

BROOK HOUSE INQUIRY

Second Witness Statement of Clare Checksfield

I provide this statement in response to a request under Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 dated 10th February 2022.

I, Clare Checksfield, date of birth, DPA will say as follows:

1. In so far as the contents of this statement are within my own personal knowledge, they are true, otherwise they are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
2. The answers provided below are to the best of my knowledge and recollection, with reference to the documents noted in the Rule 9 request and to a limited set of documents drawn to my attention by those advising me in the period provided for drafting this statement. Should the Inquiry wish me to consult any other documents, I would of course be able to do so if given sufficient time. I have endeavoured to assist the Inquiry so far as possible within the practical constraints and timeframe given and remain willing to consider any further documents or information provided by the Inquiry as it deems appropriate.

Introduction

3. I have set out below the wide range of information relating to immigration removal centres. I saw the welfare of detainees as being central to the Home Office role, namely to “...*provide for the secure but humane accommodation in a relaxed regime with as much freedom of movement and association as possible....*”.
4. In 2017, the Home Office was in the middle of a major programme of reform. The Department had commissioned an independent review from Stephen Shaw to focus on vulnerable detainees, and in early 2017 made a commitment in Parliament that

he would be invited to assess Home Office progress. NHS (England) now oversaw healthcare provision at all removal centres and was deepening its knowledge of the health needs of detainees. There was further improvement to come, especially in the provision of additional mental health support.

5. In parallel, Detention and Escorting Services (DES), was working through several contract renewals. We had recently closed Cedars and had completed a major rebuild at Tinsley House to provide a small bespoke facility to hold families before removal, to improve fire security and to provide some additional beds. The contract at Brook House was coming to an end, as was the contract for escorts, which was awarded to Mitie after an open competition at the end of 2017.

The short term

6. The primary responsibility for running Brook House lay with G4S. Most day to day Home Office business would be led by the delivery manager, Michelle Smith, and her team, with support and guidance as necessary, from Alan Gibson, Head of Detention Operations. Both are experienced and very capable. For the most part, I would have trusted my team and G4S to respond to questions relating to the day-to-day running of Brook House. I would know, often daily, if there were immediate or short-term incidents and would have got involved when it was necessary. I knew I was asking a great deal of my staff. Michelle was also piloting predeparture teams, as well as the changes at Tinsley House, and the future new contract at Brook House. Alan was closely involved in managing the last year of the escorting contract.

The medium term

7. I also knew that the introduction of the adults at risk policy, the detention gatekeeper, and other case working changes would take considerable patience and focus before they really made a difference. I had discussed with Stephen Shaw the timing of his second review, and we had agreed that the autumn of 2017 felt like the right time for him to return and assess progress. This was primarily because we knew that there was no existing benchmark against which to judge the effectiveness of the wider policy reforms, but also because of the scale of change. Many

individual decisions would be taken by caseworkers, and management information was difficult to extract. Our overarching goal was fewer vulnerable people in detention, but that was going to be difficult to demonstrate.

8. I also believed then that we were starting to develop a proper articulation of the risks of detention and vulnerabilities of detainees. The detention gatekeeper could be expected to introduce consistency and prevent the detention of a number of vulnerable detainees. A smaller number of available beds would support that filter, as would the public commitments the Home Office had given to show substantive improvement. Plans to close The Verne were well advanced, and I knew that DES, even if still stretched, would be better placed to manage fewer removal centres by the end of the year. The introduction of predeparture teams (now Detention Engagement Teams) also promised to reduce ambiguity over the role of Home Office staff at removal centres and engage caseworkers more closely with detainees.
9. It was also part of my responsibilities to provide Immigration Enforcement (IE) with bed spaces and escorts in order to support removals. In 2017, DES and commercial colleagues were placing additional management attention on the escorting contract. That contract had been through a formal arbitration in 2014, and retaining staff was proving difficult in the final year of the contract. Senior colleagues in the enforcement and asylum directorates expected me to show that DES was doing everything we could to provide detention space and escorting capacity until a better designed and funded contract could be implemented in 2018.
10. In 2017, the NHS was also starting to roll out patient-led consultation. This was supported by the work Professor Mary Bosworth had been leading at several removal centres on detainees' experience. I had a longer-term plan of developing an independent assessment of detainees' wellbeing that could be used to focus on their welfare. This was built on knowledge of Her Majesty's Prisons and Probation Service' (HMPPS¹) programme of assessing the quality of life for prisoners as part of regular management information. I would have been required to conduct an open

¹ HMPPS replaced the National Offender Management Service in April 2017 and is used throughout this statement for ease of reference.

Witness Name: Clare Checksfield
Statement No: Second
Exhibits: 0

competition to tender for developing such an assessment. In 2017 the pressures on the DES budget and capacity were too strong to implement those plans. Improvements to the buildings, such as care suites, also had to be planned against competing budgetary pressures, which meant their delivery moved into the longer term.

The long term

11. In the longer term, the Home Office was planning fewer, better maintained removal centres, with modernised contracts. I expected fewer vulnerable people to be detained in the first place, and healthcare specification to improve. I was under no illusions as to the difficulties in embedding those changes in a complex delivery system. The strategic direction of travel was set out later in HOM006077. In 2017, work was also starting on the design of a new build removal centre near Heathrow, which had the potential to allow the Home Office to plan ahead, and design a building that could manage a better balance of security and regime.

Supporting information

12. Against that background of change, I had overlapping information at my disposal:

- (a) Commercial reports against indicators in the contract;
- (b) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) reports of unannounced visits, judged against their published Expectations;
- (c) Operational live information, from two weekly meetings, supplemented by conversations during the week in the office and when I was on the out of hours call rota;
- (d) Complaints (discussed every year in the annual report of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman);
- (e) PSU investigations, mostly as escalated from Alan Gibson (Head of Detention Operations);

- (f) Reports from the Immigration Monitoring Board (IMB), mostly on an annual basis (unless they had made a direct approach to the Home Office), and consideration of their recommendations;
- (g) Ad hoc reports, often in response to media queries or NGO reports, where DES needed to provide immediate factual information for press office;
- (h) Contingency planning, for example against reports of planned protests;
- (i) Parliamentary questions, correspondence and Freedom of Information requests;
- (j) Internal and external reports, including HMIP reports, Prisons and Probation Ombudsman reports on deaths in custody, and any coroners' recommendations;
- (k) Detention and Escorting Audit and Assurance Team (DESAAT) internal audit reports; and
- (l) Immigration Enforcement system-wide activity reports.

13. In 2017, DES also had the benefit of Stephen Shaw's comprehensive report of his first review. From September 2016 onwards, I co-ordinated the Government response to each of his recommendations. Decisions and implementation came from casework and policy colleagues, as well as NHS (England) and HMPPS, in addition to DES. Those meetings were a forum for debate and action, as well as monitoring delivery milestones and implementation costs. This was a collaborative effort, with a strong commitment to improvement. The board is now the Immigration Detention Reform and Improvement Board.

14. A virtual meeting was held every Monday morning with DES, commercial and policy colleagues to share information and plan the week ahead, as well as absorb any incidents over the weekend. DES managed a 24/7 out of hours call system, and there was a second virtual handover meeting on Friday mornings.

15. I held meetings with all my delivery managers, and commercial colleagues every 6-8 weeks. These meetings covered all removal centres. We looked at available management information, such as monthly security reports, and topical questions.

We looked at risk in the round and used the meeting to try and identify new or emerging difficulties and possible solutions. We always considered staffing, security information, and often considered short to medium term changes.

Detention Service Orders

16. The inquiry has asked several questions about Detention Service Orders (DSOs).

As director of Detention Services and Escorting, I was responsible for signing off the finally issued Order, which would then be logged on the gov.uk website and circulated to Home Office staff and contractors. My team managed a programme of regular reviews of existing DSOs.

17. Most DSOs were agreed with policy colleagues and policy colleagues formally held the lead for some of them. This included guidance referring to food and fluid refusal, adults at risk and Rule 35. Those would formally be signed off by a senior civil servant in the policy Directorate, although DES would always have been part of the finalisation of the guidance.

18. Sometimes I was checking minor up-dates to well-established policies. At other times, a DSO was introducing a major policy change, and was checked with legal advisers, and went out to consultation before issue. In some instances of operational policy, DES is reliant on expertise from HMPPS.

19. I would often have been involved in earlier discussions of substance, so that by the time the draft was sent to me for clearance, most questions had been resolved. I would read the draft guidance, satisfy myself that it was clear, and if relevant, reflected any recent changes in policy.

Detention decisions

20. DSO 03/2016 replaced a much older piece of guidance from 2003 and was introduced to improve information about risk from decision makers outside DES. I signed off this DSO before its issue.

21. Decisions to maintain detention at Brook House would have been taken by case working, Border Force or Immigration Enforcement colleagues. I was not involved in those decisions. Individual cases were sometimes escalated to me for resolution.

Room sharing risk assessment

22. I have read DSO 12/2012 (CJS000710). I signed off the 2016 iteration so that there was a cross reference to DSO 08/2016 on the adults at risk policy. Stephen Shaw's first review had reported that he received no information that the room sharing assessment process was anything other than robust. I knew, from our regular DESAAT audits, that compliance, especially in record keeping, with this DSO was mixed, and that it needed constant vigilance.

Reception

23. I have read DSO 06/2008 (CJS000681) Reception, Induction and Surcharge Supplementary Guidance. I cleared this in July 2016, as part of an update, and also in response to recommendations from Stephen Shaw's review relating to HMPPS learning about the first night in detention, and the importance of reminding supplier staff that interpretation facilities should be used, rather than other detainees. I have also read the two G4S policies at CJS0006045 and CJS6046. In my reading, it appears that both carry dates of approval by G4S and the Home Office of 2014, in other words that they were not updated in 2016.

24. At the time, I knew that Stephen Shaw had made several recommendations relating to reception. G4S had accepted HMIP's recommendation relating to induction at Brook House and made a commitment to a comprehensive review of the reception process in the 2017 HMIP Service Improvement Plan.

ACDT policy

25. I have read DSO 06/2008 (HOM002511) and the G4S Suicide Prevention and Self Harm Management policy (CJS0066380). Although the Home Office guidance had not been formally reviewed for some time, ACDT principles were firmly established. The purpose of the ACDT is to try and determine the level of risk, how

to reduce the risk and how best to monitor and supervise the detainee. The 2017 IMB report reported close supervision by G4S, as well as their own reviews. Stephen Shaw had commented on the use of ACDT and urged review of the policy as soon as the HMPPS review of policy was completed, taking account of the differences between prisons and removal centres. Although we discussed a redraft of the policy with centre managers during 2017, HMPPS work was not far enough advanced to redraft the policy by the time I left in 2018. I was a member of the Ministerial Council on Deaths in Custody.

Adults at risk policy and Rule 35 process

26. I have read the DSO 08/2016 Management of Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention (CJS000731). I cleared this in January 2017, after the draft interim guidance had been cleared by policy colleagues, and shared with third sector colleagues, HMIP, PPO and IMB partners. I have read DSO09/2016 (HOM002591).
27. I would refer the Inquiry to paragraphs 23-29 of my first written statement, in which I explained that, from my vantage point in DES at that time, it was extremely difficult to make an evidence-based judgement on the impact of individual safeguards. Policy and case working colleagues were in the lead. Stephen Shaw made a first independent assessment in his second review as did the Chief Inspector of Immigration in his report published in 2019.
28. I have also read the G4S Safeguarding policy (CJS000540), amended in October 2016 and April 2017, presumably to take account of the Adults at Risk policy.
29. I have read the email dated 8th March 2017 from Michelle Smith (HOM0331975). Reading the email now, I am pleased to see the consistent way in which Michelle was approaching the implementation of the Adults at Risk policy with G4S. I cannot say exactly what I did after reading this email, but I do know that I updated centre managers at every meeting on Shaw reforms. I am afraid I cannot recall precisely whether Ben and I discussed these points at our March meeting. DESAAT found in July 2017 that G4S had made progress in creating an Adults at Risk

register, but that the recommendation from HMIP that staff needed to be trained in Adults at Risk policy could not be closed.

Food and fluid refusal

30. I have read DSO 03/2013 at CJS000724, and DSO 03/2017 at CJS0070700. I had no role in producing the 2013 guidance, but I jointly cleared the 2017 guidance with Home Office policy colleagues in October 2017. I used to check the weekly log on food and fluid refusal cases, because I regarded them as distressing and knew that they required difficult and careful judgements to be made by all staff concerned. Escalation for release would have been to the Strategic Director for Casework.

E wing policy

31. I have read the G4S policy at CJS006043. I am unable to comment on its operation during the relevant period, other than to refer to the 2017 IMB report. I knew that there was pressure on E wing and the Care and Separation Unit (CSU) at Brook House because of psychoactive substances, associated violence, and regular charter flights. In some circumstances, I knew that it was helpful to have some flexibility, other than the CSU or a room on a residential wing, to provide alternative short-term accommodation. Brook House was relatively unusual in having accommodation of this nature.

Rules 40 and 42

32. DSO 02/2017 was introduced in July 2017. In his first review, Stephen Shaw had noted that there was not much use of rule 40 and 42, and that the accommodation was of a variable standard. He noted that: "*Colnbrook, Harmondsworth and Brook House had the highest numbers of individuals in rule 40 accommodation, with Yarl's Wood having the longest average stay per person (3.24 days).*" He also said: "*On the basis of my examination of rule 40 and rule 42 records, the Home Office cannot be confident that all centres operate faithfully to the Operating Standards, or that record keeping supports good decision making.*" He also expressed his concern that rule 40 and 42 accommodation risked being used for detainees who needed mental health care. Record keeping is the responsibility of the contractor, although any

Witness Name: Clare Checksfield
Statement No: Second
Exhibits: 0

decision to place a detainee on rule 40 or 42 requires authorisation by a member of the Home Office, on behalf of the Secretary of State.

33. This was the first time a DSO had been completed for Rule 40 and 42, with contractors being guided by statutory provisions dating back to 2001. Work on the guidance had started in 2015. There were two rounds of consultation, and the draft DSO was cleared with the then Minister in March 2017. The proposals were discussed with centre managers at the meeting in March 2017. The DSO strengthens and clarifies existing safeguards and standards, providing additional guidance on levels of authorisation, notifications, and monitoring. I had been involved throughout in the process of completing the DSO and agreed it for publication in July 2017.

34. I do not feel able to offer a view on whether rule 40 and 42 was being applied during the relevant period as set out in the DSO which came into effect in July 2017. The IMB report for 2017 reflected on an increase in use of rule 40 and 42, which is consistent with my memory. The IMB also said they were: *“satisfied that officers and management do their utmost to keep the use of Rule 40 and 42 at the lowest possible level, and that where these sanctions are required, detainees spend the shortest possible time in the CSU”*.

35. DES had also initiated action to improve violence reduction, and one of the reasons I had wanted regular discussions was that I was aware that Brook House was often chosen for placement of detainees who may have been disruptive elsewhere in the removal estate. Information on the implementation of the G4S 2016 policies at CJS000725 and CJS006041 would have been held locally and overseen by the IMB and Home Office teams.

Interaction with Brook House

36. I did not visit Brook House during the relevant period, and do not recall any telephone conversations during the relevant period with Brook House senior managers. I was at Brook House in November 2016 for an open day to the industry

as a part of the procurement for a new contract for the running of Brook House. I spoke to Steve Skitt and visited Brook House after an escape in early 2016.

37. I held regular meetings with centre managers from all removal centres and the escorting contractor. There were meetings in March, July, and November 2017. The meetings always started with two regular items: an update from centre managers, followed by an update from me, including the Shaw reform programme. During 2017 we also discussed prevention of self-inflicted deaths, use of rule 40 and 42, violence reduction, and in November, held an open discussion on the Brook House Panorama programme. According to the agendas for those meetings, Ben Saunders attended the March and July meetings, and Lee Hanford represented G4S in November.

38. After the Panorama broadcast, the Home Office had asked G4S for an action plan to improve the operation of Brook House. Once agreed, Alan Gibson led for the Home Office on the joint project board that was overseeing implementation of the G4S action plan. As Director, I was still involved with checking that progress was being made. There was close interest from Hugh Ind, Director General for IE, and the Home Office Executive Committee (ExCo), in what lessons needed to be learned. I had telephone contact with Jerry Petherick and was at several meetings with Jerry Petherick and Peter Neden, including two with the Minister in September 2017.

HMIP

39. I had no direct involvement with the HMIP inspection into Brook House in 2016. A member of the DES team in Brook House would have been at the live debrief given at the end of the inspection, and the headlines would have been fed back to me. HMIP then sent the draft report to DES for checks against factual accuracy. Once finalised by HMIP, I would then provide formal written advice to the Minister, covering the draft Service Improvement Plan (agreed with G4S and others responsible for delivering recommendations as necessary). I did so in March 2017 for the 2016 inspection.

40. I do not recall any personal conversations with HMIP after the Panorama programme, although it would have been quite possible. The Inspectorate is an independent body and took its own decisions on changes to their inspection procedure after the broadcast of the Panorama programme.

IMB

41. I have read DSO 04/2014 Working with Independent Monitoring Boards (VER000029). The DSO issued in 2017 made a relatively minor amendment (extending DBS checks for IMB members to 5 years). This was in the knowledge that the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in 2014 was due for renewal in November 2017. The Ministry of Justice was the main sponsor for IMBs in immigration removal centres. I had overall Home Office responsibility for ensuring that each IRC had a properly independent team, that they were carrying out their functions, and that annual reports were made to the Minister of Immigration.

42. I attended the National Awayday for IMBs at the Ministry of Justice in March 2016. The Ministry of Justice was also planning to improve national resources, training, and governance for all IMBs, and I was a member of the panel to recruit the first National Chair of Independent Monitoring Boards between May and July 2017.

43. Given that there were several routes for escalation, I had no reason in 2017 to believe that the relevant DSO was not being followed at Brook House. The IMB's 2016 report showed that there were 9 members out of a complement of 12. This was the highest number for some years, and there had been no departures. The report indicated that members were working well with G4S and with the local Home Office team. In substance, the report was consistent with HMIP conclusions, and confident in making its recommendations to the Minister.

44. I had no direct involvement that I can recall precisely, with IMB visits to Brook House in 2016, or 2017. But I read both annual reports for 2016 and 2017, which were placed on the IMB website and reported to the relevant Minister.

45. I do not recall any personal direct interaction with the Brook House IMB after the broadcast of the Panorama programme or during the relevant period. I knew from

Michelle Smith, Alan Gibson, and other senior visitors that IMB members were deeply shocked by the Panorama programme.

Verita

46. I refer to VER000201, which is a file note taken of what I recall was an off the record telephone conversation in October 2017 with Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden of Verita, to discuss the logistics of the independent review they were to carry out for G4S. The discussion was not transcribed. I agreed to arrange for Ministerial approval of access for the Verita team to Brook House and Colnbrook, to add names of third sector organisations they might consult, and to check with HMPPS whether they agreed with my proposal of visits to Huntercombe and Maidstone. I also agreed to talk to Peter Neden of G4S, to say that while this was a decision for G4S, the Home Office had been expecting any such independent report to be published. I also provided an update on action relating to Panorama follow up.

The design of Brook House and categorisation

47. The key point I was making in the verbatim transcript (VER000029) was that the decision to build Brook House and Colnbrook to Prison Service Category B standards came after serious fires at Harmondsworth and Yarl's Wood, and the discovery in 2006 that many time served foreign national prisoners had not been deported. I believe that the Category B physical specification is still Home Office policy (it certainly was when I was working on a possible new removal centre at Heathrow in 2019).

The decision to increase capacity by 60 beds despite the Shaw recommendation

48. In 2014, when I joined IE, the Directorate had an internal plan for managing the detention estate. The plan included a new build on land next to Campsfield House (withdrawn in March 2015), the opening of the Verne (opened in 2015) and 60 additional beds in Brook House and 39 beds in Tinsley House. IE would also invest in increasing voluntary returns and achieving shorter times in detention.

49. There were also plans during 2015 to close several removal centres. Options included closures of a combination of: Haslar, Dover, and Campsfield House. The option of replacing Dungavel with a short term holding facility in Scotland was also under consideration. Predeparture accommodation at The Cedars was added as a closure proposal during 2016, solely on cost grounds.
50. The proposals for providing an additional 60 beds in Brook House were part of that planning from 2014 onwards. Although it was not a formal recommendation to the then Home Secretary, Stephen Shaw said in his first review that the beds should not be added because of pressures on other facilities. The then Director General confirmed in October 2015 that IE would still open the extra 60 beds, because of their importance to the estate plan.
51. In 2015, I believed that proper risk assessments by G4S had been taken with regard to the 60 beds, and that it was reasonable to maintain that decision. With the benefit of hindsight, I now think that there should have been an independent operational review of the 60-bed expansion at Brook House during 2016, because of the length of time from the start of the proposal to its implementation.

The nature of the population at Brook House

52. As discussed with Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden, DES kept an eye on the proportion of time served foreign national prisoners in all removal centres. This was a precautionary background risk indicator. During 2017, Home Office management information showed that the average proportion of time served foreign national prisoners was around 35%. The largest groups of detainees by nationality were from Albania, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria, although these would have fluctuated in combinations throughout the year. I would also have known how many detainees were at Brook House. The highest average monthly capacity in 2017 was 459 in August 2017.

Concerns about Brook House

53. In March 2017, I advised Ministers that HM Inspector of Prisons had concluded that Brook House had improved on the standards found during their last inspection.

As is usual, we also provided a formal response to each of the Inspectorate's 46 recommendations and invited the Minister to approve the Service Improvement Plan, which was published on the Inspectorate website on the same day as their report. The Independent Monitoring Board also reported on the calendar year 2016 in March 2017.

54. In paragraph 44 of my first witness statement (HOM0331981), I said: "*At the time, I had no specific grounds to believe that the culture or values within G4S or Home Office staff at Brook House risked the physical or verbal abuse seen in the Panorama programme.*"
55. In paragraph 66 in my first written witness statement I said that I knew that G4S staffing levels were not always meeting the required contracted hours. I was aware that the use of new psychoactive substances was worrying centre managers in general, and that this was linked with a rise in the incidence of violence, against detainees, and staff.
56. After a flight from Stansted was halted in March 2017, IE started using alternative airports, which changed routes, dates of charters and pick up times. At around the same time, additional Third Country Unit charter flights were introduced to Europe, some of which were shared with France. There was, specifically, poor communication at Brook House over the first use of a "removal window" policy. The 2017 IMB report refers to this as "short notice" removals, and the Home Office response says there was no intention to change the minimum 5 working days' notice to those due to be removed on a charter flight.
57. I knew that these changes were challenging on the ground at Brook House but expected the programme of charter flights to revert into a more settled routine.
58. In response to these concerns, DES was using the financial levers then available in the contract in relation to staffing levels. The Executive Oversight Board looked at the overall commercial relationship with G4S and the operation of its contracts with the Home Office, including Brook House, in March and June 2017.

59. I attended both meetings, chaired by a senior civil servant from the commercial profession, as did Peter Neden and Jerry Petherick. The Home Office assessed G4S performance at Amber tending towards Green in March 2017, and at Amber in June 2017. These assessments were largely based on contractual compliance, but there was also discussion of violence, with G4S reporting a drop in May 2017, and noting good cooperation on violence reduction.
60. After a 2016 review of security at removal centres Alan Gibson and I had agreed that we needed to strengthen DES' capacity to interrogate monthly reports on management information relating to security, including psychoactive substances, incidents of violence, self-harm and use of force. Once The Verne was closed (planned for autumn 2017) we planned to use the experience of some of the Home Office staff working there to build a team under an Assistant Director with prison service operational experience to properly understand the information and develop the capacity to identify risk in advance and challenge compliance. This became the Security and Use of Force Team.

Panorama

61. I can confirm I was involved in exchanges about the Home Office action plan (HOM0331949). CJS000752 and CJS000801 do not refer to those exchanges (they instead relate to the immediate response to the broadcast).
62. The Home Office action plan was an internal document, aimed at responding to lessons learned across all Home Office responsibilities. This was in the knowledge that Kate Lampard and Stephen Shaw were still to report. Hugh Ind's questions were part of his personal preparation before a meeting with the then Second Permanent Secretary.
63. I told Hugh Ind that I did not consider G4S was 'going through the motions', and that Alan Gibson's quarterly reviews of professional conduct of suppliers were being built in the formal quarterly contract review meetings. I said to Hugh he was welcome to attend the Project Board with G4S, where Alan Gibson was leading for DES. I did not attend any of those meetings myself but spoke regularly to Alan and

was copied into regular updates on progress by Lee Hanford. I was leading on the work relating to next steps on the G4S contract, and on preparing for the publication of Stephen Shaw's second review, which was sent to the Home Secretary in April 2018.

64. I answered Hugh's questions about supplier staff integrity and sent him a copy of the statement of professional conduct for suppliers.
65. The Rule 9 letter refers to oversight of use of force by escorting staff, but the discussion here was about a similar oversight mechanism for use of force within removal centres. I told Hugh that we did not think we could afford that, but that we were proposing to use our new security team to dip sample use of force in removal centres, and to join supplier debriefs on incidents, as well as giving the Home Office a better risk-based view.
66. At the time, I did not think there was enough testing of supplier self-reporting. This was largely due to the structure of the contract, but also affected by the small team in DES with capacity to interrogate. Hugh Ind's comments in these exchanges reflected an internal debate about use of IE staff at removal centres. He seemed to have been told that the teams (contract monitoring and detainee engagement) would not work together. I said this was not the intention, but that we needed clarity over respective responsibilities.
67. Alan Gibson and I had worked together on the draft Home Office action plan (HOM0331995). We had discussed the options, where necessary talked to colleagues, and written different parts of it. The action plan was discussed with the Second Permanent Secretary, and later circulated to ExCo for information. Proposals for the Professional Standards Unit were kept separate from DES in light of its independent role within the Home Office.

D1234

68. I have read the PSU investigation report dated 4th October 2017, and the letter I signed at HOM002493 to explain that D1234's complaint would be investigated, although the complaint had not been referred from the National Removals command

to DES. The background note said that a reply had, separately, been provided to the MP about D1234's asylum claim, and that he had already been removed from the UK.

Questions after June 2018

69. I cannot comment on PPG000101, SER000048, CJS007070, CJS007075, or SER000053, as they were issued after I had left the post of Director of Detention and Escorting Services. This also applies to the 2019 HMIP inspection of Brook House.

<u>Statement of Truth</u>	
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.	
I am content for this witness statement to form part of the evidence before the Brook House Inquiry and to be published on the Inquiry's website.	
Name	Clare Checksfield
Signature	<div style="border: 1px dashed black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">Signature</div>
Date	4 March 2022

Witness Name: Clare Checksfield
Statement No: Second
Exhibits: 0