing with, were sometimes, I suggest, out of control	9	you want to look at that, at page 15, you refer to the
10	and mistreating detainees. It was nothing new, was it,	10	IMB's 2017 report, which you say was largely positive in
11	and is that why I am suggesting that the leadership	11	its commentary on the use of rule 40 and 42, finding:
12	should have been alive to it?	12	"No evidence that this"
13	A. I say my opinion now is that the leadership believed	13	Your statement reads "sanction", I think it should
14	that the staff at Brook House were doing the job to the	14	be "rule":
15	best of their ability and that if they had noticed abuse	15	" has been used indiscriminately or
16	taking place, they would have raised it.	16	inappropriately; in fact, just the reverse."
17	Q. So it was as simple as that; but are you not prepared to	17	But did you appreciate that the report in 2017
18	accept that those in leadership positions should have	18	expressed concerns that mentally unwell detainees were
19	been more alert to the possibility that abuse does take	19	being held in the CSU on rule 40?
20	place and can take place, and therefore it is reasonable	20	A. I can't recall that, Mr Altman.
21	to suggest they ought to have been aware, they ought to	21	Q. Let us put up, please, on the screen <ver000138> at</ver000138>
22	have made it their business?	22	page 14.
23	A. I can't speak for my predecessor in what actions she	23	This is a report you refer to at length, isn't it,
24	took at the time but I do know that she is, you know,	24	in your annex to the second statement
25	an incredibly principled and professional leader who	25	A. It is.
	Page 73		Page 75
	1 age 75		1 age /3
1	visited the sites and was absolutely determined that	1	Q because of its content?
2	people in her care were treated properly as well, but	2	If we look at paragraph 6.5:
3	I am sure she reasonably expected that, if staff had	3	"In last year's report we raised concerns about the
4	seen things locally, they would have reported it to her;	4	use of the CSU for detainees with mental health issues.
5	they didn't and therefore they didn't she didn't get	5	Those concerns remain and it is clear that some
6	it reported to her.	6	detainees with mental health issues are held in the CSU
7	It is a circle we have been round. Was it	7	on rule 40 when the nature of their behaviour and its
8	a reasonable expectation? Well, at the end of the day,	8	impact on staff and fellow detainees makes it impossible
9	you know, she would hope her staff would report things	9	for them to remain on normal location. The CSU is not
10	back but, if they didn't see it, they couldn't report	10	an appropriate location for detainees with mental health
11	it.	11	problems and, as we said last year in the Brook House
12	Q. Then the failure is systemic, isn't it?	12	context, it simply represents the least worst available
13	A. I think the failure is, in a way, we had the site set up	13	option, providing a temporary place of last resort and
14	and the number of staff and it didn't just fail here, it	14	safety which helps to protect the individual and the
15	failed at other sites you have alluded to, and we have	15	general detainee population."
16	learnt from that now.	16	Indeed it was also raised in 2016. Can we, Zaynab,
17	Q. How confident are you that you have learnt from that	17	put up <imb000121> at page 16. At 5.7.5, at the foot of</imb000121>
18	now, Mr Riley?	18	the page:
19	A. I am very confident, Mr Altman.	19	"In last year's report, we commented on the extent
20	Q. So we will not in five years' time be having another	20	to which Brook House is fortunate in that the CSU forms
21	statutory or non-statutory inquiry as to what went wrong	21	a discrete unit within E wing. As a result, many
22	in another detention centre?	22	detainees with mental health issues can be relocated
23	A. I can't see it happening again, Mr Altman. I think the	23	from the CSU to normal location on relatively quiet
24	money we have put in the contracts, the assurance we	24	E wing, generally a far more suitable location where
25	have, the training we have now, the visibility of	25	they continue to receive appropriate support from the
	Daga 74		Page 76
	Page 74		Page 76
			19 (Pages 73 to 76)

		1	
1	same officers who had cared for them in the CSU. This	1	in some regards related. Let's put up on screen
2	arrangement continued to operate in 2016 and we are	2	<cjs000676> please. Presumably you are intimate with</cjs000676>
3	satisfied that the availability of 'sheltered	3	these DSOs, Mr Riley?
4	accommodation' on E wing significantly reduced the	4	A. Yes.
5	amount of time that some detainees with mental health	5	Q. Are you responsible for their authorship or not? Who
6	issues spent in the CSU."	6	authors these things?
7	It is this I want to focus attention on:	7	A. They are authored by a combination of operational and
8	"Nevertheless, the use of the CSU for detainees with	8	policy colleagues, but I sign them all off before they
9	mental health issues continues to reflect a worrying	9	are published.
10	lack of specialist accommodation within the detention	10	Q. You have input, perhaps not at some form of committee
11	estate and the wider NHS. The Shaw report has led to	11	stage, but do you have input into them?
12	an increased focus on detainees with mental health	12	A. I do, if I am not happy with a revision to a DSO, then
13	issues, but we are not persuaded this has had an impact	13	I will ask for further input.
14	yet. The IMB remains clear in its view that the CSU is	14	Q. You will ask for?
15	not an appropriate location for detainees with mental	15	A. Further input.
16	problems. It simply represents the least worst	16	Q. Further input?
17	available option."	17	A. Further input, yes.
18	So in both years the IMB was emphasising that the	18	Q. Yes, well, this one is 02/2017, and published
19	conditions of the CSU were poor and unsuitable for such	19	date July 2017 and title "Removal from association,
20	vulnerable detainees. Do you accept those concerns must	20	(Detention Centre Rule 40) and Temporary Confinement,
21	have been known to the Home Office?	21	(Detention Centre Rule 41)". Can we go to page 11 of
22	A. The concerns set out in the report were, yes, because,	22	this DSO, please.
23	you know, we will have published an action plan based on	23	This whole section is about authorisation and we
24	the reports, yes.	24	don't need to look at 28, because I am sure you
25	Q. Well, the Home Office was privy to these reports,	25	understand the provisions, but if we scroll down, as
	Page 77		Page 79
1	obviously.	1	Zaynab has for us, to paragraph 31, we have the
2	A. Indeed.	2	provision:
3	Q. You say the Home Office must have published action plans	3	"In no circumstances must an [individual]
4	but certainly from 2016 to 2017, the two reports we have	4	authorisation be given for a period beyond 24 hours. In
5	just seen, nothing can have happened, can it?	5	normal circumstances, any use of rule 40 or 42 for
6 7	A. I can't comment because, as I say, I wasn't there.  I don't know what we had attempted to do. Have we got	6 7	an initial 24-hour period must be authorised by a manager (executive officer or above) from the HOIE IRC
8	the action plan that we can bring up?	8	team in a contracted-out centre."
9	Q. Not that I know.	9	Then if we go to the next page, please,
10	A. Because they are all published.	10	paragraph 32:
11	Q. Well, I am sure, Mr Riley, if there was one, maybe you	11	"In cases of urgency"
12	can fish that out for us and send it to the inquiry	12	As you will know, that is footnoted 4. If we just
13	after your evidence is completed?	13	scroll down to the bottom, urgency meaning:
14	A. I am happy to go fishing.	14	"For example to protect life and/or the security of
15	Q. Maybe there is one and I have not seen it, but if there	15	the centre, for example a fight or an assault on another
16	isn't, perhaps you would help us with it.	16	detainee or member of staff."
17	The point remains, I have just taken you to two IMB	17	Back up to the top:
18	reports, separated by a year in effect. One is for 2016	18	" and if the circumstances are such that it is
19	and one for 2017, and the IMB is complaining about the	19	impracticable to seek the authority required in
20	same thing in the second as it was in the first, which	20	paragraph 31 in advance, the centre/duty manager (in
21	rather suggests that, even if there was an action plan,	21	a contracted-out or HMPPS-run centre) can make the
	nothing changed. Can you not agree with that?	22	emergency authorisation so that the authority is
22		23	considered to begin at that point."
23	A. Yes you know, the repeat comments are a concern.	23	
	A. Yes you know, the repeat comments are a concern.  I accept that.	24	Now, a letter was sent to the inquiry and it has
23			Now, a letter was sent to the inquiry and it has a reference now, from the Home Office, on 28 March, in
23 24	I accept that.	24	

1	relation to an inquiry on behalf of core participants.	1	Q. Who does the Home Office say, within G4S, was able to
2	Can we put that up on screen, please, <hom0332161>:</hom0332161>	2	authorise the use of rule 40 and, specifically, what
3	"We write in response" you are familiar with this	3	position did they need to occupy?
4	letter, Mr Riley, I assume?	4	A. As it says in the DSO, it is the centre manager or duty
5	A. Yes.	5	manager, and that depends the duty manager depends on
6	Q. "We write in response to your email dated 15 March	6	the time of day and day of week.
7	pertaining to the delegation of certain powers.	7	Q. Yes, so a duty director would have been sufficient for
8	"The position is set out clearly in Detention	8	the purpose?
9	Services Order 02/2017, namely:"	9	A. If they were the duty manager at the time.
10	What I just read out is quoted there. Then, at	10	Q. Yes. What about an Oscar 1?
11	point 3:	11	A. Yes, at certain times of the day, they are the duty
12	"The Home Office expects this DSO to be followed,	12	manager; for example, in the early hours of the morning,
13	(although as Duncan Lewis observes, it is possible to	13	they may be the most senior person on site as duty
14	obtain a formal delegation of powers and duties under	14	manager.
15	rule 65). It is, however, respectfully highlighted that	15	Q. Yes, what about a DCM?
16	the question of whether a failure to follow this or	16	A. If they are carrying out the role of duty manager, for
17	an absence of particular paperwork would result in	17	example Oscar 1, then that is in line with a DSO.
18	an 'unlawful' decision 'for lack of appropriate	18	Q. And if they are not?
19	authorisation' cannot be a matter for determination by	19	A. Well, no, it needs to be the duty manager.
20	this inquiry."	20	Q. You see, we have heard that DCMs were providing
21	So, do you agree, the effect of the letter is to say	21	authorisation in the majority of cases during the period
22	that the DSO, the particular detention sentence, the	22	that we are dealing with.
23	order, allows the centre or duty manager only to make	23	That is the evidence we have heard. And I think we
24	an emergency authorisation?	24	heard on Friday from Steve Hewer, who is the centre
25	A. Yes.	25	manager now, but under the tenure of Serco, that the
	Page 81		Page 83
1	Q. And the Home Office expects the DSO to be complied with;	1	same is happening?
2	•	-	8.
	that is the second point.	2	A. I am aware that DCMs, if they are the duty manager, can
3	that is the second point.  A. Yes, that's right.	2 3	A. I am aware that DCMs, if they are the duty manager, can authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have
3 4	A. Yes, that's right.	2 3 4	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have
	A. Yes, that's right.  Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to	3	
4	A. Yes, that's right.	3 4	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on
4 5	<ul><li>A. Yes, that's right.</li><li>Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to obtain a formal delegation under rule 65?</li><li>A. Hmm.</li></ul>	3 4 5	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on site. You know, things can happen in the early hours of
4 5 6	<ul><li>A. Yes, that's right.</li><li>Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to obtain a formal delegation under rule 65?</li></ul>	3 4 5 6	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on site.
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4 5 6 7 8	<ul> <li>A. Yes, that's right.</li> <li>Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to obtain a formal delegation under rule 65?</li> <li>A. Hmm.</li> <li>Q. And the delegation under rule 65, which is found in the Detention Centre Rules of 2001, is:</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on site.  You know, things can happen in the early hours of the morning or late at night when they are the Oscar 1 or duty manager. And I would expect it to be the
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4 5 6 7 8 9	<ul> <li>A. Yes, that's right.</li> <li>Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to obtain a formal delegation under rule 65?</li> <li>A. Hmm.</li> <li>Q. And the delegation under rule 65, which is found in the Detention Centre Rules of 2001, is:  "The manager of a detention centre may, with the leave of the Secretary of State, delegate any of the</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on site.  You know, things can happen in the early hours of the morning or late at night when they are the Oscar 1 or duty manager. And I would expect it to be the Oscar 1 but, as a safeguard, every single time rule 40 is authorised, in an emergency by a member of Serco
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. Yes, that's right.  Q. Albeit the Home Office agrees that it is possible to obtain a formal delegation under rule 65?  A. Hmm.  Q. And the delegation under rule 65, which is found in the Detention Centre Rules of 2001, is:  "The manager of a detention centre may, with the leave of the Secretary of State, delegate any of the powers and duties under these rules to another officer of that detention centre."  That is what rule 65 provides.  Finally, the final sentence in point, or paragraph, 3 of the letter:  "It is not the inquiry's role to decide upon the implications of failing to follow the process or an absence of paperwork."  Fine so far, but can I ask you these questions,  Mr Riley, please? Do you consider that rule 40 should only have been authorised by G4S in case of urgency, and where it was impracticable to seek Home Office authorisation?  A. Yes, I do. That is — you know, as you say, that is	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	authorise, and do authorise, now. I don't have a problem with that, if they are the senior manager on site.  You know, things can happen in the early hours of the morning or late at night when they are the Oscar 1 or duty manager. And I would expect it to be the Oscar 1 but, as a safeguard, every single time rule 40 is authorised, in an emergency by a member of Serco staff, the whole context of it is reviewed by my team within 24 hours. Not just the actual use of rule 40, which obviously we had to do anyway under the DSO, but, in general, the paperwork and why the individual who gave authorisation did it at that time and in that way. Q. If, during the period that we are interested in, it was routinely being done by DCMs, who were not duty managers, then that was a failure in the system?  A. I think — it was certainly against the DSO and we should have — sorry, it would certainly be outside of the DSO, and we should have noticed it, yes, I would accept that.  Q. As far as you know, Mr Riley, during the relevant period, so the period April to end of August 2017, was

1	A. I am not aware of any. I don't know, sorry, Mr Altman.	1	to prevent abuse and ill-treatment at Brook House, do
2	Q. Is that a "no" or just you don't know?	2	you accept it is your responsibility, the Home Office's
3	A. It is just I don't know, sorry.	3	responsibility, to investigate and understand what
4	Q. Can you find out for us, please? Thank you.	4	happened and to learn lessons from it to avoid the same
5	Let me just ask you something on a discrete topic	5	issues recurring?
6	which I am asked to ask you on behalf of some of the	6	A. Yes, I do.
7	core participants.	7	Q. No question about that, is there, really?
8	A. Yes.	8	In your role, now, Mr Riley, do you make it your
9	Q. D643, is, or was, a detainee at Brook House. On	9	business to make yourself aware of past abuse, scandals
10	22 February, he gave evidence to the effect that he had	10	and recommendations made to the Home Office?
11	in his possession two mobile phones, one of which was	11	A. I do. I think there is a in some ways, almost
12	operated on a 3G network and another was given to him by	12	a statute of limitations about how far I will go back,
13	Brook House staff. He describes phone blackouts around	13	but, yes, I do.
14	the time of charter flights, where Brook House phones	14	Q. How far do you go back?
15	didn't work, but his 3G phone did.	15	A. It depends on the issue, on whether there is still
16	In fact, he wasn't the only one, we have heard	16	relevance today. So, for example, there was a couple of
17	evidence of that kind and maybe you are aware of it,	17	very difficult inquests I attended at you know,
18	that, somehow, coincidentally, the internet went down	18	recently where they went back a number of years and,
19	around the time of charter flights, so the question I am	19	you know, I felt it was relevant to look into the
20	asked to ask you is this: does the Home Office or its	20	circumstances. You know, it is not a hard and fast
21	contractors have the capacity to shut off phone	21	rule, I don't think, Mr Altman.
22	connectivity and/or internet connectivity for detainees	22	Q. Whose job is it to ensure that recommendations are
23	and, if it does, has it used it?	23	followed through?
24	A. I don't know about internet connectivity. We cannot	24	A. Ultimately, it is my responsibility.
25	shut off phone connectivity.	25	Q. Yes. And do you have a team under you to help you with
	•		
	Page 85		Page 87
1	This has been raised on a number of occasions and	1	that?
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2	including, you know, prior to a charter flight a couple	2	A. We have I have various teams to deliver our
2	including, you know, prior to a charter flight a couple of years ago. To safeguard that now, we test daily, or	2 3	A. We have I have various teams to deliver our recommendations, so it varies. We have a first-line
2 3 4	including, you know, prior to a charter flight a couple of years ago. To safeguard that now, we test daily, or before charter flights, phone connectivity across the	2 3 4	A. We have — I have various teams to deliver our recommendations, so it varies. We have a first-line insurance team who look at recommendations in centres,
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1			
· '	accepted or rejected? What is the process behind that?	1	defensible, and 27 per cent took over one year.
2	A. When a recommendation is made, my team, my corporate	2	"28. The Home Office commissioned Baroness
3	oversight team, my operational teams, will work with the	3	Nuala O'Loan DBE to conduct a review of the 'Outsourcing
4	policy teams who are responsible for the recommendation	4	Abuse' report and to consider 29 of the cases referenced
5	to review it and to see whether it is deliverable or	5	in which the UK Border Agency or HM Prison Service had
6	not. Some recommendations, you know, we accept in	6	already carried out an investigation. This review was
7	delivering in full, some can only be partially accepted	7	published in March 2010. Baroness O'Loan did not find
8	for various reasons and some we don't accept.	8	evidence of systemic abuse in the cases she was able to
9	Q. Yes, and all of that, as far as you are concerned, has	9	review. However, in the 29 cases in which complaints
10	been set out in the annex. So you have looked at	10	were made, she identified 18 cases in which 'the
11	various parts of reports, you have looked at the	11	investigations were not adequate or there was no
12	recommendations and explained which have been accepted	12	investigation'."
13	and which have not and why not?	13	She found that many of the use of force techniques
14	A. Yes. And for certain types of reports, you know, for	14	were lawful, insofar as they were permitted, noting that
15	example, HM Inspectorate of Prisons or IMB reports we	15	they must, of course, also be necessary and
16	publish our findings and our action plans.	16	proportionate. And so Emma Ginn goes on in
17	Q. You say, going back in time, it is a question of	17	paragraph 29, and, at 30, she adds this:
18	relevance. Are you aware of a report which calls itself	18	"Baroness O'Loan also concluded that there was,
19	"Outsourcing Abuse" from July 2018 by Medical Justice?	19	'inadequate management of the use of force by the
20	A. No, I am not, sorry.	20	private sector companies' which resulted in 'failures
21	Q. This was in your documentation, Mr Riley.	21	properly to account for the use of force by recording
22	A. I accept that, Mr Altman. As I say, there was an awful	22	fully the circumstances and justification for the use of
23	lot in there and I have done my best to get through as	23	force'."
24	much as possible.	24	Then to paragraph 31:
25	Q. I accept there was. Can we consider parts of it,	25	"In all [she] made 22 recommendations in respect of
	Page 89		Page 91
1	because it was followed up by Baroness O'Loan, who did	1	the management of removals and the complaints
2	a report reviewing the Medical Justice Report	2	investigation processes, six of which related to the use
3	in March 2010. And perhaps it is most usefully	3	of force and handcuffing, including 'a review of the
4	summarised and, if needs be, we can look at the reports	4	control and restraint techniques and of the Guidance
5	themselves, by Emma Ginn of Medical Justice. She	5	used to determine what improvements could be made. Such
6	provided a witness statement to the inquiry, <bhm000041></bhm000041>	6	a review should encompass consideration of control and
	* * **		
7	at page 9.	7	restraint training and the physical techniques used in
	at page 9.  Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading	7 8	restraint training and the physical techniques used in mental health establishments'."
7	Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading		
7 8	Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading "Outsourcing abuse: State-sanctioned violence during the	8	mental health establishments'."
7 8 9	Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading	8 9	mental health establishments'."  She adds this:
7 8 9 10	Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading "Outsourcing abuse: State-sanctioned violence during the detention and removal of asylum seekers."  As I say, dated 2008. If we go to the next page at	8 9 10	mental health establishments'."  She adds this:  "The Home Office duly agreed to prepare a Service
7 8 9 10 11	Scroll down to the bottom. You will see the heading "Outsourcing abuse: State-sanctioned violence during the detention and removal of asylum seekers."  As I say, dated 2008. If we go to the next page at the top:	8 9 10 11	mental health establishments'."  She adds this:  "The Home Office duly agreed to prepare a Service Improvement Plan, though it has not provided a copy to
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1	the use of force at Brook House during the relevant	1	the "Key facts" infographic we'll see on the right-hand
2	period, do you accept that her commitment hasn't been	2	side: "
3	met?	3	"35 per cent recommendations from the [HMIP] report
4	A. In terms of what was happening in Brook House in 2017,	4	that have not yet been implemented one year after the
5	yes, I do.	5	inspection."
6	Q. As you accept, 2010, when Baroness O'Loan produced her	6	Do you have any explanation for that?
7	review report, that was 7 years before Panorama exposed	7	A. No. It would be helpful to have more detail with
8	what was happening at Brook House.	8	that so whether they're the recommendations we have
9	Does that suggest to you, Mr Riley before your	9	accepted or the total recommendations, including ones
10	time perhaps, but are you prepared to accept that there	10	that we have not accepted or only partially accepted.
11	has been a failure by the Home Office to manage private	11	Q. If we go to page 7, the next page, we will see at the
12	sector companies in their treatment of detainees and the	12	top this is a summary, and if we go to paragraph 3,
13	use of their detention powers?	13	there is some helpful background in it:
14	A. I think that is that is an incredibly wide statement,	14	"In March 2015, a Channel 4 undercover documentary
15	Mr Altman. What I do think is that	15	on Yarl's Wood made allegations about the way residents
16	Q. It was actually a question, rather than a statement. It	16	were treated by staff. The documentary coincided with
17	was whether you think	17	the start of the new Serco contract. It was closely
18	A. In that case, the answer is no. Sorry, it felt like	18	followed by an unannounced inspection of the centre by
19	a statement.	19	HMIP and the Care Quality Commission (CQC)
20	I think that is incredibly wide-ranging. As we have	20	in April 2015. Since then, there have been a further
21	seen in a number of the documents you have put on	21	four independent reviews. These were led by
22	screen, and in the evidence packs, that independent	22	Kate Lampard for Serco, Stephen Shaw for the
23	bodies have complimented, at times, the quality of the	23	Home Office, Bedford Borough Council's Adult Services
24	work that private sector suppliers have carried out. It	24	and Health Overview and Scrutiny Committee and the CQC.
25	is not a "one size fits all". We cannot minimise what	25	The reviews covered different aspects of the performance
	70.00		P 0-
	Page 93		Page 95
1	happened at Brook House in 2017; we have got to learn	1	of Serco and G4S. The Home Office, NHS England, Serco
2	from it. But, equally, we cannot be throwing the baby	2	and G4S subsequently drew up plans to respond to the
3	out with the bathwater and ignoring the good work that	3	reviews, and are introducing changes."
4	took place as well, paraphrasing Shakespeare on that.	4	They set out we don't need to look at it the
5	It is, you know, the good is often interred in the	5	events at Yarl's Wood.
6	bones, Mr Altman, in what our suppliers do, so I can't	6	If we go then, please, to page 10, under, "Key
7	agree with the scope of your question.	7	findings. Designing the service specification":
8	Q. So put another way, as a question, are you confident	8	"The Home Office did not reflect lessons from
9	that, during the relevant period, the Home Office was	9	previous inspections when it agreed the service
10	adequately managing G4S?	10	specification with Serco. Many of the concerns raised
11	A. I don't think we were, no. Because if we had adequately	11	by HMIP in its 2015 inspection were raised in 2011 and
12	resourced our management of the contract, then I don't	12	2013 prior to the new contracts. For example, HMIP
13	think the abuse would have happened and I have already	13	identified issues with the quality of rule 35 reporting
14	accepted that and that there were failures in that, so	14	(the process for identifying vulnerable residents) and
15	there were failings there, I accept.	15	the role of male staff in searching female residents'
16	Q. You mentioned Yarl's Wood in another context. Can we	16	rooms. At the time of the 2015 report, 59 per cent of
17	put up on screen <inq000186> please.</inq000186>	17	the 2013 report's recommendations had not been achieved,
18	This appears to be a summary report about	18	with little evidence that issues had been tackled until
19	Yarl's Wood, have you had an opportunity to look at	19	recently"
20	this, Mr Riley?	20	Then at page 12, paragraph 14:
21	A. Sorry, Mr Altman, no, I haven't.	21	"G4S has been slow to meet its contractual
22		1 22	obligations for training. G4S was required to provide
22	Q. You haven't?	22	congutions for training. The was required to provide
23	Q. You haven't? A. No.	23	staff with appropriate training on IRCs. Rule 35
23	A. No.	23	staff with appropriate training on IRCs. Rule 35
23 24	<ul><li>A. No.</li><li>Q. We can see the date of it at the foot of the page,</li></ul>	23 24	staff with appropriate training on IRCs. Rule 35 assessments are specific to IRCs so people who had not

1	repeatedly issued recommendations to address weaknesses	1	from 2015, but I do think that the Home Office has
2	in the rule 35 process during inspections in 2011, 2013,	2	learned from that and has brought in a new regime and
3	and again in 2015. However, neither Commissioners nor	3	different levels of assurance to make sure that we do
4	contractors acknowledged the urgency of addressing these	4	better now.
5	main recommendations. NHS England eventually provided	5	Q. It just seems to provide a picture of a persistent
6	training to GPs in July 2015, almost a year after the	6	failure to follow recommendations, doesn't it, Mr Riley,
7	G4S contract started. G4S was also required to provide	7	it is not just about G4S and/or the private contractors,
8	training to all staff at Yarl's Wood on mental health	8	I am focusing my attention on the Home Office. Are you
9	issues. NHS England did not enquire in the first six	9	telling us that the issue is one of resource and there
10	months of the contract whether G4S was providing mental	10	is nothing else to see there?
11	health training to Serco staff. G4S offered training to	11	A. I am not saying that. I am saying that I wasn't there
12	Serco staff in April 2015, seven months after the start	12	at the time. I don't know what the recommendations
13	of the contract, but Serco wasn't able to take it up	13	were, how easy or difficult they were to follow, but
14	until October 2015. Training is now offered on	14	I did agree, it is, on the face of these reports,
15	a monthly basis"	15	a quite sad picture in progress.
16	And then, please, finally, if we go to page 13 and	16	That is why the Home Office, you know, has put the
17	paragraph 18 under the heading "Progress into the	17	resource we have now into improving the situation.
18	reviews":	18	MR ALTMAN: Chair, it is a little early but I want to take
19	"There has been some significant process since the	19	Mr Riley to another report, but it will take me longer
20	independent reviews, although 35 per cent of the	20	than five minutes. Can I suggest 2.00?
21	recommendations from HMIP's 2015 inspection have not yet	21	THE CHAIR: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Riley. 2.00.
22	been implemented. In particular there have been	22	(12.56 pm)
23	improvements to healthcare facilities, the gender	23	(The short adjournment)
24	balance of operational staff, adult safeguarding and the	24	(2.00 pm)
25	residential regime. CQC reinspected healthcare at	25	THE CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Altman.
	Page 97		Page 99
1	V II W 1' M 2017 10 1d 4 1d 2' 1	,	MD ALTMAN, M DI
1	Yarl's Wood in May 2016 and found that all the required	1	MR ALTMAN: Mr Riley, can we look at paragraph 51 of your
2	improvements had been made and there was only one area	2	first witness statement, please.
3	requiring further work"	3	A. Excuse me?
4	And the relevant paragraphs are there set out.	4 5	Q. Page 16. Have you got that?
5	Not very encouraging, is it, Mr Riley?		A. I have, yes, thank you.
6	A. No, as I say, you know, I accept that I have accepted	6	Q. You say you defer to the assessment of experts and their
7	that, back in 2015, we didn't have sufficient	7	assessment of the Adults at Risk policy's effectiveness
8	resource	8	and this under the heading of "Vulnerability of
9	Q. Can you speak up a bit, please?	9	detainees":
10	A. Sorry, yes, I have accepted that, back in 2015,	10	"Any assessment of its effectiveness at Brook House
11	Mr Altman, we didn't have sufficient resource dedicated	11	during the relevant period will, to some degree, be
12	in the centres to make sure that recommendations were	12	stymied by the benefit of hindsight and would need to be
13	being delivered, and that the staff in the centres were	13	cognisant that the policy was in its infancy during that
14	being torn between operational jobs, induction and the	14	time."
15	issuing of papers and that you know, the review of	15	Then you refer to the second report on immigration
16	compliance with recommendations.	16	detention by Stephen Shaw, acknowledging the genuine
17	Q. Yes.	17	focus on vulnerability that the AAR policy had fostered
18	A. We have moved to change that. As I say, we have	18	and commented that it would be folly to abandon it.
19	an independent team now, and, as I set out to you	19	You say:
20	earlier, a number of independent second-line assurance	20	"Clearly there may be room for improvement in the
21	bodies. And finally, it is into the contract, as	21	operation of the Adults at Risk policy, including at
22	I think Mr Hewer himself acknowledged, that the	22	Brook House. The operation of Adults at Risk is subject
23	suppliers have to deliver third party recommendations	23	to annual inspection by the Independent Chief Inspector
24	now.	24	of Borders and Immigration, (ICIBI [for short])."
25	So, yes, I accept that it is not a great picture	25	And you say:
		1	
	Page 98		Page 100

1			
1	"In responding to the inspector's first review, the	1	and reporting and offender management."
2	then Director General of Immigration Enforcement	2	Obviously there is much more to this report than
3	acknowledged concerns that existed in such areas as	3	that, Mr Riley, but do you think it made happy reading?
4	clarity of roles, quality of discussion within case	4	A. No. I don't think it did. I think it was difficult to
5	progression panels and overall quality of decision	5	deliver during the pandemic and the landscape has been
6	making. An action plan was put in place to address	6	further complicated by the Nationality and Asylum Bill
7	those issues. I look forward to reading the ICIBI's	7	currently at the last stages of parliament and, you
8	second review which has now been published."	8	know, our decision within the Home Office that there was
9	Did you read it?	9	little point in producing reforms to Adults at Risk, and
10	A. Yes, I have, and our published response as well.	10	indeed rule 35, when the landscape may change
11	Q. Sorry, I can't hear you.	11	considerably once the Bill becomes law.
12	A. Sorry, Mr Altman, I read it and our response as well,	12	But, you know, I accept that Mr Neal's view is
13	which has been published.	13	outside of that, and he reports against what he sees and
14	Q. It was published in October '21	14	against his terms of reference, and that is what he has
15	A. Hmm.	15	reported.
16	Q is that right? This statement was November '21, so	16	Q. Yes, but it feels like the same old song, doesn't it,
17	it had been published, roughly, a few weeks beforehand.	17	about tardiness, and implementing recommendations?
18	A. I haven't got the timings, but I rely on you for those,	18	I mean, 4.1, which I have just read to you, "Without
19	yes.	19	further delays"?
20	Q. Let's just put it up on screen, please. <inq000156>.</inq000156>	20	A. But Mr Neal has not taken into account here the wider
21	We see it covers the period July 2020 to March '21, and	21	pressures of the Nationality and Asylum Bill and it
22	if we go to the next page, at the foot, we see	22	would seem nugatory to develop and further reform
23	October 2021 is when it was presented to parliament.	23	a system until we are sure what landscape it sits
24	If we go, please, to page 12, there is a summary of	24	against in the very near future.
25	conclusions. At 3.3:	25	But of the 11 recommendations that Mr Neal made,
			,
	Page 101		Page 103
1	"More broadly, genuine concerns about vulnerability	1	work is progressing against, I think, nine of them and
2	were in tension with a widely-held view within the	2	we are due to update him in the next couple of weeks on
3	Home Office that the safeguarding mechanisms used to	3	progress. There has some considerable progress been
		]	
4	identify and protect vulnerable detainees were and are	4	
4	identify and protect vulnerable detainees were and are	4 5	made, you know, a review of part C, in particular,
5	being abused."	5	made, you know, a review of part C, in particular, I think is really important.
5 6	being abused."  I am not going to read the whole paragraph. Then	5 6	made, you know, a review of part C, in particular, I think is really important. Q. Yes. Was it only the Bill which held up matters or were
5 6 7	being abused."  I am not going to read the whole paragraph. Then 3.4:	5 6 7	<ul><li>made, you know, a review of part C, in particular,</li><li>I think is really important.</li><li>Q. Yes. Was it only the Bill which held up matters or were there other issues outside of Covid-19?</li></ul>
5 6 7 8	being abused."  I am not going to read the whole paragraph. Then  3.4:  "Progress towards the implementation of the accepted	5 6 7 8	<ul> <li>made, you know, a review of part C, in particular,</li> <li>I think is really important.</li> <li>Q. Yes. Was it only the Bill which held up matters or were there other issues outside of Covid-19?</li> <li>A. I think the Bill is the main factor, Mr Altman, it will</li> </ul>
5 6 7 8 9	being abused."  I am not going to read the whole paragraph. Then  3.4:  "Progress towards the implementation of the accepted recommendations from the first inspection had been slow	5 6 7 8 9	made, you know, a review of part C, in particular, I think is really important. Q. Yes. Was it only the Bill which held up matters or were there other issues outside of Covid-19? A. I think the Bill is the main factor, Mr Altman, it will have, as you have you may have seen from the clauses,
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1	forwards in policy at times, but it is an incredibly	1	A. Yes and no, Mr Altman. I think they work in a lot of
2	difficult and complex area and when, you know, we move	2	cases but, you know, there is room for improvement and
3	policy in one place, it displaces it elsewhere. It is	3	that is why the Home Office has said we will review both
4	a big, complex machine, Mr Altman, and when, say, we	4	Adults at Risk and rule 35.
5	squeeze one thing, something pops out elsewhere.	5	Q. Say that again?
6	Q. It all sounds rather cumbersome, doesn't it? I mean, if	6	A. We have agreed, as the Home Office, that we will review,
7	you are a lay person listening to this and wondering why	7	you know, rule 35 and Adults at Risk, so we accept there
8	the same things seem to be said year in, year out, about	8	are some things we could do with improving. But other
9	recommendation, reports going back years. Try and	9	things work, and, you know, as of I think it
10	explain obviously, we don't want to go into the whole	10	was December, 36 per cent of all rule 35 submissions
11	mechanism of Home Office and government, but can you	11	resulted in someone being released, so it is not all
12	explain in a sentence or two why it just appears to be	12	a blank picture and it is working in cases.
13	so cumbersome?	13	Q. Of course, the chair is focusing on what went wrong back
14	A. I think it is cumbersome at times. I won't try and	14	in 2017. In relation to rule 34, adequate assessments
15	explain that away, but as I say, it is a massively	15	were not carried out within 24 hours of detainees'
16	complicated machine that, you know, needs to be properly	16	arriving, they didn't lead to rule 35 reports being
17	focused. Mixing my metaphors, sorry.	17	completed where appropriate, and so the detention of
18	Q. No, you are entitled to do that, Mr Riley. Of course,	18	vulnerable detainees wasn't being reviewed at the outset
19	you know that this inquiry was established by the Home	19	of detention you appreciated that?
20	Secretary following a ruling in the High Court.	20	A. There were failings at the time and they have been
21	A. Yes.	21	highlighted and we have improved now. I accept that.
22	Q. And there are a lot of people around me, including the	22	Q. We heard from Sandra Calver, who was the head of
23	chair and the inquiry more generally, who will want to	23	healthcare then, and still, as I understand it, under
24	know what confidence they can have that recommendations	24	Serco's tenure, and we heard from her on 1 March, so
25	made by the chair in this inquiry in the course of her	25	here we are, well over a month ago, telling us that it
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1	report will be looked at and followed by the Home Office	1	was a five-minute appointment that detainees had for
2	which set the inquiry up in the first place.	2	rule 34 assessments.
3	A. Hmm.	3	Dr Oozeerally, who is still there as well, ten days
4	Q. What confidence can anybody have?	4	later, on 11 March, told the inquiry that he was in some
5	A. Well, I think, you know, I am committed, myself, and	5	agreement but said that the appointment times could be
6	I am director of detention I think I am probably one	6	short depending on the circumstances, whatever that
7	of the key people in directing this in delivering the	7	meant.
8	outcomes of the inquiry where they are deliverable.	8	A systemic issue, do you think?
9	I do think that we are doing better, we are working	9	A. I think there seems to be a disagreement between
10	hard to do better. We talked, before the break, about	10	Mr Oozeerally Dr Oozeerally and Sandra Calver there,
11	some of the assurance mechanisms we have put in place to	11	but my understanding very much is, you know, a medical
12	try and make sure that recommendations are not lost and	12	practitioner will take as much time as he or she needs
13	are driven forward and are not forgotten about,	13	to do the rule 34 appointment properly and that seems to
14	including making it part of the operating contract for	14	be, from my understanding, what Mr Oozeerally was saying
15	suppliers that they have to deliver them and bringing in	15	in his evidence.
16	second-line assurance to do so.	16	Q. Except Dr Chaudhary told us time, in effect, was the
17	You know, it is not ideal and there are delays at	17	enemy. There was no time for it in the course of the
18	times but it is a work in progress and I think we are	18	day, no time for these appointments, no time for writing
19	improving.	19	up reports, which was an issue as well wasn't it,
20	Q. Thank you. Let's move on then. I want to ask you some	20	Mr Riley?
21	questions about rule 34 and rule 35.	21	A. I accept that.
22	We have heard and you know, Mr Riley, that the	22	Q. Insofar as rule 35 is concerned, reports under
23	evidence heard in this inquiry indicates rather strongly	23	rule 35(1), where detention, or continued detention, is
24	that the key safeguards under both those rules has been	24	likely to injuriously affect a detainee's health; rarely
25	failing; are you prepared to agree with that?	25	completed, we were told. Rule 35(2) reports, where
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1	there are suspicions of suicidal intention; never	1	and there still does need to be improvement and it is
2	completed, despite high numbers of self-harm and suicide	2	an iterative process and we need to keep getting it
3	attempts.	3	right.
4	It was just plain wrong, wasn't it?	4	Q. Sandra Calver, who, as I remind you, gave evidence on
5	A. Again, we have acknowledged that there have been issues	5	1 March, she accepted there were a number of cases,
6	with rule 35 and we rolled out training in 2015, 2016,	6	especially constant watch cases where it was obvious
7	we had refresher training with, you know, the changes to	7	that rule 35(2) reports should have been completed. She
8	the definition of torture in 2018, and we have a further	8	accepted that there was a serious failing in the
9	package now which we have just trialled, literally	9	safeguarding of individuals, and she said that
10	a couple of weeks ago, at Derwentside, so we are trying	10	responsibility for this lies with her, as head of
11	to improve the system. I would say that, just as a note	11	healthcare. So she accepted her responsibility but she,
12	and an aside, that a self-harm incident doesn't	12	in effect, said that responsibility was shared with the
13	necessarily mean that a rule 35(2) report is necessary	13	Home Office. She appeared to say to us that she
14	either.	14	couldn't get the GPs to do it. Do you accept that
15	You know, it somebody may self-harm but not have	15	shared responsibility?
16	suicidal intent, so there is not direct causation there.	16	A. I definitely accept the shared responsibility,
17	Q. What we have learned is that detainees were instead	17	Mr Altman. I can't comment on whether or not she can
18	being managed on a ACDT, which you know is a custodial	18	get the GPs, but, you know, as I keep saying, I accept
19	risk management tool with no therapeutic intervention?	19	that there are failings and we need to keep improving
20	A. It may be appropriate in cases where there is somebody,	20	the system and, you know, we have trained people, we are
21	for example, intends to self-harm at a protest against	21	rolling out further training. As you alluded to earlier
22	a decision by a caseworker or on their case, but has no	22	myself and Kate Davies, Director of Health and Justice
23	suicidal intent, then a rule 35(2) may not be	23	wrote to healthcare providers and health commissioners
24	appropriate and ACDT might be the right mechanism.	24	just last week, in the face of emerging evidence. We
25	Although it doesn't have the therapeutic support	25	acknowledge this and we are working on it.
	Page 109		Page 111
1	that you set out, and was set out by a previous witness,	1	Q. We will come back to that, Mr Riley, don't worry.
2	what it does is it triggers a clinical review so that	2	Mr Gasson, he couldn't tell us why that was when he
3	healthcare may look at what other interventions are	3	gave evidence on 15 March. Why it was that, as she
4	appropriate in an individual's case.	4	said, Sandra Calver, she couldn't get GPs to do it and
5	We continue to work and progress the ACDT team in	5	he was even unaware of it, he said, but he wasn't even
6	partnership with colleagues in the Prison Service and	6	sure whether it was anyone's job to question it and he
7	I think it is really important that we work at it, and	7	thought there may be a team now. Is he right about
8	develop it. But I think it is a vast improvement to the	8	that?
9	F2052 SH that preceded it.	9	A. There is indeed.
10	Q. As for rule 35(3) reports, where, as you know, the	10	Q. What does that team do?
11	medical practitioner is concerned that a detainee may be	11	A. We have a team that, again, it kind of takes us back to
12	a victim of torture, where completed, they were often	12	the start of this afternoon's session about
13	inadequate in failing to assess the impact of detention,	13	recommendations.
14	as is required, or failing to address mental health	14	Q. Yes.
15	issues leading to detention being maintained.	15	A. You know, in light of the ICIBI's report, we have
16	You will appreciate we have no rule 35 (2) reports	16	developed a team, it used to be called the rule 35 team,
17	at all from during the period and very few rule 35(1)	17	that reviewed the reports independently of caseworkers.
18	reports during the period. Dr Hard, the inquiry expert,	18	It is now called someone tell me if I get this wrong,
19	he reviewed all of the rule 35 reports available for the	19	it is the detained medical reports team that looks at
20	period and let me summarise this, I hope not doing	20	rule 35 and medico-legal reports now, and they review
21	a disservice to two very lengthy reports he concluded	21	all of the reports that come in and send them back to
22	that there was an inadequate system operating. You	22	the establishment via the detainee engagement team if
23	don't disagree with that, do you?	23	there are if they are not completed properly or there
24	A No Lithiuly was Lithiuly I have alweady a dynasyladged	24	is not enough detail to take a decision.
	A. No, I think we I think I have already acknowledged		9
25	that we recognised at the time the need for improvement	25	Q. You said in your witness statement at 53, your first

1	witness statement:	1	figures, are they, Mr Riley?
2	"Reviewing the Panorama broadcast again, I do not	2	A. No, but there are two comments to make here, I think
3	find any evidence that the operation of rule 35 of the	3	Mr Altman.
4	Detention Centre Rules was [systematically]" forgive	4	First of all, a rule 35 report does not necessarily
5	me, you say "systemically ineffective"	5	result in a release, as you are aware. There is
6	A. Sorry.	6	a balance against the release against the immigration
7	Q. No, it is my fault, I misread it:	7	considerations. As I say, since then, we have developed
8	" during the relevant period at Brook House.	8	the specialist team. The caseworkers don't take the
9	However, there may have been individual applications of	9	decision, the independent detained medical report team
10	rule 35 that fell short of the required standards, as	10	does, and they receive significant training in this and
11	had previously been highlighted by HMIP in its 2017	11	my understanding, and I will obviously write and confirm
12	inspection report."	12	this, is that the release rate now is at 36 per cent.
13	In light of the evidence that you have read since	13	But yes.
14	making that statement, do you revise that sentence?	14	Q. Under both types or all types of report?
15	That passage?	15	A. All types.
16	A. I think that the you know, the operation was more	16	Q. Across the piece, (1), (2) and (3)?
17	widely flawed than I understood it when I made the	17	A. Yes, my understanding here, again, and I am sure it
18	statement, but I am still not convinced it was	18	has been raised by witnesses is whether or not the
19	a systemic failure of the whole system. As I say,	19	rule 35(3) reports covered (1) and (2) as well, and
20	rule 35 reports were being made and people were being	20	there needs to be consideration of that and there is
21	released on the basis of them.	21	further training planned and being rolled out in coming
22	Q. Stephen Shaw, you will know, called for the whole	22	weeks on that.
23	process to be scrapped and replaced with an alternative,	23	Q. I think the point you are making is there may be
24	because, in his view, the safeguard wasn't functioning	24	overlap, is that what you are saying?
25	properly across the whole estate. You will know that	25	A. Yes, overlap, or the way that GPs use the forms and used
	Page 113		Page 115
1	from his first report	1 1	that as the dominant form rather than the others
1 2	from his first report.  Home Office statistics also showed that the high	1 2	that as the dominant form rather than the others,
2	Home Office statistics also showed that, the high	2	I don't know.
2 3	Home Office statistics also showed that, the high numbers of rule 35(3)s, virtually no rule 35(1)s and, as	2 3	I don't know. Q. Rather than?
2 3 4	Home Office statistics also showed that, the high numbers of rule 35(3)s, virtually no rule 35(1)s and, as I have already said to you, no rule 35(2)s at all, and	2 3 4	I don't know.  Q. Rather than?  A. Rather than use the (1), (2) and (3), use (3) to
2 3 4 5	Home Office statistics also showed that, the high numbers of rule 35(3)s, virtually no rule 35(1)s and, as I have already said to you, no rule 35(2)s at all, and there were very low release rates, according to	2 3 4 5	I don't know.  Q. Rather than?  A. Rather than use the (1), (2) and (3), use (3) to encapsulate them all, if that is what you mean by
2 3 4 5 6	Home Office statistics also showed that, the high numbers of rule 35(3)s, virtually no rule 35(1)s and, as I have already said to you, no rule 35(2)s at all, and there were very low release rates, according to Theresa Schleicher, for example, who have you read	2 3 4 5 6	I don't know.  Q. Rather than?  A. Rather than use the (1), (2) and (3), use (3) to encapsulate them all, if that is what you mean by overlap, yes.
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1	despite other reports to the contrary.	1	who can complete a rule 35 assessment to include
2	Q. "Well, he would say that, wouldn't he?", as somebody	2	qualified psychiatrists."
3	famously said.	3	Now, I am not sure if you touched on this a little
4	A. Indeed.	4	earlier when we were talking about the recommendations
5	Q. But the fact is, the suggestion is that there should be	5	in this report and the impact of the Nationality and
6	significantly more of both types of reports in such	6	Asylum Bill. Just so that we are clear, where are we
7	a period; that is really what the suggestion is.	7	with this?
8	A. I accept that suggestion. As I say, we have committed	8	A. It is not my area of expert knowledge because it is
9	to reviewing the rule 35 process, once the bill has	9	a different team who owns rule 35, it is the National
10	passed through parliament.	10	Returns Command that own the policy for rule.
11	Q. Are you aware that PPG have said there is to be a review	11	Q. Did you say "National Returns Command"?
12	of the rule 35 process later this month, on the 20th,	12	A. Yes, NRC.
13	did you know that?	13	Q. Okay.
14	A. No, I know there is training coming up. I didn't know	14	A. I do know, in reading the ICIBI report in our response,
15	there was a review.	15	that the roll out of planned training is going to happen
16	Q. If it is right that even PPG are still not reviewing	16	shortly and, as I say, we have trialled this in one
17	these issues properly, and not completing the right	17	centre, and other parts of this have been paused whilst
18	reports, at the very least, it is disappointing that	18	we wait for the outcome of the Nationality and Asylum
19	five years after Panorama, we are still in the same	19	Bill to progress through parliament.
20	position?	20	Q. So:
21	A. I would disagree, Mr Altman, that we are in the same	21	"iii. Review the effectiveness of rules 35(1) and
22	position. I have set out a number of times the	22	(2)"
23	additional safeguards we have had	23	That is on ice at the moment, is it?
24	Q. I know it is probably more comfortable for you, Mr Riley	24	A. My understanding is that we have paused that work, yes.
25	but I am losing you?	25	Q. Yes. When is the Bill likely to become an Act?
	Page 117		Page 119
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1 2	A. Sorry. No, I disagree, Mr Altman, that we are in the	1 2	A. Very, very shortly. It is back to the Lords this week,
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1	last week or at the end of last week; can we put it up	1	Centre Rules 2001 relating to healthcare. It is with
2	on screen, please, <hom0332160>, dated Friday, actually.</hom0332160>	2	this in mind that we are writing to you today."
3	The covering email, you may not know this, Mr Riley,	3	I hope I can be forgiven for not going through all
4	didn't come in until 6.12 on Friday evening, long after	4	of the detail, but there is set out what rule 34 is all
5	the inquiry had risen, long after all the core	5	about: "Medical examination upon admission and
6	participants had gone on their way for the weekend. And	6	thereafter", and, at the top of the next page:
7	this is the letter that was received.	7	"For the avoidance of doubt, the rule 34 examination
8	As we will see in a minute, it is cosigned by you	8	is not the same as the initial screening by a nurse",
9	and K Davies. She is, what, the Director of Health and	9	et cetera, et cetera.
10	Justice, Armed Forces and Sexual Assault Referral	10	Then rule 35 "Special illnesses and conditions
11	Centres, NHS England and NHS Improvement?	11	(including torture claims)":
12	A. Yes.	12	"Recent evidence to the inquiry has included claims
13	Q. And it was sent to the healthcare commissioners?	13	that healthcare teams in IRCs give insufficient regard
14	A. And healthcare providers as well.	14	to referrals under rules 35(1) and 35(2).
15	Q. And healthcare providers.	15	"We ask you to remember that each criterion ('limb')
16	The covering email that arrived attaching this	16	of rule 35 is equally significant in safeguarding
17	letter said as follows:	17	vulnerable people."
18	"Please find attached for the inquiry's	18	This next sentence is underlined, as we can see:
19	consideration a joint letter from the Home Office's	19	"Where a detained person meets the criterion under
20	Mr Phil Riley and NHS England's Ms Kate Davies"	20	limb (1) or (2) of the rule, a report should be written
21	Then, in brackets, what she is responsible for:	21	using the appropriate template."
22	"This letter was sent to all healthcare	22	There is some further advice:
23	commissioners and providers at immigration removal	23	"It is not acceptable, for example, to use the 35(3)
24	centres in England this morning."	24	template to record those concerns or to look for some
25	Let's just have a look at what it says. At the top,	25	other vehicle to do so, (such as the part C annex to the
			•
	Page 121		Page 123
1	first of all, we see the immigration enforcement logo	1	IS19RA form)", and so on and so forth.
2	and the NHS logo, and if you could just scroll up,	2	Again, at the bottom:
3	please, Zaynab, are you able to? Thank you.	3	"For the avoidance of doubt, the 3 'limbs' of
4	The date we see:	4	rule 35 are as follows (and no more restrictive a test
5	"Dear all.	5	should be applied)."
6	"Referencing Brook House inquiry:	6	They are there set out and, at the top of the next
7	"Many of you will be aware of the ongoing public	7	page:
8	inquiry into Brook House Immigration Removal Centre,		
	1 1	8	
9	which was established in November 2019 to investigate		"There will, we are sure, be many lessons to be
9 10	which was established in November 2019 to investigate potential Article 3 abuses of men detained at	9	"There will, we are sure, be many lessons to be learnt from this inquiry. We will write to you again
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10		9	"There will, we are sure, be many lessons to be learnt from this inquiry. We will write to you again once we have given consideration to the chair's final report.
10 11	potential Article 3 abuses of men detained at Brook House in 2017.	9 10 11	"There will, we are sure, be many lessons to be learnt from this inquiry. We will write to you again once we have given consideration to the chair's final report.  "We appreciate your assistance in this matter."
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1	A. Well, it feels, to use another phrase, we can't win.	1	the Home Office?
2	If we wait for things to progress or don't progress	2	A. For the last four years, I have been responsible on
3	them fast enough, we are criticised as the Home Office.	3	behalf of the Home Office.
4	If we act agilely and try and head things off and make	4	Q. And what about before that? During the relevant period
5	sure that people in our case get the best possible	5	at Brook House?
6	outcomes we are criticised cynically as well. It does	6	A. As I say, I accept there were failings there, and I have
7	feel we can't win on this one, Mr Altman.	7	apologised. What I can't say is whether people
8	Q. Do you agree it has the unfortunate optics of feeling	8	deliberately sat on it or whether they had other
9	a little knee-jerk?	9	priorities and other pressures that meant they were
10	A. It was written in the knowledge that that would be the	10	unable to tackle it. I can't speak on behalf of
11	accusation, yes. But better that than not write it at	11	Clare Checksfield in that way.
12	all.	12	Q. There are people behind me who will be thinking, when
13	Q. Whose idea was it?	13	you talk of "priorities and pressures", there cannot be
14	A. It was my letter, Mr Altman. It is my letter.	14	a higher priority than releasing a mentally unwell
15	Q. It is your letter and Ms Davies's letter, but whose idea	15	person held in detention, and you will agree with that?
16	was it?	16	A. I do agree with that, Mr Altman.
17	A. It was mine I recommended it to Kate to write.	17	Q. Dr Bromley told us on Friday that the real issue, as she
18	Q. This has been an issue that has been bubbling and	18	put it, is the need to address a culture of disbelief,
19	simmering, not just within this inquiry, has it?	19	in the culture and practice within IRC healthcare teams;
20	A. No.	20	do you think if you agree with what she says, do you
21	Q. What was it about the evidence that you heard or you	21	think that such a culture has been able to flourish
22	were briefed on, in this inquiry, that made you,	22	because the Home Office has persistently failed to
23	Phil Riley, say that, "The working evening or the	23	follow recommendations and has failed to get a grip on
24	working day before I give evidence to this inquiry,	24	rule 35?
25	I had better send out a letter"?	25	A. I think no, to be honest with you. I think it is
	Page 125		Page 127
	rage 123		rage 12/
1	A. Speaking to the team who give me feedback, as I said,	1	an incredibly complex question, you know, of whether
2	every day, the evidence was becoming clearer in recent	2	there is an endemic culture of disbelief or whether
3	days and weeks that this was becoming an issue and, as	3	there are pockets and why that is caused. We live in
4	I say, I knew that I would be criticised for sending it	4	a society where the debate on migration and enforcement
5	out the day before I gave evidence, if I did, but, if	5	is polarised and entrenched and that doesn't help
6	I didn't, and I delayed it, then if, you know, I sent it	6	either. And it is a difficult operating environment.
7	after I had given evidence, it would look like a knee	7	So there are a number of contributory factors but,
8	jerk, if I delayed it until the report came out, then	8	as I say, I accept that there are things we haven't got
9	people may be missed.	9	right and we continue not to get right and I accept
10	It was one of those I couldn't really win with	10	that, at times, we need to move faster on
11	this one, Mr Altman.	11	recommendations. We are doing our best on that and it
12	Q. The real criticism, don't you think, Mr Riley, is your	12	is a work in progress, but we are keen to learn.
13		1	
13	employers, the Home Office, who have done next to	13	Q. As you appreciate, part of the evidence the inquiry
14	employers, the Home Office, who have done next to nothing about this for years?	13	<ul> <li>Q. As you appreciate, part of the evidence the inquiry heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally,</li> </ul>
14	nothing about this for years?	14	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally,
14 15	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now	14 15	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't
14 15 16	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.	14 15 16	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods,
14 15 16 17	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.	14 15 16 17	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll
14 15 16 17 18	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for	14 15 16 17 18	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on
14 15 16 17 18 19	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.	14 15 16 17 18 19	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.  A. Indeed.	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some more it may be the top of the next page?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.  A. Indeed.  Q. Do you not agree that, above your head and, as I put it	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some more it may be the top of the next page? Under the underlined passage:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.  A. Indeed.  Q. Do you not agree that, above your head and, as I put it earlier, before you were a twinkle in the eye of	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some more it may be the top of the next page? Under the underlined passage: "It is not acceptable to use the 35(3) template
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.  A. Indeed.  Q. Do you not agree that, above your head and, as I put it earlier, before you were a twinkle in the eye of Detention and Escorting Services, despite your	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some more it may be the top of the next page? Under the underlined passage:  "It is not acceptable to use the 35(3) template to record those concerns or to look for some other
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	nothing about this for years?  A. At the end of the day, you know, I am in this seat now and it is my responsibility and I take it.  Q. I know that's a difficult question for you. You are in the seat and I am afraid you have to be accountable for it.  A. Indeed.  Q. Do you not agree that, above your head and, as I put it earlier, before you were a twinkle in the eye of Detention and Escorting Services, despite your experience in the Prison Service, it is the Home Office	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	heard over the past couple of weeks, Dr Oozeerally, Dr Chaudhary, they told us that the reason they didn't use rule 35 reports is because they used other methods, other methods such as part C, and if we can just scroll back to the first page, Zaynab, while we have it back on the screen, and scroll down a little, please and some more it may be the top of the next page? Under the underlined passage: "It is not acceptable to use the 35(3) template to record those concerns or to look for some other vehicle to do so (such as the part C annex)."

has been that the doctors were typically using part C reports to notify the Home Office.  A. Indeed and we need to be desert has that is not the right template and they should be using the rule 35 reporting method.  Q. Up to the point in time of receiving this letter, which for a series of the whole part C process, anyway, at the moment.  I assume has gone to PPC as well, at Brook Home and presumbly developer, those two doctors worked at presumbly developer, those two doctors worked at presumbly developer, those two doctors worked at a great series of the factors, or the impairy was that part C was used as an arched of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or or was likely to taxe, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was lackly to trave, an impiration effect on the factors, or the factors or the factors or the factors or the factors of the factors or the fact				
A. Indeed and we need to be clear that that is not the reporting method. Q. Yes. So nobady ever raised a concern about it, the declors carried on doing it and, according to Declorating method. Q. Yes to be point in time of receiving this letter, which I assume his gome to PPOs a well, at Brook House and B presumably clearwhere, those two dectors worked at B presumably clearwhere, those two dectors and the time. B c or was lakely to have, an injurious effect on the B prince of notifying the Home Office of the field, or B present and that they were saided, to they were using B time the raining that that is not the method they should B present and that they are clear in the DSO and B present and that they are clear in the DSO and B present and that they are clear in	1	has been that the doctors were typically using part C	1	A. No, I can't. No, I can't. As I say, we are carrying
right template and they should be using the rule 35 reporting method.  Q. Up to the point in time of receiving this letter, which 1 I assume has gone to PPG as well, at Brook House and 2 Processing between the some own decrins worked at 3 Brook House, as you know, during the relevant period and 3 Brook House, as you know, during the relevant period and 4 A. Yes. 4 A. Yes. 4 A. Yes. 5 Occareally, he said there wasn't - ole you remember 6 I said that is intell cardier, there wasn't rought firm 6 or are still working there now. 1 I said that is intell cardier, there wasn't rought firm 6 as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or 8 as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or 9 as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or 14 the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, 15 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 16 passing and that they were similarly to the said that part C was used even 17 it, in effect, as a satisfatule for the rule 35 template. 18 Sandra Calver, she said that part C was used even 19 though the use of part C daint trigger a review of 10 do rule 35s, so they did part Cs instead. And his 10 evidence, in summary, was the Home Office a flow and they 11 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 12 passing that the said that part C was used even 13 A. Yes. I can't offer an explanation for it, no. 14 A. Yes. I can't offer an explanation for it, no. 15 A. Yes a fast two conceample to part 16 passing that the core of the fact, or 17 tall the core of the fact, or 18 said that a flat they are a single of the fact, or 18 sandra Calver, she said that part C was used even 19 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 19 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 19 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 19 or was likely to have a said that part C was used even 19 or was likely to have a said that part C was used even 19 or the fact, as a said-ting the course of revidence and the said that the part of the rule of the fact	2	reports to notify the Home Office.	2	out a review of the whole part C process, anyway, at the
Source   Properting method.   Color   Up to the point in time of receiving this letter, which   Color   Chandhary, who gave evidence on I I March, just after   Dr Chandhary, who gave evidence on I I March, just after   Dr Chandhary, who gave evidence on I March, just after   Dr Chandhary, who gave evidence on I March, just after   Dr Chandhary, who gave evidence to the inquiry was that part C was used   are still working there now.   In addition   In additio	3	A. Indeed and we need to be clear that that is not the	3	moment.
O. Up to the point in time of receiving this letter, which I assume has gone to PPC as well, at Brook House and pressmably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at Brook House, as you know, during the relevant peried and are still working there now.  10 A. Yes. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Their evidence to the inquiry was that part C was used: 13 as a method of notifying the Home Office of the finet, or 14 the factors, or the impact, that detention was having, 15 or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the 16 patient and flast they were using 17 it, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 template. 18 Sandra Calver, she said that part C was used com 19 though the use of part C didn't trigger a review of 20 detention. 21 Perhaps more alarmingly, Mr Riley, if you picked up 22 on this when you read her evidence, she also said that 23 the Home Office advised them to do so. What do you 24 this about that? 25 A. I am surprised. You know, we are clear in the DSO and  Page 129  Page 131  1 is the training that that is not the method they should 2 in the training that that is not the method they should 3 to different places. The rule 35 report, because they go 3 to different places. The rule 35 report, because they go 4 to the rule 35 team – the medical detained team – 4 I keep forgetting its name now – 6 Q. At the time? 7 A. No, that is now. 7 I believe they went to the enseworkers at the time. 9 Q. So the caseworkers were making decisions which were 14 a graphly for medics? 15 A. No the medics, even in the rule 35 team to make that 4 the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers 15 or the medical — the old rule 35 team to make that 16 Q. D. So the caseworkers was that they had never been informed 18 by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was 19 by the Home Office, or even under decisions about the 20 the consworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a second, why are you seeding us these, for us, or the 4 further detertion of vulnerable detaineds each in the 5 decision on whether detention should be	4	right template and they should be using the rule 35	4	Q. Yes. So nobody ever raised a concern about it, the
I assume has gone to PPG as well, at Brook House and presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at a presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at a part of the presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at a part of the presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at a part of the presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at a part of the part of part of the part of part	5	reporting method.	5	doctors carried on doing it and, according to
Personal by elsewhere, those two doctors worked at	6	Q. Up to the point in time of receiving this letter, which	6	Dr Chaudhary, who gave evidence on 11 March, just after
Brook House, as you know, during the relevant period and are still working there now.  10 are still working the renow.  11 A. Yes.  12 Q. Their evidence to the inquiry was that part C was used the period of notifying the Home Office fee head.  13 as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or the fractors, or the impact, that detention was having, or was likely to have, an injurious effect on the patient and that they were suicidal, so they were using it, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 template.  15 and further, she said that part C was used even though the use of part C didn't trigger a review of detention.  16 detention.  17 an in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 template.  18 Sandra Calver, she said that part C was used even the though the use of part C didn't trigger a review of detention.  19 detention.  10 detention.  11 In me office, each what we are talking about the was used during the course of evidence. Can we put up on your screen what we are talking about the was used during the course of evidence. Can we put up on your screen, please, Zayanb, 410M3021909-This is part of the case record sheet, GCID.  12 Can you put no out of my missery, Mr Riley? What do you think about that?  13 A. No. 1 am surprised. You know, we are clear in the DSO and the time?  14 In the training that that is not the method they should use and it should be a rule 35 report, because they go to different places. The rule 35 reports, as I say, go to different places. The rule 35 reports, as I say, go at the time?  14 In the training that that is not the method they should use and it should be a rule 35 report, because they go to different places. The rule 35 reports, as I say, go to different places. The rule 35 reports, as I say, go at the time?  18 A. No, tam trying to work out what the G stands for.  19 Just a rule of the training that the time.  10 A. Thelieve they went to the caseworkers at the time.  11 Q. Set casseworkers were making decisions which were arguably for medics?  12 A. No, tam tra	7	I assume has gone to PPG as well, at Brook House and	7	Dr Oozeerally, he said there wasn't do you remember
are still working there now.  1	8	presumably elsewhere, those two doctors worked at	8	I said this a little earlier, there wasn't enough time
A. Yes.  11	9	Brook House, as you know, during the relevant period and	9	to do rule 35s, so they did part Cs instead. And his
12   Q. Their evidence to the inquiry was that part C was used as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or the the factors, or the impact that detention was having, and the patient and that they were suicidal, so they were using 16 it, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 tends for the rule 35 tends of the fact, as a substitute for the rule 35 tends of the suicidence, show the suicidal, so they were using 16 it is, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 tends of the suicidence, show the suicidal, so they were using 16 it is, the suicidal that part C was used even 18 it is suicidence, show the suicidal, so they were using 16 it is, the suicidence, show the suicidal so t	10	are still working there now.	10	evidence, in summary, was the Home Office knew and they
as a method of notifying the Home Office of the fact, or the finctors, or the impact, that detention was having, or whether detention such having, to the firetors, as substitute for the rule 35 template.  16 patient and that they were suicidal, so they were using it, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 template.  17 it, in effect, as a substitute for the rule 35 template.  18 Sandra Calver, the said that part C was used even though the use of part C didn't trigger a review of detention.  20 detention.  21 Perhaps more alarmingly, Mr Riley, if you picked up on this when you read her evidence, she also said that 22 thinks about that?  22 on this when you read her evidence, she also said that 22 thinks about that?  23 the Home Office advised them to do so. What do you think about that?  24 A. No, I am surprised. You know, we are clear in the DSO and Page 129  10 in the training that that is not the method they should use and it should be a rule 35 report, because they go to the rule 35 rem — the medical detained team—  14 to the Jastem— the medical detained team—  15 1 keep forgetting its name now—  16 Q. At the time?  17 A. No, that is now.  28 Q. Forget now, what about at the time. Where did they go at the time?  29 at the time?  20 A. The live they went to the caseworkers at the time.  21 Q. So the caseworkers were making decisions which were arguably for medics?  22 A. No, I am surprised. Page 131  23 A. No, the medics, even in the rule 35 documentation make the time?  24 A. No, the medics, even in the rule 35 documentation make the tree momendation, but it is for either the caseworkers at the time.  25 A. I believe they went to the caseworkers at the time.  26 Q. But the evidence was that they had never been informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was informed the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a sec	11	A. Yes.	11	never raised concerns. It is just inexplicable, isn't
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21 Perhaps more alarmingly, Mr Riley, if you picked up on this when you read her evidence, she also said that the Home Office advised them to do so. What do you the Home Office advised them to do so. What do you the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the Furle 35 team to make that further detention of vulnerable detainces?"; can you get me out of my misery, Mr Riley? What does GCID stand for?  22 does GCID stand for?  23 A. Er  24 Q. It sounds like you are as miserable as I am?  25 A. No, I am trying to work out what the G stands for.  26 Page 131  27 Page 131  28 Page 131  29 Page 131  20 Q. "Government"?  20 A. It is basically our database of – immigration database.  20 A. It is basically our database of – immigration database.  21 A. I don't know what the G stands for, I'm sorry.  22 A. It is basically our database of – immigration database.  23 A. It is basically our database of – immigration database.  24 Information Database.  25 A. I don't know what the G stands for, I'm sorry.  26 Q. "Government"?  27 A. No, that is now.  28 Q. Forget now, what about at the time. Where did they go at the time?  29 at the time?  20 So the caseworkers were making decisions which were arguably for medics?  21 A. No, the medical — the old rule 35 documentation make the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers the recommendation and the public of the rule o	19	though the use of part C didn't trigger a review of	19	on screen, please, Zaynab, <hom032190>This is part of</hom032190>
22 on this when you read her evidence, she also said that the Home Office advised them to do so. What do you think about that?  23 A. I am surprised. You know, we are clear in the DSO and Page 129  24 In the training that that is not the method they should use and it should be a rule 35 report, because they go to the rule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the trule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the time?  25 A. No, I am trying to work out what the G stands for.  26 Page 131  27 Page 131  28 Page 131  29 Page 131  20 "Government"?  20 A. It is basically our database of - immigration database. On the rule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the rule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the time?  29 A. It is basically our database of - immigration database. On the rule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the rule 35 team - the medical detained team - to the time?  30 A. No, that is now.  31 A. No, that is now.  42 Q. if its cunformation database? "Government Case Information Database"?  43 A. No, I can't confirm what the G is for.  44 O. It is, a ma afraid, a triviality of mine, but I don't know what a make the G stands for, I'm sorry.  45 A. No, I can't confirm what the G is for.  46 Q. So the caseworkers were making decisions which were arguably for medics?  47 A. No, the medics, even in the rule 35 documentation make the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers or the medical — the old rule 35 team to make that decision on whether detention should be maintained, so  48 Q. But the evidence was that they had never been informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was inappropriate. So all of these part Cs were going to the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a second, why are you sending us these, for us, or the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the further detention of vulnerable detainees?"; can you explain that?  40 De material and provide a part of the part Cs were going to the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well,	20	detention.	20	the case record sheet, GCID.
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Page 129  Page 131  in the training that that is not the method they should use and it should be a rule 35 report, because they go to different places. The rule 35 reports, as I say, go to the rule 35 team — the medical detained team — I keep forgetting its name now — Q. At the time? A. No, that is now. Q. Forget now, what about at the time. Where did they go at the time? A. No, that is now. Q. Forget now, what about at the time. Where did they go at the time? A. I believe they went to the caseworkers at the time. Q. So the caseworkers were making decisions which were arguably for medics? A. No, the medica, even in the rule 35 documentation make the recommendation, but it is for either the caseworkers or the medical — the old rule 35 team to make that decision on whether detention should be maintained, so What is now. Q. But the evidence was that they had never been informed by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was inappropriate. So all of these part Cs were going to the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a second, why are you sending us these, for us, or the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the further detention of vulnerable detainees?"; can you explain that?  Page 131  Q. "Government"?  A. It is basically our database of — immigration database. Information Database of — immigration database.  A. It is basically our database of — immigration database.  A. It is basically our database of — immigration database.  A. It is basically our database of — immigration database.  A. It is basically our database of — immigration database.  A. It don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. It don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants for, I'm sorry.  A. I don't know what the G stants f	24		24	Q. It sounds like you are as miserable as I am?
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inappropriate. So all of these part Cs were going to the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a second, why are you sending us these, for us, or the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the further detention of vulnerable detainees?"; can you explain that?  20 updated to show that an ACDT had been opened with hourly observations due to the risk of harm to himself. There is no record of any action resulting from this. But if we look at the top you have to get your eye in on these things can you see the first dates,	18	Q. But the evidence was that they had never been informed	18	detained at Brook House on 1 March. A part C was
the caseworkers and nobody actually said, "Well, hold on a second, why are you sending us these, for us, or the Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the further detention of vulnerable detainees?"; can you explain that?  21 observations due to the risk of harm to himself.  22 There is no record of any action resulting from this.  23 this.  24 But if we look at the top you have to get your eye in on these things can you see the first dates,	19	by the Home Office, or anyone else, that it was	19	received by the DEPMU on that date, and his notes were
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25 explain that? 25 eye in on these things can you see the first dates,	23	Home Office, generally, to make decisions about the	23	this.
	24	further detention of vulnerable detainees?"; can you	24	But if we look at the top you have to get your
Page 130 Page 132	25	explain that?	25	eye in on these things can you see the first dates,
Page 130 Page 132		D 420		D 422
·		Page 130		Page 132

1	1 March, at the top?	1	there is no record of any consideration of any of the
2	A. Yes.	2	part Cs by his caseworker.
3	Q. Just below that, beneath the name "Scholefield":	3	Phil Schoenenberger, who, at the relevant time, was
4	"Part C [presumably 'received'] from D Killick at	4	head of the DEPMU, was asked about the DEPMU's role in
5	Brook House ADCT"	5	part Cs. Again, you have had, I hope, access to his
6	The acronym is inverted, or part of it is:	6	transcripts and so you have been able to see what he had
7	" open at reception, hourly OBS, open due to risk	7	to say.
8	to himself."	8	So let me try and summarise it: he said that all
9	Then a further part C was completed on 13 March,	9	DEPMU does, or did, on receipt of a part C is update the
10	recording that he "remained under psychiatric care" and	10	notes that we are looking at here, this kind of note,
11	recording his status as "an Adult at Risk at level 2 or	11	these case notes. Do you know whether that was right or
12	3". Can we put up a different document, please, Zaynab,	12	not?
13	<hom028624> and page 35. These are D801's medical</hom028624>	13	A. I think it is slightly more involved than that, but,
14	records, and it is not a great copy, but there is	14	broadly, yes, it would be for the caseworker, who also
15	a part C, in all its glory, in relation to D801, and if	15	has access to these notes, to draw a conclusion.
16	we look at the next box down, D801 has had his mental	16	Q. Yes, and he said the DEPMU had no role in assessing
17	health section revoked and is no longer under	17	whether someone should be released, that was for the
18	a section 48. He remains if my memory serves me,	18	case owner. Is that right?
19	that is the Mental Health Act, and he remains under the	19	A. That's correct, yes.
20	psychiatrist care at Brook House or, if released, under	20	Q. Is that still right?
21	the care of the community. He remains as an Adult at	21	A. The rule 35 team also take a view independently of
22	Risk, level 2/3."	22	the case owner for the rule 35 reports.
23	But this, peculiarly, did not result in any entry on	23	Q. Just so we understand, this new team, who is
24	the GCID.	24	a constituent part of that team? What qualifications do
25	Going back to that document, <hom032190>, page 3, if</hom032190>	25	they have?
	D 400		D 405
	Page 133		Page 135
1	we can just scroll up a little, please, we see a further	1	A. They are a separate team to the case owners sitting in
2			
2	part C on 19 March, and you can just make out the date,	2	immigration enforcement, who have received training in
3	part C on 19 March, and you can just make out the date, 19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas":	2 3	• •
			immigration enforcement, who have received training in
3	19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas":	3	immigration enforcement, who have received training in assessing rule 35 reports, and have annual refreshers.
3 4	19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas": "Part C received from Brook House.	3 4	immigration enforcement, who have received training in assessing rule 35 reports, and have annual refreshers.  Q. What kind of training?
3 4 5	19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas":  "Part C received from Brook House.  "ACDT reviewed and now ACDT Constant Supervision	3 4 5	<ul> <li>immigration enforcement, who have received training in assessing rule 35 reports, and have annual refreshers.</li> <li>Q. What kind of training?</li> <li>A. I haven't seen the training details.</li> <li>Q. Mental health training or what type?</li> </ul>
3 4 5 6	19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas":  "Part C received from Brook House.  "ACDT reviewed and now ACDT Constant Supervision after act of self-harm by ligature."	3 4 5 6	<ul><li>immigration enforcement, who have received training in assessing rule 35 reports, and have annual refreshers.</li><li>Q. What kind of training?</li><li>A. I haven't seen the training details.</li></ul>
3 4 5 6 7	19 March, and just above that, under the name "Younas":  "Part C received from Brook House.  "ACDT reviewed and now ACDT Constant Supervision after act of self-harm by ligature."  There is no apparent action other than entering the	3 4 5 6 7	<ul> <li>immigration enforcement, who have received training in assessing rule 35 reports, and have annual refreshers.</li> <li>Q. What kind of training?</li> <li>A. I haven't seen the training details.</li> <li>Q. Mental health training or what type?</li> <li>A. All staff working get mental health training at least</li> </ul>
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1	A. Again, my understanding is the case owner has to abide	1	idea why it was happening. Again, surprising, to use
2	by it, but I will send you a note on that.	2	your word?
3	Q. Thank you. Curiously, Mr Schoenenberger himself said he	3	A. Yes.
4	was only presuming when he was asked whether the DEPMU	4	Q. Yes. So in sum, we have healthcare, we have GPs at
5	had any role in assessing whether someone should be	5	Brook House believing during the relevant period, and
6	released, but that was for the case owner. He said he	6	still believing when giving evidence to this inquiry in
7	was presuming, as he said he couldn't recall that the	7	2022, that part C was not only being used in place of
8	case owner would be informed by the DEPMU when a part C	8	rule 35 reports, but believing it was an appropriate way
9	was received, but he didn't know for sure and he	9	to record issues which, in fact, should be reported and
10	couldn't give any information about how it would work.	10	processed by way of rule 35. What can you say about
11	To your knowledge, is a case owner, or was a case	11	that?
12	owner, informed when a part C was received from an IRC?	12	A. That is disappointing, Mr Altman. As I say, we took
13	A. To my knowledge, they were not informed by DEPMU but	13	steps, we had some fairly wide-ranging training in 2015,
14	they would see on CID that a part C had been raised.	14	2016, 2018, but repeating and updating the training for
15	Q. Yes. He added that, even in cases like this, where the	15	this year, but obviously the message hasn't got through
16	part C records the risk of self-harm, a suicide attempt	16	to people in the way we would have expected it to, and,
17	or an assessment that the patient is unfit for	17	you know, that is disappointing.
18	detention, the DEPMU has to do nothing other than log	18	Q. Is it also disappointing that, according to
19	receipt and, he assumed, inform the case owner.	19	Sandra Calver, the Home Office seemed to have advised
20	Obviously, he was not talking about the current	20	that part Cs were an appropriate means by which these
21	system, but was that your understanding?	21	issues could be communicated, never raised a concern,
22	A. Yes. The DEPMU is somebody's operates almost as	22	never communicated until Friday, 2022, that it was the
23	a postbox on that.	23	wrong "vehicle" to use the word in the letter by
24	Q. He said he had no knowledge of whether or not part Cs	24	which vulnerabilities should be communicated? I mean,
25	required a response from the Home Office?	25	you have got to accept that the Home Office has
	Page 137		Page 139
	- 160 - 30 /		- 480 - 107
1	A. My understanding is that, at the time, if a part C	1	an important part to play in this?
2	highlighted the material change in an individual's	2	A. Of course. Of course. I don't know who in the
3	status, then it should have invoked a consideration of	3	Home Office and what level advised that, Mr Altman, but
4	detention.	4	it is certainly not something I have done in the last
5	Q. Then he said this, that he had no knowledge, while he	5	three and a half years when I have been in charge.
6	was head of DEPMU, that part Cs were being used, as we	6	Q. Is the Home Office interested in investigating how this
7	now know they were, and indeed have been, presumably, up	7	has come about, so that it cannot recur?
8	to the receipt by healthcare providers of your letter	8	A. I think the Home Office is committed to, you know,
9	from Friday, instead of rule 35(1) and (2) reports.	9	revising the full part C process to make sure that it is
10	Rather alarming, isn't it, the head of DEPMU didn't even	10	better and safer and delivers a consistent role. It is
11	know that?	11	not just about rule 35, it is about behaviour, security
12	A. It is surprising, yes.	12	concerns, and other things. And, actually, the majority
13	Q. Surprising?	13	of concerns are not raised in part Cs are not about
14	We heard from Ian Cheeseman, a Home Office official,	14	vulnerability, they are about other issues, but we have
15	policy adviser, whose principal responsibility had been	15	to get the part C process right and I accept that.
16	the framework for developing Home Office policy on	16	Q. You will agree there is nothing new about this because,
17	making operational decisions, on whether to detain	17	as long ago as 2017, there was a judgment in the
18	an individual or to continue to detain an individual	18	High Court in the case of Medical Justice v The
19	considered to be vulnerable.	19	Secretary of State for The Home Department, where the
20	In his evidence to the inquiry, he told us that he	20	High Court judge made perfectly clear at ISI91RA, part C
21	was aware of part C and other less formal communications	21	is not a substitute for a rule 35(3) report; you are
22	being used to report vulnerabilities.	22	aware of that?
23	His evidence was that the Home Office knew about it	23	A. I wasn't aware of that ruling, but it is right, it
24	but he couldn't explain why part C was being used in	24	isn't.
25	place of rule 35 reports. The policy adviser had no	25	Q. Another systemic failure, don't you think, Mr Riley, and
	D 420		D 440
	Page 138		Page 140

1	quite a serious one?	1	low", et cetera, et cetera.
2	A. It is a failing, yes.	2	Then the last couple of lines:
3	Q. And quite a serious one?	3	"The average length of cumulative detention was
4	A. Yes.	4	high. Rule 35 reports were helpful for some and a third
5	Q. Let me ask you something about post-traumatic stress	5	had led to release, but protections for those with
6	disorder issues, because you deal with this, again in	6	post-traumatic stress disorder were inadequate.
7	similar terms, this time in your witness statement, your	7	Outcomes for detainees were reasonably good against this
8	first witness statement at paragraph 54.	8	healthy establishment test."
9	You say:	9	If we then go, please, to page 14, at the bottom,
10	"With specific reference to post-traumatic stress	10	summary paragraph 12:
11	disorder I have seen no evidence to suggest that the	11	"The average length of cumulative detention was
12	policy was not operating effectively in this area during	12	three months, which was too long."
13	the relevant period."	13	That tells you something I alighted on earlier, this
14	Again, is that something you wish to revise?	14	was a finding in this report about the average
15	A. I mean, as I say, the I accept that the evidence has	15	detention:
16	shown to the inquiry that part Cs were being used more	16	"The length of detention had increased substantially
17	frequently than I understood, and that was not	17	and no work had been undertaken to understand this.
18	appropriate. So yes, I accept that.	18	Some detainees had been held for excessive periods. Our
19	Q. Let me just point out a couple of things to you. To put	19	casework analysis revealed cases of detention being
20	matters in context, first of all, the first Shaw	20	prolonged by unreasonable delays in immigration decision
21	report can we put up, please, Zaynab <inq000060> at</inq000060>	21	making. Only 19 per cent of detainees in our survey
22	page 91.	22	said it was easy to see centre immigration staff; a new
23	At 4.38, said Stephen Shaw:	23	pilot to improve contact was to be introduced. Not all
24	"In respect of people suffering from post-traumatic	24	bail summaries were served in time. Although very
25	stress disorder (PTSD) the Helen Bamber Foundation	25	brief, rule 35 reports in our sample gave clear, helpful
	, ,		
	Page 141		Page 143
1	pointed out that they often need treatment before they	1	findings on scarring, but did not provide an adequate
2	can tell their story. Those with PTSD do not respond	2	safeguard for detainees with post-traumatic stress
3	well to direct questioning, especially if they perceive	3	disorder [top of the next page, please]. Some rule 35
4	the questioning to be adversarial: these difficulties	4	responses were poor, but a third of reports had led to
5	should not be seen as evidence of reduced credibility.	5	release of the detainee, more than we usually see."
6	The Foundation said that those whose PTSD arises in the	6	Then finally, from this report, page 28, and
7	context of sexual trauma have particular difficulty in	7	paragraph 1.71. This is part it comes under the
8	disclosing fully and clearly what has occurred. I am	8	heading "Casework: Expected outcomes":
9	not convinced that these are insights wholly appreciated	9	"We reviewed reports in 10 cases, four of which had
10	by Home Office caseworkers."	10	led to the release of the detainee. All were written by
11	That was January 2016.	11	a doctor, typed and contained body maps. Although very
12	Then, please, if we put up on screen, back to the	12	brief, most contained clear, helpful findings on
13	HMIP report published in January 2017 in relation to the	13	scarring, but did not provide an adequate safeguard for
14	year 2016, or to the inspection in 2016, I should say,	14	detainees with post-traumatic stress disorder. No
15	can we put up, please, <cjs000761>?</cjs000761>	15	formal assessment of PTSD had been carried out in any
16	So I remind you, Mr Riley, that the inspection was	16	case. In two cases, symptoms were described as
17	between 31 October and 11 November. Let me just clear	17	suggestive of PTSD. In five others, symptoms such as
18	the decks a little.	18	poor sleep, anxiety and flashbacks were noted without
19	Zaynab, if we can go to page 13, please, and here	19	reference to a possible diagnosis of PTSD."
20	is I just want to take you to a couple of summary	20	So looking at that and taking into account the
21	passages, summary 1, S1, on page 13:	21	chronology, Shaw 1, first report January 2016, this HMIP
22	"Early days arrangements had improved but not all	22	report in relation to an inspection at the end of 2016
23	detainees received a consistent level of care during	23	published in January 2017, so over the course of a year.
24	reception and early days in detention. Most detainees	24	Would you agree, Mr Riley, that the position appears to
25	said they felt safe and levels of violence were fairly	25	be that, at the relevant time at Brook House, there were
	P 445		D 444
	Page 142		Page 144
			27 (D 141 + 144)

1	multiple failures in the system for protecting	1	out.
2	vulnerable detainees; are you prepared to accept that?	2	A. That is not the Home Office that I see around me,
3	A. I am. In particular, on the face of the evidence here	3	Mr Altman, and it is not the Home Office that I would
4	especially those with PTSD or apparent PTSD, yes.	4	want to be a part of if I did see it. And I don't.
5	Q. Yes. Second, the Home Office knew of it, because the	5	As I say, it the cultural awareness workshops,
6	Home Office accepted Shaw's findings and accepted the	6	the compassion that the team have shown, my team, the
7	HMIP findings?	7	casework teams, the supplier teams have shown in the
8	A. Yes.	8	past three and a half years has been incredible and, you
9	Q. But did nothing, thirdly, to implement change?	9	know, we talk about caseworkers just seeing the case,
10	A. I don't know what we did to implement change. I know	10	but there is a whole cultural view, the face behind the
11	what we are doing now I can't comment on that, but	11	case, where we, you know, caseworkers are encouraged to
12	I accept your first two points.	12	consider the personal aspects and, for example, visiting
13	MR ALTMAN: Yes. I am going to ask the chair to break now	13	an immigration removal centre to see what it is like to
14	and give us our 15 minutes, and then I will come on to	14	detain you know, to deprive someone of their liberty.
15	something else. Chair, it has just gone 3.10, shall we	15	We work incredibly hard to make sure that it is not
16	say 3.25-ish?	16	just a case and it is a person.
17	THE CHAIR: Thank you.	17	Q. I mean, in the same interview, Mr Hanford, at pages 13
18	(3.12 pm)	18	to 14, answer 139, said:
19	(a short break)	19	" the vision was, I think, G4S staff were showing
20	(3.30 pm)	20	too much empathy"
21	THE CHAIR: Thank you.	21	Ben Saunders was asked about his view when
22	MR ALTMAN: Mr Riley, continuing, please, with questions of	22	Mr Saunders gave evidence to us on 22 March, and he said
23	Home Office attitude and culture.	23	he, too, experienced elements of that. And the focus
24	Karen Churcher, a former mental health nurse at	24	was on elements of delivery that was linked to the
25	Brook House, she told us, on 10 March, that a lot of	25	immigration process. He said G4S did the same, or took
	Page 145		Page 147
1	mental health was not taken seriously by the	1	the same approach:
2	Home Office, I think. Fair or not?	2	"There was very little in the culture of G4S that
3	A. No, from my experience, not fair. But, the Home Office	3	was about people."
4	is not a homogeneous identity, so I don't know who she	4	And he said:
5	refers to by "the Home Office".	5	"This was the approach the Home Office wanted."
6	Q. Yes. Well, Lee Hanford do you remember I reminded	6	That was why he, Ben Saunders, focused that way.
7	you a little earlier of something he told Verita about	7	This may not be your Home Office today, Mr Riley,
8	the Home Office telling off G4S staff for showing too	8	but that seems to be the culture that people understood
9	much empathy? So we had him saying to Verita, just for	9	at the time and if that is right, and if their
10	the record I am not going to put it up, Zaynab	10	perception of the culture is right, it was wrong; do you
11	<ver000266>, page 22, answer 288.</ver000266>	11	agree?
12	He said:	12	A. There are a lot of ifs there to be fair, Mr Altman but,
13	"When I was here nearly two years ago, there was	13	you know, all I can say is that it is not the
14	some criticism aimed at those who empathised to that	14	Home Office I recognise. It is not the incredibly
15	extent. The caseworkers will just see it as a case."	15	dedicated civil servants I see each day and many of the
16	Then there was that passage I told you about	16	same people who were working in those days were work
17	earlier, in <ver000239> in a further interview, page 11,</ver000239>	17	in the Home Office now, and work with professionalism,
18	at 113, "Mandie Campbell" do you remember I mentioned	18	empathy and compassion.
19	this earlier:	19	Q. Finally, in this regard, Nathan Ward, when he gave
20	" it was fed back to me that she was quite	20	evidence to us during phase 1 on 7 December, recalled
21	critical of our staff empathising with detainees, the	21	a comment from a local Home Office official by the name
22	only engagement should be removal, removal, removal."	22	of Deborah Western does that mean anything to you?
23	If he is accurate about that, that is director	23	A. Debbie Western, the name rings a bell, yes.
24	general level feeding back to G4S staff that the focal	24	Q that he believed captured the tone of the Home Office
			Company of the compan
		25	there at the time, and he quoted to us in his evidence:
25	point for Brook House and their staff is to get people	25	there at the time, and he quoted to us in his evidence:
		25	there at the time, and he quoted to us in his evidence:  Page 148

1	"It is all down to who breaks first, the Home Office	1	criticisms in judgments?		
	2 or the detainee."		2 A. I think it is case specific, to be frank. In some		
3	That is a rather harsh comment, isn't it?	3	cases, you know, it is sending it out and learning from		
4	A. That is a harsh comment. It is, yes. But at the same	4	it and, in other cases, you know, definition of torture		
5	time, as I say, you know, the work I have witnessed for	5	or something like that, then it is an immediate response		
6	the last three and a half years, is completely different	6	and a change in policy and followed on by refresher		
7	to those you have recognised. I have seen staff go out	7	training.		
8	and buy children meals from McDonald's to make visits	8	So I think it depends what exactly what the		
9	more empathetic, I have seen staff coming in on their	9	judgment is.		
10	days off to help people who are distressed. The work	10	Q. You will know that Mr Schoenenberger was asked about		
11	that I have seen people do has been fantastic and not	11	three decisions at the High Court, when he was here, in		
12	just from the Home Office staff but from supplier staff	12	which article 3 breaches were found in relation to men		
13	as well.	13	in immigration detention.		
14	Q. So this is Phil Riley's Home Office, if you like, this	14	In two of them, there was a case in 2011, BA v The		
15	is today. This is the last three and a half years. So	15	Secretary of State for the Home Department, and there is		
16	listening to you, Mr Riley, are you telling us that, if	16	the 2012 case of HA (Nigeria) v The Secretary of State		
17	the culture is as those witnesses said it was during	17	for the Home Department, in which Mr Schoenenberger was		
18	that period, it has completely changed?	18	named.		
19	A. I believe so, yes.	19	The case of BA quoted an email he sent about plans		
20	Q. Yes. Let me ask you then about judicial reviews.	20	which should be made in the event of the death of a man		
21	Mr Cheeseman, who gave evidence on 16 March, and	21	who had been refusing to eat or drink, whose release had		
22	Mr Petherick, on 21 March, they told us there was no	22	been refused and the judge described that as "chilling".		
23	process for reporting where courts had found that	23	It is actually "chillingly", but it seems a fair summary		
24	detention conditions breached article 3.	24	of what the judge said and intended.		
25	A. Right.	25	Later in the judgment, he said that "On one		
	Page 149		Page 151		
1	Q. I think the impression we got was reporting might happen	1	occasion, it showed a callous indifference to the		
2	but there was no system for it, it was all rather	2	detainee's plight". Chair, I have not referred to them		
3	ad hoc. If that is right, has it changed?	3	by reference to their unique relativity reference, but		
4	A. The reporting of	4	they are <inq000182> and <dl0000178> respectively.</dl0000178></inq000182>		
5	Q. Judicial decisions in the High Court, going to the issue	5	The actions of the Home Office were said to have		
6	of the conditions of detention of individual detainees	6	been, in that case, a combination of bureaucratic		
7	under article 3?	7	inertia and lack of communication and coordination		
8	A. Yes. I believe it is different now.	8	between those who were responsible for the man's		
9	So we have a strong relationship between	9	welfare, and in that case, detention was found to have		
10	Frances Hardy's team, who works with the corporate	10	breached BA's article 3 rights.		
11	oversight team, policies teams and Home Office legal	11	In the decision in HA (Nigeria), Mr Justice Singh,		
12	advisers to allow for the dissemination of information.	12	as he then was, named Mr Schoenenberger five times, no		
13	Q. Yes.	13	less. He was involved in the detention and in the		
14	A. There's various other ways of it coming through. You	14	removal from association of a man who should have been		
15	know, senior civil servants receive global emails with	15	treated in a psychiatric unit as soon as his rule 35		
16	the updates on litigation, both detention-specific and	16	assessment was appreciated, but instead was detained and		
17	otherwise. There are a number of mechanisms for	17	in segregation for four months, and the failure to		
18	disseminating information.	18	secure transfer to hospital for his treatment, a failure		
19	Q. But is it seen today as just a bit of learning that	19	which lasted around five months, was held to be unlawful		
20	people within the Home Office might be interested in,	20	and in breach of article 3.		
21	there has been this case in the High Court, the	21	Then, the third case which Mr Schoenenberger was		
22	Home Department has lost this is what the judge had	22	asked about was another 2012 case, this time of		
23	to say read it in your own time or is it, if you	23	a detainee known as "D", for the record <dl0000179> is</dl0000179>		
24	like, mandatory that decision makers and others are to	24	the judgment, in which he was not named directly, but		
25	be aware of what High Court judges have said and the	25	the case related to the care of a detainee at a centre		
	Page 150		Page 152		
	$\sim$		<u> </u>		

1	for which he was responsible. Again, the detained man	1	Q. And he accepted, which is, I am sure we can all agree,
2	was found to have been deprived of appropriate	2	obvious, that if those judgments were not brought to the
3	psychiatric care for many months, in breach of his	3	attention of people who mattered, then nobody learns
4	article 3 rights.	4	anything?
5	Now, Mr Schoenenberger, when asked about all of	5	A. I agree, although, as I say, they are hopefully also
6	this, said he couldn't recall being made aware of any of	6	captured in policy, either to do something differently
7	them. He said he had no memory or awareness of any	7	or to stop doing something.
8	process the Home Office had of informing either	8	Q. If he was right that those judgments were not brought to
9	individuals named in similar judgments or of informing	9	his attention, or to the attention of others, and if
10	departments responsible for the care of detainees, whose	10	Nathan Ward is right that those judgments or key parts
11	article 3 rights were found to have been breached by	11	of the judgments were not brought to the attention of
12	their actions. Nor could he recall, he said, whether	12	the IRCs, to which they related, most directly, then it
13	IRCs were informed of article 3 breaches like those.	13	could suggest, or lend itself to the suggestion, that
14	If that is right, is there any explanation?	14	the Home Office is indifferent to those sorts of
15	A. Again, they are relatively historic cases.	15	criticisms.
16	Q. Yes.	16	A. I am not sure, Mr Altman, that that necessarily follows,
17	A. I can't really explain the processes from 11 years ago.	17	that whether or not somebody was informed in 2011 means
18	Q. But you know how the law works, Mr Riley, even a case of	18	that, as a department, we are indifferent. I think, you
19	150 years old could still be a leading authority.	19	know, if and you know, there are lots of ifs here
20	So the fact that they may be 2011 and 2012 cases	20	Mr Schoenenberger wasn't informed and we didn't get the
21	doesn't matter overly much because the judgments can	21	messaging right to G4S in 2017 or 2016, then we should
22	still be relevant if they pronounce on points of law or	22	have done better then, but that doesn't necessarily
23	other points of practice which are important for the	23	indicate an indifference to the rule of law.
24	Home Office to heed and understand and take forward in	24	Q. It could lend itself to the suggestion that the
25	terms of best practice.	25	Home Office is too focused on the removal of detainees
	Page 153		Page 155
1	Co coming heals to Mr Cohoonanhanoon who alaimed to	1 1	and some loss shout the welfers of them?
1	So coming back to Mr Schoenenberger, who claimed to	1	and cares less about the welfare of them?
2	have no memory or awareness of any of this, if he is	2	A. Or that we need to improve our communications.
2 3	have no memory or awareness of any of this, if he is right that he has no memory, which might suggest he was	2 3	<ul><li>A. Or that we need to improve our communications.</li><li>Q. Yes. Which do you think it is?</li></ul>
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1	allegations made against the subject of a complaint.	1	disclose evidence they have obtained and reviewed as
2	So, for example, if an allegation of assault is made	2	part of an investigation, for example, body-worn camera
3	against a DCO, there is no requirement currently for the	3	footage, CCTV footage or other records, to the
4	investigator to obtain information about whether there	4	complainant, the person who makes the allegation, for
5	has been, for example, another ten complaints, perhaps	5	them to be able to comment on that evidence.
6	some of them similar, factually, against that DCO over	6	Now, Mr Khan accepted that. Do you think there
7	the past three years.	7	should be a requirement in every case to do so?
8	Now, my question is, is that something which you	8	A. Again, I would need advice on the legalities of that and
9	think should be considered and changed?	9	the GDPR behind it before I came to a conclusion on
10	0 A. That is surprising because, in detention services, we		that.
11	1 keep a very clear log that is discussed monthly about		Q. So you think it could be a GDPR issue, or that is just
12	patterns of complaints against DCOs, so if there are	12	a sort of off-the-cuff
13	patterns of behaviour, that would actually prompt	13	A. That is an off-the-cuff view, Mr Altman, as I say, but
14	a referral to PSU. So I am surprised that PSU are not	14	it is one of those as I say, I am more than happy to
15	given that information.	15	take these back and discuss them and, you know, at the
16	Q. Yes. Because you will agree, if that is right, and that	16	risk of saying like I am trying to act quickly, as with
17	is still current practice, then individual investigators	17	the Kate Davies letter, I think it is important to get
18	could be looking at cases of an individual having no	18	to the bottom of these and I am more than prepared to do
19	idea whatsoever about the character, or previous alleged	19	it.
20	character, substantiated, or unsubstantiated, about that	20	Q. Here is another one, Mr Riley, for you to consider. We
21	individual officer, some of which could be what we call	21	have heard of cases where officers, subject to
22	in crime similar fact evidence or bad character?	22	allegations of mistreatment, who have left their
23	A. It could. It could. Yes, and it is difficult, each	23	employment with G4S and were not invited to interview by
24	case needs to be judged on its merits and the evidence	24	the investigating officer and allegations of
25	there in the case as well.	25	mistreatment against them were found to be
	Page 157		Page 159
1	Q. Yes.	1	unsubstantiated without them ever being invited to
2	A. We wouldn't want to prejudice any investigation but, at	2	interview.
3	the same time, these things should be taken into	3	Do you think that is something that should change?
4	account.	4	A. I think it may be difficult to compel someone to attend
5	As I say, we keep our own records that, you know,	5	an interview if they have left the employment.
6	all allegations against DCOs that are made locally are	6	Q. I am not talking about compulsion, because, presumably,
7	reported up to detention services and discussed monthly.	7	the one thing an investigator for the PSU doesn't have
8	Q. That may be right, but the question is, when a new	8	is any power of compulsion at all?
9	allegation comes along and it is being investigated and	9	A. Indeed.
10	the investigator is completely unsighted by five similar	10	Q. You cannot summon someone, you cannot arrest them; but
11	complaints over the last three years, then there is	11	in a case where an individual is not invited this is
10	1.1	12	the maint the DCII are not even inviting the manage to
12	a problem, isn't there?	12	the point, the PSU are not even inviting the person to
13	a problem, isn't there?  A. I am prepared — I am prepared to discuss that with PSU	13	interview, and then they consider a complaint and don't
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13 14	A. I am prepared — I am prepared to discuss that with PSU when I get back to the office to see if there are	13 14	interview, and then they consider a complaint and don't substantiate it, you can understand why complainants
13 14 15	A. I am prepared I am prepared to discuss that with PSU when I get back to the office to see if there are reasons behind that, whether it is about not wanting to	13 14 15	interview, and then they consider a complaint and don't substantiate it, you can understand why complainants would feel a little hard done by in those circumstances.
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1	inquiry, Mr Riley. Can you just find out what the	1	day and this is the statement of D71:
2	answer is, though, ask whoever is responsible, if needs	2	"On the date and time I witnessed an officer push
3	be to let the inquiry know and we will see if we need to	3	the above named detainee as he encroached into his
4	take it further?	4	personal space. I don't believe the officer did
5	A. Yes.	5	anything wrong, so the detainee got in his face
6	Q. There is one last thing in this regard I would like to	6	unnecessarily. DCM Brackenridge has written this
7	bring to your attention.	7	information for me at my request and is a true version
8	There has been evidence of one PSU investigation in	8	of events."
9	respect of at least two potential witnesses to	9	Now, given your position, Mr Riley, it may be
10	an alleged assault, the PSU investigator didn't	10	a difficult one for you to answer but do you think
11	interview the witnesses themselves, but instead	11	officers from the contractor should be invited by the
12	requested that the contractor, in this case, G4S, took	12	PSU to take statements for the purposes of its
13	the witness statements and this led to the statements	13	investigation?
14	being written by G4S staff on behalf of two detainees,	14	A. It is a difficult one to answer, Mr Altman. I am
15	neither of which supported the allegations of assault	15	surprised but I can't comment on the conduct of the
16	made by the particular detainee D1747, against another	16	investigation and why PSU chose to conduct it in this
17	G4S member of staff Derek Murphy do you remember he	17	way.
18	was the chap whose name you didn't recognise? While	18	Q. Because it rather feels like there is big potential for
19	I am thinking of it, he was actually on the Panorama	19	a conflict of interest.
20	programme, although you may not have known his name. He	20	A. I accept that but, as I say, I can't comment on why PSU
21	was the one who said, "I have no sympathy for them. If	21	approached it in this manner.
22	he dies, he dies". Do you remember that?	22	Q. Mr Khan himself conceded in principle that it ought not
23	A. I remember the comment.	23	to happen that is what he told us in the case of his
24	Q. That is Derek Murphy. We can look at the documentation.	24	evidence but perhaps, again, if you pass this on to
25	Have you seen the documentation which has been in your	25	your colleague, this might be one for them to consider.
23	Trave you seen the documentation which has been in your	23	your concague, and might be one for them to consider.
	Page 161		Page 163
1	1 #10	1	A - \$V.
1	bundle?	1 2	A. Yes.  O. Finally insofar as the PSIL is concerned training
2	A. I have seen it was a was that the complaint in	2	Q. Finally, insofar as the PSU is concerned, training.
2 3	A. I have seen it was a was that the complaint in handwriting, quite large handwriting?	2 3	Q. Finally, insofar as the PSU is concerned, training.  We heard evidence that PSU investigators didn't have
2 3 4	<ul><li>A. I have seen it was a was that the complaint in handwriting, quite large handwriting?</li><li>Q. Yes, and there were also the two witness statements</li></ul>	2 3 4	Q. Finally, insofar as the PSU is concerned, training.  We heard evidence that PSU investigators didn't have any training or guidance on taking evidence from
2 3 4 5	<ul> <li>A. I have seen it was a was that the complaint in handwriting, quite large handwriting?</li> <li>Q. Yes, and there were also the two witness statements taken by G4S officers on behalf of the two witness</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5	Q. Finally, insofar as the PSU is concerned, training.  We heard evidence that PSU investigators didn't have any training or guidance on taking evidence from vulnerable witnesses or on the types of complaints and
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this is something that perhaps you might want to		1	those with the local police at Gatwick, because I wasn't
2	consider with your colleague as well.	2	aware of it being an issue there but it was raised with
3	A. Okay.	3	me about Heathrow.
4	Q. In principle, if I am right, does it sound like	4	Q. Yes.
5	something that ought to be changed?	5	A. It is difficult, Mr Altman, because what we don't want
6	A. It feels	6	to do is create a perverse incentive for, for example,
7	Q. Or considered at least?	7 8	someone facing removal to take part in an assault,
8	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		knowing that it would provoke a police investigation and
	Q. Relatedly, can I ask you on a slightly different topic	9	delay their removal. So we have to be careful on how we
10	about criminal investigations, and, again, this may be	10	manage it but we do have to take the member of staff's
11	outside your comfort zone, Mr Riley, and if it is please	11	views into account and so do the police when deciding
12	say so but we heard from a DCO by the name of	12	whether or not to prosecute, just like any other victim
13	Ryan Bromley, who was asked about an incident where	14	of violent crime would expect.
14	a detainee had assaulted him, so it is not he assaulting a detainee but a detainee assaulting him. It had been	15	Q. Yes.  So where is that MOU, that memorandum of
15		16	understanding, now? Is it this final draft, being
16 17	referred to the police when it had been reported at	17	drafted, being considered?
18	Brook House and it was recorded by the police as "Victim	18	,
19	declined to support". So the police record I could	19	A. My understanding is it has been agreed and, if it has,
20	put it up on screen but you will not learn anything more about it than that, <sxp000102> but the suggestion</sxp000102>	20	I will share it with you. If it is in draft form, then
21	from the police record is that Mr Bromley declined to	20	I will share it. Q. Thank you.
22	•	21 22	
23	support any prosecution.	23	Moving on, Mr Riley, Steve Skitt, who you will know
23	However, when Mr Bromley was asked about this during the course of his evidence, he said he didn't decline to	24	was the then deputy director of Brook House, he told the inquiry on 17 March that the Home Office or Detention
25	support it, the police had told him that in these sorts	25	and Escort Services, did some work around or produced
23	support it, the police had told him that in these sorts	23	and Escort Services, did some work around or produced
	Page 165		Page 167
1	of cases where an individual is awaiting removal from	1	data about the patterns of incidents by certain
2	the country, the case would not be pursued because it	2	nationalities who presented certain risks. This arose
3	would interfere with that individual's removal	3	from some questions the chair asked him at the end of
4	directions.	4	his evidence, because he had said to Verita certain
5	Are you aware of the police refusing to investigate	5	things during the course of his Verita interview about
6	a case against a detainee with pending removal	6	Albanians do this, Chinese do that, Vietnamese do this,
7	directions?	7	and the other, and so he seemed to be stereotyping what
8	A. Yes, there have been cases. I wasn't aware of any at	8	certain nationalities do or how they behave inside the
9	Brook House but I have been aware of cases at Heathrow	9	detention estate.
10	and we have worked closely between the local police	10	So the question for you is was such work done and
11	borough commander and Paul Rennie, who is director of	11	who produces it? In other words, patterns about
12	Heathrow IRC, to put in place an MOU for the	12	briefing patterns?
13	investigation of these incidents.	13	A. So we do briefing for the head of operations SMT on
14	Q. A memorandum of understanding, in other words what	14	a monthly basis about incidents and whether there are
15	should happen in those instances?	15	patterns of incidents.
16	A. Yes, and the member of staff's views should be taken	16	It was something I was keen on seeing myself because
17	into account when the police make a decision on whether	17	the Prison Service, when I worked there a number years
18	or not to investigate.	18	ago, had something called "Smart Data" that helped
19	Q. So in future cases, as a matter of course, the police	19	indicate if there were patterns of behaviour that should
20	should not be saying to an individual in the position	20	raise concerns.
21	that Ryan Bromley found himself, "I am sorry, chum, this	21	It is not about stereotyping, it is about risk
22	guy's leaving the country, your interests are	22	minimisation and, actually, making sure that certain
23	secondary"; in future the police will take account of	23	groups are not disadvantaged as well; so, for example,
24	the alleged victim's concerns?	24	if a certain nationality or religion is more likely to
25	A. That is the intention but, as I say, we haven't got	25	be in rule 40 or not in work. So it is a broader
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1	concept than I think Mr Skitt described.	1	Department and this one is Serco, for the Gatwick
2	Q. So it is not just about misbehaviours but it is about,	2	estate; is that correct?
3	as you are telling us, as I understand you, how we can	3	A. That's correct, yes.
4	look after certain nationalities as well?	4	Q. There are these new performance measures, in particular
5	A. It is about ensuring fairness and safety within the	5	in relation to maintaining healthy staff culture. We
6	centre.	6	find that within schedule 2.1 at paragraph 16.4. If we
7	Q. Yes.	7	go to page 176, please, there we have paragraph 16.4,
8	Can we now look, please and we are almost at an	8	under the heading "Maintaining a Healthy Staff Culture":
9	end but not quite, Mr Riley, my promises are always	9	"The supplier [and the supplier is Serco] shall put
10	qualified at the new contract.	10	in place provisions to ensure that staff understand the
11	A. Yes.	11	behaviours and culture expected from staff working in
12	Q. All right, and we are not going to go into it in any	12	an IRC, that this is effectively monitored, and that
13	great detail because that has been done on Friday with	13	staff adhere to the these provisions."
14	Mr Hewer but there are a few things I want to ask you	14	"These provisions", presumably, it should be, and
15	about.	15	then there are a series of lettered subparagraphs, "The
16	You place a great deal of emphasis on what is said	16	supplier shall", indicating they are mandatory.
17	to be a stronger new contract. You deal with this at	17	Just listing them: "Publish a whistleblowing
18	paragraph 26 of your first witness statement:	18	policy"; "Produce the staff with a code of conduct";
19	"The new contract [you say] will provide greater	19	"Produce and implement a staff engagement strategy
20	clarity on Home Office priorities for the new supplier,	20	focusing on culture and conduct"; "Hold staff engagement
21	with a reduction from 139 to 27 Key Performance	21	forums"; "Develop and implement a culture diagnosis
22	Indicators more clearly focused on outcomes. More	22	tool"; "Review any instance where a member of staff is
23	importantly, we now have performance measures that focus	23	named in three complaints of three instances of use of
24	on staff culture, misconduct and the reporting of	24	force in a three-month period, informing the authority
25	serious incidents alongside a means of addressing	25	of instances identified", so three, three and three;
	Page 169		Page 171
1	low-level failings which have not been resolved within a	1	"Report all staff incidents/allegations that involve
2	designated period."	2	conduct to the authority immediately following
3	You say, going back in your statement, at	3	identification/notification of the conduct issue";
4	paragraph I thought it was 22, I could be wrong, but	4	"Publish a staff culture and conduct policy"; "Complete
5	you say somewhere the new contract it is in your	5	exit interviews with staff"; [top of the next page]
6	second witness statement, forgive me, I was looking at	6	"A bi-annual survey"; "Staff consultations annually";
7	the wrong witness statement.	7	"Create a staff culture/conduct action plan which
8	In your second one, if you have it, for the	8	captures all learning points from staff engagement and
9	avoidance of doubt, it is the organisational failings,	9	surveys~" and so on.
10	which you previously refer to within the contract	10	The date of this contract was 18 February 2020.
11	itself, and the way in which the contractor's	11	A. Yes that was when it was signed. It came into
12	performance was overseen, managed and assured:	12	operation in May, 21 May roughly.
13	"The new contract itself is intended to be the	13	Q. Yes, I think, well, I have seen a date on it but perhaps
13	remedy for those failings".	14	it doesn't matter
15	You say:	15	A. Yes.
16	"I include a list of its key features in	16	Q particularly much, but was this maintaining a healthy
17	paragraph 24 of my earlier statement."	17	staff culture a direct response to the subject matter of
18	Which you do, so there were a series of bullet	18	this inquiry?
19	points in paragraph 24 of the earlier statement:	19	A. It was yes, it was really. It was a view on that and
20	"These are also [you say in paragraph 22 of your	20	I think a general direction of the Home Office.
21	second witness statement] the features which underpin	20	So I joined at the start of this contract being
22	the new contract's greater focus on detainee welfare."	22	designed and we referred to Stephen Shaw's second report
23	We can put up on screen the new contract,	23	and Kate Lampard's report in developing the contract.
24	SER000226> please. There it is.	24	Q. If we go over, please, to 199, here is schedule 2.2,
25	It is between the Secretary of State for the Home	25	performance levels. If we can go to 210, please, at the
		23	
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1	top I don't want to go into all the fine detail but	1	Q. Yes. But we still have the old "resulting in death
2	at the top of 210, we have a table which indicates	2	which involves any failure to follow laid down
3	performance failures, categorised as minor, serious,	3	procedures", which is a broad church; under the old
4	severe and critical, and for critical £50,000 is what,	4	contract, it was by reference to "a failure to follow
5	a penalty by another name?	5	laid down procedures under schedule D".
6	A. Yes.	6	What was the failure to follow laid down procedures
7	Q. What is a "service credit value"?	7	in this contract; do you know off hand? Is it another
8	A. That is the percentage of the profit that can be levied	8	schedule which is involved?
9	in a penalty or service credit for a failing.	9	A. No, it can be any laid down procedures, is my
10	Q. So it is a percentage of profit, did you say?	10	understanding, Mr Altman.
11	A. Yes, it is quite a complicated	11	Q. Yes, and who was to make that decision?
12	Q. Calculation?	12	A. The Home Office will make it in reviewing the case.
13	A. Yes, it is it is a pre-determined calculation of	13	Q. With whom?
14	profit.	14	A. Well, we will review the case and then we will declare
15	Q. Right. We don't perhaps need to go into over what	15	it to the and impose the service credit on the
16	period of time the profit is calculated, how it is	16	supplier and they may or may not ask for mitigation
17	calculated, because I can see that that could be	17	against that.
18	horribly complicated, but we can see that the more	18	Q. Well, under the old contract, it was a system of
19	serious the failure becomes, the higher the service	19	self-reporting. Is it still a system of self-reporting?
20	credit value percentage.	20	A. Not for something, you know, a critical KPI, no.
21	A. Yes.	21	Q. So critical ones would naturally be reported to the
22	Q. So it is 5 per cent for a severe failure.	22	Home Office anyway but that isn't part of
23	If we go, please, to page 211, the next page, and we	23	a self-reporting system but, so that we understand, is
24	find annex 1 at the top, "Key performance indicators,	24	there still self-reporting under the new contract?
25	part 1", and the key performance indicators table, and	25	A. There is some but, the more serious measures, there is
	Page 173		Page 175
- 1	IZD1	1	100 man and annulling heather Hanna Office and Hall Co
1	KP1:	1	100 per cent sampling by the Home Office as well. So
2	"Self-harm resulting in detainee death being any	2	there is different amounts for each KPI.
2 3	"Self-harm resulting in detainee death being any known incident of deliberate self-harm resulting in	2 3	there is different amounts for each KPI.  Q. If we turn on to 216, please, within the same annex,
2 3 4	"Self-harm resulting in detainee death being any known incident of deliberate self-harm resulting in death which involves any failure to follow laid down	2 3 4	there is different amounts for each KPI.  Q. If we turn on to 216, please, within the same annex, KP15, which is referenced to schedule 2.1,
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2 3 4 5 6	"Self-harm resulting in detainee death being any known incident of deliberate self-harm resulting in death which involves any failure to follow laid down procedures."  That performance failure category is critical and	2 3 4 5 6	there is different amounts for each KPI.  Q. If we turn on to 216, please, within the same annex, KP15, which is referenced to schedule 2.1, paragraph 16.4, which we saw a little earlier, Mr Riley, the "failure to ensure staff adhere to the staff culture
2 3 4 5 6 7	"Self-harm resulting in detainee death being any known incident of deliberate self-harm resulting in death which involves any failure to follow laid down procedures."  That performance failure category is critical and therefore presumably proof of it results in a £50,000	2 3 4 5 6 7	there is different amounts for each KPI.  Q. If we turn on to 216, please, within the same annex, KP15, which is referenced to schedule 2.1, paragraph 16.4, which we saw a little earlier, Mr Riley, the "failure to ensure staff adhere to the staff culture and conduct policy" is not critical but serious, and per
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1	others.	1	this contract what steps has the Home Office taken to
2	My personal concern, and it was my personal	2	review other IRC contracts, not new ones but ones which
3	judgment, is that if we were to pursue staff giving	3	may be of an old design, I think as you put it, to
4	evidence under this KPI now, before all evidence was	4	review other IRC contracts in light of all of these
5	given, it may dis-encourage people to be as frank and	5	reviews and reports, Lampard, the Home Affairs Select
6	honest as they could be; you know, if they knew that	6	Committee, HASC, Moore Stephens and the National Audit
7	a fully honest and transparent evidence may lead to	7	Office to ensure there are no other ticking time-bomb
8	a penalty for the organisation to KPI15, then that might	8	contracts where welfare is not sufficiently prioritised?
9	have been I used the term earlier a perverse	9	What steps have been taken to review all the other
10	incentive.	10	contracts which may not be as modern and up to date as
11	So I intend to raise it with Steve and Sarah Burnett	11	this one?
12	at some stage but wait until the evidence has been fully	12	A. Well, every time a contract comes up for renewal and
13	submitted first, and then consider whether it is	13	there is a programme of that, this model contract with
14	a failing under KPI15 or not.	14	this intent is introduced. So for Derwentside, when it
15	Q. Because the problem always is, human nature being what	15	opened last year, the contract was introduced there; for
16	it is, Mr Riley, people have little interest in	16	Dungavel, when it was re-procured last year, this
17	admitting wrongdoing and senior staff in accepting there	17	contract, the new model contract was introduced.
18	has been a failure of procedures.	18	Q. Sorry, what was that name again?
19	So it is all well and good having a series of	19	A. Dungavel and Derwentside.
20	provisions promoting a healthy staff culture, but in the	20	Q. Dungavel?
21	end you are dealing with human beings and the big	21	A. Dungavel, an IRC in Scotland; Derwentside is a new IRC
22	question is how you impose it?	22	we have just opened last year in County Durham. That
23	A. Some of it, I think, Mr Altman, will be clear. So you	23	has this new model contract.
24	gave the example earlier today of the member of staff	24	The two Heathrow IRCs are under an older contract,
25	making inappropriate comments at an C&R refresher. That	25	and we are aware of that, but we are re-procuring them
	· · ·		
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1	is clearly one that falls under KPI15.	1	at the moment and the procurement is in place and they
2	Q. Yes.	2	are being tendered against this contract; and
3	A. Others may be less clear but, if it is not in there and	3	Yarl's Wood is the last IRC fully under the old contract
4	we are not trying to enforce it via this, then we are	4	but we took the opportunity of it moving from a female
5	not learning and we are not developing.	5	IRC to a male IRC and re-rolling to put in additional
6	You know, again, I take responsibility for this	6	staffing measures. So we have put 170 additional DCOs
7	contract. I am the one as SRO, senior responsible who	7	in to the staffing complement to come towards this
8	signed it off and helped design these KPIs and, you	8	contract and, when it comes up for re-tender, it will be
9	know, the intent is to have the tools in the locker to	9	re-tendered under this measure of contract.
10	use, because if they are not in the locker, we can't use	10	Plus, I have to say, any learning we get from the
11	them.	11	first couple of years' operation of this. So if we
12	Q. So the leverage is really imposed on Serco, the	12	find, as you raise, that there are problems in KPI15,
13	supplier, because the more 5 per cent credit value	13	for example, we have the opportunity to tweak that
14	penalties they have to pay, hopefully the more they will	14	before re-procuring Yarl's Wood.
15	cascade down to their staff; the staff culture is	15	Q. Thank you. A few more things and then I will be done,
16	important and has meaning and therefore the hope,	16	Mr Riley, you will be pleased to hear, I am sure.
17	I suspect from your position, is we don't see what we	17	In the end, do you accept that the Home Office, and
18	saw five years ago?	18	only the Home Office, has the ultimate responsibility
19	A. Indeed, and we are not met with the frustrations that we	19	for what happened in terms of ill-treatment of detainees
20	have nothing in the contract to impose service credits	20	at Brook House during the relevant period?
21	when we see the behaviours that we saw in Panorama and,	21	A. The Home Office is responsible for the wellbeing of
22	as the NAO said, you know, the contract was toothless to	22	everybody in our care. The behaviours perpetrated in
23	penalise G4S for those failings.	23	2017 were perpetrated by G4S staff but the Home Office,
24	Q. Talking about contracts, not this one in particular, but	24	at the end of the day, is responsible for everyone in
25	can you tell the inquiry, please, Mr Riley forget	25	our care.
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			45 (Pages 177 to 180)

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1	Q. So the answer is yes.	1	Questions from THE CHAIR
2	A. (Witness nods).	2	THE CHAIR: There is one question I have in relation to
3	Q. Secondly, do you agree that external oversight, such as	3	rule 35 and, as per a lot of Mr Altman's questions today
4	by HMIP, IMB, can highlight issues they find; HMIP, for	4	and your responses, I think we have recognised that
5	example, during the course of unannounced inspections.	5	rule 35 has been an issue that we have had a lot of
6	They can make recommendations but, in the end, their	6	evidence about throughout the inquiry. I don't fully
7	work doesn't displace the Home Office's responsibility,	7	understand where responsibility for rule 35 sits.
8	nor can it transfer it on other shoulders?	8	I am trying to make sure I don't misquote you but I
9	A. No, that I agree with completely. You know, my personal	9	think you told Mr Altman that it falls between policy
10	view is that the more sets of eyes in an IRC, the more	10	teams within the Home Office and then other commands
11	opinions, the better. I may not always agree with	11	within immigration enforcement.
12	them you know, we discussed Mary Bosworth's	12	A. Yes.
13	evidence but the more people who are in there and	13	THE CHAIR: Can you just try and explain so that we can
14	seeing what is going on and are contributing, the	14	fully understand where the responsibilities do lie for
15	better, but at the end of the day the Home Office is	15	it?
16	ultimately responsible.	16	A. Yes. Yes. So and sorry if I was not clearer,
17	Q. Finally this from me, Mr Riley.	17	chair there is a policy team red(?) policy within
18	Really just at the start of your evidence it seemed	18	the Home Office that owns enforcement and detention
19	you were very enthusiastic to apologise and, as I recall	19	policy; Ian Cheeseman worked for them at one stage,
20	it, you apologised in respect of incidents during the	20	which is why he gave the evidence he did. They are the
21	course of the Panorama broadcast and in respect of the	21	overall owners of detention policy. The
22	contractual failures. Do you know if there is any	22	operationalisation of that policy sits in one of the
23	intention by the Secretary of State herself to apologise	23	returns commands within immigration enforcement. So
24	to the detainees who suffered ill-treatment, or will	24	turning the policy into operation delivery is their
25	they have to await the outcome of the inquiry report?	25	responsibility; but to slightly complicate it further,
	Page 181		Page 183
1	A I couldn't gav either way Mu Altman I coult smeek for	1	in male 25 montionlessly, the training of CDs falls
1	A. I couldn't say either way, Mr Altman. I can't speak for	1	in rule 35, particularly, the training of GPs falls
2	the Home Secretary, I am afraid.	2	within NHS England's commissioning. So it is
2	the Home Secretary, I am afraid.  Q. You rather rushed, if you don't mind me saying so, that	2 3	within NHS England's commissioning. So it is a tripartite approach to it, I guess.
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2 3 4 5	the Home Secretary, I am afraid.  Q. You rather rushed, if you don't mind me saying so, that apology and perhaps we will understand why you were keen to get it out, but is there anything more you would like	2 3 4 5	within NHS England's commissioning. So it is a tripartite approach to it, I guess.  THE CHAIR: Okay. So obviously you have explained to Mr Altman that the I don't want to misquote you again
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1	maybe characterised.	1 been adduced. However, it was not necessary to ask the
2	Do you have any reflections on the fact that	2 witnesses about each of these documents, or every page
3	a senior manager seems to have interpreted it as being	3 of them when they came to give their evidence.
4	about risk, potentially risk-profiling people by certain	4 We do now consider that it is necessary to adduce
5	nationalities, as he described it to us, and in his	5 these particular documents in full. So with your
6	Verita interview?	6 permission, chair, the list of documents and URNs and
7	A. No. I was surprised at the words that Mr Skitt used.	7 the documents themselves will be adduced and published
8	I know Steve. You know, I have seen him at work.	8 on the inquiry's website as soon as possible. Similar
9	He doesn't strike me as someone who would necessarily	9 lists are being prepared for subsequent weeks and we
10	•	10 will seek your permission to publish those lists in the
11	stereotype in that way and I wonder whether it was	same way and the documents behind them at the opportune
	a clunky form of words rather than an intent on there,	12 moment.
12	but that is all I can say.	13 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much, Ms Wakeman, I am happy to
13	THE CHAIR: Thank you.	14 agree to that, thank you.
14	I have no other questions. I know you have been	15 MR ALTMAN: Chair, 10.00 tomorrow, please, for closing 16 statements.
15	with us for a long day and I am very grateful for you	17 THE CHAIR: Thank you. See you tomorrow. Thank you.
16	coming to give your evidence. Thank you, Mr Riley.	17 THE CHAIR: Thank you. See you tomorrow. Thank you.  18 (4.32 pm)
17	MR ALTMAN: Chair, before you rise tonight, we do have	19 (The inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
18	I am told it is not going to take very long and if	20
19	Mr Riley is happy just to sit there a few minutes	21
20	longer Ms Wakeman just to adduce some statements and	22 INDEX
21	documents if you wouldn't mind?	23
22	THE CHAIR: Absolutely.	MR PHILIP JAMES RILEY (swom)1
23	Thank you, Ms Wakeman. Thank you.	24
24		Examination by MR ALTMAN1
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