



# **HM Prison & Probation Service**

**Report to DC CT592 Stephen Trott Sussex Police**

**Case number....**

**Annex A**

**Report by Jon Collier**

**Head of Centre**

**National Tactical Response Group**

**Hatfield Woodhouse**

**6<sup>th</sup> February 2018**

1. I have received a request from DC Stephen Trott to comment on the actions of other staff involved in the incident that my original report focussed on. I can confirm that to the best of my knowledge I do not know any of the staff or, other persons, observed.
2. My original report, dated 6<sup>th</sup> February 2018, outlined the training and operational policy in relation to the Use of Force (UoF). I also explained my background and current role, which evidences my expertise within this particular field.
3. The footage involving DCO Yan Paschali starts with a restraint involving a detainee, known only as [D1527] in the supine position. This is where the detainee is lying flat on his back and staff controlling:
  - His head
  - His right arm
  - His left arm
4. The actual positions taken up by the staff are consistent with the training provided and form what is collectively known as 'a three officer team'. The person controlling the head will be known as the 'number 1' and they will be in charge of the team, whilst communicating with the incident supervisor, if one is available. The incident supervisor will normally be of a managerial/supervisory rank and they will be in overall command of the situation. In some instances the supervisor could be a basic grade member of staff who is an accredited UoF Instructor. Due to the additional knowledge and understanding of the UoF that they possess they can be ideally suited for this role.
5. It is difficult to establish if a supervisor was in attendance at this incident but the footage shows a member of staff stood alongside DCO Paschali. There is little, or no, communication between the two of them and at no time does this member of staff address the dangerous and unjustified techniques used by DCO Paschali, or does he attempt to de-escalate the situation, or address the communication that does not meet the expected standards of behaviour by staff.
6. The footage does not show the faces of the staff controlling the detainee's arms and there is no other means of identifying who is actually involved. The 'reporter' is involved on one of the arms, this is only identifiable by his dialogue. He is the only person present that attempts to address the actions of DCO Paschali. He is heard to say 'easy Yan, easy'. There are no concerns at any of the physical actions of the other staff involved.
7. At the conclusion of the incident DCO Paschali instructs the staff that it is not a use of force and does not require recording. This is clearly in breach of the policy which states that any physical force used must be recorded. This message is covered during all UoF training. The nurse in attendance also appears to ignore her responsibility. It is a requirement after any

UoF for a detainee to be examined by a member of the healthcare staff. If she had completed the report of injury to a detainee document (F213) then it would have alerted the centre managers that force had been used. It is concerning that there appears to be a culture of not reporting incidents involving the UoF on detainees.

8. I am unable to make any further comments on the application of force due to the limited footage available. Throughout the documentary there are numerous examples of poor supervision during difficult and complex situations. There is no evidence of inappropriate behaviour being challenged and even a degree of intimidation on staff following incidents, as evidenced by DCO Paschali informing staff that the incident was not a use of force.

I can confirm that the information provided is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge at the time of producing this report.

Jon Collier

9<sup>th</sup> February 2018