Tuesday, 24 June 2025

(10.00 am) LORD TURNBULL: Good morning, Mr Greaney. MR GREANEY: Good morning, sir. As you know, first today we will hear the opening statement on behalf of those represented by John McBurney solicitors, which will be delivered by Mr Kane. LORD TURNBULL: Good morning, Mr Kane. Opening statement on behalf of Core Participants represented by John McBurney Solicitors by MR KANE KC MR KANE: Good morning, sir. This opening statement is made on behalf of the bereaved families and survivor Core Participants represented by John McBurney Solicitors. We represent the following Core Participants, whose loved ones were murdered by the Real IRA. Edwin, known as Eddie, Cartwright and Stephen Cartwright in respect of Debra-Anne Cartwright. Mandy Walker and Mark Hawkes in respect of Olive Hawkes, Helen Hughes and Richard Hughes in respect of Julia Hughes. Kevin Skelton, Tracey Skelton, Paula Huntley, Shauna Murphy and Roy Skelton in respect of Philomena Skelton, Gerald McFarland and Gerald McFarland in respect of Samantha McFarland; Marion Radford, Claire Hayes, Paul Radford, Elaine O'Reilly, Carol Radford, Lynne Mullen and Heather Lagan Radford in respect of Alan Radford; and Anne Wilson, Denise

Kerrigan, Gary Wilson and Colin Wilson in respect of Lorraine Wilson.

I also appear on behalf of the following Core
Participants who survived but were injured by the Real
IRA on that occasion: Lorraine Anderson, Ray Campion,
Wendy Graham, Rosemary Ingram, Stephen McKervy, Alan
Palmer, Jim Sharkey and Robert Watson.

Before starting this opening statement, sir, it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge and refer to the commemorative hearings. Any comment elaborating on these would do those days a disservice. I say only that the tsunami of human emotion on those days overwhelmed all those present in the room and beyond. The width and depth of human loss, pain and suffering was overcome only by the courage and strength of those who gave their evidence, both orally and in written form.

On behalf of those we represent, could I thank you, sir, and all your Inquiry team, staff and support workers. In respect of our own clients, we are grateful for the invaluable assistance from the South East Fermanagh Foundation who we know as SEFF.

It is our privilege to represent a number of bereaved families and injured survivors whose names I have placed on record, both this morning and at the initial hearing. That privilege translates into an awesome responsibility

to assist both you and the Inquiry and to deliver this opening statement on their behalf.

You have asked us to focus on areas of particular concern and interest for those whom we represent. We welcome that invitation and will identify those issues. In return, we invite you, sir, the Inquiry, to give special attention to them as your work progresses.

Preventability is the question that the Inquiry must explore. Whilst not explicitly stated in the terms of reference, our collective aim and your foremost objective must be to establish the entire truth relating to all relevant issues prior to 15 August 1998. In this task, the Inquiry must be guided by principles of transparency, openness, diligence, fairness, candour, and co-operation; all of which are laudable and achievable aspirations in the discharge of the public duty of this Inquiry.

Our clients' key principles were outlined by myself last July. In summary, I repeat those views.

First, it is important that we always keep in focus that it was republican terrorists under the name Real IRA who planned and planted the Omagh bomb, and they alone are responsible for the loss and hurt caused by it. Indeed, on hearing the accounts of so many at the commemorative hearings, it beggars all belief as to what else was intended other than murderous carnage by leaving

a bomb in a peaceful town's main street on a busy sunny Saturday afternoon, where so many innocent women, children and men were likely to be. The preventability of the murders and injuries was at all times within the absolute control of the Real IRA.

Secondly, our clients do not wish to include in any consideration of preventability those members of the RUC who, on the day at the scene, followed orders and used their initiative to try and make safe the area of the bomb, working as they were with false information from the bombers. Those same members of the RUC, as we have heard, valiantly fought at the scene to save lives and to help the injured, as did many others in rescuing and providing medical care.

Thirdly, our clients are of the clear belief that whatever aspects of preventability may lie at the door of the UK State authorities, blame, to a greater or lesser extent, rests with the state authorities in the Republic of Ireland. Our clients again renew their call for a parallel Inquiry to be immediately established by the Government of the Republic of Ireland; a call that they should not be required to repeat.

Fourthly, our clients remain greatly disappointed at the lack of any commitment on the part of the authorities in the Republic of Ireland to meaningfully assist this

Inquiry, and they regard the memorandum of understanding agreed with the Minister of Justice for the government of the Republic of Ireland as wholly unsatisfactory in that regard. Our clients wish to use this Inquiry to heap shame on the government of the Republic of Ireland for their failures.

They consider that there is a moral, human, and legal imperative on the government of the Republic of Ireland to establish a parallel inquiry into the deaths of people who were their own citizens, visitors to their country and those who would have been entitled to Irish citizenship under their laws. As a country with a professed European inclination, it is extremely regrettable that the Republic of Ireland continues to be in breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in failing to ensure that there has ever been any effective investigation into the death of the people to whom they owe that duty.

There are preventability issues which clearly arise from the territorial origin of the Omagh bomb and the cowardly refuge which its perpetrators enjoyed within the boundaries of the Republic of Ireland.

With respect to the work of the Inquiry, we do not underestimate the huge challenge that it faces when, unlike some other inquiries which have more quickly

in passing before addressing certain particular issues of concern raised by those whom we represent.

Some general areas of concern will fall to be considered within the upcoming evidence chapters, chapter 3, for instance, the bombing of Omagh, which will involve establishing the sequence of events leading to the bombing, and then chapter 4 which will deal with previous incidents. Can I say we welcome the relevant aspects of the recent ruling made by you on suspects in this regard.

There will be some overlap with the subsequent chapter, chapter 7, concerning intelligence relating to the Omagh bomb, but we can now highlight some questions in preparation for the initial evidence chapters. They include: what was done to establish a link between any of the incidents that occurred during the 18 months prior to the Omagh Bombing? Were there policing, security or intelligence failures in properly recognising any such links between those incidents? Did those failures contribute to the situation where the potential for prevention of the Omagh bomb was diminished or removed? What was the impact of political developments on the investigation of those 31 incidents?

Did political events or influences act as a brake on the investigation and detection of those incidents and the methods used for those purposes? Further, did that succeeded the events which they were examining, your task is to undertake an historical investigation of facts, matters and circumstances in the period prior to 15 August 1998.

You face the task of exploring policing, security and intelligence, practices, processes and procedures within a country fighting against ongoing terrorism. Resources, technology, information storage and analysis, cultural attitudes and political dynamics have all changed so much since the events of 9/11 forever changed how the world viewed and dealt with terrorism.

Due to the considerable passage of time, there will inevitably be evidential hurdles for the Inquiry to overcome, in particular in relation to document retrieval, deceased witnesses and memories which have faded.

However, the John McBurney Core Participants caution that history must not be rewritten. They hope that the Inquiry will appreciate the grim reality of that particular time in history when republican terrorists continued to operate against a newly evolving political backdrop.

If I could turn then to areas of particular interest and concern. Could I say that there will be repetition of some matters by others, so I will refer to those only

have a negative knock-on effect upon the preventability of the Omagh bomb? Were the steps and processes of downgrading border security a consequence of political influence and considerations?

More broadly, now is perhaps not the time to examine in any detail all the many issues which have emerged over time and given our clients cause for concern, but it is perhaps appropriate at this stage to highlight two by way of example. They are, first, some of our clients have grave concern about the missing Threat Book. Their calls for an explanation of the disappearance of such an important document cannot continue to go unanswered.

Secondly, some of our clients have deep-seated concerns as to why British Army personnel were not deployed in the Omagh area either before, or on the day of, or after, the Omagh Bombing. They want to know whether this departure from normal security measures was deliberate.

I'm now going to deal with the Republic of Ireland and the issue of preventability. That is one of our clients' main areas of significant concern to which I have already referred and that is the responsibility of the government of the Republic of Ireland and their state authorities to have prevented the Omagh bomb. Kevin Skelton, whose wife Mena was murdered, gave evidence to

the Inquiry during the commemorative hearings and he reflected on this particular area of concern in his own perceptive and succinct Tyrone vernacular when he said, and I quote:

"But the British government I don't know -- sorry but Irish government -- I don't know, I don't see them playing ball with this Inquiry. And if they don't, then it's dead in the water because, at the end of the day, the bomb was made in the south, the people who built the bomb were from the south, the car was stolen in the south, and car was driv from the south and planted in Omagh and them boys driv back home again. And there's some of them still walking the streets."

That was how the families and the injured survivors whom we represent feel; that is a fundamental concern.

With the utmost respect to this Inquiry, our clients have likened the work of the Inquiry to the role of an MOT test centre where a vehicle has been taken for inspection. To their disbelief, our clients, the customer, are told that only the engine can be inspected. All that exists beyond the engine, including the body, the suspension and the brakes and the contents of the boot, cannot be examined. Such an MOT would clearly be unfit for purpose.

This Inquiry can only examine the parts of the car

However, there are, from even the most preliminary perusal of some of the documentation that has been made available by the Inquiry, issues which only intensify the concerns which I have indicated. I take only a small number of examples and will make some brief observations.

The report of the Smithwick Inquiry dated 29 November 2013. The Smithwick Inquiry was quite prepared to make a finding that, and I quote:

"There was a failure on the part of the RUC to put all relevant information in its possession before An Garda Siochana, when requested by Deputy Commissioner Conroy to do so. The failure in this respect relates to the 1985 intelligence in its possession ..."

On 6 December 2013, Mr Michael Gallagher swore an affidavit in the judicial review proceedings in which he refers in paragraph 14 of that affidavit to an assurance given to the bereaved families by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, Bertie Ahern, that "no stone would be left unturned". However, that is a promise which has significance only for the ignoring and disregarding of it which has taken place over the almost 27 years which have passed since the Omagh Bombing. The Bridger report, which was published in June 2012, states clearly on page 11 that:

made in the UK, as it were, the preventability. It cannot examine the rest of the car where there terrorists sat or the boot area where the deadly bomb was hidden. If this Inquiry could examine the whole car then it would also be able to identify any preventability issues that fall on the Republic of Ireland state authorities and all the faults and defects in the vehicle could be identified. The John McBurney Core Participants are very anxious to press the Inquiry to spend considerable time and effort dealing with paragraph 2(i) of the terms of reference. Paragraph 2(i) states that the Inquiry will investigate and I quote:

"(i) Any other matters which are relevant to whether the Omagh Bombing on 15 August 1998 could have been prevented by UK State Authorities. To the extent it is relevant to the issue of preventability by UK State Authorities, this may include information sharing and investigations with and by State Authorities in the Republic of Ireland."

End of that quotation.

The opening statements protocol in paragraph 18 acknowledges that and I quote: "opportunities at this stage for submissions on the detail of the evidence" by ourselves are circumscribed by the limited material that has been made available to date.

"Public confidence can go some way to being restored by both the British and Irish governments showing that they are willing to do their utmost to have perceived failures fully investigated and dealt with."

Without going into detail, a plethora of issues arise from reports over the years which warrant careful scrutiny by your Inquiry. They include the activities of Kevin Fulton in the Republic of Ireland, the activities of David Rupert in Republic of Ireland, the extent to which knowledge of those individual was in the possession of or attributable to the state authorities of the Republic of Ireland; the credibility of the information being supplied by Garda Detective Sergeant John White; the role of Dermot Jennings, Assistant Commissioner of the An Garda Siochana, with responsibility for security and intelligence; a clear allegation by Enda Kenny, the former Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland as to and more generally, the inadequate nature of the Nally Report and its investigations; the interactions between An Garda Siochana and RUC senior officers, including intelligence sharing and the issue of mobile phones, tracking and the security services.

Our clients wish for the Inquiry in considering any material relating to interactions with authorities and the Republic of Ireland to explore any failures on the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

part of those authorities which are explicitly or 2 implicitly demonstrated by such material. 3 Enda Kenny also stated during a debate in the Dáil on 20 February 2004 prior to his election, I quote:

1

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

"You will get your truth. You will get your truth and so I will Ireland."

Sir, I have the authority of those I represent to say that they are sick and tired of platitudes, false assurances, broken promises and grand but empty words from the state authorities of the Republic of Ireland. Their resolute refusal to institute a parallel inquiry and their ongoing failure to provide real and meaningful co-operation with this Inquiry speaks far louder than their words

All of this leads to the consideration of the memorandum of understanding dated 15 April 2025 between the Inquiry and the Minister for Justice of the government of Ireland entitled "Matters relating to disclosure of materials". Mr Justice Horner, in the judicial review proceedings brought by Michael Gallagher, stated in paragraph 310 that an investigation, and

"... will necessarily involve the scrutiny of both OPEN and CLOSED material obtained on both sides of the border. It is not within my power to order any type of

only relates to relevance concerning preventability by the UK State Authorities. This is an unacceptable yet significant escape clause for the Republic of Ireland. Under the memorandum, the Republic of Ireland state authorities and, therefore, any information that reflects badly on them, could be determined by them to be irrelevant.

The recitals to the memorandum of understanding state that:

"The Government of Ireland's provision of assistance to the Inquiry is solely within the grant of the government of Ireland."

This voluntary statement of participation by the Government of the Republic of Ireland lacks any degree of real commitment and does nothing to give our clients any degree of confidence in it.

Similarly, the memorandum relates only to documentation, there is no power to compel the attendance of witnesses. To take an example, in the recent corporate witness statement provided on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, to which I will return, it is stated in paragraph 3 and 4 that:

"Assistant Commissioner ... Dermott Jennings, who was in the Security and Intelligence Section of the [An Garda Siochana] informed the Nally group that he was in

investigation to take place in the Republic of Ireland but there is a real advantage in an Article 2 compliant investigation proceeding in the Republic of Ireland simultaneously with one in Northern Ireland."

It is against the background of defiance to such a request and its continuance by successive governments of the Republic of Ireland in ignoring the pain and plight of the Omagh families and survivors that has led to their signature on the memorandum of understanding. In a cynical effort to appear to be assisting and co-operating and to alleviate the pressure of the commencement of this Inquiry on themselves, they grasped this opportunity of a fig leaf.

Any analysis of the memorandum of understanding must have the starting point that this Inquiry, by its terms of reference, can only look at, and I quote "whether the Omagh Bombing could have been prevented by UK State authorities."

This limitation is then compounded by a further limitation: the mere commitment of the government of the Republic of Ireland to disclose what it considers to be "potentially relevant materials."

These two limitations make the memorandum redundant. First, because the assessment of relevance is in the power of the Republic of Ireland. Secondly, because it

frequent contact with the RUC about operational matters in and around the period of the Omagh Bombing."

Details as to how frequent this contact was, the nature of the contact, the records of such contact, and the personnel involved, and whether the phrase "in and around the period of the Omagh Bombing" primarily means after the event, among many other details, would all be the sort of ideal sort of inquiry to be made seeking documentary disclosure and cross-examination of witnesses, such as Mr Jennings as part of a parallel Inquiry, if it were to be held in the Republic of Ireland. Such necessary inquisitorial demands cannot be satisfied by the arrangements established under the memorandum of understanding.

Even as to documents, the memorandum entitles the authorities in the Republic of Ireland to act and react only to specific disclosure requests. There is no commitment to carrying out either any general, full or comprehensive search for or any analysis of, documents which may be within the possession of its state authorities and of which this Inquiry might have no knowledge. In fact, under the memorandum of understanding, the authorities in the Republic of Ireland may form the opinion that it is best, in its own interests, not to look for anything at all unless

specifically asked to by this Inquiry.

To add insult to injury, even if inadvertently the existence of a relevant document is made known to this Inquiry and such a document is duly requested, the unilateral power of redaction remains with the government of the Republic of Ireland. This will be applied to all documents as the state authorities of the Republic of Ireland see fit before such documents even cross the border to this Inquiry.

Having regard to the previous experience of the Kingsmill families at their inquest into murders on purely sectarian grounds by Republican terrorists operating from the Republic of Ireland, our clients have no confidence whatsoever in the workings of section 3 of the Criminal Justice International Co-operation Act 2019.

Perhaps one of the most telling statements ever to have been made by the An Garda Siochana was that contained their written submissions to the Smithwick Inquiry. Under paragraph 17 of their written submission they stated:

"The RUC and Northern authorities were not obliged by the Tribunal to comply with Orders for Discovery. As such, they were able to decide themselves what they would disclose and what they could conceal."

Such an attitude and accusation does nothing to

• •

which the Omagh Bombing was not preventable? This is a vast area, in relation to which our clients require the most intense and detailed investigation.

Were the political directions emanating from the governments of both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland such that interference with security measures, installations, surveillance techniques, mobilisation and deployment of manpower and other resources all led to a situation whereby preventability of the Omagh Bombing became an impossibility to a greater or lesser degree?

We wish to know to what extent there was diminishing activity against republican terrorists, lest such activity could disclose the involvement of well-known individuals in the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin, all of which would have been very harmful to the ongoing peace process.

It may be of no small significance that the Intelligence and Security Committee in their annual report of 1997/1998 reporting on 31 July 1998, just days before the Omagh Bombing, stated at paragraph 16, and I quote:

"For the Security Service, the renewed ceasefires in Northern Ireland led directly to a drop of over 5% in the Service allocation of resources to Irish and domestic counter-terrorism work, from 24.8% to an anticipated

suggest that any better self-serving approach would prevail in the provision of assistance to this Inquiry by those authorities in the Republic of Ireland who may have this in mind

Finally, in this regard, it may be of interest that the evidence of the Police Service of Northern Ireland in the recent corporate witness statement provided on its behalf is that the retired former senior officers who assisted with the statement have explained that the realities of the time were that, and I quote:

"... the provision of information by the [An Garda Siochana] to the RUC -- of the type which would allow for pre-emptive operational action by the RUC against subversives -- was very rare ..."

If I can now deal with the political context. The other significant area of concern for the families and injured whom we represent is the political background in the period leading up to the Omagh Bombing. This is part of Inquiry's investigation and will be covered in chapter 5 under the heading: The Peace Process and Security and Normalisation".

At this juncture, our clients have one basic question to pose to this Inquiry: could it be that the peace process, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and the political dynamics thereafter led to circumstances in

19.5% during the course of the year ... Despite the ceasefire and the Good Friday Agreement, there are clearly still elements in Northern Ireland who are intent on using terrorism to further their political aims ..."

I will turn shortly to give a brief and immediate response to the opening statements with which we have been provided from State Core Participants. However, at this stage I am compelled to highlight a most astonishing, shocking and incredible revelation. This is found in the corporate witness statement provided on behalf of the PSNI.

In the course of that statement, reference is made to what are called Security Policy Meetings attended by the Secretary of State and other senior representatives, including the Chief Constable, the General Officer commanding (of the army), the DCI (being the director and co-ordinator of intelligence within the Security Service) and the Permanent Secretary of the Northern Ireland Office.

At paragraph 251 of the witness statement, in response to the Inquiry's request for copies of the agenda, briefing paper and minutes of such meetings, the PSNI states:

"The PSNI has located agendas, briefings and minutes for SPMs for 1996, but none for 1997 and 1998."

The reality of the above statement is as staggering as it is incredible. It is hard to imagine a more high-level set of meetings to discuss security and intelligence considerations and policy touching upon the lives of the citizens in Northern Ireland in the years 1997 and 1998, and yet no record of those meetings has to date been located. Such a revelation only serves to heighten the suspicions and fears of the Omagh families and survivors that there are views to be hidden and information to remain undisclosed, at the highest possible level, for deep-seated, but hugely embarrassing and difficult political reasons.

In dealing briefly with the disclosure and corporate opening statements, evidence chapters 3 to 7 will all require an analysis of policing, security and intelligence information. The families and injured we represent have come to this Inquiry, some with degrees of reluctance, given the passage of time, and the lack of any investigation which is adequate to date by the state authorities either in the UK or in the Republic of Ireland. Within the context of the present Inquiry, an imperative must be that there will be full and OPEN disclosure of material.

A general comment can be made that there is need for as much open material as possible to be disclosed to the

However, that has then to be compared against a further effort in desperation where, at paragraph 79 of the addendum statement, it is said that it cannot even be definitively stated "how often such meetings normally took place."

These are meetings between the highest level of security officials and politicians within Northern Ireland. Such responses to this Inquiry are astonishing and do nothing to inspire confidence. This Inquiry must pursue these matters with all possible diligence, determination and strength. It is wholly unacceptable that the mantra of "hear no evil, see no evil" and that includes "write no evil and keep no evil". I will restrain myself, sir, from alluding to the images which usually accompany such phrases. All I will say is that the families and the injured survivors deserve better. They deserve respect. This Inquiry also deserves better and it deserves respect.

It is also of deep concern to our clients that the corporate witness statements provided on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland now reveal that not only have the most important documentary records of meetings in 1997 and 1998 not been located but, additionally, crucial intelligence documents, some of which have political and security policy development

bereaved families and injured survivors as Core Participants. That should be the starting point and should not be deviated from unless there is clear and compelling reason established with evidence for material to become closed.

We strongly urge you, sir, and this Inquiry, when applying the relevant test, to take a robust approach in support of the interests of the bereaved families and injured survivors and to disclose material or parts of material whenever it is possible to do so. Finely balanced judgments should fall in their favour.

Dealing then with the PSNI corporate witness statements, it was therefore with considerable dismay that we read the corporate witness statement provided on behalf of the PSNI and the addendum thereto. These documents were disclosed by the Inquiry two weeks ago.

I have already highlighted the appalling absence of the documents relating to the security policy meetings for the years 1997 and 1998. That position, however, is made all the more difficult to comprehend when, in the addendum witness statement at paragraph 30, a fallback position is a comment smacking of desperation: that any reports conveyed during higher level meetings, such as the Security Policy Meetings "may or may not have been written."

aspects, also cannot be located. In total, eight categories of documents solely relating to Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom state authorities cannot be located and three additional categories of documentation relating to the RUC and An Garda Siochana cannot be located.

Additionally and regrettably, it appears that this malaise of being unable to locate important documents extends to documents relating to important regular cross-border meetings in the critical period. They are: first, monthly meetings between the Assistant Commissioner for Crime and Security in the An Garda Siochana and the head of Special Branch of the RUC and the Intelligence Management Group. In the corporate statement addendum, it is said in parenthesis as if to portray it as an acceptable aside that, I quote: "The PSNI has not been able to locate the minutes" of any of these meetings.

Secondly, regular Cross-border Senior Officer Meetings, chaired jointly by the Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC and the Deputy Commissioner of the An Garda Siochana. In paragraph 39(b) of the addendum statement it is said, again in parenthesis, that "The PSNI has not been able to locate the minutes" of any of these meetings.

And then, thirdly, meetings between the RUC and any other organisations within the Republic of Ireland. At paragraph 39 of the main corporate statement provided on behalf of the police it is stated, and I quote:

"The PSNI has not located any record of the RUC engaging with any other organisations within the Republic of Ireland with responsibility for gathering intelligence about the activities of those engaged in acts of terrorism, other than [An Garda Siochana]."

Mr Chairman, may I just pause to say this, without further elaboration at this point: a critical question to which this Inquiry may wish to pay particular attention is any contact with the army intelligence services of the Republic of Ireland.

Such a profoundly serious state of affairs as to this asserted absence of documents represents to ourselves a disastrous commencement of the substantive work of this Inquiry and leaves our clients with a distinct lack of confidence and assurance in the co-operation of the State Core Participants, in particular the PSNI.

For ease of reference in addition to the professed absence of any documents from Security Policy Meetings (to which I have already referred), there are seven other categories of documents which also are stated as being unable to be located. We have specifically itemised

hearts of our clients with considerable disquiet and bode ill for the efficacy of the work of the Inquiry, despite its best intentions, in the days ahead.

Could I say, sir, that we welcome the intensity of scrutiny and effort in relation to documents which have been declared as not able to be located from Mr Greaney in his brief opening yesterday. However, proof of the pudding will be in the eating.

We were greatly assisted by the structure of the corporate statements provided on behalf of the PSNI, which included the text of the relevant Rule 9 requests to which a response was being provided. In circumstances where the bereaved family and survivor Core Participants have not separately been provided with, or had visibility of, the Rule 9 requests issued to the State, and organisational Core Participants and the others who may have documents and evidence to give, we welcome this approach and ask that it be adopted by all who provide Rule 9 responses to this Inquiry.

Turning, then, to Sir Ronnie Flanagan's opening statement. Sir Ronnie Flanagan, in his opening statement in paragraph 31, appears to be very concerned about hindsight. He reminds the Inquiry of a quotation from Sir Anthony Hidden QC, a rather apt name in the circumstances, and suggests that there is, I quote: "a

those seven categories in our written opening statement which is available.

However, it is noted in passing (in paragraph 264 of the main corporate statement provided on behalf of the Police Service) that certain documentation relating to the minutes of lesser groups was classified as, I quote, "secret" and "kept either in [Special Branch headquarters] or in the Chief Constable's Office."

All of this is particularly regrettable in light of the criticism of the PSNI years ago in 2010 by Lord MacLean in the Billy Wright Inquiry report. He found the reasons given by the PSNI for failing to disclose information to be unconvincing, inconsistent with the evidence, unsatisfactory, and inadequate. He concluded with concern that there may have been, and I quote "deliberate malpractice" involving -- and again I quote, "The destruction of audit trails and the concealment of evidence which might have been damaging to the reputation of the RUC."

The question is being understandably asked whether anything has changed and why are the Omagh families and survivors being potentially subjected to similar treatment?

In summary, therefore, at this early stage of the Inquiry, these are initial responses which fill the

requirement for an Inquiry to remind itself of the danger of hindsight."

We would suggest that it is not hindsight itself which is dangerous. Instead, it is any wrong interpretation of what hindsight reveals. However, it would appear that the primary danger for this Inquiry might well be not hindsight but the absence of sight of crucial documentation held by State Authorities.

The Secretary of State also made an opening statement and it is disappointing to read a purported summary of the judicial review proceedings in which the decision of Mr Justice Horner is described at paragraph 18, as having been based on the fact that he -- that's a quotation from the opening statement of the Secretary of State: "found that the relatively low bar of plausible argument was made out in relation to four of the ten grounds" of challenge."

The John McBurney Core Participants consider that the plain insinuation being made is that this Inquiry exists only because a low bar was applied in judicial review proceedings. This wrongly, and unfairly, minimises the work of the Inquiry and the weight of the evidence already available to it. Indeed, it is especially bold for such loaded comments to be made in the context of the Secretary of State Core Participant group declining your

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 invitation for concessions to be made, given the 2 substantial time which they (and the other organisational 3 Core Participants) have already had to understand and 4 investigate their role in relation to the Omagh Bombing. 5 In a similar vein, it is hoped that all restriction 6 orders which may be sought will be limited to such 7 materials as can properly be considered sensitive, 8 whether on national security or on other grounds. 9 However, again, the recent approach of the Secretary of 10 State to the redaction of all names of junior civil servants from otherwise relevant material on which a 11 12 ruling has now been given confirming that the Secretary 13 of State's alleged assessment of relevance was erroneous, 14 did little to reassure the John McBurney Core 15 Participants that they will receive the standard of 16 openness, candour and transparency that they can and do 17 expect from State Core Participants. 18

Finally dealing with the Police Ombudsman's opening and corporate statement. On the matter of open and closed materials I wish to mention the approach of the Ombudsman. The Inquiry has recently disclosed a corporate witness statement provided on behalf of the Police Ombudsman. That statement is said to be offered in response to Rule 9 requests from the Inquiry.

The internal headings of the statement make clear

1 in the task which you are about to embark upon and which 2 you have already carried out considerable work, and we 3 hope that there will be positive outcomes and we will be 4 here to assist but also to watch, observe and comment as 5 this Inquiry proceeds. Thank you very much. 6

LORD TURNBULL: Thank you, Mr Kane.

7 MR GREANEY: Sir, could we take a short break, please,

before we hear from Mr Southey.

9 (10.55 am)

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

8

10

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

(A short break)

11 (11.08 am)

MR GREANEY: As I said, we will now hear from Mr Southey. 12

Opening Statement on behalf of the Core Participants

represented by Fox Law by MR SOUTHEY KC

MR SOUTHEY: Chair, this opening statement is made on behalf of the following families who lost their loved ones in the Omagh bomb on Saturday, 15 August 1998 and whom I and the rest of the Fox Law legal team have the privilege to represent.

Michael Gallagher, Patsy Gallagher and Cat Wilkinson, who lost a son and brother, Aiden Gallagher, aged 21. Stanley McCombe, Clive McCombe and Colan McCombe, who lost a wife and mother, Ann McCombe aged 48.

Edith White and Linda White who lost a husband, and father, Fred White, aged 65 and a son and brother, Bryan

that the Rule 9 request had six parts. It is therefore difficult to understand, and disappointing, that the Police Ombudsman considered that the Rule 9 request merited a response in relation to only one of those parts, namely part A, which concerned general background as to the role and functions of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland generally.

The other five parts of the Rule 9 request -- parts B to F -- related to the following important topics: engagement with the Republic of Ireland; knowledge of past attacks; Kevin Fulton; David Rupert; and Other Agent Reporting.

Each of those topics received no substantive response. Instead it was stated:

"This will be addressed within the closed version of my statement."

It seems to our clients difficult to believe that after 26 years there is nothing that could be said about any of these topics on an open basis. Such an approach serves to exclude the bereaved families and survivor Core Participants. The Inquiry should be cautious to guard against any narrow, lazy or obstructive approach by State Core Participants to the disclosure of relevant material, and must ensure that any closed material is minimised.

Sir, those are our opening remarks. We wish you well

White, aged 27.

Michael Monaghan, Patrick Monaghan, Aoibheann Monaghan, Elisha Monaghan, who lost a wife and mother, Avril, aged 30, the daughter and sister, Maura, aged 20 months and Avril's unborn twins.

Michael Doherty, Bernadette Doherty, Amanda Doherty Caoimhe Doherty, Cillian Doherty, Aisling Doherty, Lisa Dylan, Gearoid Doherty, Oisin Doherty, who lost a son and brother, Oran Doherty, aged 8.

John and Patricia McLaughlin, who lost their son, Shaun McLaughlin, aged 12.

Joe Marlow, Bridie Marlow and Nikki Lucas, who lost a daughter and a sister, Jolene Marlow, aged 17.

Victor Barker, who lost his son, James Barker, aged

Bernadette McCrory, Louise McCrory, Colin McCrory and Brian McCrory, who lost a son and father, Brian McCrory,

Jose Abad Esquivel, Paloma Abad Ramos and Ana Abad Ramos, who lost a daughter and a sister, Rocio Abad Ramos, aged 23.

Nuala McGrath, Conor McGrath, Gavin McGrath, Noeleen McGrath and Caragh McGrath, who lost a husband and a father, Sean McGrath, aged 61.

Gareth McCrystal and Rosemary Cooney, who lost a 32

mother and a sister, Geraldine Breslin, aged 43.

Patrick Grimes and Fearghal Grimes who lost their mother, Mary Grimes, aged 66.

Elizabeth Gibson and Caroline Martin, who lost their sister, Esther Gibson, aged 36.

This statement is also on behalf of the following survivors who were injured as a result of this atrocity and who again I, and the rest of the Fox Law legal team, have the privilege to represent.

Donna Marie McGillion, Garry McGillion, Jaime McGlinn, Michelle McCullagh, Suzanne Travis, Mary Christina Kelly, Giles McCourt, Ronan McGrory, Nikki Lucas, Sandy Marcus-Smith and Monica Taggart.

At the outset, it must be clearly stated that there is no doubt who is to blame for the bomb. Responsibility for that atrocity rests firmly with the dissident Republican terrorists who planned, resourced and planted this bomb in the knowledge that it had the potential to cause mass destruction and have such devastating consequences as evidenced during the commemorative hearings. Nothing that follows is intended to suggest that responsibility is shared with anyone other than dissident republican terrorists or that their guilt is mitigated in some way. As was said during the commemorative hearings by Suzanne Travis on 13 February

The sun was shining and in all it was ideal for a summer carnival in Omagh."

That was the statement of Jaime McGlinn.

That joy, essentially, was joy in the knowledge essentially or the belief that there was effective State protection available.

Society's expectations of protection are reflected in the recognition of the importance of the right to life found in Human Rights instruments such as Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That has been said by the European Court of Human Rights:

"... ranks one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, one which, in peace time, admits of no derogation under Article 15 ... it enshrines one of the [most] basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe."

A key aspect of that right to life is the duty imposed on states to provide effective protection such as that found in the judgment of the European Court in

The duty to provide protection is in part made effective by the duty that is imposed on the state to investigate potential breaches of Article 2. That duty gave rise to this Inquiry, as is clear from the judgment of Mr Justice Horner, as he then was. That duty exists

this year, this was a:

"... cowardly, wicked act that took so much away."

However, without in any way wanting to detract from the unqualified statements I've just made, the guilt -- I don't want to detract in any way from the unqualified statements I have just made about the guilt of dissident Republican terrorists. What I've just said does not mean it is not legitimate and important for questions to be raised about possible failings by the State in relation to protection.

In a modern democracy, there will always be, unfortunately, people who seek to disrupt society. Both individuals and society collectively expect the State to protect its citizens from the threat of violence and the risk of harm. That is why the State funds security services such as the police and enacts special powers to enable those services to be effective.

The reality is that nobody would have been in Omagh enjoying a beautiful summer day had there not been an expectation of effective state protection. As described during the commemorative hearings:

"The town was busy and I distinctly recall the chatter of many of the visitors as they conversed in Spanish. There were children running about and the town was expecting the procession of a parade in a short time.

in part, as was held by the Supreme Court or the House of Lords in the Amin judgment because those who have lost their relatives may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from this death may save the lives of others.

These matters demonstrate that it is legitimate for questions to be raised about whether state agencies took steps that we expect them to take to protect and that the law obliges them to take. As Michael Gallagher said to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on 16 March 2009:

"We will not remove the blame from those who are responsible, and that is the Real IRA. They took responsibility for it. They are the people who created an extremely lethal and dangerous situation in Omagh and expected others to deal with it. Our call for an inquiry is not to shift blame from those who rightly should receive that blame, but to see what went wrong and what should be done to put it right."

So what do the families seek? The families wish to put on record, firstly, their gratitude to the Inquiry for the dignified and considered manner in which the commemorative hearings were approached and managed. It highlighted the place of the families and survivors at the centre of the process and demonstrates the importance that they should remain the focus of the Inquiry at each

and every stage. The hearings allowed the families of the deceased to remember their loved ones and convey their loss through their Pen Portraits and for the survivors to tell their experiences and describe the impact that the bomb has had on their lives.

The hearings also provided the first responders with an opportunity to communicate their own experiences of the harrowing situation that they faced and the difficult tasks they had to undertake.

Several themes are clear from the evidence heard during the commemorative hearings. First, it is clear there is a desire for the Inquiry to conduct a thorough and comprehensive review of the circumstances surrounding the Omagh bomb. For example, Paloma Abad Ramos said, on 28 January:

"... learning about the Inquiry has filled us with hope, the hope that a lot of the unanswered questions will finally be dealt with in a thorough and robust manner. The hope that all those who lost loved ones and survived can find out the whole story as to what happened."

Second, one reason why it is important that there is a thorough and comprehensive review of the circumstances surrounding the Omagh bomb is that the families need to heal. For example, Gareth McCrystal said on 30 January:

"[The Inquiry] is about making sure that something as barbaric and heinous as the Omagh bomb is not allowed to happen again. It is about learning lessons and standing up for truth and justice."

Fourthly, it is clear that an extraordinary level of suffering has resulted from the Omagh bomb. For example, you, Chair, said in responding to the evidence of Fearghal Grimes that:

"Mr Fearghal Grimes mentioned the words of the coroner spoken that inquests into the killings, which took place in the year 2000, when the coroner mentioned that he could not recall any one family suffering such a loss in the history of The Troubles. 26 years later those words still resonate as a powerful measure of the extent of the cruelty inflicted upon this family."

These matters demonstrate why it is so important that the Inquiry undertakes its role with rigour, thoroughness and in a manner that has the confidence of the victims and survivors at its heart. An important aspect of this is that the Inquiry does not rule out issues too early. For example, it's important not to rule out issues relating to the warning calls and the response to those calls at this stage for a number of reasons.

First, the victims and survivors argue that there is a need for -- or there was a need rather -- all

" ... people in the wider community have questions that remain outstanding and that they want answers to and I sincerely hope they find the answers. I hope I find the answers I'm looking for and I hope this is a cathartic process for those who involve themselves in it."

Similarly, Nicola Marlow said:

"I hope some people get the closure they need to overcome some of the challenges they have faced in the past 26 years."

In a real sense this may be a last opportunity for a cathartic/healing process. As Donna Marie McGillion said, on 12 February:

"And I'm not too sure that we can keep doing this. I mean, this is really hard. It's really hard to -- you know, you build yourself up in a way where you are -- it's never away but you build yourself up in a way where you're coping and then you have to do this again, and I just don't particularly -- I just can't do this again."

Thirdly, another reason why the victims seek a thorough and comprehensive review of the circumstances surrounding the bomb is consistent with, what I've already said about the judgment in Amin, a desire -- the victims have a desire to prevent repeats of any failures. As Stanley McCombe said on 4 February:

intelligence and information suggesting a threat to be considered by a single body with responsibility for protecting the public. This would have allowed a clear view to be formed of the threat, which may have enabled a more effective response to the warning calls. For example, a recognised codeword was used. There was available intelligence that the time between a bomb warning being given and detonation had been shortened by dissident Republicans. There is a need to investigate and assess if this information about a reduced time to respond (particularly when combined with other intelligence) should have impacted on the response and evacuation procedures implemented on the day of the bomb.

Second, there's a need to investigate what I will describe as differential policing, and what I mean by that is whether the policing of terrorism in Northern Ireland was as effective as that in England.

Preparedness for warning calls is an aspect of this. Did England have more effective procedures to respond to bomb threats?

Third, the army had regularly been called upon during bomb alerts as it possessed a range of expertise, including bomb disposal expertise. However, on 15 August 1998, they were not deployed into Omagh following the warnings being issued. At the

commemorative hearings, Kevin Skelton commented that for every bomb scare up to 14 and after 16 August 1998, the army had been brought onto the streets to clear the town. This raises the question of why the army were not deployed on the day of the bomb and what was the protocol governing their attendance. The victims and survivors submitted that an aspect of preventability is whether the decision not to deploy the army was or should have been influenced by intelligence and other materials suggesting a threat. I will come to that evidence about intelligence later.

Further, in terms of issues that shouldn't be ruled out, although it is accepted that investigation of the bomb is not directly related to preventability, it potentially needs to be considered for the following reasons among others.

Firstly, it may shed light on issues of preventability. For example, it may shed light on the extent to which there were effective mechanisms to ensure that intelligence was shared.

Secondly, it may shed light on the likely approach to the investigation of the prior incidents such as Banbridge.

Finally, it may be relevant to the weight that can be placed on the conclusions of the contemporaneous

Report which details what was said during those calls:

"David Cox, former head of PSNI [Historical Enquiries Team said - they [meaning PSNI intelligence) always gave me a limited version of the truth -- they invariably did not and will not give up information.

"Lord Stevens, [when] referring to the security forces said 'I was misled deliberately, I was criminally obstructed from doing by job by the RUC and the military, whilst MI5 failed to disclose information'.

"Judge Pomerance, Senior Counsel to the Cory Inquiry [said] - 'we could not compel material being provided - others controlled what we received and when and how we received it and the conditions in which we received it. They [meaning] (MI5) made the entire process uncomfortable. The state viewed itself as above the law.

"Mary Laverty, Senior Counsel to Judge Smithwick - said: 'They (the security forces) [meaning the security forces] made it incredibly hard - when will they decide they can reveal the information?""

Moving on from Kenova to the Billy Wright report, that states:

"The evidence which the Inquiry has heard from several witnesses, and the clear indication in the Alpass report of 2000 of the enormous number of hard copy files which were in existence mean that it is very puzzling

investigation.

In light of the matters above, or the matters I have just outlined, although it is accepted that the terms of reference mean that there are limits to what the Inquiry consider, it is the position of the families and survivors who I represent that it is important to the credibility of the Inquiry that issues are only ruled out after a review of the evidence demonstrated that it's clear that there is an evidential basis for ruling the issues out. That evidential basis needs to be explained to the victims and survivors.

One aspect of rigour that is particularly important to the victims and survivors is the need to investigate with care claims that the Inquiry has been provided with full disclosure and full evidence. There is a significant body of material that demonstrates that relevant evidence has been withheld from official investigations in the past. This material includes the interim Kenova report which states, and I quote:

"In advance of my evidence to the [Northern Ireland Affairs Committee] in September 2020, I telephoned a number of my predecessors to inform them that I was giving evidence and to ask if there was anything they might wish me to pass on to the Committee."

I am now about to read out the passage of the Kenova

that the PSNI has been unable to produce any significant hard copy intelligence records from 1997. Where they are; or if and when they were destroyed, remains a mystery."

Finally, the Police Ombudsman report, entitled Investigation by Police of the Murder of Mr Sean Brown on 12 May 1997", states:

"The Box file was not available on 23rd and 24th May 2001, and was formally declared missing on 26th July 2002. The inability of the Police Service of Northern Ireland to produce this document had massive consequences for this investigation."

The experience and learning from these investigations and reports demonstrates a need for the Inquiry to probe with care material provided to it to ensure that it is complete and accurate.

At this early stage of the Inquiry, it is concerning that it is already being indicated on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland that potentially relevant documents connected to the intelligence community, some from the highest level, cannot be located. These include any reports provided by the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; agendas and briefings and minutes of the Security Policy Meetings held in 1997 and 1998,

ry puzzling 25

despite 1996 being available; relevant Northern Ireland Intelligence Reports which had been created by the Assessment Group, part of the Security Service. There are further examples of documents that appear to be missing in the written submissions submitted on behalf of Fox Law.

It is accepted there has never been a successful conviction of anyone in relation to the Omagh bomb. However, in the time since the bomb there have been related criminal trials, civil trials, investigative reports, a judicial review that resulted in this Inquiry. Therefore, given this continual review and assessment, there should be an expectation -- and there is an expectation on the part of victims and survivors -- that all relevant material is available and that any reason proffered for a document being lost or destroyed is fully investigated. The documents I've already identified are all ones that one might expect to have been retained in light of the investigations and reviews.

The victims and survivors who I represent also submit that there should be no delay in the provision of the materials from the State Core Participants. A significant period of time has already passed since proceedings were issued in 2013 challenging the decision of the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland not

relevant documentation.

It is also regretted that there has been little engagement by the State Core Participants with the substantive issues raised by the Inquiry. This means that this opening statement is made without knowledge of the state's position.

Further, at the time this statement is being made, full disclosure and oral evidence is still to be provided. All of these matters have several consequences.

First, in the same way that the victims and survivors expect and believe that the Inquiry should not prejudge matters, the victims and survivors that I represent do not want to prejudge matters.

Second, and in light of the foot point I just made, this opening statement will identify themes and issues that are important to the victims and survivors I represent. However, these submissions cannot be complete. Issues may arise as further evidence is disclosed. It's noted that the Inquiry may provide the opportunity for opening statements at the commencement of some or all of the various chapters. This approach is welcomed given the limited disclosure of material to date.

The matters I have just outlined mean that the 47

to hold a public inquiry and it's been four years since that decision was overturned.

It is the position of the victims and survivors who I represent that state bodies have been on notice since at least 2021 that all relevant documentation would be sought for the purposes of an Article 2 compliant investigation.

The submissions that I have just made are not intended to cast down on the good faith of any current state official. The victims and survivors appreciate the commitments of the State Core Participants to this Inquiry. What the submissions are, however, intended to demonstrate is why the victims and survivors I represent are concerned that the culture of nonco-operation with investigations may need to be challenged and why claims that material cannot be discovered must be examined with care

Can I then turn to the issue of the timing of this opening statement. It is regretted that State Core Participants have concluded they are unable to make any concessions at this stage. In particular, the Secretary of State has been alert to the issues raised since 2013 at the latest in light of the judicial review proceedings. The duty of candour in the judicial review proceedings should have required a full review of the

victims and survivors I represent have not focussed on particular chapters. Instead, what they have sought to do and what I will seek to do going forward is address two things. Firstly, I intend to make some submissions about the overall approach; and, secondly, I intend to identify some themes that perhaps need to be considered.

In terms of the overall approach, there's been reference in written submissions and earlier during this hearing to the need for a holistic approach. When I can make submissions later this morning, I will highlight a number of particular issues and the preliminary issue, list of issues, also identifies a number of issues. That is to some extent inevitable. However, there is a danger in it. While the chapters provide a structure, it is essential not to consider any particular piece of evidence in isolation, but rather to approach the evidence in a holistic manner in order to identify any interconnectedness that may exist. This may prove particularly challenging, we acknowledge, when there will be evidence held in open and closed.

To give an example, though, of how a holistic approach is important, it is important not to assess any particular piece of intelligence in isolation without considering the potential that it could be related to other intelligence information. It is the full picture

that enables an assessment of risk to be conducted.

For example, intelligence may be obtained from an unreliable source. Corroboration for that intelligence may allow an assessment to be reached that it is more reliable than initially appears to be the case.

To use a concrete example of this, the fact that dissidents were carrying out a series of bomb attacks potentially corroborated intelligence showing a desire and intent to carry out further attacks, indicating a risk

The importance of the points that I have just made is clear from evidence heard in a Commission of Inquiry in the Republic of Ireland into the fatal shooting in May 1998 of Ronan McLaughlin in Ashford, County Wicklow. During that hearing a former detective sergeant, now Chief Superintendent Peter Kirwan stated that:

"Operational intelligence involved identifying a picture. The analogy often used is that of a jigsaw; the more pieces of the jigsaw you have, the more discernible the picture. If you have only one piece, it is unlikely you will be able to say whether it's a landscape or a still life. Once that picture is complete, or even if only some of the pieces are available it is disseminated to the relevant superintendents."

Further, when reviewing the response of the state,

Commander was not informed of this call until 15 August 2000, contrary to force order 99/91, which required the Sub-Divisional Commander to be informed immediately when a threat is received. The Ombudsman was firmly of the view that this significant information was not handled corrected.

Even assuming, which is not accepted, that on its own the call could be dismissed, the significance of it is potentially greater when linked with other material, such as that obtained from an agent, Kevin Fulton, suggesting that an attack might being planned. I will come back to Mr Fulton's material later.

This demonstrates two matters need to be considered. Firstly, whether anyone within the state forces was in a position to carry out an assessment of the overall intelligence position and what that said about risk and, secondly, whether the overall intelligence picture required greater action from the state.

Another topic that's already been touched upon is the issue of hindsight. In particular, several of the State Participants warn against applying hindsight. The need to avoid hindsight is particularly important when considering the issue of preventability. The issue that arises, we submit, by reason of Article 2 is not whether the bomb would have actually been prevented by any

it's easy to focus on the conduct of particular officers. By doing that, one risks failing to address the overall response of the state. For example, individual officers may have handled discrete pieces of information appropriately. That, however, does not mean the overall response was effective as there may have been no assessment of the overall picture. That concern about the failure to assess the overall picture is supported by submissions I will make later about the failure to share intelligence.

One example of the need for a holistic approach arises in relation to the handling of the anonymous telephone call that was made on 4 August 1998. It explicitly identified Omagh as a target. The caller spoke for at least ten minutes and stated that an unspecified attack would be made on police on 15 August 1998. Three individuals were named and a fourth referred to by a nickname and two addresses were provided. The caller stated that weapons, including AK 47s and rocket launchers were to be brought on a given date and to be moved from a given address to an unknown address 2 to 3 miles from Omagh.

This call was investigated by the Ombudsman. It was reported that the call was dismissed by Special Branch as a fall out between smugglers. The police Sub-Divisional

particular steps. Such an approach is objectionable as it involves the application of hindsight. The issue that arises, we submit, as a matter of law, based on a judgment of the English Court of Appeal in a case called Sarjantson, is whether there was a real and immediate risk that the state failed to take reasonable steps to address.

Linked to the issue of hindsight, the PSNI opening statement indicates or argues that there is a need to consider other issues and threats the RUC was dealing with. In principle, this is not disputed. However, two matters need to be taken into consideration when considering the other challenges the RUC was dealing with

For reasons that I will come to and probably obvious anyway, this was a time when the security challenges had reduced. This was not a situation when the state was dealing with a sudden unpredictable upsurge in violence.

Second, the UK is obliged to ensure that it has put the resources in place to comply with its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention to provide protection. We refer in relation to that to another judgment of the English Court of Appeal Noorkoiv. Therefore, the issue is not whether the actual resources available to the state could cope with the demands on

them, the issue is whether the state put in place sufficient resources. In this context, it's noted from a report at the time for the Intelligence and Security Committee that it was said:

"For the security services, the renewed ceasefires in Northern Ireland led directly to a drop of over 5 per cent in the Service allocation of resources to Irish and domestic counter-terrorism ..."

Therefore, an issue that potentially arises is whether the resources in fact were adequate to deal with the challenges that continued to be faced in Northern Ireland

That leads on to a topic I want to spend some time on which is the security context at the relevant time.

Obviously, everyone present will be aware that the bomb was planted after the Good Friday Agreement which brought to an end the period which has become known as The Troubles. That is important as it means the bomb was preceded by almost 30 years of terrorist violence. That was so intense at times that what had emerged by 1972 was described by one of the experts in their expert report as being an effective civil war. Although those 30 years were horrific and traumatic for the people of Northern Ireland, they did allow the state to develop powers, resources and experiences that were valuable in

There were attempts to address this complexity, for example, through the Walker Review, but what emerged was, and I quote an:

"unhelpful separation between the intelligence gathering and law enforcement sides of policing in Northern Ireland' and this 'resulted in the routine practice of intelligence not being shared with those investigating Troubles related crimes, on the basis that to share such information would risk exposing where it came from."

The complexities were compounded by the fact that throughout the period of The Troubles, the pursuit of gathering intelligence and the management of agents was not governed by statute but by non-statutory guidance and direction.

At the time of the bomb, RUC Special Branch had lead responsibility for gathering and exploiting intelligence on Republican and terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. It was structured into regions which reported into Special Branch headquarters where units had responsibility for the assessment and dissemination of intelligence. Special Branch, it was said, was of:

"Critical importance in the sphere of intelligence and ran the majority of agents in all terrorist groups."

Special Branch's structure and workings had been

addressing the risks posed by terrorism.

I'm about to address those resources and powers, but before doing it it is important to notice that the Good Friday Agreement meant that the demands placed on those resources and powers were likely to be less than they had been for many years.

Turning first to the resources. Until 2001, and the establishment of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, law enforcement in Northern Ireland had been carried out by the RUC since 1922. However, in 1969, due to the level of civil unrest, the British army were also deployed in Northern Ireland to support the RUC and continued to have a role in the security and protection of the civilian population of Northern Ireland until the period of normalisation after the Good Friday Agreement.

While the structure of law enforcement was at all material times relatively clear, the responsibility for intelligence gathering was more complex. That, in part, reflected history. In a 2002 briefing paper of the Security Service, it was said:

"The complex intelligence machinery in Northern Ireland was grown out of the history of security emergencies and the different, complimentary and supportive roles played in them over the years by the intelligence agencies and the security forces."

reviewed in 1996 by Sir Gerald Warner as a result of concerns raised by the UK Government about its operations. The implementation of that review had also been reviewed. That has two implications.

Firstly, there should have been no structural reason why intelligence was not handled effectively by the RUC at the time of the Omagh bomb.

Secondly, findings of other investigations and inquiries touching on the workings of Special Branch, such as Kenova Inquiry that considered the period before Warner, need to be viewed with caution.

Despite the RUC's role at the time of the bomb, at the commencement of The Troubles the RUC was not in a position to lead intelligence collection, which prompted the British Army to intervene and forced it and other intelligence agencies to take the lead in obtaining their own intelligence. This resulted in a multitude of intelligence units from military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies all becoming involved and undertaking substantial roles. It has been reported that the organisational landscape with responsibility for intelligence gathering included some 20 units that formed or evolved between 1969 and 1983.

While the British Army acted in support of the RUC, it was also involved in many aspects of intelligence,

including the recruitment and handling of agents through various units, including the force representation unit, which operated with the headquarters and four regional units.

"The ... role of the FRU was explained by a former Commanding Officer as being ... to obtain intelligence from secretly penetrating terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland by recruiting and running agents and informants. The role is vital to counter terrorist operations because only the 'inside knowledge' can lead to a true understanding of the terrorists and their intention "

Similarly, 14 Intelligence Company played a role in gathering intelligence.

In addition, the Security Service MI5, the security intelligence service and Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ, also played a role in intelligence gathering. These services are high quality and have played an important role in disrupting intelligence.

For example, MI5's website states:

"Despite devastating bomb attacks on the Baltic Exchange and NatWest Tower, PIRA failed to achieve its aim. A Whitehall report commented 'Only a combination of good intelligence, good policing and good luck prevented several more incidents of such scale'. Among other

their handlers within the intelligence community.

The running of agents has been viewed in Northern Ireland as, and I quote:

"One of the most effective methods by which the security forces could frustrate terrorist activity and save lives."

And that, and again I quote:

"The most valuable agents during The Troubles were undoubtedly those positioned deep within the terrorist groups themselves."

The state did not merely receive information from its own resources. Material was also received from the Republic of Ireland. In 1998, in the Republic of Ireland, the Crime and Security Branch was responsible for the National Surveillance Unit and the intelligence service within the Garda. While it worked within the Garda structures, the NSU was a covert intelligence-gathering unit which conducted its work separately. In 1998, most NSU duties involved following suspected members of terrorist organisations with team leaders compiling a daily report after each tour of duty which were entered into a ledger.

The function of the intelligence service was to analyse information and intelligence about national security issues which was received from various sources,

counter-terrorism successes was Operation AIRLINES which, in the summer of 1996, defeated a well-planned PIRA attempt to disrupt the whole of Greater London's electricity supply."

It may be of some significance that the highlighted successes appear related to London, as already noted, a significant issue is whether a differential and inferior approach was adopted to terrorism in Northern Ireland.

With particular reference to GCHQ, it is known that they had the capacity and expertise to use electronic monitoring to track electronic devices and listen to telephone calls, and that the legislation would have allowed for the collection of that information, whether or not it was inside or outside the United Kingdom.

When I am come to some submissions about legal powers it demonstrates that there does not appear to have been any effective restrictions on that material being passed to the police if it was in furtherance of GCHQ's functions and could be justified on the grounds of national security or to protect against a threat of a terrorist attack.

One particular feature of the state's response to The Troubles was the use of agents such as Kevin Fulton and David Rupert who had infiltrated terrorist organisations and were gathering intelligence to communicate back to

including the NSU. National security in this context largely referred to counter-terrorism policing or policing of any group which threatened the state.

The emergency response unit, which operated under the umbrella of the Special Detective Unit, also worked closely with the NSU in 1998 and had responsibility for counter-terrorism work. As a general rule, and this is a quote:

"NSU stayed in the background as an undercover unit, while the ERU was called in if there was a need to intercept or interrupt potential offences, or to make arrests."

The ERU was, as I've just made clear, used as a front line or intervention unit and was established to combat armed crime and many of their operations in the late 1990s were counter-terrorist operations. However, the ERU did not generally have access to intelligence files.

All of this demonstrates that the Garda had plainly had the capacity to gather valuable intelligence. For example, it is reported that Garda intelligence maintained an internal report containing the names and addresses of those believed to hold senior positions within the IRA.

The issue of the effectiveness of cross-border co-operation in relation to intelligence will be

something I return to.

Overall, though, at this stage I want to make clear that there is evidence of the effectiveness of intelligence gathering by the state. For example, as already noted, intelligence operations had successes. One example that you have already heard about was Operation Airlines. Another example of intelligence gathering being valuable relates to the Canary Wharf bomb. The Canary Wharf bomb is highlighted as an example of cross-border co-operation. However, it is - and I will come back to this - unfortunately the case that it appears that cross-border co-operation may not always have been as effective as might have been hoped.

The matters that I have just outlined I have outlined to demonstrate that within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland there were an exceptional level of resources available to protect the public from terrorism. However, the resources, particularly those in relation to intelligence, were distributed across a number of organisations and units. That, we submit, inherently undermined the ability of any organisation to form an overall picture of the risks posed and the action required as a result of that risk. That, we submit, is an important issue for the Inquiry to investigate.

Turning, then, to the legal powers available to the

exceptional powers to use against suspected terrorists. In summary, these included the following: the powers to initiate a road check; powers to wholly or partially close a road; powers to stop a person for so long as necessary for the purpose of ascertaining that person's identity or involvement or movements or their knowledge of any recent explosion or any other recent incident concerning life or injury to life; to stop and search a personal vehicle if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the presence of stolen or prohibited articles; or to stop and search anyone who appeared to be liable for arrest in relation to terrorism; to enter and search premises under warrant or without a warrant; to arrest without a warrant and detain a person initially for 48 hours with a further extension of five days.

John Wadham, in his expert report, makes clear that these policing powers were exceptional. He states that the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 gave the police and the army exceptional powers to use against suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland.

These Acts provided police officers and others with a wide remit to use their already significant powers under Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to disrupt, question, search and arrest those

security services and security forces at the time of the bomb. Since the origins of The Troubles with the continuing and developing methods of terrorist activities that followed, there was a requirement to ensure that appropriate legal authorities were available to the state authorities in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As John Wadham has set in his expert report these were

"... to seek to keep under surveillance, prevent or disrupt and/or detect the activities of those suspected of being engaged in the planning of and/or the preparation for and/or the carrying out a terrorist attack."

At the time of the Omagh bomb, the most important legislation was the Northern Ireland Emergency Powers Act 1996 which encompassed most of the powers included in earlier emergencies legislation of 1973, 1978 and 1991. In addition, powers were found in the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 which preserved most of the powers for the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 which applied throughout the United Kingdom.

The 1989 Order and the 1989 and 1996 Acts provided the police and, in some instances, the army with

suspected of acts of terrorism.

These Acts also created a number of special substantive criminal offences, including wearing uniforms and possessing information or articles where there was only suspicion that they were possessed for terrorist purposes. Those extensive wide-ranging substantive offences extended the range of all of the other policing powers because the threshold for their use was based on the investigation of criminal activity.

Further, while police powers would now be constrained by the Human Rights Act 1998 so that wide powers of detention would be restricted, as is demonstrated by the case of *Beghal v United Kingdom*, this was not true at the time of the bomb.

The powers available were not restricted to those relating to the policing of suspects. There was also a wide range of the steps that could be taken to gather intelligence. According to the report prepared by John Wadham, covert investigations by law enforcement agencies were largely unregulated and could have included:

"... the surveillance of suspects or others; following a person or observing their movements or tracking them using electronic devices or by the collection of geographic telephone cell site data (subject to that being technically possible); listening

to conversations using listening devices placed in homes, buildings and vehicles; collecting data about telephone calls from telecom suppliers; accessing the content of emails and other messages (at least by accessing the computer terminal); watching or recording computer or other devices' keystrokes, (subject to that being technically possible); using covert human intelligence sources, [in other words] (informers and undercover agents)."

The bomb occurred prior to the enactment of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which now regulates surveillance in the United Kingdom. Therefore, in 1997 and 1998, in the absence of legislation there were no general restrictions regarding the use of surveillance by law enforcement agencies. Some restrictions did exist for MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service, and GCHQ. Telephone interception and property interference were two techniques that were regulated for all law enforcement agencies.

In relation to the interception of telecommunications, there were restrictions, but a warrant could be obtained from the Secretary of State for the required interception to be initiated with the provision applying equally to calls made from public telephone boxes or from an individual's home phone.

and/or damage another person's property. These are further powers that could be used to obtain intelligence.

At the time of the bomb, an individual's right to privacy would have been considered very weak under common law. That was significant as the Human Rights Act had not come into force. In many situations, the law would not have prevented most activities regarding law enforcement because simply their activities would not have been deemed unlawful. The courts had previously decided in a case that there was no right to privacy in law, including any particular right of privacy in relation to telephone calls.

Therefore, it appears that during the time leading up to the Omagh bomb in 1997 and 1998, there were few protections or controls on surveillance and that the real limitations were not legal or regulatory, but rather technical or scientific limitations at the time.

The key points about the powers I've just been outlining are: firstly, many of these powers appear to be exceptional powers directed at the challenges posed by terrorism in Northern Ireland. That is demonstrated by the name of the legislation and the fact that equivalent powers were not enacted in England.

Secondly, although no legislative scheme can eliminate the threat of terrorism, the experience

While the Interception of Communication Act 1985 created a number of safeguards, there were also allegations made that between 1990 and 1997 GCHQ was intercepting all telephone traffic from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland.

There were restrictions in relation to the passing on of information about the existence of intercepts or the material derived from those intercepts, but this did not include a recording that took place in a telephone box and that which could have been relevant in the Omagh bomb when one considers the content of the cell site analysis.

Furthermore, those restrictions on sharing the product of the interceptions did not apply where the disclosure was necessary for the purposes set out in section 2(2) of the 1985 Act which included national security, preventing or detecting serious crime, or safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Essentially, this could well have allowed the product of an intercept to be shared with any law enforcement agency when necessary to prevent terrorism.

Law enforcement agencies would have had access to public and private CCTV systems and automatic number plate recognition camera systems.

The Police and Intelligence Service could have been authorised by the Secretary of State to trespass on land

gathered by The Troubles is likely to mean that the state had all powers that it needed and that were consistent with human rights, with the human rights of the civilian

population.

Thirdly, these powers potentially enabled significant steps to be taken to disrupt terrorism. For example,

suspect terrorists could be repeatedly stopped to both make it clear they were of interest and also to potentially obtain intelligence regarding that person's movements and their associates.

Finally, the powers also potentially enabled significant steps to be taken to gather intelligence. Indeed, as already noted, intelligence gathering was a key part of the state's response to The Troubles.

The knowledge and experience gathered and developed by the British intelligence services has been well documented. To quote one author:

"... the British tried almost every conceivable form of emergency power to quell the violence in Northern Ireland over [the] 30-year period."

Having considered the state powers, can I then go on to the -- and addressed them as part of the context, can I go on to the political context.

**LORD TURNBULL:** Mr Southey, it will be important for us to take a break for the assistance of the stenographer,

apart from anything else. You are just about to touch on
 your next heading. You have been speaking for an hour.
 Would this be a suitable point to break?
 MR SOUTHEY: This would be a very suitable moment.
 LORD TURNBULL: We will take a short break at this stage.
 (12.06 pm)

(A short break)

8 (12.24 pm)

MR SOUTHEY: When we broke, I'd concluded some submissions about the security context and I was looking to move on to the political context. Certainly the victims and survivors that I represent would submit the political context is relevant for at least three reasons. Firstly, we submit it is possible that politics had an influence on security activities. In simple terms, there is a concern that the need to promote a narrative of peace may have resulted in a light touch being adopted to terrorist activity.

Equally, it's possible that intelligence did or should have had an influence on political decisions. For example, intelligence did or should have had an influence on the security resources deployed in Northern Ireland.

Finally, the peace process certainly did cause the number of people engaged in terrorism to reduce. That may have meant that it was easier to act against those

Northern Ireland most weeks during the relevant period to discuss security and political issues. He attended the most important strategic security meetings, some of which were chaired by the Secretary of State and included the military General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, to include the Province Executive Committee ... and Security Policy Meetings. From these meetings strategic decisions in respect of the approach to security issues cascaded down through the hierarchy of committees for implementation."

As the brief for the Chief Constable was prepared by Special Branch, Special Branch also had an input at the highest possible levels in terms of the government of Northern Ireland.

The Security Service was also a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee within the government's Cabinet Office which is and was responsible for intelligence assessment and co-ordination within the United Kingdom. While it's not known if there is or was a specific Joint Intelligence Committee subcommittee for Northern Ireland in 1998, it is known that the security service operated an assessments group in Northern Ireland and they were responsible for receiving intelligence from Special Branch, the Security Service and the FRU and using it to produce intelligence reports and assessments for the

still involved in terrorism.

The potential for political influence on security decisions and vice versa is clear from the fact that there were clear formal organisational ties between the state's political decision-makers and the security forces.

After direct rule was introduced in 1972, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had constitutional responsibility for the administration of law and order. The Northern Ireland Office advised government ministers on security policy issues, including legal and resourcing issues and information strategy. The Secretary of State was supported by the Northern Ireland's Permanent Secretary and three primary security advisers: these were the Chief Constable of the RUC, the General Officer commanding the army, and the director and co-ordinator of Intelligence, a senior officer within the Security Services.

There were Security Policy Meetings between these people which were described as the most important meeting. Some sense of the frequency of the contact between the Secretary of State and the Chief Constable can be obtained from the opening statement of Sir Ronnie Flanagan which appears to accept that, and I quote:

"Sir Ronnie met with the Secretary of State for

intelligent community and the Government of Northern Ireland.

Within Special Branch, the Intelligence Management Group formed in 1997 was a central point responsible for collating, analysing and distributing intelligence and ensuring it was passed on to the assessments groups.

The director and co-ordinator of intelligence who was based in Stormont, but also had representation in RUC HQ and army headquarters, was concerned with the provision of an intelligence reporting service to ministers and officials in the Northern Ireland office and in Whitehall primarily through reports prepared by his staff in the assessment group. The DCI also chaired the weekly Intelligence Review Committee meetings which were considered strategic -- which considered strategic intelligence requirements and priorities and was attended by senior representatives of the assessments group, Special Branch and the army.

At the material time, obviously the most significant political development was the Good Friday Agreement.

Unlike other atrocities, the bomb occurred after the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998. The Good Friday Agreement was obviously endorsed overwhelmingly by the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland who were pursuit of a peaceful society. As a

consequence, the bomb can be viewed as distinct from The Troubles. However, The Troubles are obviously part of its background.

During The Troubles, the Provisional IRA had engaged in a campaign of violence with a goal of achieving a united Ireland and removing any involvement in Britain in Northern Ireland. However, in 1993, meetings commenced between the SDLP leader, John Hume, and the leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, in an effort to bring an end to Provisional IRA violence with the focus on achieving a political solution.

The talks were criticised, but there was also confirmation that secret talks had taken place between the British government and Sinn Féin. In December 1993, the British and Irish governments issued a joint statement which became known as the Downing Street Declaration which initiated a peace process around the principle of self-determination. This initiative ultimately resulted in the IRA declaring a ceasefire on 31 August 1994 with a complete cessation of military operations and the belief that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement has been created and urging "everyone to approach this new situation with energy, determination and patience".

The declaration of a ceasefire by the combined

April 1997 and shot dead two police officers in Lurgan on 16 June 1997.

While a ceasefire was subsequently called by the IRA on 20 July 1997, the matters already highlighted, along with divisions within unionism, Loyalist terrorist activities and dissident Republican activity, clearly highlight the fragility of the peace process around that time, which continued after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.

The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 and, as I've already said, was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the people of Northern Ireland. However, a significant minority of the people of Northern Ireland subsequently did vote against the Good Friday Agreement and issues remained outstanding, particularly around the issue of decommissioning.

The IRA issued a statement on 30 April 1998 in relation to the Good Friday Agreement and decommissioning which stated that the Good Friday Agreement:

"falls short of presenting a solid basis for a lasting settlement".

And which also stated:

"Let us make it clear that there will be no decommissioning by the IRA."

The issue of decommissioning continued to cause

Loyalist military command followed on 13 October 1994 which described "a new and exciting beginning with our battles in future being political battles".

However, the peace process encountered a number of issues with a particular deadlock ensuing over the issue of decommissioning of weapons which resulted in both governments agreeing a twin-track approach in order to make parallel progress on the issue of decommissioning and on all-party negotiations.

The issues with the peace process resulted in the IRA exploding a bomb in the Docklands area of London, killing two people and causing injury to others, which marked the end of the ceasefire. Despite this development, however, political discussions and efforts continued and multiparty talks, the Mitchell talks, commenced on 10 June 1996.

In the intervening period, however, prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the IRA exploded a bomb in Manchester, injury 20 people, that was on 15 June 1996, exploded two bombs in the British Army headquarters in Lisburn on 7 October 1996, shot dead a British soldier in Bessbrook on 12 February 1997, caused widespread disruption on motorways in England with bomb warnings on 3 April 1997, issued bomb treats which forced the postponement of the Grand National horse race on 5

issues after the bomb. The history set out above demonstrates the need to -- demonstrates that the need to effectively police, deter and disrupt terrorism and the terrorist threat continued despite the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement was fragile at the date of the bomb. In addition, as is considered in greater detail later in my submissions, there remained opponents of peace, some of those who were willing to engage in violence.

Although the fragility of the Good Friday Agreement meant, in our submission, there was a need to maintain the security response to the IRA, there is also evidence that suggests that the security response was, in fact, relaxed. Mr Norman Baxter a former RUC Detective Chief Superintendent stated in his evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee:

"In the post-1998 settlement, there was a drive by the Northern Ireland Office to ensure that security was reduced in certain areas and, as a serving police officer, I was aware that that was happening, so we had Cloghogue and other border checkpoints where the soldiers were moved off the road, not stopping cars. We had soldiers not allowed to patrol areas. The security policy was a failure and these people were coming freely into Northern Ireland and carrying out attacks."

He also stated that the Government had their eye off the ball.

In light of the matters above, a key issue was whether there was a decision to relax security that was inappropriate and contributed to the bomb. There is a linked issue as to whether any flawed decision was political. Mr Baxter expressly stated in his evidence that:

"I am saying that you would have to be naive to believe that the Secretary of State and his officials, or her officials, in the past did not directly intervene in policing."

The concern that politicians may have influenced security decisions is consistent with the evidence regarding demilitarisation. Mr Baxter stated that he was at meetings when commanders were disputing with their senior officers about the removal of troops from areas because they felt it was leaving people vulnerable. Similarly, the former Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, said in the context of demilitarisation and the reduction/removal of army patrols, that "he could not be seen to be working to an overt political agenda involving decommissioning for de-escalation, although he recognised that [no-one] 'is working in a vacuum and there is a wider political context'."

by Sinn Féin to discontinue its abstentionist policy from taking seats in Dáil Éireann.

This has been referred to as very much an uneven split with the new Adams-McGuinness leadership bringing the vast majority of Republicans with them and which would go on to lead the provisional politicisation process into the peace process. A key point about this split is that it didn't demonstrate how any engagement with democratic processes risk dissent among those committed to armed conflict.

The Provisional IRA leadership retained significant support at this time and the Continuity IRA did not have the capabilities to threaten its position and faced obstacles in attaining any weaponry for any serious arming campaign. It was not until the mid-1990s that the continuity IRA were able to mount any paramilitary offensive.

A more significant split occurred in 1997 with the formation of the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Committee. Although the IRA convention in Gweedore, Donegal, in October 1997 is regarded as the formal point of the split, it is generally accepted that the origins of the divergence had actually commenced around the time of the first IRA ceasefire with a growing discontentment by some members of their involvement in the peace

Linked into this, the history of violence in the context of The Troubles set out that I've just described suggests that there may have been greater tolerance of terrorism than that found in other jurisdictions. The Inquiry has identified a significant number of incidents that preceded the bomb. The legitimate question to ask is whether a more intensive police response would have followed an equivalent pattern of violence in England.

One feature of the political context was dissident Republicans. As part of the peace process the political parties committed to, adhered to, what were known as the Mitchell Principles while participating in talks which included a commitment to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues. This resulted in Republican and loyalist organisations entering into periods of ceasefires, as I've already described. In principle, however, while the Good Friday Agreement then cemented the peace process, there remained those who opposed the process.

There has been a history of splits within republicanism and in particular within armed republican groups. In particular, splits occurred over participation in democratic processes. For example, an important split occurred in 1986 with the formation of Republican Sinn Féin and Continuity IRA over the decision

process. This discontentment had resulted from the belief that the negotiations were not progressing the Republican cause while the British government were standing firm on the need for decommissioning and the IRA executive were being excluded from the process.

However, ultimately it was the endorsement of the Mitchell Principles that was viewed by some members within the IRA executive as unconstitutional and could be considered as accepting the legitimacy of the Northern Irish state and if they were to sign up to disarmament process, there would be no opening for them to return to the armed struggle.

Following the IRA convention, five members of the IRA executive subsequently resigned. Michael McKevitt, Seamus McGrane, Liam Campbell, Frank McGuinness, whose true identity is unknown, and Pascal Burke. They went on to form the Real IRA.

While the split also saw the establishment of the 32 Sovereignty Committee, it was the division within the paramilitary wing of the provisional Republican movement that was most significant. However, it was not a major split in terms of the number of members leaving the provisionals as the vast majority remained within the Adams-McGuinness leadership.

While only a small number left the Provisional IRA, 80

the majority of the Real IRA membership came from within the quartermaster and engineering departments. This included the Belfast and southern command's quarter masters with many of those joining being from the border counties. Their existing skill set and expertise enabled them to launch a near immediate paramilitary campaign.

In particular, in his role as Quartermaster General, McKevitt had control and access to the Provisional IRA's explosives, artillery and weaponry for 14 years. As a result, the Real IRA were able to obtain a small number of small arms, a small amount of Semtex alongside detonators and timing devices. Included within these weapons were IRECO detonators like the one used in the Omagh bomb.

In their paramilitary campaign, the Real IRA Council followed the direction proposed by Liam Campbell. That was to the focus on the use of car bombs against commercial premises for the purpose of disrupting and putting pressure on the peace process. This was intended to make it difficult for Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA and unionists to remain within talks. In light of the small numbers within the Real IRA and the powers and capacity of the state, there is every reason to believe that the state forces will have known who was playing an active role within the Real IRA and their intention and

dissident Republicans, the Smithwick Tribunal refers to the active surveillance of Michael McKevitt by the Garda going back as far as 1990 through intercepted telephone conversations.

Fourth, a surveillance operation by the NSU had targeted Pascal Burke which resulted in his arrest in May 1998 following a foiled attempt at a robbery of a Securicor van. He had previous convictions for explosive offences. He was known to the Garda as an engineer, having been involved in the explosives department of the Provisional IRA. Mr Burke was among a number of people, but he was by no means the most important target of the Garda.

Fifth, David Rupert was initially recruited by the FBI and later became an agent for the British Secret Security Services in 1997. He was jointly operated and managed by both organisations at the time of the bomb. Over a period of time, he had infiltrated dissident Republicans at leadership level within the organisations. During the trial of McKevitt, David Rupert gave evidence as the main prosecution witness. He stated that he had met McKevitt and other Republicans such, as Michael Donnelly, Phil Kent, Seamus McGrane in Monaghan, and that the Omagh bombing had been discussed.

Sixth, the Garda also appears to have developed

capacity to cause serious violence.

That submission is supported by a number of items of evidence. Firstly, during a meeting on 16 August 1998 between Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and Prime Minister Tony Blair following the bomb, the Taoiseach stated that:

"Putting matters in context, the Taoiseach said those in the splinter group numbered perhaps 90 in all, including those who stole cars, did lookout, etc.

Perhaps only a third or less were dangerous activists."

Secondly, during a telephone conversation on 20 August 1998 between Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and Prime Minister Tony Blair following the bomb, Taoiseach stated in relation to 32 Sovereignty Committee:

"I think we can break the 32 County totally ... I think we can disintegrate them. There might remain a little kind of a political group talking about stuff, but I think the militant end of it, we can break it."

In relation to Continuity IRA, the Taoiseach stated:

"... now I'm trying to make some overtures to them, they're not that significant, as I told you before, ...
I'd just be afraid that the rump might move to them ...
because the rump will move somewhere but if we can ...
keep hunting the rump ... I think we're having major hits
if we just keep at it."

Thirdly, as another example of the knowledge of

intelligence regarding the Real IRA. It is known that the NSU of the Garda had been developing intelligence on the Real IRA since the end of 1997. There were obvious reasons for the Garda to gather this intelligence. For example, there is evidence that after the Good Friday Agreement in relation to the Real IRA there was real concern within the Irish state and even indeed within the IRA who were on the ceasefire as to who was leaking to this new organisation.

Further evidence from a Garda stated that:

"... this embryonic group did not appear to have defined political objectives, but wanted to commit 'some kind of terrorist outrage' as he put it, as soon as possible."

Seventh, the Garda placed tracking devices on two vans in 1998 which it was believed were going to be used by the Real IRA with the speculation that explosives were involved. That was because there had been two previous incidents involving car bombs in April in Dun Laoghaire and Dundalk.

Eighth, according to his evidence to the Smithwick Tribunal, Kevin Fulton enlisted in the British Army in 1979 and was recruited by British Army intelligence. It was arranged that he would be falsely discharged from the Royal Irish Rangers. When he returned to Northern

Ireland, he worked for the FRU and continued to work for army intelligence until early 1990 and was jointly handled by MI5. In his evidence, he stated that while he worked for Special Branch -- while he never worked for Special Branch, he sometimes attended these meetings.

As noted elsewhere, Kevin Fulton provided intelligence that may have been relevant to the bomb.

All of these matters demonstrate that there was clear state intelligence regarding the activities of the Real

In light of the matters that I have just described about the overall context, it is submitted that there is every reason to believe that the state's resources enabled it to know that there was a serious risk of attacks by dissident Republicans and the identity of the individuals who posed that risk.

Further, the state and the powers to disrupt those individuals. Whether this is correct is obviously a matter that will need to be considered when the evidence is reviewed. However, if it is correct, it raises very important questions regarding why there was a failure to disrupt the bombers. The overlap between the political elements of the state and the security forces means that both parts of the state must be considered. That is the context in which what follows should be viewed.

"The relationship between the FRU and the RUC sometimes lacked co-ordination and clarity. This confusion was exacerbated by institutional rivalry between the different organisations and parts of the intelligence community. This rivalry became most apparent in the often strained relationship between the FRU and the RUC Special Branch."

In addition, MI5 at that time operated only a small number of agents and only sought to recruit agents who could provide strategic intelligence about threats against Great Britain and British interests overseas.

MI5 provided technical support to the RUC, but the RUC owned the intelligence produced, whether strategic or tactical, and controlled its exploitation and dissemination.

In the superior provision in the intelligence network, while running its own agents and collecting information from external agencies, the RUC was responsible for determining what, if any, action should be taken as a result of the information received and therefore assumed a degree of primacy in matters of intelligence. However, it would appear unclear whether any part of the RUC was charged with undertaking overarching assessment of intelligence or assessing what actions needed to be taken to protect the public.

What follows is a list of areas where there may have been failures. For the reasons already given, it is not comprehensive and obviously no final conclusions regarding these issues can be reached at this stage.

The first of these issues is intelligence sharing.

As I've already mentioned, there was a complex intelligence machinery in Northern Ireland. The lead for intelligence in relation to Irish Republican

Paramilitaries was Special Branch, although this was not without difficulties even within the RUC as the CID also had collectors of intelligence and issues arose about the exchange of this information and that resulted in, as I've already mentioned, the review by Sir Patrick Walker.

The PSNI corporate statement appears to recognise that CID intelligence gathering continued at the time of the bomb, albeit it was focussed largely on non-terrorist crime.

In addition, as I've already set out, the army had developed its own intelligence capacities, including the recruitment of running agents, which, from 1982, had been centralised into the FRU. Many in the RUC believed there was no requirement for the army to have its own intelligence gathering operation which perhaps contributed to a difficult relationship as highlighted in the Kenova Report. I quote:

Therefore, this would appear to suggest that there were silos of information within the RUC and the intelligence community rather than a cohesive and co-ordinated approach that would allow for consistent gathering, assessment and sharing of intelligence.

I've already made submissions that there is every reason to believe that intelligence was being gathered in relation to key dissidents associated with the bomb. Specific intelligence may include, firstly, the intelligence provided by Kevin Fulton, which was considered to be of such significance that the Police Ombudsman carried out an investigation into the information that he provided. The Police Ombudsman was satisfied that Mr Fulton was a reliable source and that he had passed information on to the police on five occasions between June and August 1998 and that contact sheets for each meeting were passed on to Special Branch. Notably, the information provided by Fulton included intelligence on 12 August that the Real IRA was to move something north over the next few days.

Secondly, there are allegations regarding the conduct of Garda officers that have been identified in the work of the Police Ombudsman. Paddy Dixon was providing intelligence in the Republic of Ireland to the Garda claiming that he provided cars to dissident Republicans

for the purposes of the bombings. This information provided to Detective John White enabled the Garda to intercept cars containing bomb equipment which were destined for Northern Ireland.

Third, the BBC and Daily Telegraph had published allegations that GCHQ had monitored mobile telephone conversations on the day of the bombing live and that at least one phone had been monitored from at least July 1998.

Fourth, there is evidence of an intelligence gathering operation in the South Armagh border area as reported in the 2014 report of the Police Ombudsman.

Mr Baxter gave evidence also supporting this when he gave evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee.

Fifth, there is evidence of anonymous phone call being made to the Omagh police station on 4 August 1998 stating that an attack would take place in Omagh on 15 August 1998.

Finally, there have been emails obtained that demonstrate that David Rupert was supplying relevant intelligence in advance of the bombing.

This material would therefore appear to have been gathered by different parts of the police and the security services that were managing their own intelligence sources. For example, David Rupert was

understanding of the language which emanates from intelligence community. People within the intelligence and investigation community speak in term of information, intelligence and evidence, and in respect of those three things they are distinctly different from a professional's perspective. Information is regarded as almost raw data which is received. Intelligence is information which is analysed and produces what is known as intelligent product, which can either be predictive which forecasts something which may happen, or reflective, which helps investigators deal with something in the past. Evidence is the translation of information through witnesses and documents to something which can be placed before the court.

"I would have to say to the committee that when statements are made that all intelligence has been passed to the police, it cannot be assumed, nor is it the case, that all information has been passed to the police because the information that is used to develop the intelligence which has been discarded as of no intelligence value will not be disseminated, and information which has formed part of the intelligence part will also not accompany the intelligence part. So when people speak about 'all' intelligence being shared, that is not declaring or stating everything has been

handled by MI5 and the FBI, Kevin Fulton, after initially being recruited by army intelligence was jointly handled by MI5 and with Special Branch sometimes attending his briefings. He then worked for RUC CID. All of this raises questions about whether intelligence was being shared so that an overall picture could be developed. The existence of multiple bodies collating and disseminating intelligence supports the points already made

There was, we submit, a risk of silos. Three points support these concerns. First, as I will come to later, there were no rules or guidance gathering (sic) the handling of intelligence. As a result, it appears clear that individual officers and units of the security forces had considerable discretion as to how to handle intelligence. It would appear that there may have been no expectation of intelligence sharing.

Secondly, as I will come to later, there have clearly been issues with record-keeping. That made it and makes it and made in the past more difficult to hold people to account for a failure to share intelligence.

Finally, when giving evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Mr Baxter made the following opening comments in relation to the sharing of intelligence:

"... I think there has been a blurring of

shared. From a police investigator's [point of view], investigators try to turn information into evidence, not intelligence into evidence. Intelligence should point investigators to where information which can be translated into evidence can be found."

It should be noted that this evidence supports the submission that claims by state parties to have provided full material to the Inquiry should be viewed with caution.

So far these submissions have focused on intelligence sharing within the state authorities operating within Northern Ireland. However, the problems with intelligence sharing were obviously enhanced by the need to ensure intelligence was shared cross-border. Following the Omagh bomb, the Taoiseach stated in relation to co-operation between the Garda and the RUC:

"The big problem with me trying to get these two, the Guards and the RUC, to co-operate on the ground is that there is all these old bits on trust ..."

PSNI's corporate statement states:

"... the provision of information by the An Garda Siochana to the RUC -- of the type which would allow for pre-emptive operational action by RUC against subversives -- was very rare. However, this improved after the Omagh bombing."

I will return to the issue of cross-border co-operation later.

The submissions that I have just made about the importance of linking intelligence raises concerns that are relevant on the facts. There is reason to believe that relevant information or, rather, material relevant to the bomb was not shared. First, it is known that David Rupert sent an email dated 11 April 1998 to MI5 which identified Omagh as a potential target. It said:

"Since he is involved with the present operation we are speaking of and last known location of the car (Letterkenny) Derry or Omagh would be two suspect viable targets."

While this intelligence may not have been of the greatest significance on its own, the suggestion that Omagh might be a target might inform the response to subsequent intelligence, such as that from Kevin Fulton, suggesting that something was to be moved north. However, it is unclear whether this intelligence from David Rupert was ever linked with other material.

Second, it has been accepted by former Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan that intelligence obtained from Kevin Fulton was not passed by RUC Force Intelligence to Special Branch.

Third, the 2001 Ombudsman's report was critical that

detonation of car bombs to 20 minutes, and that this would apply in future. This information was not passed to the RUC. This information, as I've already suggested, may have suggested a need to adjust the response to threats such as that received in Omagh.

Sixth, in 2008 the team investigating the Omagh bomb stated that:

"... intelligence indicating Omagh as a potential target before August 1998 should have been passed to the RUC and thereafter to the Sub-Divisional Commander. That would probably have changed the response of the police to the coded message they received on 15 August 1998 ... military resources were not deployed to assist [the] police in evacuation because there was nothing known prior to August 1998 indicating Omagh was a [significant] target."

I've already mentioned in this context the potential relevance of the cross-border co-operation. The potential importance of that cross-border co-operation is one reason why the memorandum of understanding between the Inquiry and the Government of Ireland is particularly important. Although it is accepted that the Tribunal's jurisdiction does not allow it to criticise the actions of the Government of Ireland or any of its security services, the adequacy of the response of the United

significant intelligence was not shared by Special Branch and which may have had the potential to make a difference in the investigation that followed the bomb. While it is accepted that this intelligence was not directly related to preventability, it is further evidence of silos of information not being shared. If even after the atrocity of the bomb intelligence was not being shared, there's every reason to believe it was not shared before the bomb.

Fourth, when giving evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Mr Baxter stated:

"... I am not laying blame with any particular organisation. There seems to have been a policy and that policy was not to disseminate."

Consistent with this, he made it clear that relevant intelligence relating to earlier incidents that preceded the bomb had not been shared. He said that intelligence was potentially useful, and I quote:

"... to ensure that the investigators after those incidents we had an opportunity to look at suspects and to have them arrested prior to the Omagh bomb."

Fifth, the day following the bomb in Banbridge on 1 August 1996 (sic), information was received within the intelligence community that the Continuity IRA had reduced the warning time given in relation to the

Kingdom Security Forces must depend upon matters such as whether the United Kingdom had taken all reasonable steps to obtain all relevant material from the Republic of Ireland. That implies a need to consider, among other matters, whether more information could have been obtained

It's not yet known if the memorandum of understanding will result in full disclosure of all documentation and the attendance of all relevant witnesses, but this will become clear within a relatively short period of time. The victims and survivors that I represent urge the Inquiry to keep the effectiveness of the memorandum of understanding under review. The credibility of the Inquiry's work does, at least to some extent, depend on the memorandum of understanding.

I should add in relation to that that the victims and survivors I represent continue to press for a parallel inquiry in the Republic of Ireland that will enable findings to be made in relation to the actions of the Government of the Republic of Ireland and its forces.

They welcome the fact that a meeting has been arranged for today to discuss the position of the government of the Republic of Ireland.

Can I then turn to a topic linked to what I've just been addressing, which is the absence of rules and 

guidelines on the use of intelligence. LORD TURNBULL: Can we perhaps just break there for lunch then, Mr Southey? MR SOUTHEY: Certainly. LORD TURNBULL: So we will sit again just after 2.00. (Luncheon Adjournment) (2.06 pm) LORD TURNBULL: So when you are ready Mr Southey. MR SOUTHEY: Thank you, Chair. When we broke, I had made a number of submissions about intelligence and, in 

Linked to that is another topic I just wanted to touch on which is the absence of rules and guidelines regarding the use of intelligence.

particular the issues that related to intelligence

sharing.

At the material time, it appears to the victims and survivors I represent that, despite various requests and reports that sought a proper set of bespoke guidelines for the management and use of agents in Northern Ireland, there was no formal protocol in place. As was stated in the interim report of the Kenova Inquiry:

"The use of agents by the security forces in Northern Ireland was not the subject of any meaningful, effective or enforceable legal or policy framework during the

said in the Kenova interim report that:

"... the operational priority for security forces was the continued acquisition of counter-terrorist intelligence and this meant the protection of established agents from compromise. If acting on intelligence about a risk to life might bring its source under suspicion or blow their cover, the intelligence would often be withheld or, at least, not acted upon."

The victims and survivors I represented are not in a position to know, on the state of the evidence, where it is arguable that any inaction in relation to intelligence was motivated by a desire to protect state agents. However, the victims and survivors that I represent submit that the evidence regarding prioritising agent safety over public protection is potentially relevant because, firstly, it demonstrates that there is a need to subject any apparent inaction to careful scrutiny. It cannot be assumed that state agents were always primarily motivated by a desire to protect the public. For example, the evidence regarding the handling of intelligence from Kevin Fulton should be considered taking account of the possibility that the protection of Kevin Fulton was seen as a priority.

More generally, the material about inactivity or desire to prioritise the protection of state agents

course of The Troubles."

Similarly, the corporate statement of PSNI states:

"There were no [Special Branch] guidelines for
Northern Ireland issued by the executive arm of [Her
Majesty's Government], which would include guidance on
gathering and managing intelligence in a Northern Ireland
terrorist-related policing context. This was an issue
repeatedly raised by the RUC with [Her Majesty's
Government]. In particular, the absence of guidelines
and/or legislation on agent handling. It is clear the
RUC was unhappy with the situation as it stood at the
time, and that it continued to raise the issue with [Her
Majesty's Government] ..."

The absence of any rules or guidance governing the use of informers potentially had two consequences. These were it potentially permitted, firstly, the development of intelligence silos based on intelligence that wasn't shared. In addition, it potentially allowed risks to be taken with public safety despite intelligence suggesting risk.

The submission that risk could be taken with public safety is supported by clear findings in the past that the focus of intelligence handling was on protecting agents and that, as a consequence, there was a degree of tolerance to terrorist activity. For example, it was

demonstrates that there may have been motives for declining to share key intelligence.

A further issue linked to intelligence that the victims and survivors I represent would wish to raise is that relating to loss of records. I've already drawn attention to the fact that Kevin Fulton provided intelligence on 12 August that the Real IRA was to move something north over the following few days. The contact sheet for this meeting and for the meeting on 23 July 1998 could not be located in Special Branch records.

In his response to the Police Ombudsman's report, the former Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan admitted that due to, and I quote, "an unacceptable breakdown in procedure" and "an administrative error", two of the five intelligence reports based on information from Kevin Fulton in the period from June to August 1998 were never passed by RUC Force Intelligence Bureau to Special Branch

Although the implication of Sir Ronnie Flanagan's statement was that material had been lost accidentally, there are possible motives for it being deliberately destroyed. A detective sergeant in RUC CID, referred to as W71, who was Fulton's handler at the time of the Omagh bomb, gave evidence to the Smithwick Tribunal that he was informed by Special Branch on 20 August 1998, five days

(25) Pages 97 - 100

after the Omagh bomb, and by Sir Ronnie Flanagan during a telephone call, that Keeley, or Fulton, was an intelligence nuisance. That raises issues as to whether Fulton's intelligence was discounted wrongly. If that is the case, records may have demonstrated that and there was an incentive to withhold them.

W71 also gave evidence that:

"I also phoned intelligence through to various departments."

It would be surprising if the various departments had not kept records. It is surprising, therefore, that it appears that all records have been lost.

The victims and survivors I represent have also raised questions pertaining to the whereabouts of the Threat Book which has never been located and which should have contained all information about threats received, including the content of an anonymous phone call on 4 August 1998.

As noted already, there are good reasons to believe that sensitive material has been with held in the past from official investigations. It has already been submitted that this means that claims to have provided full disclosure should be scrutinised with care. That is supported by the fact that material has apparently been mislaid in this case in the past.

Provisional IRA when Semtex-based detonating cord and two IRECO detonators were found in a 230-kilogram bomb defused at Banbridge and attributed to the IRA. These matters demonstrate the importance of adopting an inclusive approach to prior incidents. Prior incidents should be considered even if not attributed to the Real IRA.

It's recognised that the evidence gathering in relation to these earlier incidents is at an earlier stage. The victims and survivors I represent are grateful to the priority that is being given to that evidence gathering by PSNI. At this early stage, the victims and survivors highlight the following matters as being potentially indicative of the fact that earlier incidents needed to be fully investigated or need to be fully investigated by the Inquiry and/or may demonstrate that the bomb could have been prevented.

Firstly -- and the issues arise we submit are as following -- firstly, an issue that I have already raised at other points of these submissions is the issue of whether there was differential policing and/or greater tolerance of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland. That means that there is a need to consider whether the prior incidents would have resulted in greater action had they occurred in Great Britain.

Overall in relation to intelligence, it is submitted on behalf of the victims and survivors that I represent that the material I've just drawn attention to demonstrates how it's important to investigate with rigour: firstly, the extent to which intelligence was gathered before the bomb; secondly, the extent to which intelligence was properly shared; thirdly, the extent to which there was an appropriate response to that intelligence. That includes whether the response to bomb threats was adequately updated in light of intelligence.

A separate topic that is of importance to the Core Participants I represent is the issue of the linked incidents. The Omagh bomb was clearly not a one-off isolated incident and followed a series of linked attacks in 1997 and 1998 with an increase -- which was part of an increase in violent dissident republican activity.

While publicly it may have been claimed that these attacks were undertaken by separate entities, the experts would suggest that there was active co-operation and co-ordination between the dissident groups. It has been suggested in his role as Director of Operations of the Real IRA Liam Campbell had developed an operational coalition with the Continuity IRA and the INLA. It has also been suggested that following the split there was evidence of co-operation between the Real IRA and the

The concerns that I've just expressed are supported by the fact that in his evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Mr Baxter, who was in charge of the bomb investigation from 2000, stated that the Omagh bomb might have been prevented had earlier action been taken against those involved in other incidents. He said:

"... there could have been opportunities to arrest this gang after Lisburn, after bombs in May, June and July even after Banbridge ... If we take Lisburn, which is one of the linked incidents, a car bomb, there was an opportunity, had the investigators been given the identities of the bomb team, to carry out searches of the properties or the homes of suspects."

He also stated that:

"... certainly disruption could have prevented it."

Those remarks need to be considered in light of the submissions that I already made that the state had both powers and resources necessary to gather relevant intelligence and then take disruptive action.

Another topic that the Core Participants that I represent would wish to raise is the need for an overall assessment. Depending upon the evidence that is heard regarding the issues, one of the concerns that is raised on behalf of the Core Participants I represent is whether there was a need for a designated decision-maker

with responsibility for assess all of the material that may have been available in order to assess what steps needed to be taken to protect the public. For example, was there a need to develop a better response plan to threats such as the threat received in Omagh before the bomb?

A further issue I have touched upon already but I just want to highlight again is the issue of differential policing. In his evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. Mr Baxter stated:

"I think it is inconceivable on mainland United Kingdom if you have a series of bombs happening every week or two that there would not have been arrests and there would not have been government intervention to ensure that this team was disrupted."

One reason to be concerned about differential policing is that as I've already indicated, MI5, for example, appeared to claim particular success in relation to the disruption of terrorism in London.

A further reason to be concerned about this issue is that PSNI's corporate statement appears to suggest that a different approach may have been adopted to the handling of intelligence in Britain to that adopted in Northern Ireland. All of these matters raise concerns that it is submitted are legitimate concerns that need to be

assessed that this information should have been passed on to the RUC at the time, bearing in mind the number of terrorist bombs and attempted bombs in 1997.

In addition to that, following an operation by the Garda in April 1998 to disrupt a dissident operation, a generalised document was provided to the RUC which was said to lack sufficient detail.

More generally, there appear to have been mixed descriptions of the co-operation between the police forces on both sides of the border. The Smithwick Tribunal suggests that there was close co-operation at a local level across the border, particularly between police forces in Newry and Dundalk. The Nally Report refers to close counter-terrorism co-operation, both formally and on a personal basis and that co-operation was excellent. However, as I've already outlined, in the corporate statement of PSNI there are statements that suggest preventative material in particular was not shared.

Although findings regarding the conduct of Irish state authorities are not a matter for the Inquiry, there are clearly findings open to the Inquiry. These include whether information of value was received from the Republic of Ireland, whether more could have been done to improve the supply of information from the Republic of

examined with particular care.

The final topic that I want to raise in this opening is the issue of co-operation with the Republic of Ireland. There is little or no doubt that dissident Republic activity linked to the bomb took place in the Republic of Ireland. That suggests that effective protection of the bomb potentially required the assistance of the Republic of Ireland's authorities. The victims and survivors encourage the Government of the Republic of Ireland, as I've already indicated, to establish a procedure that will enable findings to be reached regarding any failings that may have occurred within the south of Ireland.

There is reason to believe that intelligence was known by the Garda but not the RUC. The Omagh bomb investigation team presented a briefing paper to some of the families of the bereaved and injured, the Omagh Support and Self-help Group, on 22 February 2008 which stated, among other matters: firstly, that intelligence material indicated that in November 1997, dissident Republicans discussed the military and police bases in Omagh. That information was not passed on to the RUC and therefore the Sub-Divisional Commander in Omagh was not made aware of this information regarding the military bases or his own station. The investigation team

Ireland, and whether any information of value received from the Republic of Ireland was effectively deployed.

That covers the issues that we want to highlight or that the Core Participants I represent want to highlight at this stage.

As I've already noted, the victims and survivors I represent are not seeking at this stage to argue that particular findings should be made. The victims and survivors I represent believe that it's important the Inquiry keeps an open mind. However, the victims and survivors argue that it's clear that there are difficult and important issues that arise in relation to a range of matters that need to be considered with care. The victims and survivors I represent appreciate the commitment of the Inquiry to get to the truth.

The range and importance of the issues, though, mean, among other matters, that: firstly, it is important that victims and survivors are able to participate fully in the questioning of witnesses, including by asking questions directly; secondly, victims and survivors' interests are advanced in CLOSED by special advocates; and, thirdly, there is full engagement by the Irish government.

Thank you. That concludes the opening statement on behalf of the victims and survivors I represent.

LORD TURNBULL: Thank you, Mr Southey. MR GREANEY: Sir, would you rise for about five minutes, following which we will hear the final opening statement delivered by Mr Mansfield who, as I said at the beginning of yesterday, will be appearing via video link. LORD TURNBULL: Yes. (2.24 pm) (A short break) (2.34 pm) LORD TURNBULL: Mr Greaney. MR GREANEY: Sir, we will now hear from Mr Mansfield who will address you on behalf of the Rush family. LORD TURNBULL: Good afternoon, Mr Mansfield. MR MANSFIELD: Am I being heard loud and clear and can everybody see; is that all right? LORD TURNBULL: You are, yes, thank you. Opening statement on behalf of the Rush family by MR MANSFIELD KC MR MANSFIELD: I wanted you to also thank you to allowing me to do it this way. As you know, I had an injury, but by

As you know, I appear together with Nicola Rountree and we're instructed by Desmond Doherty on behalf of Libby Rush, who died in this atrocity, her husband who 109

the next hearing I hope to be in person because I prefer

Inquiry, particularly the last set of hearings which were commemorative.

The terms of reference are set out in the key areas of analysis for the Inquiry, but the issue of greatest concern to the Rush family and it is of course -- and I have the terms of reference in front of me I will come back to them in a moment -- but it's quite clear that the core issue for the Inquiry is preventability and that is what is of the greatest concern to the Rush family and requires rigorous investigation, which they are perfectly satisfied you will provide.

Often described as the worst atrocity of The Troubles, the Omagh bombing on 15 August 1998 altered the trajectory of life for so many. What was set to be a peaceful time, in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, descended into confusion, chaos and utter devastation for the Rush family, and so many others. It was a trauma which shaped so many generations. The grief, the unimaginable loss, has been compounded by the long and arduous path to get to the truth. Being met with a wall of silence, the self-protection of the state authorities, the lack of accountability, the closing down of ranks, has only further intensified the unresolved allegations which have become corrosive over the past 26 years.

died later in 2012, and her daughter Siobhan, who I think may be there today, and her two brothers Anthony and Andrew.

So what I intend to do, as you will see, we've done a relatively short open written statement and I am going to read it, but I will break off occasionally -- hopefully not too much and not at length -- to incorporate observations on matters that have been put before you yesterday and again some today.

The reason for reading and using this statement in the way -- and it's quite probably different to some of the others -- is because it does provide for you -- and you know a lot already -- but it provides for the public a narrative and a genesis, in a sense, of this whole Inquiry. It also explains, this particular statement, not only Laurence Rush's concerns, were he to be here to make observations, but also the rest of the family, explains their concerns about observations that were made yesterday and a few more today as to why they hold these worries, sentiments and undoubtedly a long-standing, deeply-held belief that the truth is the object and they are going to help you and your team.

The Rush family wish to extend their continued gratitude to you, the Chair, and the Inquiry team for their professionalism, courtesy, commitment to the 110

Turning now to the inquest, which I attended with my instructing solicitor, that occurred in the year 2000.

Now, these are important events in the terms of not only providing a backdrop but actually providing you with necessary inquisitive -- as essentially it is an inquisitorial process, as you know -- questions that might need to be asked and after a section I will just stop and suggest where we're going in the light of what has been said yesterday and today.

So the inquest happened in the year 2000, so there has been a gap of almost two years from the incident itself. The Rush family, Laurence Rush, adopted a position over two decades ago that the bomb could have been prevented.

In the year 2000, Laurence Rush took a stand at the inquest -- a lonely figure in the inquest -- he asked difficult questions and gently probed at sensitive issues which others sought to shy away from. He was criticised -- at times ridiculed -- but his family lived in a state of fear in case matters escalated beyond words, but he remained steadfast in his suspicions that the full picture was being airbrushed and the truth withheld from the families and the public. This is now the very subject matter that this Inquiry is tasked to deal with, two and a half decades later.

You, sir, acknowledged the unique and difficult path the Rush family took at the commemorative hearings. Describing Laurence Rush as a campaigner for truth and justice from a very early stage who sought to cast light on the circumstances surrounding the bombing and tried to learn about previous attacks, what was done and not done. You acknowledged that he was the first to raise some of the questions the Inquiry has to determine and not deterred from speaking them loudly and publicly. These questions are still uncomfortable for so many.

Laurence Rush may not have known the full truth about how or why the Omagh bombing happened before he died, that was in 2012, but he had a genuine and honest belief that the state narrative about the bombing didn't make sense, and at the time of the inquest he was convinced there was more to it. His daughter and two sons still view the state narrative about the circumstances of the bombing as illogical.

The stance adopted by Laurence Rush drew virtually no support from any quarter in society and this had a profound effect on him, impact on him. He was very much alone in his search for truth and accountability. It was a fact, and of course acknowledged by everyone, the Real IRA murdered his wife. They claimed responsibility for the bomb and that's how it should remain. He had to

reality in this, once this happened on 15 August 1998, are we to imagine that state authorities didn't immediately have meetings? These meetings are important. I don't know how they all happened. There are various different ways you can have meetings and the meetings they must have had which should have ensured the preservation not "oh we only got notice yesterday", the state had known since this incident.

This was an incident, termed as I've already indicated, the worst atrocity in peacetime, an incident which comes after the Good Friday Agreement. Therefore, there are going to be massive questions and not just asked within the United Kingdom but asked in the United States because of their participation in it, not only at the intelligence level but at a higher level as well which I will come back to a little later.

So what they must have done -- and if they didn't I think there will have to be confessions fairly soon -- and I will come back to that as well -- this all bears on observations made yesterday. The difficulties that they are facing not -- well, in a sense indirectly, but are facing the state are of their own making because if they didn't sit down at that time or whatever they do and ask the basic questions -- and on this, may I say, that the terms of reference are extremely apposite and very well

grapple with this extremely distressing fact, whilst also trying to understand how something like this could have happen without state authorities having any suspicion; or worse, actual intelligence about the bomb. He had great difficulty articulating and arguing that he felt that the bombing could have been prevented by authorities of the state and at times did not want to believe this himself. He challenged himself many times because of the doubt and of course because of hostility from others. However, ultimately his determination did not wane and fuelled by the love for his wife and the family she had left behind, he continued to search for answers.

If I may, I am going to pause at that moment because what I want to do is, just bearing in mind the two pages I have read, deal with a question of the response by the state authorities yesterday and they are really indicating that, you know, we should be sympathetic, which we are with the difficulties of amassing information. This is an important job.

However, it cannot be said that they were not aware. I don't mean the individuals now concerned, I am talking obviously of continuity here, it cannot be said that government departments were not on notice the date that has been specified today, 2021, I'm sorry it's much earlier than that. If I tried to put an element of

focused. I'm not going to read them all out, but is it to be believed that the state on 16 August 1998 didn't ask themselves -- and this is the scope part of the terms of reference and (a) the assessment by UK State Authorities of the threat posed in Northern Ireland by dissident Republican terrorists from 1 December 1997 to the date the Omagh Bombing. This shall include the consideration of any change in (unclear).

That is absolutely crucial. Are we to believe nobody asked themselves that question and where are the records relating to that? And if they are being preserved, we need an explanation now and I come back to it under the concessions. These are basic questions that must have been asked then. They don't need to be getting a letter or a writ or a summons before they ask these questions.

So the state, I'm not holding them responsible for the bombing in the sense that the Real IRA are, but we are saying that they have a responsibility, a responsibility for safety. So if they did ask about these questions, what were the answers? Of course risk assessment is at the centre of this and it's already been explained what the risk -- terms of the risk might be implied by the European Convention and Article 2 itself.

That's the first question.

The second question these are all basic. The adequacy of measures taken by the authorities to disrupt the dissident Republicans. At the end, you don't have to be at a university level to work these questions out. They are not borne from hindsight. If you were sitting there, I was sitting there and I had relatives killed in the High Street at Omagh, just as we heard yesterday very movingly from counsel, you would ask that question: who did this? Who claimed it? What have they done before? Where were they? Where were we?

I mean, one is trying to introduce an element of realism into this that it's all very well relying on it's a long time since it happened. Sorry, I'm talking about then. What happened then? What were they doing then about these questions which are entirely proper?

This is the third one which is obvious again: the adequacy of policies and practice of the UK State Authorities, including the police, security forces and intelligence and security agencies in sharing intelligence? Well, again, it's a question you are bound to ask. Did we know about this? If we didn't know, why didn't we know?

These are questions that need to be asked in your Inquiry and I am absolutely confident -- and so are the

the risk here is you have got a dissident group who have made their part very clear over the previous year. So if there's any information coming in and you have got somebody who is inside the organisation, you have a precautionary approach, particularly in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement when so much was at stake.

So these linked incidents were asked about, Banbury particularly, the ones before that we didn't have all the information that you now have.

So we say when the authority is saying, as they did yesterday, "sorry, sorry, it's going to take a long time to get there and actually we've lost a lot of documents anyway, some of which have been outlined today" -- horrific, shocking, was the description given, that the meetings at a certain level, which were happening regularly, which I suggest were happening on 16 and possibly 15 August 1998, that we don't have the records. Well, if we don't have the records, they had better have a very watertight explanation other than "well, we can't tell you".

So I pause there because this question of notice and disclosure and concessions -- because what I'm going to read now from the statement that we make is the struggle that Laurence Rush had after the inquest to try and make his point wider than just the questions asked at the

Rush family -- that your counsel will be asking them and on sometimes occasionally you will be asking them yourself. So they have been on notice since 1998.

However, it gets more specific in the year 2000 and I can say this because obviously I was there at the inquest. They were absolutely put on notice in the year 2000, not 2021, but 2000. May I just list the issues that arose in the inquest and why Laurence was isolated in the way I've described?

The issues that were -- one main issue which arose in the inquest is: Why was the army -- we've heard it today from Mr Southey before me -- why was the army not deployed that day? They were there in Omagh. They could have been deployed. So why weren't they?

First topic.

Second topic: warnings. We went through that. We didn't have all the information we now have, but we understood there were warnings, including the one on the fourth. So that was an issue then. Intelligence was an issue then, general intelligence, if there was any relating to Omagh.

The possibility of disruption. What we were talking about then was roadblocks intercepting vehicles and so forth. Fairly basic. So even if you don't know which vehicle, you close it down. Yes, it's a risk. However,

inquest.

I'm on paragraph 6 if you are following the copy of it. Baroness Nuala O'Loan's Police Ombudsman report dated 12 December 2001, so that is one year after the inquest, raised some potential issues about the use of and dissemination of intelligence between various agencies within the police at the time. She criticised the police for their response following the event and missed opportunities to properly investigating the bombing.

Laurence Rush had been struggling with doubts and unease about the circumstances surrounding the bomb. This report gave him hope and, in a sense, of vindication for his feelings. He felt that there was finally a light being cast on the actions of the authorities. These findings acted as a catalyst for further investigation.

Over the course of the next few years, others began to see what Laurence had seen from the start: gaps in the narrative, obscured facts, evasive answers and things that simply didn't make sense.

The Rush family are indebted to Baroness O'Loan for exposing some of the issues their father sought to bring to the fore and extend their gratitude and respect to her. Given the political landscape at that time and the

controversial issues raised, her courage should be recognised and will not be forgotten.

I move to the litigation that Laurence Rush was driven to initiate. You recognised also that Laurence Rush was the first to issue litigation against the police and the British government. This was not action which was taken lightly, but rather after many legal consultations and after much deliberation. It was the view of Laurence Rush that this was a necessary step to uncover the truth. Previous enquiries actioned by him and others had resulted in many dead ends and the family were running out of road.

Laurence Rush litigated in the High Court against the Chief Constable of the PSNI, formerly RUC, and the British government on 17 July 2002. So here's another date in the chronology, as it were, whereby the idea that they can only -- they need to get things together now when in fact they must have been getting things together much earlier and here's another stepping stone in that, some 23 years ago and one year following the publication of the report of the Police Ombudsman.

The cause of action itself that Libby Rush, this is words taken from the cause of action, Laurence's wife, was murdered on 15 August 1998 by reason of the negligence, misfeasance in public office, and breach of

record for the Inquiry reminding everyone that these issues were raised by him 25 years ago. He said from the beginning, and I quote from the pleadings referred to:

"A proscribed organisation the so-called Real IRA planted the bomb in Omagh.

"That proscribed organisation had been infiltrated by an informer, one Kevin Fulton [who you have heard a lot about today] who fed to the security forces information sufficient to have prevented the bombing."

Of course documents which have gone missing mentioned by Hugh Southey moments ago are particularly pertinent, the one on August 12, so-called missing.

"The police and government or one of them had sufficient quality of information to apprehend the perpetuators or prevent the planting of the bomb. The police, in particular failed to take such steps as would have prevented the loss of life by failing to stop the bombers or apprehend them in time or at all as a consequence of not acting on intelligence to ensure that no car bomb was planted in Omagh on 15 August 1998".

Throughout the years of litigation the Rush family answered every question asked of them. There was much back and forth in the pleadings and ultimately the Rush family named a number of individuals and agent handlers

the statutory duties of the police and the Government in their failures in the apprehension, detection and pre-emptive arrest of members of a criminal terrorist conspiracy, namely the Real IRA, who planted the bomb which led to the explosion in which Libby Rush was murdered.

In other words, he was saying, firstly, that the bombing could have been prevented by the relevant authorities and his wife's right to life was not protected by the state.

Secondly, in addition, he said that her murder was never properly investigated. This has always been, and remains, the Rush family position.

The litigation was a difficult chapter in the Rush family history. The mental toll of controversial litigation had an obvious impact on Laurence Rush. There was fierce resistance by the authorities to information being disclosed into the public domain and the Rush family feel strongly that this resistance was deliberate to prevent difficult questions being asked.

We would ask this to be borne in mind now in relation to disclosure by the authorities even at this stage.

Laurence Rush through this litigation, 2002, presented to the court an alternative narrative. As part of his legacy we wish to put this formally on the 122

in the course of their answers on 2 April 2004 and 12 October 2004. The full set of pleadings has been provided to the Inquiry and we would ask you, sir, to analyse these closely. We say there is evidence which is capable of suggesting that the state authorities could have and should have prevented the bomb.

Another important turning point for the rush family was the Panorama documentary aired on 15 September 2008. Following this documentary, the civil pleadings were expanded as follows: firstly, that the defendants in the action, through their agents or servants, namely GCHQ Communications Centre at Cheltenham Gloucester, had contemporaneous intercept of the bombers' mobile phone communication on the afternoon of 15 August 1998. The said communications centred had actual knowledge of the route of the bombers and their target being Omagh.

This information was not acted upon to either apprehend the bombers or put into operation a comprehensive evacuation strategy of Omagh, mindful of the intent of the Real IRA which had demonstrated some weeks previously when a bomb was planted and exploded in Banbridge. The threat and the capacity of the Real IRA were known to the police and government in consequence of that previous bombing.

The circumstances of the transportation of the bomb 124

to Omagh could not have been more serious and the defendants failed to react, either in time or at all to prevent the loss of life to Libby Rush. There was a failure to have in place a clear, precise and expeditious method for transmitting the intelligence received by GCHQ to the police that would have prevented the bombing.

The context and timing of these submissions made by the Rush family is important. This was unpopular litigation and many struggled to support Laurence Rush.

There was a complete blanket denial by the authorities. This we say is an important paragraph because, as you will see in a moment -- and I am going to pause again -- a reflection on how the authorities are dealing with it now. Efforts were made by the authorities to strike the litigation out in 2009. The case was described by the police had government as frivolous and vexatious, even unarguable and unsustainable. Strong and confronting words for any family to hear. We are yet to hear a retraction on the part of government, which I will come to in a moment.

The application to strike the litigation out was a private *in camera* hearing before the High Court at which only Laurence Rush and his legal team were permitted to be present. Later he was permitted to bring a family friend in view of his failing health and the requirement

information. The Rush family had to obtain a court order to secure discovery. That is why I pause for a moment. The family find it difficult, they want to believe they are going to get co-operation, it's difficult to believe that we're going to get full disclosure or, rather, you are going to get it because some of it plainly will not be available to us, although we hope and endorse those sentiments that as much in open should be made.

The initial writ of summons issued in the High Court was dated 2002 and the Gillen judgment is dated 2011. There was a discovery order for documents dated 2014. It all moved at a glacial pace.

Some documents were eventually disclosed. These have been provided to assist the Inquiry. Sensitive documentation was not provided. These civil proceedings were ongoing at the time of the litigation commenced by Michael Gallagher and together these two sets of legal proceedings complemented each other. Two men, two families, searching for truth and accountability.

In the civil litigation there was a blanket denial of everything pleaded by Laurence Rush. In the initial Statement of Claim on 21 January 2004, Laurence Rush pleaded that:

"The defendants, that is RUC/PSNI or government or one of them, had sufficient quality of information to

to travel. There was no public element to the hearings in that initial process, which is in stark contrast to the public and open nature of this Inquiry which we know will be transparently conducted by you.

The initial application was struck out on 18 May 2010 and we give the reference. Another setback for the Rush family and other families perhaps in similar situations might have just given up, but he didn't. But later reinstated on the appeal. 2011, Lord Justice Gillen in his judgment did not accept that the position adopted by Laurence Rush was unsustainable. Towards the end of his judgment he said:

"I've come to the conclusion that it is neither plain nor obvious that the cause of action in this matter has no chance of success. In short, I do not consider that on the pleadings the case made by the plaintiff is unarguable."

By this time, Laurence Rush was in a nursing home and, sadly, his health was deteriorating rapidly. He was comforted by the words of Lord Justice Gillen, but there was still a long road ahead.

The litigation had many twists and turns. The process again of obtaining disclosure and documentation was tiresome and frustrating. There was inordinate and unjustifiable delay by the authorities in providing

apprehend the perpetrators or prevent the planting of the bomb at Omagh on 15 August 1998 which directly caused the death of Libby Rush."

In the defence to this litigation served on behalf of the police and government, dated 8 December 2004, the first named defendant was:

"... [the Chief Constable of the police], further says that he and his servants or agents are not responsible in law for the operational decisions, acts or omissions of the second named defendant, the Government, in respect of crime prevention and/or crime detection/investigation and none of the allegations of negligence properly are to be viewed as within his area of responsibility."

The Rush family ask you, sir, to conduct a root and branch review of the practices and the oversight of the police and government agencies. Now, this is the kernel of our statement.

The Rush family do not seek to criticise or blame officers on the ground in Omagh -- and I think none of the families want to do that -- on 15 August 1998, but rather those who had oversight of decision-making. Those involved in accessing information/intelligence, agents who were making high level decisions in both police and government agencies. We know now they were meeting

regularly and there was regular contact, but we don't have the record.

Those are the people that the family of Libby Rush wish to have questioned at least in terms of, if they are still alive, the documentation that is available. Who made the decision about the distance of evacuation for the explosion? Who made the decision to deplete the number of officers Omagh on that particular morning? Who made the decision not to act on intelligence received, not to pass on information? Just a sample of the questions to be answered.

The officers who were there on that day were clearly doing their best in horrific circumstances and the Rush family extend their gratitude to those who tried to help the bereaved and the injured. Laurence Rush died on 4 March 2012; he died without answers. That is a source of great regret for his family.

Now I'm going to pause again at this stage to deal with another observation and, sir, we take this particular matter, it's not just a procedural matter, it is absolutely vital we say for the transparency, the alacrity and scope of this Inquiry. I was just about to talk about inquest which it overlaps.

You asked in the protocol and set out very clearly that you:

they are now saying to you yesterday it's too early, too early because we haven't heard any evidence. Excuse me, this sounds very much like a process whereby a defendant waits to see what is produced before they say anything. These are not criminal proceedings. We say the state authorities must be pressed now, not next week, not next year, they must be in a position otherwise it's more than serious negligence if they don't know where they stand on some of these basic questions. There's quite a lot they can already, we say, concede.

For example, if it's going to be missing documents, let's concede that straightaway and that's why something didn't happen with an explanation. It will make life for everyone, including obviously yourself, far easier and of course far more transparent and the idea that they don't say anything and they keep their mouths shut until the first witness we say is a disgrace. That should not happen.

Also, may I just add an extra part of the protocol which we say is important:

"In the event there are mistakes or failings which the state Core Participant considers can only be acknowledged in CLOSED due to the risk to national security, an account of those failings must be provided in writing to the Inquiry legal team in a CLOSED "Expect the State Core Participants to understand and exhibit the principles of the Hillsborough charter and the Hillsborough law. You expect openness, candour and transparency. In the event, any State Core Participants has identified mistakes or failings going in the terms of reference, three of which I have read -- there are in fact 9, but I'm not reading them all about -- has identified mistakes or failings going to those terms of reference, these must be fully and clearly acknowledged in plain language cross-referring to the terms of reference and the provisional list of issues."

You go on to state:

"Core Participants can expect scrutiny of their opening statements in the context of what subsequently emerges."

Now, I know your counsel opened these matters and I wish on behalf of the Rush family to endorse them because both he and I have appeared in previous matters one of which was the Hillsborough inquest, as opposed to Inquiry, and I appeared in the Grenfell Inquiry as well.

These are not -- it's obvious and you have said it many times -- adversarial, these are inquisitorial processes and it is extremely important that those who have the material, which of course is the state authorities here, in fact have had them for 25 years and 130

environment at the same time as OPEN written statement. Any CLOSED document should be accompanied by an application for a restriction order and justify why these concessions cannot be made in OPEN. The Chairman expects both OPEN and CLOSED versions of any restriction order applications or clear justification for why there is no restriction order application being made in the CLOSED application and then upon the receipt of these documents."

Now, the question we have on behalf of the Rush family: have you had anybody, or particularly state authorities, providing you -- and obviously we don't want to know what the information is, that obviously would be completely counter-productive -- but has there been any CLOSED -- we get a hint of it obviously with the Ombudsman's statement yesterday -- but has anybody else provided you with a CLOSED statement as to why they concede certain things but they can't and you have had to, as it were, consider these matters and decide they stay CLOSED they should be OPEN.

So I'm not asking for an answer obviously at this stage, but we say this protocol is extremely important because the problem faced in Hillsborough, which was inquest, in Grenfell was exactly the same. What happened in Hillsborough was that the learned High Court

judge dealing with the inquest insisted that the state authorities make a position statement of what their position, otherwise we wouldn't have known where they were coming from or what they were trying to say, or what the point was, what they accept, what they didn't. So they were each made to do that. It was the first one I've known where that actually happen.

In Grenfell, it was expected and happened that when the openings occurred, state authorities would make clear what they accepted and interestingly what happened in Grenfell was the state authorities accepted certain aspects of responsibility, but the private corporations didn't. But I don't go into it any more than that, other than to say what you set out in this protocol is vital to the lifeblood of this Inquiry that we know now, the families know now, they have waited long enough, what they are prepared to concede.

If the answer coming back within 28 days or the time of the next hearing in July, if they are still unable to do that, then I think there has to be far more -- well, it speaks for itself, may I say, *res ipsa loquitur* as they say.

So that's a pause I have made. I am sorry I have taken a little longer on that. Coming to the end of this statement.

family, alongside other families, have a lot of information which they have accumulated over the years and hope for maximum participation.

May I say just at this stage, the issue raised by Hugh Southey moments ago about special advocates and direct questioning we defer to the next hearing on 21 and 22 of July.

They ask for as much transparency in open hearings as possible. The Rush family request that everyone who has been involved in any way should co-operate fully with the Inquiry on both sides of the Irish border. The Rush family had hoped there may be a parallel Inquiry in the Republic of Ireland, but that is not the case and that is obviously supporting the others who have made that same proposition to you. They welcome the memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Ireland and hope this is sufficiently robust to ensure transparency and exchange of information across the two jurisdictions.

There are clearly many important questions which must be answered by the Irish government relating to, the lead-up to, time and aftermath of the Omagh bomb. These are amplified because of the overlap of terrorist activity and involvement of identified individuals across both jurisdictions.

The following assumptions can be made, even at this 135

When he died, that's Laurence Rush, in 2012, the family made a decision to await the outcome of the other legal processes to see if they could make progress regarding the provision of documentation. It was clear from the decision of Mr Justice Gillen that the Rush litigation could only properly proceed once there was full discovery of documentation. The litigation has been paused pending the outcome of the public inquiry.

A public investigation into the Omagh bombing and its preventability, which is what the Rush civil action would have become, is not frivolous nor vexatious. This establishment of the Inquiry is evidence of that.

The truth about the preventability of the Omagh bombing is uncomfortable. The Rush family view, this public inquiry is an important moment in history and trying to uncover the truth and providing some answers for all of the families. They ask you, Mr Chairman, to now carry the baton they have tirelessly carried for years to help them find the answers they have been searching for.

The terms of reference are not all encompassing; however they are sufficiently wide to reflect the concerns of Laurence Rush. No one knows, Mr Chairman, where the evidence will lead you and the Rush family hope that all avenues will be explored. The Rush

preliminary stage, that in all probability some element of planning of the bomb was carried out in the Republic of Ireland; that in all probability some perpetrators came from or were involved with individuals from the republic; that in all probability information which identifies and concerns the perpetrators still exists in the Republic of Ireland; that in all probability there will be information relating to the issues in the terms of reference in relation to the Omagh Bombing which is in the Republic; that in all probability there will be relevant witnesses in respect of the bombing who reside in the Republic.

The Rush family says that it is therefore imperative that there is full co-operation on both sides of border.

There is a risk that if the commitments provided by the Irish government and other state authorities in the North are not honoured, this could grind the Inquiry process to a halt. The Rush family make a plea that this Inquiry does not become a further endurance test of their strength and courage. Each of the bereaved families have suffered enough.

In an affidavit on 18 May 2005, 20 years ago, Laurence Rush said:

"It is my honest belief that in particular as a result of all the information contained in the Police

Ombudsman report with particular reference to the pre-warnings about an attack on Monday, 15 August 1998 that the murder of my wife may have been prevented by the defendants."

There is significantly more information available now which the Rush family says supports their belief that the Omagh bombing was preventable.

The Rush family are embarking on this chapter of Omagh with positivity and hope. They, along with the other families, have demonstrated remarkable strength of courage. The Rush family hope that this Public Inquiry represents the beginning of the end of the story of the Omagh Bombing.

If I may be permitted just to add a tiny postscript, but given what is going on globally at the moment, it is important to remember the words of the President of the United States on the first anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement in 1999. I am quoting, it's very little, I just want to quote from this because of its significance in terms of the status of this Inquiry and the important role this Inquiry plays in the rule of law and adherence to a judicial process. This is what he said:

"As we approach the first anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement we can all take heart at how far we've come in a year.

"But the response to Omagh showed that, despite the pain, there is deep determination in both the North and the South that peace is the only path."

We say to you, sir, you are part of that path towards truth because, as has been said so many times, there can be no lasting peace without truth.

Thank you.

**LORD TURNBULL:** Thank you, Mr Mansfield. We hope you might be able to join us in person at the next hearing of the Inquiry.

11 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, I will be there.

**LORD TURNBULL:** Thank you very much. Mr Greaney.

**MR GREANEY:** I was about to ask Mr Mansfield to turn off his camera and his microphone, but he is ahead of me.

Sir, that then concludes the opening statements of the Core Participants. Many important questions have been raised by the bereaved families and survivors over the course of the last two days. We expect that no-one would expect the Inquiry Legal Team to be in a position to answer all of those questions at this stage, but there are two issues upon which we do feel we can provide a degree of further clarification.

First, in the course of our opening observations yesterday, we acknowledged the concerns of the bereaved families and survivors about missing documentation and we

"The Agreement has provided the basis for two traditions to work together, both in Northern Ireland and on the island as a whole, for the first time in 200 years."

I pause: I hope that the Republic will respond to what is being said here.

"Democratically endorsed by an emphatic majority of people in both the North and the South, it gives a unique opportunity for peace and reconciliation in which all the signatories can take pride."

And, of course, that includes the Republic.

"It has rightly been acknowledged as an example to the rest of the world how dialogue can bring an end to conflict."

These are acute and singular resonance, these words, now, today in the present circumstances where the rule of law is being ignored and processes in institutions upholding it are being ignored. What is happening here with your Inquiry is continuing exactly what was set out in 1998.

The President went on to reference Omagh in this statement in 1999:

"Despite the progress, Omagh demonstrated that the peace has not been a perfect peace."

He goes on:

made plain the rigorous approach that the Inquiry intends to take to any claims that are made that relevant materials cannot be located.

In his opening statement, Mr Kane gave an example of a category of missing documentation. He referred to the fact that it was the Inquiry which had identified the relevance of the agenda and briefing papers for and minutes of the Security Policy Meetings and he identified, too, that the Inquiry had sought these materials from the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Mr Kane, as we all heard, went on to express the serious concerns of those that he represents about the failure of PSNI to locate any such documents for the years 1997 and 1998. Those concerns, in our view, sir, are understandable but there is more to the story.

The bereaved families and survivors can be assured of this, that in accordance with the approach we set out yesterday, the Inquiry Legal Team will not simply accept at face value that PSNI cannot locate these documents. Explanations have been sought and those explanations will be tested.

Furthermore, it's important to emphasise that the Inquiry's search for these documents has not been limited to a request of PSNI. As Mr Kane set out, the Security Policy Meetings were attended not only by senior police

officers but also by a range of other senior figures involved in security policy within Northern Ireland and that range of persons included the Permanent Secretary in the Northern Ireland Office.

As a result, at the same time as seeking the material relating to the Security Policy Meetings from PSNI, the Inquiry also sought that material from the Northern Ireland Office. Initially the Northern Ireland Office asserted that it had destroyed those records. The Inquiry pressed the NIO hard for an explanation of why those important records had been destroyed and in what circumstances and the Inquiry required further searches to be undertaken for that material.

Sir, the upshot is that on undertaking such further searches, the Northern Ireland Office has now located most of the documents that PSNI was unable to locate and the Inquiry's actively taking steps to locate the balance.

Sir, we hope that this single, albeit small, example will provide reassurance to the bereaved families and survivors and indeed the wider public as to the rigour with which the Inquiry will seek the documentation it requires for its work.

Sir, that is the first issue upon which we are able offer some clarification.

Those opening statements contained, as all have observed, no concessions and gave reasons for that position. It is a fact that no CLOSED opening statements were submitted. So, sir, where we reach is that no concessions have been made

That, sir, is all we propose to say at the end of Chapter 2 of the Inquiry's work, save to thank those who have attended or who have viewed the proceedings online and save to thank the legal representatives for the positive and co-operative way in which they have engaged with this process.

Sir, we believe that finally you have something that you wish to say.

## Closing comments by LORD TURNBULL

LORD TURNBULL: Thank you, Mr Greaney.

I would wish to say that I am grateful to all of the counsel for setting out and delivering their respective opening statements. Each has contributed in a helpful and informative manner. Hearing the State Core Participants explain the processes which they are engaged in will help all of us to understand the challenges which some of them face in providing disclosure to the Inquiry.

I do not doubt that these challenges are significant.

In the case of the Secretary of State for Northern

Ireland, he, as a Core Participant, represents not just

The second issue relates to concessions, a topic upon which Mr Mansfield, of course, has just addressed you. Mr Mansfield has noted that in our opening observations yesterday we referred to the requirement that State Core Participants make concessions where they recognise failings have been made. Mr Mansfield noted, too, that against that background we said the following yesterday:

"In their written opening statements, the State Core Participants have not made any such concessions."

Today, indeed this afternoon, Mr Mansfield has highlighted that the Inquiry's protocol on opening statements says this:

"In the event there are mistakes or failings which
[a] state Core Participant considers can only be
acknowledged in CLOSED due to the risk to national
security, an account of those failings must be provided
in writing to the Inquiry Legal Team in a CLOSED
environment at the same time as the OPEN written
[opening] statement."

In those circumstances, entirely understandably the question that has been posed by Mr Mansfield in effect is this: was our comment yesterday that the State Core Participants have not made concessions deliberately unequivocal? The answer is it was. The State Core Participants supplied their opening statements in OPEN.

his own department but all of the other departments across government who hold material that is of interest and value to the Inquiry.

So that adds to the complexities for the legal team he has instructed. It also raises issues concerning two matters, in particular. First, the management of the requests from the Inquiry and, second, the resourcing needed to comply with those requests.

Regardless of the efforts now being made, such as were outlined by Ms Fee in her opening statement, the fact remains that two years have already passed since the Secretary of State announced that there was to be an inquiry.

Many times since that point the progress towards setting up the Inquiry and then of trying to move towards evidential hearings has appeared to be frustratingly slow. Difficulties over providing disclosure, of course, impact on the ability to schedule evidential hearings.

Many of the complications which make that disclosure such a slow and difficult process are inherent in the task of trying to trace documents and information from so many years ago.

Whilst all of us will understand the reality of those difficulties, some of those listening to what was said may have been thinking to themselves that if the various

Secretaries of State and other ministers involved had not so staunchly set their face against a Public Inquiry over the very many years and very many times that such requests were made, the problems now being grappled with would not be so acute

Of course, I also recognise that the government departments with whom the Inquiry liaises have many other demands placed upon them and that is perhaps particularly the case for the Secretary of State of Northern Ireland.

So I recognise that we are where we are in regard to the timing of the Inquiry and the progress to date.

I have one observation to make, though, in that regard.

Having opposed the setting up of an Inquiry so long, there is a plain duty on the Secretary of State and others in government to remedy that now by making available whatever resources are necessary to ensure that full disclosure can be swiftly made available.

I say that not just because of the passage of time.

My experience to date has caused me to have some concerns. I have not been convinced that some of those with whom the Inquiry has to depend upon to provide it with the materials it seeks have always been in a position properly to engage with the Inquiry or to dedicate the necessary resources to those tasks.

I therefore trust that after all that's been said over

an examination of, and I quote:

"The UK State's response to the two telephone calls made on 15 August 1998 to Ulster Television and the single call made to Samaritan's Service, sometimes referred to as the warning calls. The attempts made to evacuate people from the location the bomb was believed to be in and the emergency response to the Omagh Bombing more generally."

As is stated in the list of issues, an analysis of these matters is not within the Inquiry's terms of reference.

A further aspect of the value which emerged from the opening statements presented on behalf of the family Core Participants was to learn of the concerns which they harbour. One matter which emerged very plainly was the ability to obtain relevant documentation after so many years have passed? The family Core Participants have rightly drawn attention to the concerns which they hold over statements made by state bodies about apparent inability to locate relevant documents.

The Inquiry shares those concerns.

What I would say is that, while I recognise that the passage of time brings with it challenges, as Mr Greaney has emphasised, the Inquiry will simply not accept statements that what appear to it to be important

today and yesterday that my remarks and concerns will be passed on to the relevant ministers and others who manage the responses to the Inquiry's requests.

Separately it was, of course, most informative to hear from the family Core Participants and to learn of the areas which they are most interested in seeing the Inquiry explore. For the most part, these areas of interest seem to be shared across the differently represented groups and, again, for the most part, the matters which the Core Participants wished to see being explored are reflective of what the Inquiry Legal Team has in mind as is foreshadowed in the provisional list of issues.

Having had the benefit of listening to the submissions, I and the Inquiry Legal Team will reflect further on everything that has been said.

However, there's one point which I would like to revisit. As was acknowledged in the submissions presented by Mr Southey, the terms of reference for the Inquiry mean that there are limits to what it can consider. That is self-evidently correct. Some of what flows from that boundary to the Inquiry's jurisdiction is set out in the list of issues. It is noted there that there are several issues which fall beyond an analysis of preventability. The first of those specified matters is

documents have been destroyed or cannot be found.

As the families have pointed out, claims of this sort have bedevilled some previous inquiries. As it happens, I do not even need to look to experience in other inquiries to vouch the importance of assessing such claims with care.

I have already seen for myself an example of how assertions that documents have been destroyed can turn out to be unreliable. Where claims are made that documents of importance have been destroyed or cannot be located, material providers can expect such assertions to be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny. Accordingly, the Inquiry will expect to hear detailed evidence as to the nature of the efforts made to locate any such documents and the processes around their storage and retention.

Having done so, the Inquiry will draw such inferences as seem appropriate in light of the nature and importance of the documents concerned alongside the quality of any evidence given by way of explanation for their absence.

Another area of concern which emerged clearly from the opening statements of the family Core Participants was that of co-operation between the Inquiry and the authorities in the Republic of Ireland. These are understandable concerns even if some are expressed in

. 

1	more trenchant language than others.	1	INDEX	
2	I have no doubt that the more strongly worded and	2		
3	sceptical remarks passed concerning co-operation were	3	Opening statement on behalf of Core	1
4	formulated through the lens of long previous experience.	4	Participants represented by John McBurney	
5	But by way of contrast, I come to these proceedings	5	Solicitors by MR KANE KC	
6	unburdened by any previous experience of contact,	6		
7	negotiation or communication with the authorities in the	7	Opening Statement on behalf of the Core	3
8	Republic of Ireland. Some may consider that an	8	Participants represented by Fox Law by	
9	advantage; others a disadvantage. However, it allows me	9	MR SOUTHEY KC	
10	the luxury of an open mind. I therefore take the various	10		
11	assurances which have repeatedly been made by senior	11	Opening statement on behalf of the Rush	109
12	members of the Government of Ireland at face value and	12	family by MR MANSFIELD KC	
13	I assume that they are made in good faith.	13		
14	That is the approach which I will continue to take,	14	Closing comments by LORD TURNBULL	143
15	unless and until I am given reason to think differently.	15		
16	The Inquiry will now adjourn still its next hearing,	16		
17	which will take place on Monday, 21 July.	17		
18	(3.40 pm)	18		
19	(Adjourned until Monday, 21 July 2025)	19		
20		20		
21		21		
22		22		
23		23		
24		24		
25		25		
	149		150	

74/24 120/4 85/2 118/7 12 February [1] **1990s [2]** 60/16 **2001 [4]** 44/9 54/7 3 miles [1] 50/22 LORD TURNBULL: **3.40 pm [1]** 149/18 38/13 79/15 93/25 120/4 **[16]** 1/3 1/8 31/6 **30 [2]** 22/21 32/4 12 February 1997 [1] **1991 [1]** 62/17 **2002 [5]** 44/10 54/19 68/24 69/5 97/2 97/5 74/22 **1993 [2]** 73/7 73/14 121/15 122/23 127/10 30 April 1998 [1] 97/9 109/1 109/6 12 May 1997 [1] 44/7 **1994 [2]** 73/20 74/1 **2004** [5] 13/4 124/1 75/17 109/10 109/13 109/16 **1996** [11] 20/25 45/1 124/2 127/22 128/5 **30 January [1]** 37/25 12 October 2004 [1] 139/8 139/12 143/15 56/1 58/2 62/16 62/24 **2005 [1]** 136/22 124/2 **30 years [2]** 53/19 MR GREANEY: [6] 12.06 pm [1] 69/6 63/18 74/16 74/20 **2008 [3]** 95/6 106/18 53/22 1/4 31/7 31/12 109/2 74/21 94/23 12.24 pm [1] 69/8 124/8 **30-year [1]** 68/20 109/11 139/13 **1997 [25]** 20/25 21/6 **2009 [2]** 36/10 **31 [2]** 7/22 27/22 13 February [1] MR KANE: [1] 1/11 22/19 23/23 44/2 44/7 125/15 31 August 1994 [1] 33/25 MR MANSFIELD: [3] 2010 [2] 26/10 126/5 13 October 1994 [1] 44/25 65/13 66/3 73/20 109/14 109/19 139/11 67/14 72/4 74/22 **2011 [2]** 126/9 31 July 1998 [1] 74/1 MR SOUTHEY: [5] 74/24 75/1 75/2 75/4 **14 [3]** 11/17 41/2 127/10 19/19 31/15 69/4 69/9 97/4 57/13 79/18 79/21 83/16 **2012** [5] 11/24 110/1 **310 [1]** 13/21 97/10 **32 [4]** 79/19 80/18 84/3 102/15 106/20 113/13 129/16 134/1 **14 years [1]** 81/9 107/3 116/6 140/14 **2013 [4]** 11/7 11/15 82/13 82/14 **15 [1]** 35/14 15 April 2025 [1] **1997/1998 [1]** 19/19 45/24 46/22 **36 [1]** 33/5 **'all' [1]** 91/24 1998 [59] 3/12 6/4 2014 [2] 89/12 **39 [2]** 24/22 25/3 13/16 **'I [1]** 43/7 10/14 19/19 19/19 15 August 1998 [18] 127/11 'I was [1] 43/7 3/12 6/4 10/14 31/17 20/25 21/6 22/19 **2019 [1]** 17/15 'inside [1] 57/10 4 August 1998 [3] 40/24 50/17 89/18 23/23 31/17 40/24 **2020 [1]** 42/21 'is [1] 77/24 50/13 89/16 101/18 95/12 111/13 115/1 41/2 44/25 49/14 2021 [3] 46/5 114/24 'Only [1] 57/23 119/17 121/24 123/21 50/13 50/17 59/13 118/7 4 February [1] 38/25 'resulted [1] 55/6 124/14 128/2 128/21 59/19 60/6 64/11 4 March 2012 [1] 2025 [3] 1/1 13/16 'some [1] 84/12 129/16 137/2 147/3 65/13 67/14 71/21 149/19 'They [1] 43/17 **43 [1]** 33/1 72/22 75/10 75/17 **21 [2]** 31/21 135/6 15 August 2000 [1] 'unhelpful [1] 55/4 **47s [1]** 50/20 51/2 76/17 82/3 82/11 83/7 **21 January [1] 'we [1]** 43/11 **15 June [1]** 74/19 84/16 88/16 89/9 127/22 **48 [1]** 31/23 89/16 89/18 93/8 95/9 **21 July [1]** 149/17 **48 hours [1]** 63/15 15 September 2008 **[1]** 124/8 95/12 95/15 100/10 21 July 2025 [1] ... [6] 13/23 18/11 **16 [2]** 19/20 119/16 100/16 100/25 101/18 149/19 34/2 38/1 104/7 **5 per cent [1]** 53/7 16 August 1998 [3] 102/15 107/5 111/13 **22 [1]** 135/7 104/15 115/1 116/2 118/3 **54 [1]** 32/18 41/2 82/3 116/2 22 February 2008 [1] ... certainly [1] 16 June 1997 [1] 119/17 121/24 123/21 106/18 104/15 124/14 128/2 128/21 75/2 **23 [1]** 32/21 ... cowardly [1] 34/2 6 December 2013 [1] 16 March [1] 36/10 137/2 138/20 140/14 23 July [1] 100/9 ... people [1] 38/1 11/15 **17 [2]** 17/19 32/13 147/3 **23 years [1]** 121/20 ... the [1] 18/11 61 [1] 32/24 17 July 2002 [1] **1999 [2]** 137/18 230-kilogram [1] ... there [1] 104/7 **65 [1]** 31/25 121/15 138/22 103/2 ... will [1] 13/23 **66 [1]** 33/3 **18 [2]** 10/21 28/12 23rd [1] 44/8 2 1 18 May 2005 [1] 24 June 2025 [1] 1/1 2 April 2004 [1] 136/22 **24.8% to [1]** 19/25 1 August 1996 [1] 7 October 1996 [1] 124/1 18 May 2010 [1] 24th May 2001 [1] 94/23 74/21 **2.00 [1]** 97/5 44/9 126/5 1 December 1997 [1] **79 [1]** 23/2 **2.06 pm [1]** 97/8 **18 months [1]** 7/15 **25 years [2]** 123/2 116/6 **2.24 pm [1]** 109/7 1.07 pm [1] 97/6 **19.5 [1]** 20/1 130/25 **2.34 pm [1]** 109/9 **1922 [1]** 54/10 **251 [1]** 20/20 10 April 1998 [1] 8 December 2004 [1] **1969 [2]** 54/10 56/23 **20 [3]** 56/22 74/19 **26 [1]** 38/10 75/10 128/5 95/1 **1972 [2]** 53/20 70/7 26 years [3] 30/18 10 June 1996 [1] 20 August [1] 82/11 1973 [1] 62/17 39/13 111/25 74/16 1974 [1] 62/22 20 August 1998 [1] **264 [1]** 26/3 10.00 [1] 1/2 **9/11 [1]** 6/10 100/25 1978 [1] 62/17 26th July 2002 [1] 10.55 [1] 31/9 **90 [1]** 82/7 20 February 2004 [1] **1979 [1]** 84/23 44/10 **11 [2]** 6/10 11/25 **91 [1]** 51/2 13/4 **1982 [1]** 86/20 **27 [1]** 32/1 11 April 1998 [1] **99/91 [1]** 51/2 20 July 1997 [1] 75/4 **1983 [1]** 56/23 **27 years [1]** 11/23 93/8 **20 months [1]** 32/5 **1985 [3]** 11/13 66/1 **28 [1]** 133/18 **11.08 [1]** 31/11 **20 years [1]** 136/22 **12 [3]** 32/11 32/15 66/15 28 January [1] 37/15 **Abad [5]** 32/19 32/19 **1986 [1]** 78/24 **200 years [1]** 138/4 **29 November 2013** 123/13 32/19 32/20 37/14 **2000 [11]** 39/11 **[1]** 11/7 **1988 [1]** 62/19 **12 August [2]** 88/19 ability [3] 61/21 43/24 51/2 65/11 **1989 [5]** 62/20 62/24 100/7 144/18 147/16 62/24 63/20 63/25 104/4 112/2 112/10 12 December [1] able [11] 10/5 17/23 112/15 118/4 118/7 3 April 1997 [1] **1990 [3]** 66/3 83/3

able... [9] 24/17 24/24 27/6 49/21 79/16 81/10 108/18 139/9 141/24 about [73] 8/10 16/1 25/8 27/22 30/18 31/1 34/6 34/9 34/24 36/7 37/16 38/23 39/1 39/3 40/10 41/10 42/25 48/5 50/7 50/9 51/16 54/2 56/2 58/15 59/24 61/6 65/2 66/7 67/18 69/1 69/10 77/17 79/7 82/16 85/12 86/11 87/10 90/5 91/24 93/3 97/11 99/5 99/24 101/16 105/16 105/20 109/2 110/18 113/6 113/11 113/14 113/17 114/4 116/19 117/14 117/15 117/22 118/23 119/7 120/5 120/12 123/9 129/6 129/22 129/23 130/7 134/13 135/5 137/2 139/13 139/25 140/12 147/19 above [5] 21/1 42/2 43/15 76/1 77/3 absence [10] 22/17 25/16 25/22 28/7 65/13 96/25 97/15 98/9 98/14 148/20 absolute [1] 4/5 **absolutely [4]** 116/9 117/25 118/6 129/21 abstentionist [1] 79/1 accept [5] 70/24 126/10 133/5 140/18 147/24 acceptable [1] 24/16 accepted [10] 41/13 42/3 45/7 51/7 79/22 93/21 94/4 95/22 133/10 133/11 accepting [1] 80/9 access [3] 60/17 66/21 81/8 accessing [3] 65/3 65/4 128/23 accidentally [1] 100/20 accompanied [1] **accompany [2]** 23/15 91/23 accordance [1] 140/17 according [2] 64/18 84/21 Accordingly [1] 148/12

account [4] 90/21 99/22 131/24 142/16 accountability [3] 111/22 113/22 127/19 accounts [1] 3/23 accumulated [1] 135/2 accurate [1] 44/16 accusation [1] 17/25 achievable [1] 3/15 achieve [1] 57/22 achieving [2] 73/5 73/10 acknowledge [2] 2/9 48/19 acknowledged [9] 113/1 113/7 113/23 130/9 131/23 138/12 139/24 142/15 146/18 acknowledges [1] 10/22 acquisition [1] 99/3 across [6] 61/19 107/12 135/18 135/24 144/2 146/8 act [16] 7/23 16/16 17/15 34/2 62/15 62/20 62/22 63/18 63/19 64/11 65/11 66/1 66/15 67/5 69/25 adequate [2] 21/19 129/9 acted [4] 56/24 99/8 120/16 124/17 acting [2] 99/5 123/20 action [14] 18/13 51/18 61/22 87/19 92/23 103/24 104/5 104/19 121/6 121/22 121/23 124/11 126/14 134/10 actioned [1] 121/10 actions [4] 87/25 95/23 96/19 120/15 active [3] 81/25 83/2 102/19 actively [1] 141/17 activists [1] 82/9 activities [10] 12/7 12/8 25/8 62/3 62/10 67/7 67/8 69/15 75/6 85/9 activity [11] 19/12 19/13 55/18 59/5 64/9 69/18 75/6 98/25 102/16 106/5 135/23 acts [6] 25/8 62/24 63/22 64/1 64/2 128/9 adversarial [1] actual [3] 52/24 114/4 124/15 actually [5] 51/25 79/23 112/4 119/12 133/7

acute [2] 138/15

145/5 36/10 42/21 76/16 **Adams [3]** 73/9 79/4 80/24 Adams-McGuinness [2] 79/4 80/24 add [4] 17/2 96/16 131/19 137/14 addendum [5] 22/15 22/21 23/3 24/15 24/22 addition [9] 25/21 57/15 62/18 76/6 86/18 87/8 98/18 107/4 122/11 additional [1] 24/4 additionally [2] 23/24 147/16 24/7 address [8] 48/3 50/2 119/5 135/21 50/21 50/22 52/7 54/2 afternoon [4] 4/2 55/1 109/12 addressed [3] 30/15 68/22 142/2 addresses [2] 50/18 60/22 addressing [3] 7/1 54/1 96/25 adds [1] 144/4 adequacy [3] 95/25 117/2 117/18 53/10 adequately [1] 102/10 adhered [1] 78/11 adherence [1] 137/21 adjourn [1] 149/16 Adjourned [1] 149/19 Adjournment [1] 97/7 adjust [1] 95/4 administration [1] 70/9 administrative [1] 100/14 admits [1] 35/13 admitted [1] 100/12 adopted [8] 27/18 58/8 69/17 105/22 105/23 112/12 113/19 83/15 98/10 99/15 126/10 adopting [1] 103/4 advance [2] 42/20 89/21 advanced [1] 108/21 advantage [2] 14/2 149/9 130/22 advised [1] 70/10 advisers [1] 70/15 advocates [2] 108/21 135/5 affairs [9] 25/15

Agreement [25] 89/14 90/23 94/11 104/3 105/10 affidavit [3] 11/16 11/17 136/22 afraid [1] 82/21 after [30] 8/16 16/7 30/18 41/2 42/8 53/16 54/15 59/21 70/7 72/21 75/8 76/1 84/5 90/1 92/25 94/6 94/19 126/21 139/14 97/5 101/1 104/8 104/8 104/9 112/7 115/11 119/24 120/4 121/7 121/8 145/25 aftermath [3] 111/15 109/13 124/14 142/10 AIRLINES [2] 58/1 again [19] 4/19 9/12 24/23 26/16 29/9 33/8 Aisling [1] 32/7 38/18 38/19 39/3 59/7 97/5 105/8 110/9 117/17 117/21 125/13 Alan [2] 1/25 2/6 126/23 129/18 146/9 against [21] 6/7 6/21 14/5 18/13 19/12 23/1 30/22 51/21 58/20 63/1 63/21 69/25 75/14 81/17 87/11 92/23 104/6 121/5 121/13 142/7 145/2 aged [16] 31/21 31/23 31/25 32/1 32/4 32/4 32/9 32/11 32/13 32/14 32/18 32/21 32/24 33/1 33/3 33/5 agencies [13] 36/7 54/25 56/16 56/19 64/19 65/15 65/19 66/21 87/18 117/20 120/7 128/17 128/25 agency [1] 66/20 agenda [3] 20/22 77/22 140/7 agendas [2] 20/24 44/24 agent [6] 30/11 51/10 123/25 agents [22] 55/13 55/24 57/1 57/8 58/23 59/2 59/8 65/9 86/20 87/9 87/9 87/17 97/20 97/23 98/24 99/5 99/13 99/18 99/25 124/11 128/8 128/23 **ago [9]** 22/16 26/10 112/13 121/20 123/2 123/12 135/5 136/22 144/22 agreed [1] 5/2 agreeing [1] 74/7

18/24 20/2 53/16 54/4 54/15 72/20 72/22 72/23 74/18 75/9 75/10 75/15 75/18 75/19 76/5 76/5 76/10 78/18 84/6 111/16 115/11 119/6 137/18 137/24 138/1 ahead [3] 27/3 Ahern [3] 11/19 82/4 82/11 Aiden [1] 31/21 aim [2] 3/10 57/23 aims [1] 20/4 airbrushed [1] 112/22 aired [1] 124/8 61/7 **AK [1]** 50/19 alacrity [1] 129/22 albeit [2] 86/16 141/19 alert [1] 46/22 alerts [1] 40/22 alive [1] 129/5 all [88] 2/12 2/18 3/11 3/15 3/24 4/4 6/9 8/6 9/21 10/6 11/10 13/15 16/7 16/25 17/6 19/8 19/14 21/14 22/20 23/10 23/15 26/9 27/18 29/5 29/10 35/1 37/19 39/25 45/15 45/18 46/5 47/9 47/22 54/16 55/24 56/19 60/18 64/7 65/19 66/3 68/2 74/9 82/7 85/8 90/4 91/16 91/18 92/19 96/2 96/3 96/8 96/9 101/12 101/16 105/1 105/24 109/15 115/4 115/19 116/1 117/1 117/12 118/17 119/8 123/19 125/2 127/12 130/7 134/17 134/21 134/25 136/1 136/3 136/5 136/7 136/10 136/25 137/24 138/9 139/20 140/11 143/1 143/6 143/16 143/21 144/1 144/23 145/25 all-party [1] 74/9 allegation [1] 12/16 allegations [5] 66/2 88/21 89/6 111/24 128/12 alleged [1] 29/13 alleviate [1] 14/11

31/11 42/25 58/15 48/22 51/25 58/17 142/13 143/20 143/23 approach [28] 18/1 77/9 94/12 109/14 60/3 61/21 63/7 63/7 22/7 27/18 29/9 29/20 144/20 145/10 145/10 allocation [2] 19/24 110/5 114/13 114/21 66/19 67/11 73/6 77/6 30/19 30/22 41/21 145/16 146/6 146/11 53/7 117/25 125/12 133/23 79/8 79/14 79/14 47/22 48/5 48/7 48/9 146/20 146/24 148/9 allow [6] 18/12 49/4 137/18 143/16 149/15 79/16 87/19 87/23 48/16 48/22 50/11 148/24 148/25 149/13 53/24 88/4 92/22 Amanda [1] 32/6 94/12 95/24 97/24 52/1 58/8 71/8 73/23 area [10] 4/9 8/15 9/2 95/23 98/14 99/11 99/17 74/7 88/4 103/5 10/3 18/16 19/2 74/11 amassing [1] 114/18 allowed [7] 37/1 39/2 **Amin [2]** 36/2 38/23 106/12 108/1 113/20 105/22 119/5 137/23 89/11 128/13 148/21 40/3 58/13 66/18 among [8] 16/7 41/16 140/1 140/17 149/14 114/3 116/8 118/20 areas [11] 3/3 6/23 76/23 98/18 57/25 79/9 83/11 96/4 119/3 125/18 130/4 7/3 8/21 76/19 76/23 approached [1] allowing [1] 109/19 106/19 108/17 131/2 132/2 132/5 36/22 77/17 86/1 111/3 **allows [1]** 149/9 132/15 133/13 135/10 appropriate [4] 8/8 146/6 146/7 amount [1] 81/11 alluding [1] 23/14 amplified [1] 135/22 140/2 140/13 142/9 62/5 102/8 148/18 arguable [1] 99/11 almost [5] 11/22 148/14 148/19 149/6 argue [3] 39/24 108/7 **Ana [1]** 32/19 appropriately [1] 53/19 68/18 91/7 analogy [1] 49/18 anybody [2] 132/11 50/5 108/11 112/11 analyse [2] 59/24 132/16 April [10] 13/16 argues [1] 52/9 alone [2] 3/21 113/22 anyone [4] 33/22 124/4 72/22 74/24 75/1 **arguing [1]** 114/5 along [2] 75/4 137/9 analysed [1] 91/8 45/8 51/14 63/11 75/10 75/17 84/19 argument [1] 28/15 alongside [3] 81/11 **analysing [1]** 72/5 anything [6] 16/25 93/8 107/5 124/1 arise [5] 5/19 12/5 135/1 148/19 **April 1997 [1]** 75/1 47/19 103/18 108/12 **analysis** [8] 6/8 26/21 42/23 69/1 **Alpass [1]** 43/23 14/14 16/19 21/15 131/4 131/16 **April 1998 [2]** 72/22 arises [4] 50/12 already [43] 8/22 66/11 111/4 146/24 anyway [2] 52/16 107/5 51/24 52/3 53/9 22/17 25/23 28/23 147/9 119/13 apt [1] 27/24 arm [1] 98/4 29/3 31/2 38/23 44/18 **Anderson** [1] 2/5 **Aoibheann [1]** 32/2 arduous [1] 111/20 Armagh [1] 89/11 45/17 45/23 51/19 are [144] 2/19 3/15 armed [4] 60/15 **Andrew [1]** 110/3 apart [1] 69/1 58/6 61/5 61/6 63/23 3/22 4/15 5/19 8/9 **Ann [1]** 31/23 appalling [1] 22/17 78/21 79/10 80/12 68/13 75/4 75/11 9/20 10/8 10/13 10/24 arming [1] 79/15 **Anne [2]** 1/17 1/25 apparent [3] 87/6 78/16 86/2 86/6 86/13 anniversary [2] 99/17 147/19 11/1 12/3 13/1 13/8 arms [1] 81/11 86/18 88/6 90/8 95/3 army [25] 8/14 20/16 137/17 137/23 20/2 20/3 20/13 21/9 apparently [1] 95/17 100/5 101/19 23/6 23/8 24/10 25/23 25/13 40/21 41/3 41/4 announced [1] 101/24 101/21 103/19 104/17 144/12 appeal [3] 52/4 52/23 25/24 26/21 26/25 41/8 54/11 56/15 105/7 105/17 106/10 annual [1] 19/18 126/9 30/25 31/1 35/7 36/11 56/24 62/25 63/20 107/16 108/6 110/13 appear [15] 2/3 14/10 36/13 37/10 38/16 70/16 72/9 72/18 anonymous [3] 115/9 116/21 131/10 50/12 89/15 101/17 42/4 42/7 44/3 45/4 28/6 45/4 58/6 58/16 74/20 77/21 84/22 144/11 148/7 another [14] 38/20 67/19 84/11 87/22 45/17 46/8 46/12 84/23 85/2 86/18 also [53] 2/3 10/5 51/19 52/22 61/7 67/1 88/1 89/22 90/16 46/14 46/20 47/17 86/22 90/2 118/11 13/3 23/17 23/19 24/1 82/25 97/14 104/20 49/23 57/18 63/9 67/1 107/8 109/23 147/25 118/12 25/24 28/9 31/4 33/6 121/15 121/19 124/7 67/19 69/1 73/2 88/21 arose [3] 86/11 118/8 appeared [5] 63/11 37/6 45/20 47/2 48/12 105/18 130/18 130/20 91/5 91/16 93/5 93/11 118/10 126/6 129/19 148/21 54/11 56/3 56/25 97/9 99/9 100/21 answer [4] 132/21 144/16 around [7] 16/2 16/6 57/17 59/12 60/5 64/2 101/19 103/10 103/18 73/17 75/7 75/16 133/18 139/20 142/24 appearing [1] 109/5 64/16 66/2 68/8 68/11 answered [3] 123/23 appears [12] 24/7 104/1 105/25 107/17 79/23 148/15 71/12 71/15 72/8 129/11 135/20 27/22 49/5 61/12 107/21 107/22 108/7 arranged [2] 84/24 72/13 73/12 75/22 108/11 108/18 108/21 96/22 answers [10] 38/2 67/13 70/24 83/25 76/12 77/1 80/18 38/3 38/4 114/12 86/14 90/13 97/17 109/16 110/22 111/3 arrangements [1] 83/25 86/10 89/13 111/10 112/3 113/10 116/20 120/20 124/1 101/12 105/21 16/13 91/23 101/7 101/8 129/16 134/16 134/19 application [6] 52/2 114/16 114/18 115/2 arrest [6] 63/12 101/13 102/24 104/14 **Anthony [2]** 27/24 125/21 126/5 132/3 115/3 115/4 115/12 63/13 63/25 83/6 109/19 110/15 110/17 110/2 132/7 132/8 115/21 115/21 115/22 104/7 122/3 114/1 121/4 131/19 115/25 116/9 116/10 anticipated [1] 19/25 applications [1] arrested [1] 94/21 141/1 141/7 144/5 116/11 116/13 116/17 arrests [2] 60/12 **anxious [1]** 10/9 132/6 145/6 any [87] 2/10 4/6 applied [3] 17/6 116/18 117/1 117/5 105/13 altered [1] 111/13 4/24 5/17 7/14 7/17 117/15 117/21 117/24 Article [9] 5/15 14/2 28/20 62/22 alternative [1] 8/6 10/5 10/13 12/23 117/25 120/2 120/22 **apply [2]** 66/13 95/2 35/9 35/14 35/23 46/6 122/24 123/12 125/13 125/19 51/24 52/21 116/23 12/25 13/25 14/14 applying [3] 22/7 although [12] 41/13 15/5 15/14 15/15 51/21 65/24 127/4 127/6 128/8 Article 15 [1] 35/14 42/3 53/22 67/24 16/18 16/19 18/1 128/13 129/3 129/4 apposite [1] 115/25 Article 2 [8] 5/15 76/10 77/23 79/20 21/19 22/22 24/17 appreciate [3] 6/19 130/6 130/21 130/22 14/2 35/9 35/23 46/6 86/9 95/22 100/19 24/24 25/1 25/5 25/6 131/1 131/5 131/21 51/24 52/21 116/23 46/10 108/14 107/20 127/7 133/17 133/19 134/21 articles [2] 63/10 25/13 25/22 28/4 apprehend [4] always [7] 3/19 34/11 30/19 30/22 30/24 123/15 123/19 124/18 134/22 135/19 135/22 64/4 43/3 61/12 99/19 34/3 34/5 38/24 39/12 128/1 136/17 137/8 138/15 articulating [1] 114/5 122/12 145/22 44/1 44/22 45/15 46/9 apprehension [1] 138/18 139/4 139/21 artillery [1] 81/9 am [18] 1/2 20/8 31/9 46/20 48/15 48/17 122/2 140/2 140/15 141/24 as [214]

71/2 72/16 85/5 112/1 76/20 106/24 114/20 135/22 137/19 139/5 assurances [2] 13/9 149/11 140/25 143/8 away [3] 34/2 38/17 145/18 ascertaining [1] 63/5 **assured [1]** 140/16 attending [1] 90/3 112/18 become [6] 22/5 **Ashford [1]** 49/14 astonishing [2] 20/9 attention [5] 3/7 awesome [1] 2/25 53/17 96/10 111/24 aside [1] 24/16 25/12 100/6 102/3 134/11 136/19 23/8 ask [15] 27/18 42/23 at [129] 2/24 3/23 4/4 147/18 **becoming [1]** 56/19 78/6 115/23 116/3 4/8 4/12 4/16 4/23 8/8 attitude [1] 17/25 back [11] 9/12 51/11 **bedevilled** [1] 148/3 116/15 116/19 117/8 58/25 61/11 83/3 9/8 10/22 14/16 16/25 attitudes [1] 6/9 been [156] 117/22 122/21 124/3 111/7 115/16 115/19 17/11 18/22 19/20 attributable [1] 12/11 before [23] 2/8 7/1 128/15 134/17 135/8 116/12 123/24 133/18 20/7 20/20 21/10 8/15 11/10 17/8 19/20 attributed [2] 103/3 139/13 backdrop [2] 6/22 22/21 23/2 25/2 25/11 103/6 31/8 54/3 56/10 82/20 **asked [15]** 3/3 17/1 112/4 26/24 28/12 33/14 91/14 94/8 95/9 102/6 audit [1] 26/17 26/20 112/7 112/16 36/3 36/23 36/25 background [6] 14/5 August [36] 3/12 6/4 105/5 110/8 113/12 115/13 115/13 116/10 18/17 30/5 60/9 73/3 39/19 39/23 40/25 10/14 31/17 40/24 116/15 117/10 118/12 116/14 117/24 119/7 142/7 44/17 46/5 46/21 41/2 50/13 50/17 51/2 119/8 125/22 131/4 119/25 122/20 123/23 **badly [1]** 15/6 46/23 47/7 47/21 73/20 82/3 82/11 began [1] 120/18 129/24 50/15 53/3 53/14 88/16 88/19 89/16 **balance [1]** 141/18 beggars [1] 3/24 asking [4] 108/19 balanced [1] 22/11 53/20 54/16 55/16 89/18 94/23 95/9 **Beghal** [1] 64/13 118/1 118/2 132/21 ball [2] 9/7 77/2 56/7 56/12 56/12 61/2 95/12 95/15 100/7 **beginning [4]** 74/2 aspect [6] 35/17 100/16 100/25 101/18 Baltic [1] 57/21 62/1 62/14 64/13 65/4 109/4 123/3 137/12 39/19 40/18 41/7 **Banbridge [5]** 41/23 67/3 67/17 67/20 69/5 behalf [33] 1/5 1/9 111/13 115/1 116/2 42/12 147/12 119/17 121/24 123/13 94/22 103/3 104/9 69/13 71/12 72/19 1/12 2/3 2/17 3/2 aspects [5] 4/16 7/8 124/22 76/5 77/16 79/12 123/21 124/14 128/2 15/20 18/8 20/11 24/1 56/25 133/12 **Banbury** [1] 119/7 82/24 83/7 83/17 128/21 137/2 147/3 22/15 23/20 25/4 26/4 aspirations [1] 3/15 83/19 86/4 86/15 87/8 August 12 [1] 123/13 bar [2] 28/15 28/20 27/10 29/22 31/13 **asserted [2]** 25/16 89/7 89/8 94/20 96/14 August 1998 [4] barbaric [1] 39/2 31/15 33/6 44/18 45/5 141/9 97/17 98/11 99/8 **Barker [2]** 32/14 102/2 104/24 108/25 88/16 95/9 95/15 **assertions** [2] 148/8 32/14 100/23 103/3 103/9 109/12 109/17 109/24 100/16 148/11 **Baroness [2]** 120/3 103/12 103/20 107/2 author [1] 68/17 128/4 130/17 132/10 assess [5] 40/10 107/11 108/5 108/7 120/22 147/13 150/3 150/7 authorised [1] 66/25 48/22 50/8 105/1 based [7] 28/13 52/3 109/4 110/7 112/15 authorities [55] 4/17 150/11 105/2 64/8 72/8 98/17 112/17 112/19 113/2 4/18 4/24 8/24 10/6 behind [1] 114/11 assessed [1] 107/1 being [55] 12/1 12/13 100/15 103/1 113/15 114/7 114/13 10/15 10/17 10/18 assessing [2] 87/24 bases [2] 106/21 20/16 24/8 25/24 115/15 115/15 115/23 12/11 12/24 13/1 148/5 106/25 116/21 117/3 117/4 13/10 14/18 15/2 15/5 26/20 26/22 27/12 assessment [16] basic [7] 18/22 35/15 117/7 118/5 119/6 16/16 16/21 16/23 28/19 40/8 40/25 14/24 29/13 45/3 17/7 17/21 18/3 21/20 115/24 116/13 117/1 43/11 44/18 45/1 119/15 119/25 120/7 45/12 49/1 49/4 50/7 118/24 131/9 120/25 122/22 123/19 24/3 28/8 62/5 62/6 45/16 47/7 51/11 51/15 55/21 71/18 basis [7] 30/19 42/9 124/12 125/2 125/22 92/11 106/8 107/21 53/22 55/7 57/6 58/17 72/13 87/24 88/5 42/10 55/8 75/20 111/22 114/3 114/6 127/12 127/16 128/2 61/8 62/11 64/25 65/6 104/22 116/4 116/21 107/15 138/1 129/4 129/18 132/1 114/16 115/2 116/5 66/17 69/17 74/3 80/5 assessments [4] **baton [1]** 134/18 132/21 135/4 135/25 117/2 117/19 120/16 81/4 88/7 89/16 90/2 71/22 71/25 72/6 137/15 137/24 139/9 122/9 122/17 122/22 **battles [2]** 74/3 74/3 90/5 91/24 94/6 94/7 72/17 **Baxter [8]** 76/14 77/7 139/20 140/19 141/5 124/5 125/11 125/13 100/21 103/11 103/14 assist [5] 3/1 4/25 125/15 126/25 130/25 77/15 89/13 90/23 142/18 143/6 149/12 109/14 111/20 112/22 31/4 95/13 127/14 94/11 104/3 105/10 atrocities [1] 72/21 131/6 132/12 133/2 116/11 120/15 122/18 assistance [5] 2/20 **BBC** [1] 89/5 133/9 133/11 136/16 122/20 124/16 132/7 atrocity [6] 33/7 15/10 18/2 68/25 be [242] 138/6 138/17 138/18 33/16 94/6 109/25 148/24 149/7 106/8 bearing [2] 107/2 111/12 115/10 **authority [2]** 13/7 144/9 145/4 146/10 **Assistant [3]** 12/14 114/14 attack [6] 50/16 119/10 Belfast [2] 18/24 15/23 24/11 bears [1] 115/19 51/11 58/21 62/13 automatic [1] 66/22 81/3 assisted [2] 18/9 89/17 137/2 beautiful [1] 34/19 Belfast/Good [1] available [21] 10/25 27/9 11/3 26/2 28/23 35/6 became [4] 19/10 attacks [9] 30/11 18/24 **assisting [1]** 14/10 73/16 83/15 87/5 49/7 49/9 57/21 76/25 40/7 44/8 45/1 45/15 belief [9] 3/24 4/15 associated [1] 88/8 because [33] 9/8 85/15 102/14 102/18 49/23 52/25 61/17 35/5 73/21 80/2 **associates** [1] 68/10 14/24 14/25 28/20 113/6 61/25 62/5 64/15 110/21 113/13 136/24 **assume [1]** 149/13 36/2 57/10 64/8 67/8 105/2 127/7 129/5 attaining [1] 79/14 137/6 assumed [3] 87/21 77/18 82/22 84/18 137/5 145/16 145/17 believe [16] 30/17 attempt [2] 58/3 83/7 91/17 99/18 91/19 95/14 99/16 avenues [1] 134/25 **attempted** [1] 107/3 47/12 77/10 81/23 **assuming [1]** 51/7 109/21 110/12 114/8 85/13 88/7 93/5 94/8 attempts [2] 55/1 avoid [1] 51/22 assumptions [1] 114/9 114/13 115/14 147/5 Avril [1] 32/4 101/19 106/14 108/9 135/25 115/22 118/5 119/21 114/7 116/9 127/3 attendance [3] 15/18 **Avril's [1]** 32/5 assurance [2] 11/17 119/22 125/12 127/6 41/6 96/9 await [1] 134/2 127/4 143/12 25/19 130/18 131/2 132/23 attended [7] 20/13 aware [4] 53/15 believed [5] 60/22

В believed... [4] 84/16 86/21 116/2 147/6 benefit [1] 146/14 bereaved [14] 1/12 2/22 11/18 22/1 22/8 27/13 30/20 106/17 129/15 136/20 139/17 139/24 140/16 141/20 Bernadette [2] 32/6 32/16 Bertie [3] 11/19 82/4 82/11 bespoke [1] 97/19 Bessbrook [1] 74/22 best [3] 16/24 27/3 129/13 **better [5]** 18/1 23/16 23/17 105/4 119/18 between [32] 7/14 7/18 12/19 13/16 23/6 24/11 25/1 40/7 50/25 55/4 56/23 66/3 70/4 70/19 70/22 73/8 73/13 82/4 82/11 85/22 87/1 87/4 87/6 88/16 92/16 95/20 102/20 102/25 107/9 107/12 120/6 148/23 beyond [4] 2/13 9/21 112/20 146/24 big [1] 92/17 Billy [2] 26/11 43/20 bits [1] 92/19 Blair [2] 82/5 82/12 blame [7] 4/17 33/15 36/11 36/16 36/17 94/12 128/19 **blanket [2]** 125/10 127/20 blow [1] 99/7 blurring [1] 90/25 bode [1] 27/1 bodies [3] 46/4 90/7 147/19 body [3] 9/21 40/2 42/16 bold [1] 28/23 bomb [104] 3/21 4/1 4/10 5/20 7/12 7/20 8/2 8/24 9/9 9/10 10/3 31/17 33/15 33/18 37/5 37/14 37/24 38/22 39/2 39/6 40/7 40/13 40/19 40/22 40/23 41/2 41/5 41/14 45/8 45/9 49/7 51/25 53/15 53/18 55/16 56/7 56/12 57/21 61/9 61/9 62/2 62/14 64/14 65/10 66/10 67/3 67/14 72/21 73/1 brake [1] 7/23 74/11 74/19 74/23

74/24 76/1 76/6 77/5 branch [26] 24/13 78/6 81/14 82/5 82/12 83/17 85/7 86/16 88/8 89/3 92/15 93/7 94/3 94/7 94/9 94/17 94/21 94/22 95/6 100/24 101/1 102/6 102/9 102/13 103/2 103/17 104/4 104/4 104/10 104/12 105/6 106/5 106/7 106/15 112/13 113/25 114/4 120/12 122/4 123/6 123/16 123/21 124/6 124/21 124/25 128/2 135/21 136/2 147/6 bombers [5] 4/11 85/22 123/19 124/16 124/18 bombers' [1] 124/13 bombing [38] 7/5 7/7 7/16 8/16 10/14 11/23 14/17 16/2 16/6 18/18 Bridie [1] 32/12 19/1 19/9 19/20 29/4 83/24 89/7 89/21 92/25 111/13 113/5 113/12 113/14 113/18 114/6 116/7 116/17 120/10 122/8 123/10 124/24 125/6 134/9 134/14 136/9 136/11 137/7 137/13 147/7 **bombings** [1] 89/1 bombs [8] 74/20 81/17 84/19 95/1 104/8 105/12 107/3 107/3 Book [2] 8/10 101/15 **boot [2]** 9/23 10/3 border [19] 8/3 13/25 17/9 24/10 24/19 60/24 61/10 61/12 76/21 81/4 89/11 92/14 93/1 95/18 95/19 107/10 107/12 135/11 136/14 **borne [2]** 117/5 122/21 both [24] 2/16 2/24 3/1 12/2 13/23 13/24 19/5 34/12 68/7 74/6 83/17 85/24 104/17 107/10 107/14 128/24 130/18 132/5 135/11 135/24 136/14 138/2 138/8 139/2 bound [1] 117/22 boundaries [1] 5/22 **boundary [1]** 146/22 box [2] 44/8 66/9 boxes [1] 65/25 boys [1] 9/12

brakes [1] 9/22

26/7 50/24 55/16 55/20 55/22 56/9 59/14 71/12 71/12 71/24 72/3 72/18 85/4 85/5 86/9 87/7 88/17 90/3 93/24 94/1 98/3 100/10 100/18 100/25 128/16 **Branch's [1]** 55/25 breach [2] 5/15 121/25 breaches [1] 35/23 break [11] 31/7 31/10 68/25 69/3 69/5 69/7 82/14 82/17 97/2 109/8 110/6 breakdown [1] 100/13 Breslin [1] 33/1 Brian [2] 32/17 32/17 Bridger [1] 11/24 brief [4] 11/5 20/5 27/7 71/11 briefing [4] 20/22 54/19 106/16 140/7 briefings [3] 20/24 44/24 90/4 briefly [1] 21/13 bring [5] 73/9 99/6 **bringing** [1] 79/4 brings [1] 147/23 Britain [5] 62/6 73/6 87/11 103/25 105/23 **British [19]** 8/14 9/5 12/2 54/11 56/15 56/24 68/16 68/18 73/14 73/15 74/20 74/21 80/3 83/15 84/22 84/23 87/11 121/6 121/15 British Army [5] 8/14 56/15 56/24 74/20 84/23 broadly [1] 8/5 **broke [2]** 69/9 97/10 broken [1] 13/9 brother [3] 31/21 31/25 32/9 brothers [1] 110/2 brought [4] 13/20 41/3 50/20 53/16 **Brown [1]** 44/6 Bryan [1] 31/25 build [2] 38/16 38/17 **buildings** [1] 65/2 built [1] 9/9 Bureau [1] 100/17 Burke [3] 80/16 83/6 83/11 busy [2] 4/1 34/22 **but [70]** 2/4 7/12 8/7

9/5 9/5 13/9 14/2 20/25 21/11 23/23 28/7 31/4 36/17 38/17 Canary [2] 61/8 61/9 65/21 66/8 67/16 72/8 61/8 73/12 82/16 82/22 83/12 84/12 87/12 96/9 105/7 106/15 109/20 110/6 110/13 110/17 111/4 111/7 112/4 112/19 112/21 113/13 115/13 115/15 115/21 116/1 116/17 118/7 118/17 121/7 126/8 126/8 126/20 139/14 139/20 140/15 60/19 81/23 82/1

128/21 129/1 130/7 135/13 137/15 139/1 141/1 144/1 149/5 Cabinet [1] 71/16 call [12] 4/19 4/21 36/15 50/13 50/23 50/24 51/1 51/8 89/15 101/2 101/17 147/4 called [7] 20/13 123/5 123/13 120/23 125/24 138/13 caller [2] 50/14 50/19 carnival [1] 35/2 calls [12] 8/10 39/22 39/23 40/5 40/18 43/1 | Caroline [1] 33/4 58/12 65/3 65/24 67/12 147/2 147/5 came [3] 55/10 81/1 136/4 camera [3] 66/23 125/22 139/14 **campaign [4]** 73/5 79/15 81/6 81/15 campaigner [1] 113/3 Campbell [3] 80/15 81/16 102/22 **Campion [1]** 2/5 can [52] 7/8 7/12 9/20 9/25 12/1 14/16 18/15 21/24 29/7 29/16 37/20 38/14 41/24 43/19 46/18 48/9 57/10 67/24 68/21 68/22 70/23 73/1 82/14 82/15 82/17 82/22 86/4 91/9 24/4 25/24 26/1 97/2 109/14 115/5 118/5 121/17 130/13 137/24 138/10 138/13 38/12 139/5 139/21 140/16 142/14 145/17 146/20 148/8 148/11

48/16 54/2 55/2 55/14 Canary Wharf [1] candour [4] 3/14 29/16 46/24 130/3 cannot [20] 8/12 9/23 10/2 16/12 23/3 24/1 24/3 24/6 44/21 46/16 47/18 91/17 99/18 114/20 114/22 132/4 140/3 140/19 148/1 148/10 Caoimhe [1] 32/7 capabilities [1] 79/13 132/14 132/16 132/18 capable [1] 124/5 132/22 133/12 133/13 capacities [1] 86/19 capacity [5] 58/10 124/22 car [11] 9/10 9/11 9/25 10/2 10/4 81/17 84/19 93/11 95/1 104/10 123/21 Caragh [1] 32/23 care [8] 4/14 42/14 44/15 46/17 101/23 106/1 108/13 148/6 40/21 52/4 60/10 75/3 careful [2] 12/6 99/18 carnage [1] 3/25 Carol [1] 1/24 carried [5] 31/2 54/9 88/12 134/18 136/2 carry [4] 49/9 51/15 104/12 134/18 carrying [4] 16/18 49/7 62/12 76/25 cars [4] 76/22 82/8 88/25 89/3 Cartwright [3] 1/16 1/16 1/17 **cascaded** [1] 71/9 case [14] 49/5 52/4 61/11 64/13 67/10 91/17 101/5 101/25 112/20 125/16 126/16 135/13 143/24 145/9 cast [3] 46/9 113/4 120/15 Cat [1] 31/20 catalyst [1] 120/16 categories [4] 24/2 91/13 92/4 92/5 96/24 category [1] 140/5 **cathartic** [2] 38/5 38/12 131/10 131/22 135/25 cathartic/healing [1] cause [9] 8/7 33/19 69/23 75/25 80/3 82/1 121/22 121/23 126/14

can't [3] 38/19

119/19 132/18

C 124/12 18/22 19/2 23/19 79/20 80/19 82/13 **collectors** [1] 86/11 Chief [13] 20/15 25/18 27/1 30/17 combat [1] 60/14 89/14 90/23 91/15 caused [4] 3/22 24/20 26/8 49/16 clients' [2] 3/17 8/21 combination [1] 94/11 104/3 105/10 74/22 128/2 145/19 70/15 70/22 71/11 Clive [1] 31/22 57/23 committees [1] 71/9 causing [1] 74/12 76/14 77/19 93/21 **Cloghogue** [1] 76/21 combined [2] 40/11 common [1] 67/4 caution [3] 6/17 100/12 121/14 128/7 close [4] 63/4 107/11 73/25 communicate [2] 56/11 92/9 children [2] 4/3 34/24 107/14 118/25 come [17] 21/17 37/7 58/25 cautious [1] 30/21 **Christina** [1] 33/12 closed [18] 13/24 41/10 51/11 52/15 communication [3] CCTV [1] 66/22 22/5 29/20 30/15 58/15 61/11 67/6 66/1 124/14 149/7 chronology [1] ceasefire [7] 20/2 30/24 48/20 108/21 90/11 90/18 111/6 communications [3] 121/16 73/19 73/25 74/13 115/16 115/19 116/12 57/16 124/12 124/15 CID [4] 86/10 86/15 131/23 131/25 132/2 75/3 79/24 84/8 132/5 132/8 132/15 125/20 126/13 137/25 community [9] 38/1 90/4 100/22 ceasefires [3] 19/22 Cillian [1] 32/7 132/17 132/20 142/15 149/5 44/21 59/1 72/1 87/5 53/5 78/16 142/17 143/3 88/3 91/2 91/3 94/24 circumscribed [1] comes [1] 115/11 cell [2] 64/24 66/11 10/24 closely [2] 60/6 comforted [1] 126/20 Company [1] 57/13 cemented [1] 78/18 compared [1] 23/1 circumstances [15] 124/4 coming [5] 76/24 cent [1] 53/7 119/3 133/4 133/18 6/3 18/25 27/12 27/25 closing [3] 111/22 **compel [2]** 15/18 central [1] 72/4 37/13 37/23 38/21 143/14 150/14 133/24 43/11 centralised [1] 86/21 113/5 113/17 120/12 closure [1] 38/8 command [1] 74/1 compelled [1] 20/8 centre [4] 9/18 36/24 124/25 129/13 138/16 **co [33]** 3/14 13/13 compelling [1] 22/4 command's [1] 81/3 116/21 124/12 141/12 142/20 14/11 17/15 20/17 **Commander [4]** 51/1 compiling [1] 59/21 centred [1] 124/15 citizens [3] 5/10 21/5 25/19 60/25 61/10 51/3 95/10 106/23 complemented [1] certain [6] 7/1 26/5 34/14 61/12 70/17 71/18 commanders [1] 127/18 76/19 119/15 132/18 citizenship [1] 5/12 72/7 87/2 88/4 92/16 77/16 complete [5] 44/16 civil [8] 29/10 45/10 92/18 93/2 95/18 47/19 49/22 73/20 commanding [4] certainly [4] 69/11 95/19 102/19 102/20 53/22 54/11 124/9 20/16 57/6 70/16 71/5 125/10 69/23 97/4 104/15 127/15 127/20 134/10 102/25 106/3 107/9 commemorative [11] completely [1] **cessation** [1] 73/20 107/11 107/14 107/15 2/10 3/24 9/1 33/20 civilian [2] 54/14 132/14 Chair [4] 31/15 39/7 68/3 127/4 135/10 136/14 33/25 34/21 36/22 complex [3] 54/18 97/10 110/24 143/10 148/23 149/3 37/11 41/1 111/2 54/21 86/6 **claim [2]** 105/18 chaired [3] 24/20 127/22 co-operate [2] 92/18 113/2 complexities [2] 71/4 72/13 claimed [3] 102/17 135/10 commenced [4] 73/7 55/11 144/4 Chairman [4] 25/10 74/15 79/23 127/16 113/24 117/9 complexity [1] 55/1 co-operating [1] 132/4 134/17 134/23 **claiming [1]** 88/25 14/11 commencement [4] **compliant [2]** 14/2 **challenge** [2] 5/24 claims [8] 42/14 co-operation [22] 14/12 25/17 47/21 46/6 28/17 46/15 92/7 101/22 3/14 13/13 17/15 56/13 complications [1] **challenged [2]** 46/15 140/2 148/2 148/6 25/19 60/25 61/10 **comment [5]** 2/10 144/19 114/8 148/9 61/12 92/16 93/2 21/24 22/22 31/4 complimentary [1] challenges [8] 38/9 95/18 95/19 102/19 Claire [1] 1/23 142/22 54/23 52/13 52/16 53/11 102/25 106/3 107/9 clarification [2] commented [2] 41/1 comply [3] 17/22 67/20 143/21 143/23 139/22 141/25 107/11 107/14 107/15 57/23 52/20 144/8 147/23 clarity [1] 87/2 127/4 136/14 148/23 comments [4] 28/24 compounded [3] challenging [2] 45/24 classified [1] 26/6 149/3 90/24 143/14 150/14 14/19 55/11 111/19 48/19 **clause [1]** 15/3 co-operative [1] comprehend [1] commercial [1] **chance [1]** 126/15 clear [35] 4/15 12/16 143/10 81/18 22/20 **change [1]** 116/8 22/3 29/25 35/24 co-ordinated [1] 88/4 Commission [1] comprehensive [6] **changed [4]** 6/9 6/10 37/10 37/11 39/5 40/3 co-ordination [3] 49/12 16/19 37/13 37/23 26/21 95/11 41/3 42/9 43/23 49/12 71/18 87/2 102/20 Commissioner [5] 38/21 86/3 124/19 chaos [1] 111/16 54/17 60/13 61/2 co-ordinator [3] 11/12 12/14 15/23 compromise [1] 99/5 chapter [8] 7/4 7/7 63/16 68/8 70/3 70/4 20/17 70/17 72/7 24/12 24/21 computer [2] 65/5 7/11 7/11 18/19 75/23 85/8 90/13 coalition [1] 102/23 Commissioner 65/5 122/14 137/8 143/7 94/15 96/10 98/10 coded [1] 95/12 Conroy [1] 11/12 conceal [1] 17/24 Chapter 2 [1] 143/7 98/22 108/11 109/14 **codeword [1]** 40/6 commit [1] 84/12 concealment [1] **chapters [6]** 7/4 7/13 111/7 119/2 125/4 commitment [7] 4/24 **cohesive** [1] 88/3 26/18 21/14 47/22 48/2 132/6 133/10 134/4 Colan [1] 31/22 14/20 15/15 16/18 concede [4] 131/10 48/14 clearly [14] 5/19 9/23 Colin [2] 2/1 32/16 78/13 108/15 110/25 131/12 132/18 133/17 **charge [1]** 104/3 11/25 20/3 33/14 75/6 **collating [2]** 72/5 commitments [2] conceivable [1] charged [1] 87/23 90/18 102/13 107/22 90/7 46/11 136/15 68/18 charter [1] 130/2 129/12 129/24 130/9 collecting [2] 65/2 **committed [2]** 78/11 concern [19] 3/4 chatter [1] 34/23 135/19 148/21 87/17 79/10 6/24 7/2 7/3 8/7 8/10 check [1] 63/3 clients [20] 2/19 4/6 8/21 9/2 9/15 18/16 **collection [3]** 56/14 committee [19] checkpoints [1] 4/15 4/19 4/23 5/4 8/7 58/13 64/24 19/18 36/10 42/21 23/19 26/15 50/7 76/21 8/9 8/13 9/16 9/19 42/24 53/4 71/6 71/16 69/16 77/13 84/7 **collective** [1] 3/10 Cheltenham [1] 12/23 15/15 17/13 collectively [1] 34/13 71/20 72/14 76/16 111/5 111/9 148/21

C 52/10 96/4 103/23 96/17 149/14 139/18 139/23 142/2 **corporate** [18] 15/20 126/15 132/19 146/21 continued [13] 6/21 18/7 20/10 21/13 144/17 145/6 146/4 concern in [1] 9/2 149/8 53/11 54/13 74/14 22/12 22/14 23/20 court [12] 35/11 concerned [8] 27/22 35/19 36/1 52/4 52/23 considerable [6] 75/8 75/25 76/4 85/1 24/14 25/3 26/4 27/10 30/5 46/14 72/9 6/12 10/9 22/13 27/1 86/15 98/12 99/3 29/19 29/22 86/14 91/14 121/13 122/24 105/16 105/20 114/21 31/2 90/15 110/23 114/12 92/20 98/2 105/21 125/22 127/1 127/9 148/19 107/17 132/25 consideration [4] 4/7 **continues** [1] 5/14 concerning [6] 7/11 13/15 52/12 116/8 continuing [2] 62/3 corporations [1] courtesy [1] 110/25 15/1 44/17 63/8 144/5 courts [1] 67/9 considerations [2] 138/19 133/12 149/3 8/4 21/4 **continuity** [7] 78/25 correct [3] 85/18 cover [1] 99/7 concerns [22] 8/14 considered [22] 7/4 79/12 79/16 82/18 85/20 146/21 covered [1] 18/19 11/4 56/2 90/11 93/4 29/7 30/3 36/21 40/2 94/24 102/23 114/22 **corrected [1]** 51/6 covers [1] 108/3 104/1 104/23 105/24 41/15 48/6 51/13 covert [3] 59/17 **contrary** [1] 51/2 corroborated [1] 105/25 110/16 110/18 56/10 67/4 68/21 contrast [2] 126/2 49/8 64/19 65/7 134/23 136/6 139/24 72/15 72/15 76/6 80/9 149/5 Corroboration [1] cowardly [2] 5/21 140/12 140/14 145/20 85/19 85/24 88/11 contribute [1] 7/19 49/3 34/2 146/1 147/14 147/18 99/22 103/6 104/16 contributed [3] 77/5 corrosive [1] 111/24 Cox [1] 43/2 147/21 148/25 108/13 86/24 143/18 **created [5]** 36/13 **Cory [1]** 43/10 concessions [11] control [2] 4/5 81/8 **Cory Inquiry [1]** 45/2 64/2 66/1 73/22 considering [4] 29/1 46/21 116/13 12/23 48/24 51/23 credibility [3] 12/12 **controlled [2]** 43/12 43/10 119/22 132/4 142/1 could [50] 2/17 6/23 52/13 87/14 42/7 96/13 142/5 142/9 142/23 considers [4] 14/21 controls [1] 67/15 6/24 10/4 10/7 10/14 crime [7] 24/12 59/14 143/2 143/4 66/11 131/22 142/14 controversial [2] 14/17 15/6 17/24 60/15 66/16 86/17 concluded [3] 26/15 consistent [5] 38/22 121/1 122/15 18/23 19/13 27/4 128/11 128/11 46/20 69/9 68/2 77/14 88/4 94/15 convention [7] 5/15 30/18 31/7 39/12 crimes [1] 55/8 concludes [2] 108/24 43/11 48/24 51/8 conspiracy [1] 122/4 35/10 35/13 52/21 **criminal [8]** 17/15 139/15 52/25 58/19 59/5 Constable [10] 20/15 79/20 80/13 116/23 45/10 62/18 63/24 conclusion [1] 64/17 64/20 65/22 24/20 70/15 70/22 conversation [1] 64/3 64/9 122/3 131/5 126/13 71/11 77/19 93/22 82/10 66/10 66/18 66/24 criminally [1] 43/7 conclusions [2] 100/12 121/14 128/7 67/2 68/7 77/21 80/8 conversations [3] critical [4] 24/10 41/25 86/3 87/10 90/6 96/5 98/21 25/11 55/23 93/25 **Constable's [1]** 26/8 65/1 83/4 89/7 concrete [1] 49/6 **conversed** [1] 34/23 100/10 103/17 104/7 **criticise [2]** 95/23 Constabulary [1] **conditions** [1] 43/13 104/15 107/24 112/13 128/19 44/23 convey [1] 37/2 conduct [5] 37/12 constitutional [1] conveyed [1] 22/23 114/2 114/6 118/14 **criticised [3]** 73/12 50/1 88/21 107/20 70/9 conviction [1] 45/8 122/8 124/5 125/1 112/19 120/7 128/15 convictions [1] 83/8 134/3 134/6 136/17 constrained [1] criticism [1] 26/10 conducted [3] 49/1 convinced [2] 113/15 Council [2] 35/16 64/10 cross [12] 16/9 17/8 59/18 126/4 145/20 81/15 24/10 24/19 60/24 consultations [1] confessions [1] 121/8 Cooney [1] 32/25 counsel [6] 43/10 61/10 61/12 92/14 115/18 43/16 117/8 118/1 93/1 95/18 95/19 contact [10] 16/1 cope [1] 52/25 confidence [6] 12/1 16/3 16/4 16/4 25/13 copies [1] 20/21 130/16 143/17 130/10 15/16 17/14 23/9 70/21 88/16 100/8 coping [1] 38/18 counter [10] 19/25 cross-border [9] 25/19 39/18 129/1 149/6 copy [3] 43/24 44/2 53/8 57/9 58/1 60/2 24/10 24/19 60/24 confident [1] 117/25 contained [4] 17/18 120/2 60/7 60/16 99/3 61/10 61/12 92/14 confirmation [1] 101/16 136/25 143/1 107/14 132/14 93/1 95/18 95/19 **cord** [1] 103/1 73/13 containing [2] 60/21 core [47] 1/9 1/12 counter-productive cross-examination **confirming [1]** 29/12 1/14 2/3 6/17 10/8 89/3 **[1]** 132/14 **[1]** 16/9 **conflict [2]** 79/10 20/7 22/1 25/20 27/13 counter-terrorism [6] cross-referring [1] contemporaneous 138/14 **[2]** 41/25 124/13 27/16 28/18 28/25 19/25 53/8 58/1 60/2 130/10 confronting [1] 29/3 29/14 29/17 60/7 107/14 content [3] 65/3 crucial [3] 23/24 28/8 125/18 66/11 101/17 30/20 30/23 31/13 counter-terrorist [2] 116/9 **confusion [2]** 87/3 contents [1] 9/22 45/22 46/11 46/19 60/16 99/3 cruelty [1] 39/15 111/16 47/3 102/11 104/20 context [21] 18/15 counties [1] 81/5 **cultural** [1] 6/8 **connected [1]** 44/20 21/21 28/24 53/2 104/24 108/4 111/8 country [3] 5/10 5/12 culture [1] 46/14 Conor [1] 32/22 53/14 60/1 68/22 130/1 130/4 130/13 6/7 current [1] 46/9 Conroy [1] 11/12 68/23 69/10 69/11 131/22 139/16 142/4 County [3] 49/14 customer [1] 9/20 consequence [5] 8/3 69/13 77/20 78/2 78/9 142/8 142/14 142/22 79/19 82/14 cynical [1] 14/10 73/1 98/24 123/20 82/6 85/12 85/25 142/24 143/19 143/25 courage [4] 2/15 124/23 95/17 98/7 125/7 146/5 146/10 147/13 121/1 136/20 137/11 consequences [4] daily [2] 59/21 89/5 130/14 147/17 148/22 150/3 course [19] 20/1 33/20 44/12 47/10 context' [1] 77/25 damage [1] 67/1 150/7 20/12 98/1 111/5 98/15 damaging [1] 26/18 **continual [1]** 45/12 coroner [2] 39/10 113/23 114/9 116/20 consider [11] 5/7 danger [3] 28/1 28/6 continuance [1] 14/6 120/18 123/11 124/1 39/11 28/18 42/5 48/15 48/13 continue [3] 8/12 coroner mentioned 130/24 131/15 138/11 **[1]** 39/11

41/8 45/24 46/2 70/5 23/17 102/22 D demands [4] 16/12 77/4 77/6 78/25 52/25 54/4 145/8 deserves [2] 23/17 developing [2] 62/3 dangerous [3] 28/4 104/25 128/22 129/6 demilitarisation [2] 23/18 84/2 36/14 82/9 129/7 129/9 134/2 77/15 77/20 designated [1] development [4] data [3] 64/24 65/2 134/5 democracy [1] 34/11 104/25 23/25 72/20 74/13 91/7 decision-maker [1] democratic [4] 35/15 desire [7] 37/12 98/16 date [11] 10/25 21/7 38/23 38/24 49/8 104/25 78/13 78/23 79/9 developments [1] 21/19 47/24 50/21 99/12 99/19 99/25 decision-makers [1] Democratically [1] 7/21 76/6 114/23 116/7 138/7 **Desmond [1]** 109/24 deviated [1] 22/3 70/5 121/16 145/11 145/19 demonstrate [9] 36/6 desperation [2] decision-making [1] devices [5] 58/11 dated [8] 11/6 13/16 128/22 39/16 46/13 61/15 22/22 23/2 64/23 65/1 81/12 93/8 120/4 127/10 79/8 85/8 89/20 103/4 despite [11] 20/1 84/15 decisions [6] 69/20 127/10 127/11 128/5 70/3 71/8 77/14 128/9 103/16 27/2 45/1 56/12 57/21 devices' [1] 65/6 daughter [5] 32/4 74/13 76/4 97/18 dialogue [1] 138/13 128/24 demonstrated [8] 32/13 32/20 110/1 13/2 42/8 64/12 67/21 declaration [2] 73/17 98/19 138/23 139/1 did [28] 4/13 7/18 113/16 101/5 124/20 137/10 destined [1] 89/4 7/23 7/25 29/14 40/18 73/25 David [10] 12/9 30/11 43/4 53/24 59/11 **declared [2]** 27/6 138/23 **destroyed** [8] 44/3 43/2 58/24 83/14 44/9 45/16 100/22 141/9 60/17 65/16 66/8 demonstrates [11] 83/20 89/20 89/25 36/24 42/16 44/14 declaring [2] 73/19 141/11 148/1 148/8 66/13 69/19 69/21 93/8 93/20 51/13 58/16 60/18 148/10 69/23 75/14 77/11 91/25 day [10] 4/8 8/15 9/8 76/2 76/2 99/16 100/1 79/12 82/8 84/11 declining [2] 28/25 destruction [2] 26/17 34/19 40/13 41/5 89/7 100/2 102/4 33/19 114/7 114/10 116/19 94/22 118/13 129/12 decommissioning [8] denial [2] 125/10 detail [5] 8/6 10/23 117/9 117/22 119/10 days [10] 2/11 2/12 74/6 74/8 75/16 127/20 12/5 76/7 107/7 126/10 19/19 27/3 63/15 75/18 75/24 75/25 didn't [15] 79/8 **Denise [1]** 1/25 detailed [2] 19/3 88/20 100/8 100/25 77/23 80/4 department [2] 83/10 148/13 113/14 115/2 115/17 133/18 139/18 dedicate [1] 145/24 144/1 details [3] 16/3 16/7 115/23 116/2 117/22 DCI [2] 20/16 72/13 deemed [1] 67/9 departments [6] 81/2 43/1 117/23 118/17 119/8 de [1] 77/23 deep [5] 8/13 21/11 101/9 101/10 114/23 detain [1] 63/14 120/21 126/8 131/13 de-escalation [1] 23/19 59/9 139/2 144/1 145/7 133/5 133/13 detect [1] 62/10 77/23 **deep-seated** [2] 8/13 departure [1] 8/17 **detecting [1]** 66/16 died [6] 109/25 110/1 dead [4] 9/8 74/21 21/11 depend [3] 96/1 detection [3] 7/24 113/12 129/15 129/16 75/1 121/11 deeply [1] 110/21 96/14 145/21 122/2 128/12 134/1 deadlock [1] 74/5 deeply-held [1] Depending [1] detection/investigati difference [1] 94/2 deadly [1] 10/3 110/21 104/22 on [1] 128/12 different [7] 54/23 deal [9] 7/7 8/19 defeated [1] 58/2 deplete [1] 129/7 **detective [6]** 12/13 87/4 89/23 91/5 18/15 36/15 53/10 49/15 60/5 76/14 89/2 defects [1] 10/7 deploy [1] 41/8 105/22 110/11 115/5 91/11 112/25 114/15 deployed [9] 8/15 100/22 differential [5] 40/15 defence [1] 128/4 129/18 defendant [3] 128/6 40/24 41/5 54/12 **detention [1]** 64/12 58/7 103/21 105/9 dealing [9] 10/10 128/10 131/3 69/22 95/13 108/2 deter [1] 76/3 105/16 21/13 22/12 29/18 defendants [4] 118/13 118/14 deteriorating [1] differently [2] 146/8 52/10 52/13 52/18 124/10 125/2 127/24 **deployment** [1] 19/8 126/19 149/15 125/14 133/1 137/4 determination [5] difficult [16] 21/12 depth [1] 2/14 dealt [3] 6/11 12/4 defer [1] 135/6 **Deputy [3]** 11/11 23/11 73/18 73/24 22/20 30/2 30/17 37/8 37/18 defiance [1] 14/5 24/20 24/21 114/10 139/2 81/20 86/24 90/20 death [3] 5/17 36/4 108/11 112/17 113/1 defined [1] 84/12 derived [1] 66/8 **determine** [1] 113/8 128/3 122/14 122/20 127/3 definitively [1] 23/4 **Dermot** [1] 12/14 determined [1] 15/6 deaths [1] 5/9 defused [1] 103/3 **Dermott** [1] 15/23 determining [1] 127/4 144/20 **debate** [1] 13/3 degree [6] 15/14 derogation [1] 35/14 87/19 difficulties [5] 86/10 **Debra [1]** 1/17 15/16 19/10 87/21 114/18 115/20 144/17 **Derry [1]** 93/12 deterred [1] 113/9 **Debra-Anne** [1] 1/17 98/24 139/22 descended [1] **detonating [1]** 103/1 144/24 **decades [2]** 112/13 degrees [1] 21/17 detonation [2] 40/8 difficulty [1] 114/5 111/16 112/25 delay [2] 45/21 describe [2] 37/4 95/1 dignified [1] 36/21 deceased [2] 6/15 126/25 40/15 detonators [3] 81/12 diligence [2] 3/14 37/2 described [11] 28/12 deliberate [3] 8/18 81/13 103/2 23/10 **December [5]** 11/15 26/16 122/20 34/20 53/21 70/20 detract [2] 34/3 34/5 diminished [1] 7/20 73/14 116/6 120/4 74/2 78/2 78/17 85/11 deliberately [3] 43/7 devastating [2] 33/19 diminishing [1] 128/5 100/21 142/23 111/12 118/9 125/16 57/21 19/11 **December 1993 [1]** deliberation [1] direct [2] 70/7 135/6 **Describing [1]** 113/3 devastation [1] 73/14 111/17 directed [1] 67/20 121/8 description [1] decide [3] 17/23 develop [3] 53/24 deliver [1] 3/1 119/14 **direction [2]** 55/15 43/18 132/19 delivered [2] 1/7 descriptions [1] 91/19 105/4 81/16 decided [1] 67/10 109/4 107/9 developed [5] 68/15 directions [1] 19/4 decision [15] 28/11 **delivering [1]** 143/17 deserve [2] 23/16 83/25 86/19 90/6 directly [7] 19/23

(46) dangerous - directly

68/17 D disrupt [10] 34/12 during [22] 7/15 9/1 **election [1]** 13/4 58/3 62/10 63/25 68/6 documents [36] 13/3 20/1 22/23 33/20 electricity [1] 58/4 directly... [6] 41/14 76/3 85/17 85/22 16/15 16/19 17/7 17/8 33/24 34/21 37/11 53/6 77/11 94/4 107/5 117/2 22/16 22/18 23/24 40/21 43/1 48/8 49/15 58/11 64/23 108/20 128/2 59/8 67/13 71/1 73/4 disrupted [1] 105/15 24/2 24/8 24/9 25/16 director [4] 20/16 disrupting [2] 57/19 25/22 25/24 27/5 82/3 82/10 83/20 70/16 72/7 102/21 27/17 44/20 45/4 97/25 101/1 81/18 disadvantage [1] disruption [4] 74/23 45/17 91/13 119/12 duties [2] 59/19 149/9 104/15 105/19 118/22 123/11 127/11 127/13 122/1 disappearance [1] duty [10] 3/16 5/18 131/11 132/9 140/13 disruptive [1] 104/19 8/11 disseminate [1] 140/19 140/23 141/16 35/17 35/21 35/22 disappointed [1] 94/14 144/21 147/20 148/1 35/23 35/25 46/24 4/23 59/21 145/14 disseminated [2] 148/8 148/10 148/15 disappointing [2] 148/19 49/23 91/21 **Dylan [1]** 32/8 28/10 30/2 disseminating [1] does [10] 15/15 **dynamics** [2] 6/9 disarmament [1] 90/8 17/25 34/7 39/20 50/5 18/25 80/10 dissemination [3] 58/16 95/23 96/14 **Dáil [2]** 13/3 79/2 disastrous [1] 25/17 55/21 87/15 120/6 110/12 136/19 disbelief [1] 9/19 dissent [1] 79/9 **Doherty [10]** 32/6 discarded [1] 91/20 each [8] 30/13 36/25 32/6 32/6 32/7 32/7 disservice [1] 2/11 discernible [1] 49/19 59/21 88/17 127/18 32/7 32/8 32/8 32/9 dissident [18] 33/16 discharge [1] 3/16 133/6 136/20 143/18 33/23 34/6 40/9 75/6 109/24 discharged [1] 84/24 earlier [9] 48/8 62/17 78/9 83/1 83/18 85/15 doing [6] 38/14 43/8 disclose [6] 14/21 94/16 103/9 103/9 88/25 102/16 102/20 50/2 54/3 117/15 17/24 19/13 22/9 106/4 106/20 107/5 103/14 104/5 114/25 129/13 26/13 43/9 121/19 116/6 117/3 119/1 domain [1] 122/18 disclosed [6] 21/25 early [8] 26/24 39/20 dissidents [2] 49/7 domestic [2] 19/24 22/16 29/21 47/20 44/17 85/2 103/12 88/8 53/8 122/18 127/13 113/4 131/1 131/2 distance [1] 129/6 don't [18] 9/5 9/6 9/6 disclosure [20] ease [1] 25/21 9/7 34/5 38/19 114/21 distinct [2] 25/18 13/19 16/9 16/17 easier [2] 69/25 73/1 115/4 116/14 117/3 21/13 21/23 30/23 118/24 119/17 119/18 131/14 **distinctly [2]** 34/22 42/15 47/8 47/23 91/5 129/1 131/8 131/16 East [1] 2/20 66/14 96/8 101/23 easy [1] 50/1 distressing [1] 114/1 132/12 133/13 119/22 122/22 126/23 eating [1] 27/8 distributed [1] 61/19 done [9] 7/14 36/18 127/5 143/22 144/17 economic [1] 66/17 107/24 110/4 113/6 distributing [1] 72/5 144/19 145/17 113/6 115/17 117/9 **Eddie [1]** 1/16 **divergence** [1] 79/23 discontentment [2] Edith [1] 31/24 division [1] 80/19 148/17 79/24 80/1 **Divisional [4]** 50/25 **Edwin [1]** 1/15 **Donegal** [1] 79/21 discontinue [1] 79/1 effect [3] 8/1 113/21 51/3 95/10 106/23 **Donna [2]** 33/10 **discounted** [1] 101/4 142/21 **divisions** [1] 75/5 38/12 **discovered** [1] 46/16 effective [17] 5/17 **Dixon [1]** 88/23 Donnelly [1] 83/23 discovery [4] 17/22 34/17 34/20 35/5 do [26] 2/11 4/6 5/23 door [1] 4/16 127/2 127/11 134/7 11/12 12/3 22/10 23/9 doubt [5] 33/15 106/4 35/18 35/22 40/5 discrete [1] 50/4 40/17 40/19 41/19 29/16 36/19 38/18 114/8 143/23 149/2 discretion [1] 90/15 38/19 47/13 48/3 48/3 doubts [1] 120/11 50/6 53/22 58/17 59/4 discuss [3] 21/3 71/2 61/13 97/24 106/6 109/20 110/4 114/14 down [5] 46/9 71/9 96/22 effectively [3] 56/6 115/23 126/15 128/19 111/22 115/23 118/25 discussed [2] 83/24 76/3 108/2 downgrading [1] 8/3 128/21 133/6 133/20 106/21 139/21 143/23 148/4 effectiveness [3] **Downing [1]** 73/16 discussions [1] 60/24 61/3 96/12 Docklands [1] 74/11 draw [1] 148/17 74/14 document [8] 6/14 drawn [3] 100/5 efficacy [1] 27/2 disgrace [1] 131/17 8/12 17/3 17/4 44/11 102/3 147/18 effort [5] 10/10 14/10 disintegrate [1] 23/2 27/5 73/9 45/16 107/6 132/2 drew [1] 113/19 82/15 efforts [4] 74/14 documentary [4] driv [2] 9/11 9/12 dismay [1] 22/13 125/14 144/9 148/14 16/9 23/22 124/8 drive [1] 76/17 **dismissed [2]** 50/24 eight [1] 24/1 124/9 driven [1] 121/4 51/8 drop [2] 19/23 53/6 Eighth [1] 84/21 documentation [17] disposal [1] 40/23 either [7] 8/15 16/18 11/2 15/18 24/5 26/5 due [5] 6/12 54/10 disputed [1] 52/11 100/13 131/23 142/15 21/20 26/7 91/9 28/8 46/5 47/1 96/8 disputing [1] 77/16 124/17 125/2 126/23 127/15 129/5 duly [1] 17/4 disquiet [1] 27/1 **Dun [1]** 84/19 elaborating [1] 2/10 134/4 134/7 139/25 disregarding [1] elaboration [1] 25/11 140/5 141/22 147/16 **Dundalk [2]** 84/20 11/22 **Elaine [1]** 1/23 documented [1] 107/13

**electronic [3]** 58/10 element [4] 114/25 117/11 126/1 136/1 elements [2] 20/3 85/23 eliminate [1] 67/25 Elisha [1] 32/3 **Elizabeth [1]** 33/4 else [3] 3/25 69/1 132/17 **elsewhere** [1] 85/6 email [1] 93/8 emails [2] 65/4 89/19 **emanates** [1] 91/1 **emanating** [1] 19/4 embark [1] 31/1 **embarking [1]** 137/8 embarrassing [1] 21/11 **embryonic** [1] 84/11 **emerged** [6] 8/6 53/20 55/2 147/12 147/15 148/21 emergencies [2] 54/23 62/17 emergency [5] 60/4 62/15 63/18 68/19 147/7 emerges [1] 130/15 **emotion [1]** 2/12 emphasise [1] 140/22 emphasised [1] 147/24 **emphatic** [1] 138/7 **emptive [3]** 18/13 92/23 122/3 **empty** [1] 13/9 enable [3] 34/17 96/18 106/11 enabled [6] 40/4 68/5 68/11 81/5 85/14 89/2 enables [1] 49/1 enacted [1] 67/23 **enactment [1]** 65/10 enacts [1] 34/16 encompassed [1] 62/16 encompassing [1] 134/21 encountered [1] 74/4 **encourage [1]** 106/9 end [13] 9/8 10/20 53/17 73/9 74/13 82/17 84/3 117/3 126/11 133/24 137/12 138/13 143/6 Enda [2] 12/16 13/3 endorse [2] 127/7 130/17 endorsed [3] 72/23

69/19 48/20 49/12 61/3 Ε **existing** [1] 81/5 expressly [1] 77/7 **equipment** [1] 89/3 62/19 63/24 76/12 exists [4] 9/21 28/19 **extend [3]** 110/23 endorsed... [2] 75/11 **equivalent** [2] 67/22 76/15 77/7 77/14 82/3 35/25 136/6 120/24 129/14 138/7 78/8 83/20 84/5 84/10 expanded [1] 124/10 extended [1] 64/7 endorsement [1] erroneous [1] 29/13 84/21 85/3 85/19 expect [12] 29/17 extends [1] 24/9 80/6 34/13 36/8 45/18 **error [1]** 100/14 89/10 89/13 89/14 **extension** [1] 63/15 ends [1] 121/11 **ERU [3]** 60/10 60/13 89/15 90/22 91/4 47/12 130/1 130/3 **extensive** [1] 64/6 endurance [1] 130/13 139/18 139/19 extent [11] 4/18 91/12 92/2 92/3 92/5 60/17 136/19 escalated [1] 112/20 92/6 94/5 94/10 99/10 148/11 148/13 10/15 12/9 19/11 energy [1] 73/23 99/14 99/20 100/24 39/15 41/19 48/13 escalation [1] 77/23 expectation [4] enforceable [1] 101/7 102/25 103/8 34/20 45/13 45/14 96/14 102/5 102/6 **escape** [1] 15/3 97/25 **especially [1]** 28/23 103/12 104/2 104/22 102/7 90/17 enforcement [10] **Esquivel [1]** 32/19 105/9 124/4 131/2 expectations [1] external [1] 87/18 54/9 54/16 55/5 56/18 134/12 134/24 148/13 35/7 **essential** [1] 48/15 **extra [1]** 131/19 64/19 65/15 65/19 essentially [4] 35/4 148/20 **expected [2]** 36/15 extraordinary [1] 66/20 66/21 67/8 35/5 66/18 112/5 evidenced [1] 33/20 133/8 39/5 engage [2] 76/9 establish [4] 3/11 5/9 **evidential** [5] 6/13 **expecting [1]** 34/25 **extremely [6]** 5/13 145/23 7/14 106/11 42/9 42/10 144/16 36/14 114/1 115/25 **expects [1]** 132/5 engaged [6] 25/8 **expeditious [1]** 125/4 130/23 132/22 established [5] 4/20 144/18 62/11 69/24 73/4 16/13 22/4 60/14 99/4 evidently [1] 146/21 experience [8] 17/10 eye [1] 77/1 143/10 143/20 evil [4] 23/12 23/12 establishing [1] 7/6 44/13 67/25 68/15 engagement [4] establishment [3] 23/13 23/13 145/19 148/4 149/4 30/10 47/3 79/8 face [5] 6/5 140/19 54/8 80/18 134/12 evolved [1] 56/23 149/6 143/22 145/2 149/12 **Esther [1]** 33/5 evolving [1] 6/21 experiences [3] 37/4 **engaging [1]** 25/6 exacerbated [1] 87/3 37/7 53/25 faced [5] 37/8 38/9 etc [1] 82/8 engine [2] 9/20 9/21 53/11 79/13 132/23 **Europe [1]** 35/16 exactly [2] 132/24 expert [3] 53/21 62/7 **engineer** [1] 83/9 faces [1] 5/24 138/19 **European [7]** 5/13 63/16 engineering [1] 81/2 facing [2] 115/21 5/15 35/10 35/11 examination [2] 16/9 **expertise [4]** 40/22 England [5] 40/17 115/22 35/19 52/21 116/23 147/1 40/23 58/10 81/5 40/19 67/23 74/23 fact [21] 16/22 28/13 evacuate [1] 147/6 examine [4] 8/5 9/25 **experts [2]** 53/21 78/8 49/6 53/10 55/11 **evacuation [4]** 40/13 10/2 10/4 102/18 English [2] 52/4 examined [3] 9/23 67/22 70/3 76/13 95/14 124/19 129/6 explain [1] 143/20 52/23 96/21 100/6 101/24 evasive [1] 120/20 46/16 106/1 **explained [4]** 18/9 enhanced [1] 92/13 even [18] 11/1 16/15 103/14 104/2 113/23 **examining** [1] 6/1 42/10 57/5 116/22 enjoyed [1] 5/21 17/2 17/8 23/3 49/22 114/1 121/18 130/7 example [35] 8/9 **explains [2]** 110/15 enjoying [1] 34/19 130/25 140/6 143/3 51/7 84/7 86/10 94/6 15/19 37/14 37/25 110/18 enlisted [1] 84/22 144/11 103/6 104/9 118/24 39/6 39/21 40/6 41/18 explanation [6] 8/11 enormous [1] 43/24 116/12 119/19 131/13 **facts [3]** 6/2 93/5 122/22 125/17 135/25 48/21 49/2 49/6 50/3 **enough [2]** 133/16 120/20 148/4 148/25 50/11 55/2 57/20 141/10 148/20 136/21 event [5] 16/7 120/8 faded [1] 6/16 60/20 61/4 61/6 61/7 explanations [2] **enquiries [2]** 43/2 failed [5] 43/9 52/6 61/9 68/6 69/21 78/23 140/20 140/20 130/4 131/21 142/13 121/10 **explicitly [3]** 3/9 13/1 57/22 123/17 125/2 events [5] 6/1 6/10 82/25 84/5 89/25 enshrines [1] 35/14 failing [5] 5/16 26/12 7/6 7/23 112/3 98/25 99/20 105/3 50/14 **ensuing [1]** 74/5 105/18 131/11 138/12 exploded [3] 74/18 50/2 123/18 125/25 eventually [1] 127/13 ensure [13] 5/16 failings [9] 34/9 ever [3] 5/16 17/16 140/4 141/19 148/7 74/20 124/21 30/24 41/19 44/15 106/12 130/5 130/8 **exploding** [1] 74/11 93/20 **examples** [2] 11/5 52/19 62/4 76/18 131/21 131/24 142/6 every [9] 37/1 41/2 45/4 exploitation [1] 92/14 94/19 105/15 142/13 142/16 68/18 81/23 85/13 **excellent** [1] 107/16 87/14 123/20 135/17 145/16 failure [10] 11/9 88/6 94/8 105/12 **exceptional [5]** 61/16 **exploiting [1]** 55/17 ensured [1] 115/6 11/12 13/12 50/8 50/9 63/1 63/17 63/20 123/23 **explore [3]** 3/9 12/25 **ensuring [1]** 72/6 76/24 85/21 90/21 everybody [1] 109/15 67/20 146/7 enter [1] 63/12 125/4 140/13 **exchange [3]** 57/22 **explored [2]** 134/25 **everyone [6]** 53/15 entered [1] 59/22 failures [8] 5/6 7/17 73/23 113/23 123/1 86/12 135/18 146/11 **entering [1]** 78/16 7/18 12/4 12/25 38/24 131/14 135/9 exciting [1] 74/2 **exploring** [1] 6/5 entire [2] 3/11 43/14 86/2 122/2 everything [3] 91/25 exclude [1] 30/20 **explosion [3]** 63/7 **entirely [2]** 117/15 failures in [1] 122/2 127/21 146/16 excluded [1] 80/5 122/5 129/7 142/20 fairly [2] 115/18 evidence [71] 2/16 exclusively [1] 78/13 explosive [1] 83/8 entities [1] 102/18 118/24 7/4 7/13 8/25 10/23 Excuse [1] 131/2 explosives [3] 81/9 entitled [3] 5/11 18/6 21/14 22/4 26/14 executive [5] 71/6 fairness [1] 3/14 83/10 84/17 13/18 44/5 faith [2] 46/9 149/13 26/18 27/17 28/22 80/5 80/8 80/14 98/4 **exposing [2]** 55/9 entitles [1] 16/15 fall [5] 7/3 10/6 22/11 37/10 39/7 41/10 42/8 exhibit [1] 130/2 120/23 environment [2] 50/25 146/24 express [1] 140/11 42/15 42/17 42/20 exist [2] 48/18 65/16 132/1 142/18 fallback [1] 22/21 42/23 43/22 47/8 **existence** [4] 17/3 **expressed [2]** 104/1 equally [2] 65/24 falls [1] 75/20 47/19 48/16 48/17 43/25 66/7 90/7 148/25

Γ
<b>∣F</b>
false [2] 4/10 13/8
false [2] 4/10 10/0
falsely [1] 84/24
families [36] 1/12
2/23 9/14 11/18 14/8
17/11 18/16 21/8
21/16 22/1 22/8 23/16
26/21 30/20 31/16
36/19 36/19 36/23
37/1 37/24 42/5
106/17 112/23 126/7
127/19 128/21 133/10
134/17 135/1 136/21
137/10 139/17 139/2
140/16 141/20 148/2
family [52] 27/13
20/42 20/45 400/42
39/12 39/15 109/12
109/17 110/17 110/23
111/5 111/9 111/17
112/12 112/19 113/2
114/11 118/1 120/22
121/11 122/13 122/1
122/19 123/22 123/25
124/7 125/8 125/19
125/24 126/7 127/1
127/3 128/15 128/19
129/3 129/14 129/17
130/17 132/11 134/2
134/14 134/24 135/1
135/9 135/12 136/13
136/18 137/6 137/8
137/11 146/5 147/13
147/17 148/22 150/12
far [7] 13/13 83/3
92/10 131/14 131/15
133/20 137/24
fatal [1] 49/13
fath or [4] 21/25
father [4] 31/25
32/17 32/24 120/23
faults [1] 10/7 favour [1] 22/11 FBI [2] 83/15 90/1 fear [1] 112/20
favour [1] 22/11
<b>FBI [2]</b> 83/15 90/1
fear [1] 112/20
Fearghal [3] 33/2
39/8 39/9
fears [1] 21/8
feature [2] 58/22
78/9
February [6] 13/4
33/25 38/13 38/25
74/22 106/18
fed [1] 123/9
Fee [1] 144/10
feel [3] 9/15 122/19
139/21
feelings [1] 120/14
felt [3] 77/18 114/5
120/14
felt that [1] 114/5
Fermanagh [1] 2/21
few [5] 67/14 88/20
100/0 110/10 100/20
100/8 110/19 120/18
fierce [1] 122/17

**Fifth [3]** 83/14 89/15 94/22 fig [1] 14/13 **fighting [1]** 6/7 figure [1] 112/16 figures [1] 141/1 file [1] 44/8 files [2] 43/24 60/17 fill [1] 26/25 filled [1] 37/16 final [3] 86/3 106/2 109/3 finally [11] 18/5 29/18 37/18 41/24 44/5 68/11 69/23 89/19 90/22 120/15 143/12 find [5] 37/20 38/3 38/3 127/3 134/19 finding [1] 11/8 findings [8] 56/8 96/19 98/22 106/11 107/20 107/22 108/8 120/16 Finely [1] 22/10 firm [1] 80/4 firmly [2] 33/16 51/5 first [28] 1/4 3/19 8/9 14/24 24/11 37/6 37/11 39/24 47/11 54/7 79/24 86/5 90/11 93/7 113/7 116/25 118/15 121/5 128/6 131/17 133/6 137/17 137/23 138/3 139/23 141/24 144/6 146/25 firstly [18] 36/20 41/17 48/4 51/14 56/5 **formation [2]** 78/24 67/19 69/13 82/3 88/9 98/16 99/16 102/5 103/18 103/19 106/19 108/17 122/7 124/10 fit [1] 17/8 five [7] 30/8 63/15 80/13 88/15 100/14 100/25 109/2 Flanagan [6] 27/21 70/24 77/20 93/22 100/12 101/1 Flanagan's [2] 27/20 100/19 **flawed [1]** 77/6 flows [1] 146/22 **focus [7]** 3/3 3/19 36/25 50/1 73/10 81/17 98/23 focused [2] 92/10 116/1 focussed [2] 48/1 86/16 foiled [1] 83/7 followed [7] 4/8 62/4 74/1 78/8 81/16 94/3 102/14

following [29] 1/14 **fragility [2]** 75/7 2/3 30/9 31/16 33/6 40/25 41/15 59/19 63/2 64/22 80/13 82/5 Frank [1] 80/15 82/12 83/7 90/23 92/15 94/22 100/8 102/24 103/13 103/19 frequency [1] 70/21 107/4 109/3 120/2 120/8 121/20 124/9 135/25 142/7 follows [4] 33/21 85/25 86/1 124/10 foot [1] 47/15 force [5] 51/2 57/2 67/6 93/23 100/17 forced [2] 56/15 74/24 forces [19] 43/7 43/17 43/18 51/14 54/25 59/5 62/1 70/6 81/24 85/23 90/14 96/1 96/20 97/23 99/2 FRU [6] 57/5 71/24 107/10 107/13 117/19 85/1 86/21 87/1 87/7 123/9 fore [1] 120/24 forecasts [1] 91/10 foremost [1] 3/10 foreshadowed [1] 146/12 forever [1] 6/10 forgotten [1] 121/2 form [5] 2/16 16/24 61/21 68/18 80/17 formal [3] 70/4 79/21 97/21 formally [3] 44/9 107/15 122/25 79/19 formed [4] 40/4 56/22 72/4 91/22 former [9] 12/17 18/8 88/14 88/18 90/1 43/2 49/15 57/5 76/14 93/17 93/23 99/21 77/19 93/21 100/12 formerly [1] 121/14 formulated [1] 149/4 forth [2] 118/24 123/24 forward [1] 48/3 fought [1] 4/12 found [10] 20/10 26/12 28/14 35/9 35/19 62/18 78/4 92/5 funds [1] 34/15 103/2 148/1 **Foundation** [1] 2/21 four [3] 28/16 46/1 57/3 fourth [5] 50/18 83/5 89/10 94/10 118/19 Fourthly [2] 4/23 39/5 Fox [5] 31/14 31/18 33/8 45/6 150/8 fragile [1] 76/5

framework [1] 97/25 Fred [1] 31/25 freely [1] 76/24 frequent [2] 16/1 16/3 Friday [24] 18/24 20/2 53/16 54/4 54/15 72/20 72/22 72/23 74/18 75/9 75/10 75/14 75/18 75/19 76/4 76/5 76/10 78/17 84/5 111/15 115/11 119/6 137/17 137/24 friend [1] 125/25 frivolous [2] 125/17 134/11 front [2] 60/13 111/6 frustrate [1] 59/5 frustrating [1] 126/24 frustratingly [1] 144/16 fuelled [1] 114/10 full [18] 16/18 21/22 42/15 42/15 46/25 47/8 48/25 92/8 96/8 101/23 108/22 112/22 68/15 88/7 89/23 113/11 124/2 127/5 134/7 136/14 145/17 fully [7] 12/4 45/16 103/15 103/16 108/18 130/9 135/10 Fulton [18] 12/8 30/11 51/10 58/23 84/22 85/6 88/10 99/23 100/6 100/16 101/2 123/8 Fulton's [3] 51/12 100/23 101/4 **function [1]** 59/23 **functions [2]** 30/6 58/19 fundamental [2] 9/15 35/12 further [29] 7/25 14/19 20/4 23/2 25/11 41/12 45/4 47/7 47/19 49/9 49/25 63/15 64/10 67/2 84/10 85/17 94/5 100/3 105/7 105/20 111/23 120/17 128/7 136/19 139/22 141/12 141/14 146/16 147/12 furtherance [1] 58/18 111/18

Furthermore [2] 66/12 140/22 future [2] 74/3 95/2 **Féin [6]** 19/14 73/9 73/14 78/25 79/1 81/20

76/10

Gallagher [7] 11/15 13/20 31/20 31/20 31/21 36/9 127/17 gang [1] 104/8 gap [1] 112/11 gaps [1] 120/19 Garda [30] 11/11 12/13 12/15 12/19 15/24 17/17 18/11 24/5 24/12 24/21 25/9 59/16 59/17 60/18 60/20 83/2 83/9 83/13 83/25 84/2 84/4 84/10 84/15 88/22 88/24 89/2 92/16 92/21 106/15 107/5 Gareth [2] 32/25 37/25 **Garry [1]** 33/10 **Gary [1]** 2/1 gather [5] 60/19 64/17 68/12 84/4 104/18 gathered [5] 68/1 102/6 gathering [21] 25/7 54/18 55/5 55/13 55/17 56/22 57/14 57/18 58/25 59/18 61/4 61/8 68/13 86/15 86/23 88/5 89/11 90/12 98/6 103/8 103/12 gave [13] 2/15 8/25 35/24 43/3 63/20 83/20 89/13 89/13 100/24 101/7 120/13 140/4 143/2 Gavin [1] 32/22 **GCHQ [7]** 57/17 58/9 65/17 66/3 89/6 124/11 125/5 **GCHQ's [1]** 58/18 Gearoid [1] 32/8 general [11] 7/3 16/18 20/15 21/24 30/5 60/7 65/14 70/16 71/5 81/7 118/20 generalised [1] 107/6 generally [7] 12/18 30/7 60/17 79/22 99/24 107/8 147/8 generations [1]

84/5 101/19 109/13 24/14 28/25 45/3 60/3 57/1 90/13 98/10 85/1 85/3 85/3 85/4 G 111/15 115/11 119/6 71/22 72/4 72/13 98/23 99/21 105/22 85/5 88/13 88/15 genesis [1] 110/14 137/17 137/23 149/13 72/17 82/7 82/16 happen [6] 39/3 88/25 89/13 90/4 gently [1] 112/17 got [3] 115/7 119/1 84/11 106/18 119/1 91/10 114/3 131/13 93/10 94/15 94/17 genuine [1] 113/13 119/3 groups [7] 26/6 131/18 133/7 100/24 104/6 104/14 geographic [1] 64/24 55/24 59/10 72/6 governed [1] 55/14 happened [10] 37/21 110/16 112/16 112/18 Gerald [3] 1/21 1/21 78/22 102/20 146/9 112/10 113/12 115/1 112/21 113/7 113/12 governing [2] 41/6 56/1 115/4 117/13 117/14 113/13 113/15 113/21 98/14 growing [1] 79/24 **Geraldine** [1] 33/1 government [50] grown [1] 54/22 132/25 133/8 133/10 113/25 114/4 114/5 Gerry [1] 73/9 4/21 5/2 5/5 5/8 8/23 114/8 114/12 120/14 guard [1] 30/21 happening [5] 76/20 get [12] 13/5 13/5 **Guards [1]** 92/18 9/5 9/6 13/18 14/20 105/12 119/15 119/16 122/7 122/11 123/2 38/8 92/17 108/15 15/10 15/12 15/14 125/24 126/8 126/12 guidance [4] 55/14 138/18 111/20 119/12 121/17 17/5 56/2 57/16 70/11 90/12 98/5 98/14 happens [1] 148/3 126/19 128/8 129/16 127/4 127/5 127/6 71/13 72/1 73/14 77/1 harbour [1] 147/15 130/18 134/1 137/22 guided [1] 3/13 132/15 guidelines [5] 97/1 80/3 95/21 95/24 hard [7] 21/2 38/15 138/25 139/14 140/5 gets [1] 118/4 96/20 96/23 98/5 98/9 97/15 97/19 98/3 98/9 38/15 43/18 43/24 140/8 140/12 143/25 getting [2] 116/14 98/13 105/14 106/9 guilt [3] 33/23 34/4 44/2 141/10 144/5 121/18 108/23 114/23 121/6 34/6 harm [1] 34/15 head [2] 24/13 43/2 Gibson [2] 33/4 33/5 121/15 122/1 123/14 **Gweedore** [1] 79/20 harmful [1] 19/15 heading [2] 18/20 **Giles [1]** 33/12 124/23 125/16 125/20 **harrowing** [1] 37/8 69/2 Giles McCourt [1] 127/24 128/5 128/10 has [88] 5/16 9/18 headings [1] 29/25 33/12 128/17 128/25 135/20 had [108] 27/14 29/3 headquarters [6] 10/25 11/2 11/21 Gillen [4] 126/9 30/1 33/18 34/19 37/5 136/16 144/2 145/6 11/22 14/8 20/24 21/6 26/8 55/20 57/3 57/17 126/20 127/10 134/5 37/9 40/8 40/21 41/3 145/15 149/12 23/1 24/17 24/23 25/5 72/9 74/20 give [7] 3/6 15/15 44/11 45/2 52/16 26/21 29/12 29/21 heal [1] 37/25 government's [1] 20/5 27/17 43/5 48/21 53/20 54/5 54/9 55/16 35/10 37/5 37/16 39/6 healing [1] 38/12 71/16 126/6 55/20 55/25 56/3 39/18 42/14 42/17 governments [5] health [2] 125/25 given [21] 8/7 11/18 58/10 58/24 60/6 43/22 44/1 45/7 45/23 126/19 12/2 14/6 19/5 73/15 21/18 26/12 29/1 60/18 60/19 61/5 74/7 46/22 47/2 52/19 heap [1] 5/4 29/12 40/8 45/12 66/21 67/5 67/9 68/2 53/17 56/4 56/20 59/2 hear [10] 1/5 23/12 Graham [1] 2/6 47/23 50/20 50/21 69/14 69/20 69/21 62/7 68/16 73/22 78/5 31/8 31/12 109/3 grand [2] 13/9 74/25 86/2 94/25 103/11 grant [1] 15/11 70/8 71/12 72/8 73/4 78/20 79/3 90/25 109/11 125/19 125/19 104/11 119/14 120/25 73/13 76/20 76/22 91/16 91/18 91/20 146/5 148/13 grapple [1] 114/1 126/8 137/15 148/20 grappled [1] 145/4 77/1 79/23 80/1 81/8 91/22 91/25 93/21 heard [12] 4/12 37/10 149/15 83/5 83/8 83/18 83/21 grasped [1] 14/12 96/21 101/15 101/20 43/22 49/12 61/6 gives [1] 138/8 83/24 84/2 84/18 grateful [3] 2/19 101/21 101/24 102/20 104/23 109/14 117/7 giving [3] 42/23 86/11 86/18 86/20 102/23 111/19 111/23 118/11 123/8 131/2 103/11 143/16 90/22 94/10 88/15 89/5 89/6 89/8 112/9 112/11 113/8 140/11 gratitude [4] 36/20 glacial [1] 127/12 90/15 94/2 94/17 110/24 120/24 129/14 114/24 122/12 124/2 hearing [11] 2/24 **globally [1]** 137/15 94/20 94/24 96/2 126/14 130/5 130/7 grave [1] 8/10 3/23 48/9 49/15 Gloucester [1] 97/10 98/15 100/20 **Greaney [6]** 1/3 27/6 132/14 132/16 133/20 109/21 125/22 133/19 124/12 101/10 102/22 103/24 134/7 135/9 138/1 109/10 139/12 143/15 135/6 139/9 143/19 go [7] 8/12 12/1 147/23 104/5 104/11 104/17 138/12 138/24 139/5 149/16 68/21 68/23 79/6 great [5] 62/6 87/11 109/20 113/13 113/20 140/23 141/15 142/2 hearings [17] 2/10 130/12 133/13 113/25 114/4 114/11 103/25 114/4 129/17 142/3 142/10 142/21 3/24 9/1 33/21 33/25 goal [1] 73/5 115/6 115/8 117/6 143/18 144/5 144/16 greater [9] 4/17 34/21 36/22 37/1 37/6 goes [1] 138/25 119/18 119/24 120/11 145/19 145/21 146/12 19/10 51/9 51/18 58/3 37/11 41/1 111/1 going [22] 8/19 12/5 120/19 121/11 122/16 146/16 147/24 113/2 126/1 135/8 76/7 78/3 103/21 48/3 83/3 84/16 110/5 123/7 123/14 124/12 103/24 have [248] 144/16 144/18 110/22 112/8 114/13 124/15 124/20 125/16 greatest [3] 93/15 haven't [1] 131/2 heart [2] 39/19 115/12 116/1 119/11 126/22 127/1 127/25 111/4 111/9 having [9] 17/10 137/24 119/22 125/12 127/4 128/22 130/25 132/11 greatly [2] 4/23 27/9 28/12 68/21 82/23 hearts [1] 27/1 127/5 127/6 129/18 132/18 135/12 140/6 83/10 114/3 145/13 Grenfell [4] 130/20 **Heather [1]** 1/24 130/5 130/8 131/11 140/9 141/9 141/11 146/14 148/17 132/24 133/8 133/11 heighten [1] 21/8 137/15 145/1 146/14 grief [1] 111/19 Hawkes [2] 1/17 1/18 heinous [1] 39/2 gone [1] 123/11 half [1] 112/25 held [7] 16/11 28/8 grim [1] 6/19 Hayes [1] 1/23 good [35] 1/3 1/4 1/8 he [76] 9/1 9/3 11/16 halt [1] 136/18 36/1 44/25 48/20 **Grimes [5]** 33/2 33/2 1/11 18/24 20/2 46/9 handle [1] 90/15 33/3 39/8 39/9 15/25 26/11 26/14 101/20 110/21 53/16 54/3 54/15 handled [6] 50/4 51/6 grind [1] 136/17 27/23 28/13 35/25 Helen [1] 1/18 57/24 57/24 57/24 56/6 85/3 90/1 90/2 ground [2] 92/18 39/12 63/17 71/2 77/1 help [6] 4/13 106/18 72/20 72/21 72/22 handler [1] 100/23 77/15 77/21 77/23 110/22 129/14 134/19 128/20 74/18 75/8 75/10 grounds [5] 17/12 handlers [2] 59/1 83/8 83/9 83/12 83/16 143/21 75/14 75/18 75/19 28/16 29/8 58/19 63/9 123/25 83/18 83/21 83/21 helpful [1] 143/18 76/4 76/5 76/10 78/17 handling [7] 50/12 group [14] 15/25 84/13 84/24 84/25 helps [1] 91/11

90/20 110/19 144/2 26/17 27/25 42/19 Н hunting [1] 82/23 107/16 108/6 115/9 147/18 Huntley [1] 1/20 55/3 59/3 59/7 70/24 118/9 126/13 133/7 her [11] 77/11 98/4 hurdles [1] 6/13 idea [2] 121/16 **holding [1]** 116/16 86/25 94/18 100/13 98/8 98/12 109/25 holistic [4] 48/9 hurt [1] 3/22 123/3 147/1 131/15 110/1 110/2 120/25 48/17 48/21 50/11 husband [3] 31/24 I recognise [2] ideal [2] 16/8 35/1 121/1 122/11 144/10 home [3] 9/12 65/25 32/23 109/25 145/10 147/22 identified [11] 10/8 here [7] 31/4 110/16 45/17 50/14 78/5 126/18 I repeat [1] 3/18 114/22 119/1 130/25 I represent [25] 13/7 homes [2] 65/1 88/22 93/9 130/5 138/6 138/18 I already [1] 104/17 104/13 42/6 45/20 46/4 46/13 130/8 135/23 140/6 here's [2] 121/15 I also [3] 2/3 101/8 47/13 47/18 48/1 honest [2] 113/13 140/9 121/19 145/6 136/24 69/12 96/11 96/17 identifies [2] 48/12 **hidden [3]** 10/3 21/9 lam [13] 20/8 42/25 97/18 99/14 100/4 136/6 honoured [1] 136/17 27/24 77/9 94/12 110/5 hope [20] 6/18 31/3 101/13 102/2 102/12 identify [5] 3/5 10/5 hierarchy [1] 71/9 114/13 114/21 117/25 103/10 104/21 104/24 47/16 48/6 48/17 37/17 37/17 37/19 high [8] 21/3 57/18 125/12 133/23 137/18 38/3 38/3 38/4 38/8 108/4 108/7 108/9 identifying [1] 49/17 117/7 121/13 125/22 143/16 149/15 109/21 120/13 127/7 108/14 108/25 identities [1] 104/12 127/9 128/24 132/25 134/25 135/3 135/16 I and [2] 31/17 I represented [1] identity [3] 63/6 high-level [1] 21/3 146/15 137/9 137/11 138/5 99/9 80/16 85/15 higher [2] 22/23 lappear [1] 109/23 139/8 141/19 I return [1] 61/1 if [52] 6/23 9/7 10/4 115/15 hoped [3] 29/5 61/13 I appeared [1] I said [2] 31/12 109/4 16/11 17/2 18/15 highest [4] 21/10 130/20 135/12 I say [6] 2/11 27/4 24/15 40/10 42/23 23/6 44/21 71/13 l assume [1] 149/13 hopefully [1] 110/6 115/24 133/21 135/4 44/3 49/20 49/22 highlight [9] 7/12 8/8 I attended [1] 112/1 Horner [3] 13/19 145/18 58/18 60/10 63/9 20/8 48/10 75/7 28/12 35/25 I being [1] 109/14 I should [1] 96/16 71/19 80/10 82/22 103/13 105/8 108/3 I can [2] 18/15 118/5 82/24 85/20 87/19 horrific [3] 53/23 **I sincerely [1]** 38/3 108/4 I come [2] 116/12 94/6 96/7 99/5 101/4 119/14 129/13 I suggest [1] 119/16 highlighted [7] 22/17 149/5 101/10 103/6 104/9 horse [1] 74/25 I take [1] 11/4 36/23 58/5 61/9 75/4 I distinctly [1] 34/22 105/12 114/13 114/25 hostility [1] 114/9 I telephoned [1] 86/24 142/11 hour [1] 69/2 I do [3] 126/15 42/21 115/17 115/22 116/11 Hillsborough [5] 143/23 148/4 116/19 117/5 117/22 **hours [1]** 63/15 I thank [1] 2/17 130/2 130/3 130/19 I don't [6] 9/5 9/6 9/6 House [1] 36/1 I therefore [2] 145/25 118/20 118/24 119/3 132/23 132/25 114/21 115/4 133/13 how [17] 6/10 9/14 149/10 119/18 120/2 129/4 him [5] 113/21 131/8 131/11 133/18 16/3 23/4 43/12 48/21 | **I find [1]** 38/3 I think [9] 82/14 113/21 120/13 121/10 79/8 90/15 102/4 I had [3] 97/10 82/15 82/17 82/23 133/19 134/3 136/15 123/2 109/20 117/6 113/12 113/25 114/2 90/25 110/1 115/18 137/14 144/25 148/25 himself [2] 114/7 I have [26] 2/23 8/22 115/4 125/13 137/24 128/20 133/20 ignored [2] 138/17 114/8 11/4 13/7 22/17 25/23 I tried [1] 114/25 138/13 148/7 138/18 hindsight [11] 27/23 34/6 42/2 46/8 47/25 however [46] 6/17 I want [4] 53/13 61/2 ignoring [2] 11/21 28/2 28/3 28/5 28/7 49/11 61/14 61/14 11/1 11/20 20/7 22/19 106/2 114/14 14/7 51/20 51/21 51/22 85/11 93/3 103/19 I wanted [1] 109/19 23/1 26/3 27/7 28/5 ill [1] 27/2 52/2 52/8 117/5 111/6 114/15 130/6 29/9 34/3 40/23 45/9 I was [8] 42/22 43/7 illogical [1] 113/18 hint [1] 132/15 130/18 133/23 133/23 69/10 76/20 117/6 46/12 47/18 48/13 images [1] 23/14 his [44] 9/2 13/4 27/7 145/12 145/20 148/7 50/5 52/11 54/10 118/5 129/22 139/13 imagine [2] 21/2 27/21 32/14 62/7 60/16 61/10 61/18 149/2 I will [14] 6/25 20/5 115/2 63/16 72/12 76/15 I hope [5] 38/3 38/4 73/2 73/7 74/4 74/13 23/13 23/15 40/14 immediate [3] 20/5 77/7 77/10 81/7 83/6 38/8 109/21 138/5 74/17 75/13 78/17 52/5 81/6 48/10 50/9 61/11 84/21 85/3 90/3 I intend [3] 48/4 48/5 80/6 80/21 85/20 90/18 110/6 111/6 immediately [3] 4/20 100/11 102/21 104/2 110/4 87/22 92/12 92/24 115/19 125/20 149/14 51/4 115/3 105/9 106/25 112/19 I just [8] 25/10 38/19 93/19 99/13 107/16 I wish [1] 130/17 impact [5] 7/21 37/5 112/21 113/16 113/22 38/19 47/15 97/14 113/21 122/16 144/18 108/10 114/9 114/20 I would [4] 91/15 113/24 114/10 114/11 105/8 118/7 131/19 118/4 118/25 134/22 143/16 146/17 147/22 impacted [1] 40/12 119/25 120/14 122/9 146/17 149/9 I know [1] 130/16 I'd [2] 69/9 82/21 imperative [3] 5/8 122/25 125/23 125/25 I may [2] 114/13 **HQ [1]** 72/8 I'm [14] 8/19 38/4 21/22 136/13 126/10 126/11 126/19 137/14 38/14 54/2 82/19 huge [1] 5/24 implementation [2] 128/8 128/13 129/17 I mean [3] 38/15 hugely [1] 21/11 114/24 116/1 116/16 56/3 71/10 139/13 139/14 140/4 40/15 117/11 Hugh [2] 123/12 117/13 119/22 120/2 implemented [1] 144/1 I move [1] 121/3 129/18 130/7 132/21 135/5 40/13 historical [2] 6/2 43/2 Hughes [3] 1/18 1/18 | I pause [3] 119/21 implication [1] I've [27] 34/4 34/7 history [10] 6/18 6/20 127/2 138/5 38/22 45/17 60/13 1/19 100/19 39/13 54/19 54/22 human [12] 2/12 2/14 | I prefer [1] 109/21 67/18 75/11 78/2 implications [1] 56/4 76/1 78/1 78/20 I quote [25] 9/4 10/12 **implicitly [1]** 13/2 5/7 5/16 35/9 35/10 78/16 86/6 86/13 122/15 134/15 10/22 11/8 13/4 13/22 35/11 64/11 65/7 67/5 86/18 88/6 95/3 95/17 implied [1] 116/23 hits [1] 82/23 14/16 18/10 19/21 96/24 100/5 102/3 68/3 68/3 implies [1] 96/4 hold [6] 46/1 60/22 24/16 25/4 26/6 26/16 **importance** [12] 35/8 **Hume [1]** 73/8 104/1 105/17 106/10

including [18] 9/21 88/13 88/15 88/18 inquisitive [1] 112/5 **interested [1]** 146/6 12/20 20/15 40/23 89/1 91/3 91/6 91/8 inquisitorial [3] interestingly [1] importance... [11] 50/19 57/1 57/2 60/1 91/12 91/18 91/19 16/12 112/6 130/22 133/10 36/24 49/11 55/23 64/3 67/11 70/11 82/8 91/22 92/2 92/4 92/21 inside [2] 58/14 interests [4] 16/25 93/4 95/19 102/11 86/19 101/17 108/19 93/6 94/6 94/23 95/2 119/4 22/8 87/11 108/21 103/4 108/16 148/5 117/19 118/18 131/14 95/3 96/5 100/15 insinuation [1] 28/19 interference [2] 19/6 148/10 148/18 101/16 106/22 106/24 inclusive [1] 103/5 insisted [1] 133/1 65/18 important [50] 3/19 107/1 107/23 107/25 inconceivable [1] inspected [1] 9/20 interim [3] 42/19 8/12 23/22 24/8 24/9 105/11 108/1 114/19 118/17 inspection [1] 9/19 97/22 99/1 30/9 34/8 37/22 39/16 119/3 119/9 122/18 inconsistent [1] inspire [1] 23/9 internal [2] 29/25 39/19 39/21 42/6 26/13 123/9 123/15 124/17 installations [1] 19/7 60/21 42/12 47/17 48/22 incorporate [1] 110/7 127/1 127/25 128/23 **instance** [1] 7/5 International [1] 48/22 51/22 53/18 129/10 132/13 135/2 increase [2] 102/15 instances [1] 62/25 17/15 54/3 57/19 61/24 135/18 136/5 136/8 102/16 Instead [3] 28/4 interpretation [1] 62/14 68/24 70/20 incredible [2] 20/9 136/25 137/5 144/21 30/14 48/2 28/5 71/3 78/24 83/12 21/2 information' [1] 43/9 institute [1] 13/11 interrupt [1] 60/11 85/21 95/22 102/4 incredibly [1] 43/18 information/intellige institutional [1] 87/3 **intervene [2]** 56/15 108/9 108/12 108/17 nce [1] 128/23 indebted [1] 120/22 77/11 institutions [1] 112/3 114/19 115/3 indeed [6] 3/23 28/23 informative [2] intervening [1] 74/17 138/17 124/7 125/8 125/11 68/13 84/7 141/21 143/19 146/4 instructed [2] 109/24 intervention [2] 130/23 131/20 132/22 informed [4] 15/25 142/10 144/5 60/14 105/14 134/15 135/19 137/16 indicated [6] 11/4 51/1 51/3 100/25 instructing [1] 112/2 into [28] 2/25 5/9 137/20 139/16 140/22 44/18 105/17 106/10 informer [1] 123/8 instruments [1] 35/9 5/17 12/5 17/11 39/10 141/11 147/25 106/20 115/10 informers [2] 65/8 40/24 49/13 52/12 insult [1] 17/2 imposed [2] 35/18 55/19 55/19 59/22 indicates [1] 52/9 98/15 intelligence [204] 35/22 indicating [4] 49/9 67/6 76/25 78/1 78/16 Ingram [1] 2/6 intelligence-gatherin impossibility [1] 95/8 95/15 114/17 inherent [1] 144/20 79/7 86/21 88/12 92/2 **g [1]** 59/18 19/10 indication [1] 43/23 inherently [1] 61/20 intelligent [2] 72/1 92/3 92/5 111/16 **improve [1]** 107/25 indicative [1] 103/14 initial [7] 2/24 7/13 91/9 117/12 122/18 124/18 improved [1] 92/24 indirectly [1] 115/21 26/25 126/2 126/5 intend [3] 48/4 48/5 133/13 134/9 inability [2] 44/10 individual [3] 12/10 127/9 127/21 110/4 introduce [1] 117/11 147/20 50/3 90/14 initially [5] 49/5 intended [5] 3/25 introduced [1] 70/7 inaction [2] 99/11 individual's [2] 65/25 63/14 83/14 90/1 33/21 46/9 46/12 invaluable [1] 2/20 99/17 67/3 141/8 81/19 invariably [1] 43/4 inactivity [1] 99/24 individuals [9] 19/14 initiate [2] 63/3 121/4 intends [1] 140/1 investigate [8] 10/12 **inadequate [2]** 12/18 34/13 50/17 85/16 29/4 35/23 40/9 40/14 initiated [2] 65/23 intense [2] 19/3 26/14 85/18 114/21 123/25 73/17 53/20 42/13 61/24 102/4 inadvertently [1] 135/23 136/4 initiative [2] 4/9 intensified [1] 111/23 investigated [6] 12/4 17/2 45/17 50/23 103/15 inevitable [1] 48/13 73/18 **intensify** [1] 11/3 inappropriate [1] injured [12] 2/4 2/23 **inevitably [1]** 6/13 intensity [1] 27/4 103/16 122/12 77/5 4/13 9/14 18/17 21/16 intensive [1] 78/7 inferences [1] investigating [3] incentive [1] 101/6 148/17 22/1 22/9 23/16 33/7 intent [3] 20/3 49/9 55/8 95/6 120/9 incident [6] 63/7 inferior [1] 58/7 106/17 129/15 124/20 investigation [27] 102/14 112/11 115/8 infiltrated [3] 58/24 injuries [1] 4/4 intention [2] 57/12 5/17 6/2 7/22 7/24 115/9 115/10 injury [5] 17/2 63/8 83/18 123/7 13/21 14/1 14/3 18/19 81/25 incidents [20] 7/8 74/12 74/19 109/20 inflicted [1] 39/15 intentions [1] 27/3 19/3 21/19 41/13 7/15 7/18 7/22 7/24 **INLA [1]** 102/23 41/22 42/1 44/6 44/12 influence [5] 8/4 interactions [2] 41/22 57/25 78/5 69/14 69/20 69/21 innocent [1] 4/2 12/19 12/24 46/7 64/9 88/12 91/3 84/19 94/16 94/20 70/2 inordinate [1] 126/24 intercept [4] 60/11 94/3 104/4 106/16 102/13 103/5 103/5 66/19 89/3 124/13 106/25 111/10 120/17 influenced [2] 41/9 input [1] 71/12 103/9 103/15 103/24 77/13 inquest [16] 17/11 intercepted [1] 83/3 128/12 134/9 104/6 104/10 119/7 influences [1] 7/23 112/1 112/10 112/16 intercepting [2] 66/3 investigations [9] inclination [1] 5/13 112/16 113/15 118/6 10/18 12/19 42/18 inform [2] 42/22 118/23 include [11] 4/6 7/14 118/8 118/11 119/24 44/13 45/19 46/15 93/16 interception [4] 10/17 12/7 44/22 66/9 informants [1] 57/9 120/1 120/5 129/23 65/17 65/20 65/23 56/8 64/19 101/21 71/6 88/9 98/5 107/22 information [76] 4/10 130/19 132/24 133/1 66/1 investigative [1] 116/7 6/8 10/17 11/10 12/12 inquests [1] 39/10 interceptions [1] 45/10 included [12] 27/11 inquiries [4] 5/25 15/5 18/11 21/10 66/13 investigator's [1] 56/22 62/16 63/2 56/9 148/3 148/5 21/16 26/13 40/1 intercepts [2] 66/7 92/1 64/20 66/15 71/4 40/10 43/5 43/19 66/8 inquiry [159] investigators [5] 78/13 81/3 81/12 Inquiry's [10] 18/19 48/25 50/4 51/5 55/9 interconnectedness 91/11 92/2 92/4 94/19 88/18 141/3 58/13 59/11 59/24 20/21 96/14 140/23 104/11 **[1]** 48/18 includes [4] 23/13 interest [6] 3/4 6/23 64/4 66/7 70/12 86/12 141/17 142/11 143/7 Investigatory [1] 42/18 102/9 138/11 87/18 87/20 88/2 146/3 146/22 147/10 18/5 68/8 144/2 146/8 65/11

98/12 100/3 102/12 13/19 17/15 28/12 118/24 126/3 128/25 Jennings [3] 12/14 103/19 103/20 105/7 15/23 16/10 35/25 39/4 113/4 130/16 131/8 132/13 invitation [2] 3/5 29/1 105/8 105/20 106/3 jigsaw [2] 49/18 126/9 126/20 134/5 133/15 133/16 invite [1] 3/6 Justice Gillen [2] 111/4 111/8 118/10 49/19 knowing [1] 36/4 involve [3] 7/5 13/23 118/19 118/20 121/5 Jim [1] 2/7 126/9 126/20 knowledge [10] 38/5 135/4 141/24 142/1 job [2] 43/8 114/19 Justice International 12/10 16/22 30/10 involved [15] 16/5 issued [8] 27/15 Joe [1] 32/12 **[1]** 17/15 33/18 35/4 47/5 63/6 49/17 56/19 56/25 justification [1] 68/15 82/25 124/15 40/25 45/24 73/15 John [15] 1/6 1/10 59/19 70/1 83/10 1/13 6/17 10/8 12/13 74/24 75/17 98/4 132/6 knowledge' [1] 57/10 84/18 93/10 104/6 28/18 29/14 32/10 justified [1] 58/19 127/9 known [23] 1/15 17/3 128/23 135/10 136/4 issues [58] 3/5 3/12 62/7 63/16 64/18 73/8 **justify [1]** 132/3 19/13 53/17 58/9 141/2 145/1 89/2 150/4 5/19 7/1 8/6 10/5 11/3 71/19 71/21 73/16 involvement [5] 12/5 39/20 39/21 join [1] 139/9 78/11 81/24 83/9 84/1 19/13 63/6 73/6 79/25 **Kane [8]** 1/7 1/8 1/10 41/12 41/17 42/7 91/8 93/7 93/11 95/14 joining [1] 81/4 135/23 31/6 140/4 140/11 42/10 46/22 47/4 joint [3] 71/15 71/19 96/7 106/15 113/11 involves [1] 52/2 140/24 150/5 47/16 47/19 48/11 73/15 115/8 124/23 133/3 involving [3] 26/16 **KC [6]** 1/10 31/14 48/12 48/12 52/10 jointly [4] 24/20 133/7 77/22 84/19 109/18 150/5 150/9 knows [1] 134/23 59/25 70/11 70/12 83/16 85/2 90/2 ipsa [1] 133/21 150/12 71/2 71/8 74/5 74/10 Jolene [1] 32/13 IRA [58] 1/15 2/5 75/15 76/1 78/14 86/4 **Keeley [1]** 101/2 **Jose [1]** 32/19 3/20 4/5 19/14 36/12 keep [8] 3/19 23/13 lack [5] 4/24 21/18 86/5 86/11 90/19 joy [2] 35/4 35/4 60/23 73/4 73/10 38/14 62/9 82/23 25/18 107/7 111/22 97/12 101/3 103/18 judge [3] 43/10 43/16 73/19 74/10 74/18 82/24 96/12 131/16 lacked [1] 87/2 104/23 108/3 108/12 133/1 75/3 75/17 75/24 keeping [1] 90/19 108/16 112/17 118/7 judgment [9] 35/19 lacks [1] 15/14 76/12 78/25 79/11 118/10 120/5 120/23 35/24 36/2 38/23 52/4 **keeps [1]** 108/10 Lagan [1] 1/24 79/12 79/16 79/19 52/23 126/10 126/12 Kelly [1] 33/12 land [1] 66/25 121/1 123/2 130/11 79/20 79/24 80/4 80/8 Kenny [2] 12/16 13/3 | landscape [3] 49/21 136/8 139/21 144/5 127/10 80/13 80/13 80/17 56/21 120/25 Kenova [7] 42/19 146/13 146/23 146/24 judgments [1] 22/11 80/25 81/1 81/10 42/25 43/20 56/10 language [3] 91/1 147/9 judicial [8] 11/16 81/15 81/21 81/22 86/25 97/22 99/1 13/20 28/11 28/20 130/10 149/1 it [257] 81/25 82/18 83/11 Kent [1] 83/23 Laoghaire [1] 84/19 it didn't [1] 79/8 45/11 46/23 46/24 84/1 84/3 84/6 84/8 kept [2] 26/7 101/11 largely [3] 60/2 64/20 it's [34] 9/8 38/15 137/22 84/17 85/10 88/19 38/17 39/21 42/8 46/1 Julia [1] 1/19 86/16 kernel [1] 128/17 94/24 100/7 102/22 47/20 49/21 50/1 53/2 July [12] 3/18 19/19 **Kerrigan [1]** 2/1 last [5] 3/18 38/11 102/23 102/25 103/1 **Kevin [18]** 1/19 8/24 93/11 111/1 139/18 69/19 71/19 96/7 44/10 75/4 89/9 100/9 103/3 103/7 113/24 12/8 30/11 41/1 51/10 lasting [3] 73/22 102/4 103/8 108/9 104/9 121/15 133/19 116/17 122/4 123/5 58/23 84/22 85/6 108/11 110/11 111/7 135/7 149/17 149/19 75/21 139/6 124/20 124/22 88/10 90/1 93/17 late [1] 60/15 114/24 116/21 117/12 July 1998 [1] 89/9 IRA's [1] 81/8 93/23 99/21 99/23 later [15] 39/13 41/11 117/13 117/21 118/25 juncture [1] 18/22 **IRECO [2]** 81/13 100/6 100/15 123/8 48/10 50/9 51/12 76/7 119/11 127/4 129/20 June [8] 1/1 11/24 103/2 key [9] 3/17 35/17 83/15 90/11 90/18 130/21 131/1 131/7 74/16 74/19 75/2 **Ireland** [153] 67/18 68/14 77/3 79/7 93/2 110/1 112/25 131/11 137/18 140/22 88/16 100/16 104/8 Ireland' [1] 55/6 itemised [1] 25/25 June 2012 [1] 11/24 88/8 100/2 111/3 115/16 125/24 126/8 Ireland's [3] 15/10 **keystrokes** [1] 65/6 latest [1] 46/23 items [1] 82/2 junior [1] 29/10 70/14 106/8 killed [1] 117/6 laudable [1] 3/15 its [34] 5/21 11/10 jurisdiction [2] 95/23 Irish [15] 5/11 9/6 killing [1] 74/11 11/13 12/19 14/6 launch [1] 81/6 146/22 12/2 19/24 53/8 73/15 killings [1] 39/10 launchers [1] 50/20 14/15 16/20 16/24 jurisdictions [3] 78/4 80/10 84/7 84/25 86/8 kilogram [1] 103/2 Laurence [26] 18/7 27/3 34/14 39/17 135/18 135/24 107/20 108/22 135/11 kind [2] 82/16 84/13 110/16 112/12 112/15 39/19 51/7 52/20 56/2 just [46] 19/19 25/10 135/20 136/16 34/4 34/6 34/7 38/19 **Kingdom [13]** 19/5 113/3 113/11 113/19 57/22 59/11 59/18 irrelevant [1] 15/7 24/3 58/14 62/23 118/8 119/24 120/11 73/3 79/1 79/13 86/19 38/19 42/3 46/8 47/15 is [353] 64/13 65/12 66/4 120/19 121/3 121/4 86/22 87/14 87/17 47/25 49/11 60/13 **island [1]** 138/3 66/18 71/18 96/1 96/2 121/9 121/13 122/16 93/15 95/24 96/20 61/14 67/18 69/1 isolated [2] 102/14 105/12 115/13 122/23 125/9 125/23 99/6 134/9 137/19 73/22 78/2 82/21 118/8 Kingsmill [1] 17/11 126/11 126/18 127/21 141/23 149/16 82/24 85/11 93/3 **isolation [2]** 48/16 127/22 129/15 134/1 96/24 97/2 97/5 97/14 Kirwan [1] 49/16 itself [7] 28/1 28/3 48/23 134/23 136/23 43/15 112/12 116/24 102/3 104/1 105/8 knock [1] 8/1 issue [42] 8/20 10/16 Laurence's [1] knock-on [1] 8/1 121/22 133/21 112/7 114/14 115/12 12/21 46/18 48/11 know [26] 1/4 2/21 121/23 117/7 118/7 119/25 51/20 51/23 51/23 8/16 9/5 9/6 19/11 Laverty [1] 43/16 126/8 129/10 129/20 52/2 52/8 52/24 53/1 **Jaime [2]** 33/10 35/3 38/16 85/14 99/10 law [26] 31/14 31/18 129/22 131/19 135/4 53/9 58/7 60/24 61/24 109/20 109/23 110/13 33/8 36/9 43/15 45/6 James [1] 32/14 137/14 137/19 142/2 74/5 74/8 75/16 75/25 January [3] 37/15 112/6 114/17 115/4 52/3 54/9 54/16 55/5 143/25 145/18 77/3 77/6 93/1 98/7 117/22 117/23 117/23 37/25 127/22 justice [11] 5/2 13/17 56/18 64/19 65/15

law... [13] 65/19 66/19 66/21 67/5 67/6 67/7 67/11 70/10 128/9 130/3 137/21 138/17 150/8 laws [1] 5/12 laying [1] 94/12 lazy [1] 30/22 lead [8] 55/16 56/14 56/16 57/10 79/6 86/7 134/24 135/21 lead-up [1] 135/21 leader [2] 73/8 73/8 leaders [1] 59/21 leadership [4] 79/4 79/11 80/24 83/19 leading [3] 7/6 18/18 67/13 leads [2] 13/15 53/13 leaf [1] 14/13 leaking [1] 84/8 learn [3] 113/6 146/5 147/14 learned [2] 36/4 132/25 learning [3] 37/16 39/3 44/13 least [10] 36/3 46/5 50/15 65/4 69/13 89/8 89/8 96/14 99/8 129/4 leaves [1] 25/18 leaving [3] 3/25 77/18 80/22 led [6] 14/8 18/25 19/8 19/23 53/6 122/5 ledger [1] 59/22 left [3] 11/20 80/25 114/11 legacy [1] 122/25 legal [21] 5/7 31/18 33/8 58/15 61/25 62/5 67/16 70/12 97/25 121/7 125/23 127/17 131/25 134/3 139/19 140/18 142/17 143/9 144/4 146/11 146/15 legislation [6] 58/12 62/15 62/17 65/13 67/22 98/10 legislative [1] 67/24 legitimacy [1] 80/9 legitimate [4] 34/8 36/6 78/6 105/25 length [1] 110/7 lens [1] 149/4 less [2] 54/5 82/9 lesser [3] 4/17 19/10 26/6 lessons [2] 36/4 39/3 lest [1] 19/12 Let [1] 75/23 let's [1] 131/12

lethal [1] 36/14 **letter [1]** 116/14 Letterkenny [1] 93/12 level [15] 21/3 21/11 22/23 23/6 39/5 44/21 little [7] 29/14 47/2 54/11 61/16 83/19 107/12 115/15 115/15 117/4 119/15 128/24 levels [1] 71/13 liable [1] 63/11 liaises [1] 145/7 **Liam [3]** 80/15 81/16 102/22 **Libby [6]** 109/25 121/22 122/5 125/3 128/3 129/3 lie [1] 4/16 life [11] 35/8 35/17 49/22 63/8 63/8 99/6 111/14 122/9 123/18 125/3 131/13 lifeblood [1] 133/15 light [18] 26/9 41/17 41/18 41/21 42/2 45/19 46/23 47/15 69/17 77/3 81/21 85/11 102/10 104/16 112/8 113/4 120/15 148/18 lightly [1] 121/7 like [4] 81/13 114/2 131/3 146/17 likely [4] 4/3 41/21 54/5 68/1 likened [1] 9/17 **limitation [2]** 14/19 14/20 limitations [3] 14/23 67/16 67/17 limited [5] 10/24 29/6 43/4 47/23 140/23 limits [2] 42/4 146/20 Linda [1] 31/24 line [1] 60/14 link [2] 7/14 109/5 linked [13] 51/9 52/8 77/6 78/1 93/20 96/24 Lord Stevens [1] 97/14 100/3 102/12 102/14 104/10 106/5 119/7 linking [1] 93/4 links [1] 7/18 Lisa [1] 32/7 Lisburn [3] 74/21 104/8 104/9 list [7] 48/12 86/1 118/7 130/11 146/12 146/23 147/9 listen [1] 58/11 listening [4] 64/25 65/1 144/24 146/14 litigated [1] 121/13 **litigation [15]** 121/3

121/5 122/14 122/16 122/23 123/22 125/9 125/15 125/21 126/22 127/16 127/20 128/4 134/6 134/7 82/16 106/4 115/16 133/24 137/18 live [1] 89/7 lived [1] 112/19 lives [5] 4/12 21/5 36/5 37/5 59/6 loaded [1] 28/24 local [1] 107/12 locate [9] 24/8 24/17 24/24 140/13 140/19 141/16 141/17 147/20 **luxury [1]** 149/10 148/14 located [15] 20/24 21/7 23/23 24/1 24/4 24/6 25/5 25/25 27/6 44/22 100/10 101/15 140/3 141/15 148/11 location [2] 93/11 147/6 London [3] 58/6 74/11 105/19 **London's [1]** 58/3 lonely [1] 112/16 long [9] 63/4 110/20 111/20 117/13 119/11 126/21 133/16 145/13 149/4 long-standing [1] 110/20 longer [1] 133/24 look [4] 14/16 16/25 94/20 148/4 looking [2] 38/4 69/10 lookout [1] 82/8 loquitur [1] 133/21 Lord [6] 26/11 43/6 126/9 126/20 143/14 150/14 Lord MacLean [1] 26/11 43/6 **Lords [1]** 36/2 **Lorraine [2]** 2/2 2/5 loss [8] 2/14 3/22 37/3 39/13 100/5 111/19 123/18 125/3 lost [21] 31/16 31/21 31/23 31/24 32/3 32/8 32/10 32/12 32/14 32/17 32/20 32/23 32/25 33/2 33/4 36/2 37/19 45/16 100/20 101/12 119/12 lot [6] 37/17 110/13 119/12 123/8 131/9 135/1

**loud [1]** 109/14 louder [1] 13/13 loudly [1] 113/9 Louise [1] 32/16 love [1] 114/11 loved [4] 1/14 31/16 37/2 37/19 low [2] 28/15 28/20 loyalist [3] 74/1 75/5 78/15 **Lucas [2]** 32/12 33/13 luck [1] 57/24 lunch [1] 97/2 **Luncheon [1]** 97/7 **Lurgan [1]** 75/1 Lynne [1] 1/24 М machinery [2] 54/21 86/7 MacLean [1] 26/11 made [81] 1/11 7/9 9/9 10/1 10/25 11/2 16/8 17/3 17/17 20/12 Manchester [1] 21/24 22/20 28/9

28/16 28/19 28/24 29/1 31/15 34/4 34/6 35/21 43/14 43/18 46/8 47/5 47/7 47/15 49/11 50/13 50/16 89/16 90/9 90/19 90/20 90/23 91/16 93/3 94/15 96/19 97/10 104/17 106/24 108/8 110/18 115/20 119/2 125/7 125/14 126/16 127/8 129/6 129/7 129/9 132/4 132/7 133/6 133/23 134/2 135/14 135/25 140/1 140/2 142/6 142/9 142/23 143/5 144/9 145/4 145/17 147/3 147/4 147/5 147/19 148/9 148/14 149/11 149/13 main [6] 4/1 8/21 25/3 26/4 83/21 118/10 mainland [1] 105/11 maintain [1] 76/11 maintained [1] 60/21 Majesty's [3] 98/5 98/8 98/13 major [2] 80/21 82/23 marked [1] 74/12 majority [6] 55/24 75/12 79/5 80/23 81/1 138/7 make [30] 4/9 11/5 11/8 14/23 29/25 46/20 48/4 48/10 50/9 mass [1] 33/19

60/11 61/2 68/8 74/8 75/23 81/20 82/19 94/2 110/17 113/14 119/23 119/24 120/21 131/13 133/2 133/9 134/3 136/18 142/5 144/19 145/12 maker [1] 104/25 makers [1] 70/5 makes [2] 63/16 90/19 making [6] 35/15 39/1 115/22 128/22 128/24 145/15 malaise [1] 24/8 malpractice [1] 26/16 manage [1] 146/2 managed [2] 36/22 83/17 management [5] 24/14 55/13 72/3 97/20 144/6 managing [2] 89/24 98/6 74/19 Mandy [1] 1/17 manner [5] 36/21 37/19 39/18 48/17 143/19 manpower [1] 19/8 60/13 65/24 66/2 88/6 Mansfield [12] 109/4 109/11 109/13 109/18 139/8 139/13 142/2 142/3 142/6 142/10 142/21 150/12 mantra [1] 23/12 many [33] 3/23 4/2 4/13 8/6 16/7 34/23 54/6 56/25 60/15 67/6 67/19 81/4 86/21 111/14 111/17 111/18 113/10 114/8 121/7 121/11 125/9 126/22 130/22 135/19 139/5 139/16 144/14 144/19 144/21 145/3 145/3 145/7 147/16 March [2] 36/10 129/16 Marcus [1] 33/13 Marcus-Smith [1] 33/13 Marie [2] 33/10 38/12 Marion [1] 1/22 **Mark [1]** 1/17 Marlow [4] 32/12 32/12 32/13 38/7 Martin [1] 33/4 Mary [3] 33/3 33/11 43/16

100/9 100/9 128/25 М 136/22 137/3 137/14 militant [1] 82/17 140/15 147/8 149/1 144/25 149/8 meetings [34] 20/13 military [8] 43/8 149/2 massive [2] 44/11 morning [7] 1/3 1/4 **May 1998 [2]** 49/14 20/22 21/3 21/6 22/18 56/18 71/5 73/20 74/1 115/12 83/7 22/23 22/24 23/4 23/6 95/13 106/21 106/24 1/8 1/11 2/24 48/10 masters [1] 81/4 McBurney [8] 1/6 23/23 24/10 24/11 mind [7] 18/4 107/2 129/8 material [46] 10/24 1/10 1/13 6/17 10/8 24/18 24/20 24/25 108/10 114/14 122/21 most [27] 11/1 17/16 12/24 13/2 13/24 28/18 29/14 150/4 25/1 25/22 44/25 146/12 149/10 19/3 20/8 23/22 35/12 21/23 21/25 22/4 22/9 70/19 71/3 71/7 71/7 McCombe [5] 31/22 mind the [1] 114/14 35/15 59/4 59/8 59/19 22/10 29/11 30/23 31/22 31/22 31/23 72/14 73/7 77/16 85/5 mindful [1] 124/19 62/14 62/16 62/21 30/24 42/16 42/18 67/7 70/20 71/1 71/3 38/25 115/3 115/3 115/5 minimised [1] 30/24 43/11 44/15 45/15 McCourt [1] 33/12 115/5 119/15 140/8 72/19 80/21 83/12 minimises [1] 28/21 46/16 47/23 51/9 McCrory [5] 32/16 140/25 141/6 **Minister [5]** 5/2 11/18 87/5 141/16 146/4 51/12 54/17 58/17 32/16 32/16 32/17 member [1] 71/15 13/17 82/4 82/12 146/6 146/7 146/9 59/12 66/8 72/19 148/12 32/17 members [9] 4/7 ministers [4] 70/11 89/22 92/8 93/6 93/20 McCrystal [2] 32/25 4/11 59/20 79/25 80/7 72/10 145/1 146/2 **MOT [2]** 9/18 9/23 96/3 97/17 99/24 37/25 80/13 80/22 122/3 **minority [1]** 75/13 mother [4] 31/23 100/20 101/20 101/24 McCullagh [1] 33/11 149/12 minutes [10] 20/22 32/3 33/1 33/3 102/3 105/1 106/20 McFarland [3] 1/21 20/24 24/17 24/24 motivated [2] 99/12 membership [1] 81/1 107/18 130/24 141/5 26/6 44/24 50/15 95/1 1/22 1/22 memorandum [16] 99/19 141/7 141/13 144/2 109/2 140/8 McGillion [3] 33/10 5/1 13/16 14/9 14/14 motives [2] 100/1 148/11 33/10 38/12 14/23 15/4 15/8 15/17 misfeasance [1] 100/21 materials [9] 13/19 McGlinn [2] 33/11 16/14 16/15 16/22 121/25 motorways [1] 74/23 14/22 29/7 29/20 41/9 35/3 95/20 96/7 96/12 mislaid [1] 101/25 mount [1] 79/16 45/22 140/3 140/10 96/15 135/15 misled [1] 43/7 mouths [1] 131/16 McGrane [2] 80/15 145/22 memories [1] 6/15 missed [1] 120/9 move [7] 69/10 82/21 83/23 matter [9] 29/19 52/3 missing [8] 8/10 44/9 82/22 88/19 100/7 McGrath [6] 32/22 men [2] 4/3 127/18 85/19 107/21 112/24 32/22 32/22 32/23 45/5 123/11 123/13 121/3 144/15 Mena [1] 8/25 126/14 129/20 129/20 32/23 32/24 mental [1] 122/15 131/11 139/25 140/5 moved [4] 50/21 147/15 McGrory [1] 33/12 mention [1] 29/20 mistakes [4] 130/5 76/22 93/18 127/12 matters [40] 6/3 6/25 130/8 131/21 142/13 McGuinness [3] 79/4 mentioned [6] 39/9 movement [1] 80/20 10/13 13/18 16/1 movements [3] 63/6 80/15 80/24 39/11 86/6 86/13 Mitchell [3] 74/15 23/10 36/6 39/16 42/2 95/17 123/11 78/12 80/7 64/22 68/10 McKervy [1] 2/6 42/2 47/9 47/13 47/14 McKevitt [5] 80/14 mere [1] 14/20 mitigated [1] 33/24 **Moving [1]** 43/20 47/25 51/13 52/12 81/8 83/2 83/20 83/22 merely [1] 59/11 mixed [1] 107/8 **movingly [1]** 117/8 61/14 75/4 77/3 82/6 McLaughlin [3] 32/10 merited [1] 30/4 mobile [3] 12/21 89/6 Mr [58] 1/3 1/7 1/8 85/8 85/11 87/21 96/1 32/11 49/14 1/10 11/15 13/19 message [1] 95/12 124/13 96/5 103/4 103/13 me [11] 2/9 42/24 messages [1] 65/4 mobilisation [1] 19/7 16/10 25/10 27/6 105/24 106/19 108/13 43/4 92/17 109/19 met [3] 70/25 83/22 28/12 31/6 31/8 31/12 modern [1] 34/11 108/17 110/8 112/20 111/6 118/12 131/2 111/20 31/14 35/25 39/9 44/6 moment [8] 69/4 130/16 130/18 132/19 139/14 145/19 149/9 method [1] 125/5 111/7 114/13 125/12 51/12 68/24 76/14 144/6 146/10 146/25 mean [12] 34/7 38/15 methods [3] 7/25 125/20 127/2 134/15 77/7 77/15 83/11 147/10 40/15 42/4 43/25 59/4 62/3 137/15 88/14 89/13 90/23 Maura [1] 32/4 47/25 50/5 68/1 MI5 [11] 43/9 43/14 94/11 97/3 97/9 104/3 moments [2] 123/12 maximum [1] 135/3 108/16 114/21 117/11 57/15 65/16 85/3 87/8 135/5 105/10 109/1 109/4 may [72] 4/16 10/17 146/20 87/12 90/1 90/3 93/8 109/10 109/11 109/13 **Monaghan [5]** 32/2 16/20 16/24 18/3 18/5 109/18 118/12 134/5 meaning [3] 43/3 105/17 32/2 32/3 32/3 83/23 19/17 22/24 22/24 134/17 134/23 139/8 **MI5's [1]** 57/20 43/14 43/17 **Monday [3]** 137/2 25/10 25/12 26/15 meaningful [2] 13/12 139/12 139/13 140/4 Michael [10] 11/15 149/17 149/19 27/16 29/6 36/3 36/4 97/24 13/20 31/20 32/2 32/6 Monica [1] 33/13 140/11 140/24 142/2 38/11 40/4 41/17 36/9 80/14 83/2 83/22 monitored [2] 89/6 meaningfully [1] 142/3 142/6 142/10 41/18 41/21 41/24 4/25 127/17 89/8 142/21 143/15 146/19 44/7 44/9 46/15 47/19 means [8] 16/6 47/4 Michelle [1] 33/11 **monitoring [1]** 58/11 147/23 150/5 150/9 47/20 48/18 48/18 53/18 78/14 83/12 150/12 microphone [1] monthly [1] 24/11 49/2 49/4 49/14 50/4 months [2] 7/15 32/5 Mr Baxter [7] 77/7 85/23 101/22 103/23 139/14 50/6 58/5 61/12 69/16 meant [4] 54/4 69/25 mid [1] 79/15 moral [1] 5/7 77/15 89/13 90/23 69/25 77/13 78/3 83/7 76/11 99/4 mid-1990s [1] 79/15 more [32] 5/25 8/5 94/11 104/3 105/10 85/7 86/1 88/9 90/16 12/18 21/2 22/20 40/5 Mr Burke [1] 83/11 measure [1] 39/14 might [17] 16/21 91/10 93/14 94/2 95/4 26/18 28/7 42/24 40/19 49/4 49/19 measures [3] 8/17 Mr Chairman [3] 100/1 101/5 102/17 45/18 51/11 61/13 49/19 54/18 57/25 25/10 134/17 134/23 19/6 117/2 103/16 104/8 105/2 82/15 82/21 93/16 78/7 79/18 90/20 96/5 Mr Fearghal [1] 39/9 mechanisms [1] 105/22 106/12 110/2 41/19 93/16 99/6 104/5 99/24 107/8 107/24 Mr Fulton [1] 88/14 113/11 114/13 115/24 medical [1] 4/14 112/7 116/22 126/8 110/19 113/16 118/4 **Mr Fulton's [1]** 51/12 118/7 126/5 131/19 meeting [7] 70/21 139/8 125/1 131/7 131/15 Mr Greaney [6] 1/3 133/21 135/4 135/12 82/3 88/17 96/21 miles [1] 50/22 133/13 133/20 137/5 27/6 109/10 139/12

М	67/22	109/23	76/18 76/25 80/9	objectionable [1]
Mr Greaney [2]	named [4] 50/17	Nikki [2] 32/12 33/12	84/25 86/7 89/4 89/14	1
143/15 147/23	123/25 128/6 128/10	NIO [1] 141/10	90/22 92/12 94/10 97/20 97/23 98/4 98/6	objective [1] 3/10
Mr Jennings [1]	namely [3] 30/5 122/4 124/11	<b>no [44]</b> 11/19 15/18 16/17 16/21 17/14	103/22 104/2 105/9	objectives [1] 84/12 obligations [1] 52/20
16/10	names [3] 2/23 29/10		105/23 116/5 138/2	obliged [2] 17/21
Mr Justice [4] 13/19	60/21	23/12 23/13 23/13	140/10 141/2 141/4	52/19
28/12 35/25 134/5	narrative [6] 69/16	30/13 33/15 35/13	141/7 141/8 141/15	obliges [1] 36/9
<b>Mr Kane [6]</b> 1/7 1/8 31/6 140/4 140/11	110/14 113/14 113/17	45/21 50/6 56/5 65/14	143/24 145/9	<b>obscured [1]</b> 120/20
140/24	120/20 122/24	67/10 67/24 75/23	not [183]	observation [2]
Mr Mansfield [12]	narrow [1] 30/22	77/24 80/11 83/12	Notably [1] 88/18	129/19 145/12
109/4 109/11 109/13	national [9] 29/8	86/3 86/22 90/12	noted [13] 26/3 47/20	
109/18 139/8 139/13	58/20 59/15 59/24	90/17 91/20 97/21	53/2 58/6 61/5 68/13	11/5 110/8 110/17
142/2 142/3 142/6	60/1 66/15 74/25 131/23 142/15	98/3 106/4 113/19 123/21 126/1 126/15	85/6 92/6 101/19 108/6 142/3 142/6	110/18 115/20 139/23   142/3
142/10 142/21 150/12	nature [5] 12/18 16/4	132/7 134/23 139/6	146/23	observe [1] 31/4
Mr Michael [1] 11/15	126/3 148/14 148/18	139/18 143/2 143/3	nothing [6] 15/15	observed [1] 143/1
Mr Norman [1] 76/14	NatWest [1] 57/22	143/4 149/2	17/25 23/9 30/18	observing [1] 64/22
Mr Seath 1 44/6	near [1] 81/6	no-one [2] 77/24	33/21 95/14	obstacles [1] 79/14
<b>Mr Southey [8]</b> 31/8 31/12 68/24 97/3 97/9	necessarily [1] 13/23		notice [7] 46/4 54/3	obstructed [1] 43/8
109/1 118/12 146/19	necessary [9] 16/12	nobody [2] 34/18	114/23 115/7 118/3	obstructive [1] 30/22
Ms [1] 144/10	63/5 66/14 66/20	116/9	118/6 119/21	obtain [7] 57/6 67/2
Ms Fee [1] 144/10	104/18 112/5 121/9	Noeleen [1] 32/23	November [2] 11/7	68/9 81/10 96/3 127/1
much [16] 6/9 21/25	145/16 145/24	Noeleen McGrath [1]	106/20	147/16
31/5 34/2 79/3 110/7	need [43] 21/24 37/24 38/8 39/25	32/23	November 1997 [1] 106/20	obtained [8] 13/24 49/2 51/10 65/22
113/21 114/24 119/6	39/25 40/9 40/14	non [2] 55/14 86/16 non-statutory [1]	now [41] 7/12 8/5	70/23 89/19 93/22
121/8 121/19 123/23	42/13 44/14 46/15	55/14	8/19 18/15 23/21	96/6
127/8 131/3 135/8	48/6 48/9 50/11 51/13		29/12 31/12 42/25	<b>obtaining [2]</b> 56/16
139/12	51/21 52/9 52/12	86/16	49/15 64/10 65/11	126/23
Mullen [1] 1/24 multiparty [1] 74/15	56/11 60/10 69/16	nonco [1] 46/14	82/19 109/11 112/1	obvious [6] 52/15
multiple [1] 90/7	76/2 76/2 76/11 80/4	nonco-operation [1]	112/3 112/23 114/21	84/3 117/17 122/16
multitude [1] 56/17	85/19 92/13 95/4 96/4		116/12 118/17 119/9	126/14 130/21
murder [3] 44/6	99/17 103/15 103/23	none [3] 20/25	119/23 121/18 122/21	obviously [15] 53/15
122/11 137/3	104/16 104/21 104/25 105/4 105/25 108/13	128/12 128/20 <b>Noorkoiv [1]</b> 52/23	125/14 128/17 128/25   129/18 130/16 131/1	72/19 72/23 73/2 85/18 86/3 92/13
murdered [5] 1/15	112/7 116/12 116/14	nor [3] 91/17 126/14	131/6 132/10 133/15	114/22 118/5 131/14
8/25 113/24 121/24	117/24 121/17 148/4	134/11	133/16 134/18 137/5	132/12 132/13 132/15
122/6	needed [6] 62/8 68/2	normal [1] 8/17	138/16 141/15 144/9	132/21 135/14
murderous [1] 3/25 murders [2] 4/4	87/25 103/15 105/3	normalisation [2]	145/4 145/15 149/16	occasion [1] 2/5
17/11	144/8	18/21 54/15	<b>NSU [7]</b> 59/17 59/19	occasionally [2]
Murphy [1] 1/20	needs [2] 41/15	normally [1] 23/4	60/1 60/6 60/9 83/5	110/6 118/2
must [22] 3/8 3/11	42/10	Norman [1] 76/14	84/2	occasions [1] 88/16
3/13 6/18 14/14 21/22	negative [1] 8/1	<b>north [6]</b> 88/20 93/18 100/8 136/17 138/8	Nuala [2] 32/22 120/3	65/10 72/21 78/22
23/9 30/24 33/14	negligence [3] 121/25 128/13 131/8	139/2	Nuala O'Loan's [1] 120/3	78/24 79/18 103/25
46/16 85/24 96/1	negotiation [1] 149/7		nuisance [1] 101/3	106/12 112/2 133/9
115/6 115/17 116/13	negotiations [2] 74/9		number [24] 2/22	occurred in [1] 112/2
121/18 130/9 131/6	80/2	19/23 20/3 20/18 21/5		October [4] 74/1
131/7 131/24 135/19 142/16	neither [1] 126/13	23/7 23/21 24/2 30/7	43/24 48/11 48/12	74/21 79/21 124/2
my [10] 13/25 30/16	network [1] 87/17	36/10 40/16 42/20	61/19 64/2 66/2 66/22	
42/20 42/22 76/7	never [6] 38/17 45/7	44/11 44/19 44/24	69/24 74/4 78/5 80/22	1
112/1 136/24 137/3	85/4 100/16 101/15	45/1 45/25 53/6 53/11	l .	off [5] 76/22 77/1
145/19 146/1	122/12	53/23 54/8 54/9 54/12 54/14 54/21 55/6	83/11 87/9 97/11 107/2 123/25 129/8	102/13 110/6 139/13
myself [3] 3/17 23/14	<b>new [4]</b> 73/23 74/2 79/4 84/9	55/18 57/8 58/8 59/2	numbered [1] 82/7	offences [4] 60/11 64/3 64/7 83/9
148/7	newly [1] 6/21	61/15 62/6 62/15	numbers [1] 81/22	offensive [1] 79/17
mystery [1] 44/4	Newry [1] 107/13	62/19 63/18 63/21	nursing [1] 126/18	offer [1] 141/25
N	next [10] 69/2 88/20	63/24 67/21 68/19		offered [1] 29/23
naive [1] 77/9	109/21 120/18 131/6	69/22 70/8 70/10	0	office [11] 20/19 26/8
Nally [3] 12/18 15/25	131/6 133/19 135/6	70/13 71/1 71/5 71/14		70/10 71/17 72/11
107/13	139/9 149/16	71/20 71/22 72/1	O'Loan's [1] 120/3	76/18 121/25 141/4
name [3] 3/20 27/24	nickname [1] 50/18	72/11 72/24 73/7	O'Reilly [1] 1/23 object [1] 110/21	141/8 141/8 141/15
	Nicola [2] 38/7	75/12 75/13 76/15		officer [7] 20/15

(56) Mr Greaney... - officer

0 officer... [6] 24/19 57/6 70/16 70/17 71/5 76/20 officers [13] 12/20 18/8 50/1 50/3 63/22 75/1 77/17 88/22 90/14 128/20 129/8 129/12 141/1 official [3] 42/17 46/10 101/21 officials [4] 23/7 72/11 77/10 77/11 often [5] 23/4 49/18 87/6 99/7 111/12 oh [1] 115/7 Oisin [1] 32/8 old [1] 92/19 Olive [1] 1/18 Omagh [88] 3/21 5/20 7/5 7/12 7/16 7/20 8/2 8/15 8/16 8/24 9/12 10/14 11/23 14/8 14/17 16/2 16/6 18/18 19/1 19/9 19/20 21/8 26/21 29/4 31/17 34/18 35/2 36/14 37/14 37/24 39/2 39/6 40/24 45/8 50/14 50/22 56/7 62/14 66/10 67/14 81/14 83/24 89/16 89/17 92/15 92/25 93/9 93/12 93/16 94/21 95/5 95/6 95/8 95/15 100/23 101/1 102/13 104/4 105/5 106/15 106/17 106/22 106/23 111/13 113/12 116/7 117/7 118/13 118/21 123/6 123/21 124/16 124/19 125/1 128/2 128/20 129/8 134/9 134/13 135/21 136/9 137/7 137/9 137/13 138/21 138/23 139/1 147/7 Ombudsman [14] 29/21 29/23 30/3 30/6 44/5 50/23 51/4 88/12 88/13 88/23 89/12 120/3 121/21 137/1 Ombudsman's [4] 29/18 93/25 100/11 132/16 omissions [1] 128/10 on [259] on it's [1] 117/13 once [3] 49/22 115/1 134/6 one [47] 8/20 14/4 17/16 18/22 30/4

35/12 35/13 35/14

37/22 39/12 42/12 45/18 49/20 50/2 50/11 53/21 58/22 59/4 61/6 66/11 68/17 77/24 78/9 81/13 89/8 17/13 92/11 95/20 102/13 104/10 104/23 105/16 117/11 117/17 118/10 118/18 120/4 121/20 123/8 123/13 123/14 127/25 130/19 133/6 134/23 139/18 145/12 146/17 147/15 one-off [1] 102/13 ones [6] 1/15 31/16 37/2 37/19 45/18 119/8 ones and [1] 37/2 ongoing [4] 6/7 13/12 19/15 127/16 online [1] 143/8 only [37] 2/11 2/14 6/25 9/20 9/25 11/3 11/4 11/21 14/16 15/1 15/17 16/17 21/7 23/22 28/20 30/4 42/7 49/20 49/23 57/10 64/5 80/25 82/9 87/8 87/9 110/16 111/23 112/3 115/7 115/15 121/17 125/23 131/22 134/6 139/3 140/25 142/14 only suspicion [1] 64/5 onto [1] 41/3 open [19] 13/24 21/22 21/25 29/19 30/19 48/20 107/22 108/10 110/5 126/3 127/8 132/1 132/4 132/5 132/20 135/8 142/18 142/25 149/10 **opened [1]** 130/16 opening [48] 1/5 1/9 1/11 2/8 3/2 10/21 20/6 21/14 26/1 27/7 27/20 27/21 28/9 28/14 29/18 30/25 31/13 31/15 46/19 47/5 47/16 47/21 52/8 70/23 80/11 90/23 106/2 108/24 109/3 109/17 130/14 139/15 139/23 140/4 142/3 142/8 142/11 142/19 142/25 143/1 143/3 143/18 144/10 147/13 148/22 150/3 150/7 150/11 openings [1] 133/9 openness [3] 3/14 29/16 130/3 operate [3] 6/21

92/18 135/10 **operated** [5] 57/3 60/4 71/21 83/16 87/8 operating [3] 14/11 operation [32] 3/14 13/13 17/15 25/19 46/14 58/1 60/25 61/7 61/10 61/12 83/5 86/23 89/11 92/16 93/2 93/10 95/18 95/19 102/19 102/25 106/3 107/4 107/5 107/9 107/11 107/14 107/15 124/18 127/4 136/14 148/23 149/3 operational [7] 16/1 18/13 49/17 92/23 99/2 102/22 128/9 operations [7] 56/3 57/10 60/15 60/16 61/5 73/21 102/21 **operative** [1] 143/10 opinion [1] 16/24 **opponents** [1] 76/8 opportunities [3] 10/22 104/7 120/9 opportunity [8] 14/13 organisation [6] 37/7 38/11 47/21 73/21 94/20 104/11 138/9 opposed [3] 78/19 130/19 145/13 or [131] 4/17 7/16 7/20 7/23 8/15 8/16 10/3 12/11 13/1 16/18 83/17 83/19 87/4 16/19 19/10 21/20 29/8 30/22 33/23 35/5 Osman [1] 35/20 36/1 39/25 41/8 42/2 44/3 45/16 47/22 49/21 49/22 52/9 56/23 58/14 58/14 58/20 60/2 60/11 60/11 60/14 62/9 62/10 62/11 62/12 63/3 63/6 63/6 63/6 63/7 63/8 63/10 63/11 63/13 64/4 64/21 64/22 64/22 64/23 65/5 65/5 65/25 66/7 66/16 66/16 67/1 67/15 67/16 67/17 69/19 69/21 71/19 77/10 82/9 87/13 87/24 90/12 91/10 91/25 93/6 93/12 95/24 97/25 97/25 98/10 98/14 99/6 99/8 64/21 74/12 110/12 99/24 101/2 103/15 103/16 103/21 104/13 105/13 106/4 106/25 108/3 113/12 114/3

123/14 123/16 123/19 131/7 133/3 123/19 124/11 124/18 our [34] 2/19 2/22 125/2 127/5 127/24 127/24 128/1 128/8 128/9 128/11 128/19 130/5 130/8 131/21 132/6 132/11 133/4 133/4 133/18 136/4 142/13 143/8 145/23 148/1 148/10 149/7 or in [1] 21/20 oral [1] 47/8 orally [1] 2/16 **Oran [1]** 32/9 order [14] 13/25 48/17 51/2 62/19 62/24 63/24 70/10 74/7 105/2 127/1 127/11 132/3 132/6 132/7 orders [3] 4/8 17/22 29/6 ordinated [1] 88/4 ordination [3] 71/18 87/2 102/20 ordinator [3] 20/17 70/17 72/7 61/21 84/9 94/13 119/4 123/5 123/7 organisational [4] 27/16 29/2 56/21 70/4 47/25 61/14 61/14 organisations [10] 25/2 25/6 57/7 58/24 59/20 61/20 78/15 origin [1] 5/20 other [54] 3/25 5/25 20/14 25/2 25/6 25/9 25/23 29/2 29/8 30/8 30/11 33/22 40/11 41/9 48/25 51/9 52/10 52/13 56/8 56/16 57/25 63/7 64/7 65/4 65/6 65/8 72/21 76/21 78/4 83/22 93/20 96/4 103/20 104/6 106/19 108/17 119/19 122/7 126/7 127/18 133/14 134/2 135/1 136/16 137/10 141/1 144/1 145/1 145/7 148/4 others [21] 4/13 6/25 27/16 36/5 36/15 41/16 43/12 63/22 111/17 112/18 114/9 145/15 146/2 149/1 149/9 115/23 116/15 116/15 otherwise [3] 29/11

3/10 3/17 4/6 4/15 4/19 4/23 5/4 8/7 8/9 8/13 8/20 9/16 9/19 12/23 15/15 17/13 18/22 19/2 23/19 25/18 26/1 27/1 30/17 30/25 36/15 74/2 76/11 128/18 139/23 140/14 142/3 142/22 ourselves [2] 10/24 25/16 out [41] 16/18 28/16 31/2 37/20 39/20 39/21 41/13 42/7 42/10 42/25 49/7 49/9 50/25 51/15 54/9 54/22 62/12 66/14 76/1 76/25 78/2 86/18 88/12 104/12 111/3 116/1 117/4 121/12 125/15 125/21 126/5 129/24 133/14 136/2 138/19 140/17 140/24 143/17 146/23 148/2 148/9 outcome [2] 134/2 134/8 **outcomes** [1] 31/3 outlined [8] 3/17 42/3 107/16 119/13 144/10 outlining [1] 67/19 outrage' [1] 84/13 outset [1] 33/14 outside [1] 58/14 22/9 22/24 26/8 27/14 origins [2] 62/2 79/22 outstanding [2] 38/2 75/15 over [24] 8/6 11/22 10/13 16/7 18/16 19/8 12/6 19/23 53/6 54/24 68/20 74/5 78/22 78/25 83/18 88/20 99/15 100/8 111/24 112/13 119/2 120/18 135/2 139/17 144/17 145/2 145/25 147/19 overall [14] 48/5 48/7 50/2 50/5 50/7 50/8 51/15 51/17 61/2 61/22 85/12 90/6 102/1 104/22 overarching [1] 87/24 overcome [3] 2/14 6/14 38/9 overlap [3] 7/10 85/22 135/22 overlaps [1] 129/23 overseas [1] 87/11 120/18 121/11 135/14 oversight [2] 128/16 128/22 overt [1] 77/22 **overtures** [1] 82/19

24/22 25/3 75/15 95/21 107/12 76/24 77/18 83/11 placed [7] 2/23 41/25 0 paragraph 6 [1] 111/1 119/5 119/8 90/20 91/2 91/24 54/4 65/1 84/15 91/14 overturned [1] 46/2 120/2 123/12 132/11 145/8 129/3 138/8 147/6 145/8 overwhelmed [1] paragraph 79 [1] parties [2] 78/11 92/7 per [1] 53/7 plain [5] 28/19 2/12 23/2 parts [9] 9/25 22/9 **perceived** [1] 12/3 126/13 130/10 140/1 overwhelming [1] parallel [7] 4/20 5/9 30/1 30/5 30/8 30/8 perceptive [1] 9/3 145/14 75/12 13/11 16/10 74/8 85/24 87/4 89/23 plainly [3] 60/18 perfect [1] 138/24 overwhelmingly [1] 96/17 135/12 party [1] 74/9 perfectly [1] 111/10 127/6 147/15 72/23 Paramilitaries [1] Pascal [2] 80/16 83/6 perhaps [10] 8/5 8/8 plaintiff [1] 126/16 owe [1] 5/18 pass [2] 42/24 17/16 48/6 82/7 82/9 86/9 plan [1] 105/4 own [16] 2/19 5/10 paramilitary [4] 129/10 86/23 97/2 126/7 planned [4] 3/21 9/2 16/24 37/7 51/7 79/16 80/20 81/6 145/8 33/17 51/11 58/2 passage [5] 6/12 56/17 59/12 86/19 21/18 42/25 145/18 81/15 period [16] 6/3 16/2 **planning [2]** 62/11 86/22 87/17 89/24 147/23 16/6 18/18 24/10 136/2 parenthesis [2] 93/15 106/25 115/22 24/15 24/23 passed [18] 11/23 45/23 53/17 54/15 planted [8] 3/21 9/11 144/1 part [28] 4/24 11/9 45/23 58/17 72/6 55/12 56/10 68/20 33/17 53/16 122/4 owned [1] 87/13 13/1 16/10 18/18 30/5 88/15 88/17 91/16 71/1 74/17 83/18 123/6 123/21 124/21 35/21 36/1 45/3 45/14 91/18 93/23 95/2 95/9 96/10 100/16 **planting [2]** 123/16 54/18 68/14 68/22 100/17 106/22 107/1 **periods** [1] 78/16 128/1 pace [1] 127/12 144/11 146/2 147/17 73/2 78/10 87/23 Permanent [3] 20/18 | plate [1] 66/23 Paddy [1] 88/23 91/22 91/23 91/23 149/3 70/14 141/3 platitudes [1] 13/8 page [1] 11/25 102/15 116/3 119/2 passing [3] 7/1 26/3 permitted [4] 98/16 plausible [1] 28/15 page 11 [1] 11/25 122/25 125/20 131/19 66/6 125/23 125/24 137/14 played [4] 54/24 pages [1] 114/14 139/4 146/7 146/9 past [10] 30/11 38/10 perpetrators [4] 5/21 57/13 57/17 57/19 pain [3] 2/14 14/7 partially [1] 63/3 42/18 77/11 90/20 128/1 136/3 136/6 **playing [2]** 9/7 81/24 139/2 Participant [4] 28/25 91/12 98/22 101/20 **plays [1]** 137/21 perpetuators [1] Palmer [1] 2/7 131/22 142/14 143/25 101/25 111/24 123/16 plea [1] 136/18 **Paloma [2]** 32/19 Participants [43] 1/9 path [4] 111/20 113/1 person [5] 63/4 pleaded [2] 127/21 37/14 1/13 1/14 2/4 6/17 139/3 139/4 63/14 64/22 109/21 127/23 Panorama [1] 124/8 pleadings [5] 123/3 10/8 20/7 22/2 25/20 patience [1] 73/24 139/9 paper [3] 20/22 54/19 27/13 27/16 28/18 123/24 124/2 124/9 Patricia [1] 32/10 person's [3] 63/5 106/16 29/3 29/15 29/17 Patrick [3] 32/2 33/2 67/1 68/9 126/16 papers [1] 140/7 30/21 30/23 31/13 86/13 please [1] 31/7 personal [2] 63/9 parade [1] 34/25 patrol [1] 76/23 45/22 46/11 46/20 107/15 plethora [1] 12/5 paragraph [18] 10/10 47/3 51/21 102/12 patrols [1] 77/21 personnel [2] 8/14 plight [1] 14/7 10/11 10/21 11/17 pm [7] 69/6 69/8 97/6 104/20 104/24 108/4 Patsy [1] 31/20 16/5 13/21 15/22 17/19 130/1 130/4 130/13 97/8 109/7 109/9 pattern [1] 78/8 persons [1] 141/3 19/20 20/20 22/21 139/16 142/5 142/9 perspective [1] 91/6 149/18 Paul [1] 1/23 23/2 24/22 25/3 26/3 142/23 142/25 143/20 Paula [1] 1/20 point [15] 14/15 22/2 pertaining [1] 101/14 27/22 28/12 120/2 146/5 146/10 147/14 25/11 47/15 69/3 72/4 pause [8] 25/10 pertinent [1] 123/12 125/11 147/17 148/22 150/4 114/13 119/21 125/13 perusal [1] 11/2 79/7 79/21 92/1 92/3 paragraph 14 [1] 150/8 127/2 129/18 133/23 **Peter [1]** 49/16 119/25 124/7 133/5 11/17 138/5 Phil [1] 83/23 144/14 146/17 participate [1] paragraph 16 [1] 108/18 paused [1] 134/8 **Philomena** [1] 1/21 pointed [1] 148/2 19/20 phone [5] 65/25 89/8 points [5] 49/11 pay [1] 25/12 participating [1] paragraph 17 [1] 89/15 101/17 124/13 67/18 90/8 90/10 peace [21] 18/20 78/12 17/19 18/23 19/15 35/13 **phoned** [1] 101/8 103/20 participation [4] paragraph 18 [2] 15/13 78/23 115/14 69/16 69/23 73/17 phones [1] 12/21 police [64] 15/21 10/21 28/12 135/3 74/4 74/10 75/7 76/8 phrase [1] 16/5 18/6 23/21 25/4 26/5 paragraph 2 [2] particular [37] 3/3 78/10 78/18 79/7 29/18 29/23 30/3 30/6 phrases [1] 23/15 10/10 10/11 6/14 6/20 6/23 7/1 9/2 79/25 81/19 138/9 picture [10] 48/25 34/16 44/5 44/6 44/10 paragraph 251 [1] 25/12 25/20 46/21 138/24 138/24 139/3 49/18 49/20 49/22 44/19 50/16 50/25 20/20 48/2 48/11 48/15 139/6 50/7 50/8 51/17 61/22 54/8 58/18 62/18 paragraph 264 [1] 48/23 50/1 51/20 52/1 90/6 112/22 62/25 63/20 63/22 peaceful [4] 4/1 26/3 58/9 58/22 67/11 74/5 72/25 78/14 111/15 piece [3] 48/15 48/23 63/24 64/10 66/24 paragraph 3 [1] peacetime [1] 115/10 49/20 78/21 78/22 81/7 75/1 76/3 76/19 78/7 15/22 94/12 97/12 98/9 88/11 88/13 88/15 Pen [1] 37/3 pieces [3] 49/19 paragraph 30 [1] 105/18 106/1 107/18 pending [1] 134/8 49/23 50/4 88/23 89/12 89/16 22/21 108/8 110/15 123/17 **PIRA [2]** 57/22 58/2 89/23 91/17 91/18 penetrating [1] 57/7 paragraph 31 [1] 129/8 129/20 136/24 people [24] 5/9 5/18 place [14] 11/22 14/1 92/1 95/11 95/14 27/22 137/1 144/6 23/5 36/23 39/11 100/11 106/21 107/9 9/9 34/12 36/13 38/1 paragraph 310 [1] particularly [16] 26/9 38/8 53/23 69/24 52/20 53/1 66/9 73/13 107/13 117/19 120/3 13/21 38/19 40/11 42/12 70/20 72/24 74/12 89/17 97/21 106/5 120/7 120/8 121/6 paragraph 39 [2] 48/19 51/22 61/18 74/19 75/12 75/13 125/4 149/17 121/21 122/1 123/14

P possible [13] 21/11 **prepared** [5] 11/8 principle [3] 52/11 **product [3]** 66/13 21/25 22/10 23/10 64/18 71/11 72/12 73/18 78/17 66/19 91/9 police... [11] 123/17 34/9 64/25 65/7 69/14 133/17 principles [5] 3/13 productive [1] 124/23 125/6 125/16 69/19 71/13 84/14 Preparedness [1] 3/17 78/12 80/7 130/2 132/14 128/5 128/7 128/17 100/21 135/9 40/18 prior [12] 3/12 6/3 **professed** [2] 5/13 128/24 136/25 140/10 possibly [1] 119/17 presence [1] 63/10 7/15 13/4 41/22 65/10 25/21 140/25 74/17 94/21 95/15 post [1] 76/17 present [6] 2/13 professional's [1] policies [1] 117/18 post-1998 [1] 76/17 21/21 53/15 93/10 103/5 103/5 103/24 91/6 policing [17] 6/5 7/16 125/24 138/16 **priorities** [1] 72/16 postponement [1] professionalism [1] 21/15 40/15 40/16 presented [4] 106/16 **prioritise** [1] 99/25 74/25 110/25 55/5 57/24 60/2 60/3 postscript [1] 137/14 122/24 146/19 147/13 prioritising [1] 99/15 **proffered [1]** 45/16 63/17 64/7 64/16 potential [12] 7/19 **presenting [1]** 75/20 priority [3] 99/2 profound [1] 113/21 77/12 98/7 103/21 33/18 35/23 48/24 99/23 103/11 **profoundly [1]** 25/15 preservation [1] 105/9 105/17 60/11 70/2 93/9 94/2 privacy [3] 67/4 115/7 **progress [5]** 74/8 policy [19] 20/13 95/8 95/17 95/19 preserved [2] 62/21 67/10 67/11 134/3 138/23 144/14 21/4 22/18 22/24 120/5 private [3] 66/22 145/11 116/11 23/25 25/22 44/25 potentially [17] 14/22 President [2] 137/16 125/22 133/12 progresses [1] 3/7 70/11 70/19 71/7 progressing [1] 80/2 26/22 41/15 44/19 privilege [4] 2/22 138/21 76/24 79/1 94/13 49/8 51/9 53/9 68/5 press [2] 10/9 96/17 2/25 31/18 33/9 **prohibited [1]** 63/10 94/14 97/25 140/8 68/9 68/11 94/18 probability [5] 136/1 pressed [2] 131/6 promise [1] 11/20 140/25 141/2 141/6 98/15 98/16 98/18 141/10 136/3 136/5 136/7 promises [1] 13/9 political [33] 6/9 6/21 99/16 103/14 106/7 pressure [2] 14/11 136/10 promote [1] 69/16 7/21 7/23 8/3 18/15 power [5] 13/25 81/19 probably [3] 52/15 prompted [1] 56/15 18/17 18/25 19/4 20/4 14/25 15/18 17/5 prevail [1] 18/2 95/11 110/11 proof [1] 27/7 21/12 23/25 68/23 68/19 prevent [7] 38/24 probe [1] 44/14 **proper [2]** 97/19 69/11 69/12 69/20 probed [1] 112/17 powerful [1] 39/14 62/9 66/20 122/20 117/16 70/2 70/5 71/2 72/20 powers [34] 34/16 123/16 125/3 128/1 properly [8] 7/17 problem [2] 92/17 73/11 74/3 74/14 77/7 53/24 54/2 54/5 58/15 preventability [21] 132/23 29/7 102/7 120/9 77/22 77/25 78/9 61/25 62/15 62/16 3/8 4/3 4/7 4/16 5/19 problems [2] 92/12 122/12 128/13 134/6 78/10 78/14 82/16 62/18 62/21 63/1 63/2 8/1 8/20 10/1 10/5 145/4 145/23 84/12 85/22 120/25 63/3 63/4 63/17 63/20 10/16 15/1 19/9 41/7 procedural [1] properties [1] 104/13 politicians [2] 23/7 63/23 64/8 64/10 41/14 41/18 51/23 129/20 **property [2]** 65/17 77/13 64/11 64/15 65/11 94/5 111/8 134/10 procedure [2] 100/14 67/1 politicisation [1] 67/2 67/18 67/19 134/13 146/25 106/11 **propose** [1] 143/6 79/6 67/20 67/23 68/2 68/5 preventable [2] 19/1 procedures [3] 6/6 proposed [1] 81/16 **politics** [1] 69/14 68/11 68/21 81/22 40/13 40/19 137/7 proposition [1] Pomerance [1] 43/10 preventative [1] 85/17 104/18 proceed [1] 134/6 135/15 **population** [2] 54/14 107/18 practice [2] 55/7 proceeding [1] 14/3 **proscribed** [2] 123/5 68/4 prevented [17] 8/24 proceedings [12] 117/18 123/7 **Portraits** [1] 37/3 11/16 13/20 28/11 practices [2] 6/6 10/15 14/17 51/25 prosecution [1] portray [1] 24/16 128/16 57/24 67/7 103/17 28/21 45/24 46/24 83/21 pose [1] 18/23 pre [4] 18/13 92/23 104/5 104/15 112/14 46/25 127/15 127/18 protect [8] 34/14 posed [6] 54/1 61/22 122/3 137/2 114/6 122/8 123/10 131/5 143/8 149/5 36/8 58/20 61/17 67/20 85/16 116/5 pre-emptive [3] 123/18 124/6 125/6 87/25 99/12 99/19 proceeds [1] 31/5 142/21 18/13 92/23 122/3 137/3 process [29] 18/20 105/3 position [20] 22/19 protected [1] 122/10 preventing [1] 66/16 18/24 19/16 36/24 pre-warnings [1] 22/22 42/5 46/3 47/6 prevention [5] 7/20 38/5 38/12 43/14 137/2 protecting [2] 40/3 51/15 51/16 56/14 precautionary [1] 62/19 62/21 63/19 69/23 73/17 74/4 98/23 79/13 96/22 99/10 119/5 128/11 74/10 75/7 78/10 protection [14] 34/10 112/13 122/13 126/10 previous [12] 7/7 78/18 78/19 79/7 79/7 preceded [3] 53/19 34/20 35/6 35/7 35/18 131/7 133/2 133/3 78/6 94/16 17/10 83/8 84/18 80/1 80/5 80/11 81/19 35/21 52/22 54/13 139/19 143/2 145/23 precise [1] 125/4 113/6 119/2 121/10 112/6 126/2 126/23 99/4 99/15 99/23 positioned [1] 59/9 124/24 130/18 148/3 131/3 136/18 137/22 99/25 106/7 111/21 predecessors [1] positions [1] 60/22 149/4 149/6 143/11 144/20 protections [1] 67/15 42/22 **positive [2]** 31/3 **predictive** [1] 91/9 previously [2] 67/9 processes [9] 6/6 8/2 protocol [8] 10/21 143/10 prefer [1] 109/21 124/21 78/23 79/9 130/23 41/5 97/21 129/24 **positivity** [1] 137/9 134/3 138/17 143/20 131/19 132/22 133/14 prejudge [2] 47/12 pride [1] 138/10 possessed [2] 40/22 47/14 primacy [1] 87/21 148/15 142/11 64/5 **primarily [3]** 16/6 **procession [1]** 34/25 preliminary [3] 11/1 prove [1] 48/18 possessing [1] 64/4 72/12 99/19 provide [13] 13/12 48/11 136/1 produce [3] 44/1 possession [4] 11/10 premises [2] 63/13 primary [2] 28/6 44/11 71/25 27/18 35/18 35/21 11/14 12/10 16/20 70/14 produced [2] 87/13 47/20 48/14 52/21 81/18 possibility [2] 99/22 Prime [3] 11/18 82/4 87/10 110/12 111/11 preparation [2] 7/13 131/4 118/22 62/12 82/11 **produces [1]** 91/8 139/21 141/20 145/21

	I			T
P	purely [1] 17/12	Radford [5] 1/23 1/23		refer [3] 2/9 6/25
provided [40] 15/20	purported [1] 28/10	1/24 1/24 1/25	reasonable [3] 52/6	52/22
	purpose [3] 9/24	raise [6] 98/12 100/4	63/9 96/2	reference [22] 3/10
18/7 20/7 20/10 22/14	62/5 04/40	104/21 105/24 106/2	reasons [10] 21/12	10/11 14/16 20/12
23/20 25/3 26/4 27/10	l .	113/7	26/12 39/23 41/16	25/21 42/4 48/8 58/9
27/12 27/14 29/22	purposes [5] 7/25			l .
37/6 42/14 43/11	46/6 64/6 66/14 89/1	raised [15] 7/2 34/9	52/15 69/13 84/4 86/2	
44/15 44/22 47/9	pursue [1] 23/10	36/7 46/22 47/4 56/2	101/19 143/2	116/4 126/6 130/6
1	pursuit [2] 55/12	98/8 101/14 103/19	reassurance [1]	130/9 130/11 134/21
50/19 62/24 63/22	72/25	104/24 120/5 121/1	141/20	136/9 137/1 138/21
85/6 87/12 88/10	put [11] 11/9 36/18	123/2 135/4 139/17	reassure [1] 29/14	146/19 147/11
88/13 88/18 88/25	36/20 52/19 53/1			l .
89/2 92/7 100/6		raises [6] 41/4 85/20		referred [10] 8/22
101/22 107/6 124/3	84/13 110/8 114/25	90/5 93/4 101/3 144/5		25/23 50/18 60/2 79/3
127/14 127/15 131/24	118/6 122/25 124/18	<b>Ramos [4]</b> 32/19	receive [3] 29/15	100/22 123/3 140/5
132/17 136/15 138/1	putting [2] 81/19	32/20 32/21 37/14	36/17 59/11	142/4 147/5
I	82/6	ran [1] 55/24	received [18] 30/13	referring [2] 43/6
142/16	puzzling [1] 43/25	range [7] 40/22 64/7	43/12 43/13 43/13	130/10
<b>providers [1]</b> 148/11	puzziiiig [1] 10/20	64/17 108/12 108/16	51/4 59/12 59/25	refers [3] 11/17 83/1
<b>provides [1]</b> 110/13	Q			
providing [9] 4/14	<u> </u>	141/1 141/3	87/20 91/7 94/23 95/5	
88/23 112/4 112/4	QC [1] 27/24	Rangers [1] 84/25	95/12 101/16 105/5	reflect [2] 134/22
126/25 132/12 134/16	quality [4] 57/18	ranging [1] 64/6	107/23 108/1 125/5	146/15
I	123/15 127/25 148/19	ranks [2] 35/12	129/9	reflected [3] 9/2 35/7
143/22 144/17	quarter [2] 81/3	111/23	receiving [1] 71/23	54/19
<b>Province [1]</b> 71/6	113/20			l .
provision [9] 15/10		rapidly [1] 126/19	recent [6] 7/9 15/19	reflection [1] 125/13
18/2 18/11 45/21	quartermaster [2]	rare [2] 18/14 92/24	18/7 29/9 63/7 63/7	reflective [2] 91/11
65/24 72/9 87/16	81/2 81/7	rather [9] 27/24	recently [1] 29/21	146/11
92/21 134/4	quell [1] 68/19	39/25 48/16 67/16	recitals [1] 15/8	reflects [1] 15/5
	question [17] 3/8	88/3 93/6 121/7 127/5	recognise [5] 86/14	refuge [1] 5/21
provisional [13]	18/22 25/11 26/20	128/22	142/5 145/6 145/10	refusal [1] 13/11
19/14 73/4 73/10 79/6	41/4 63/25 78/6	raw [1] 91/7	147/22	regard [7] 5/1 5/4 7/9
79/11 80/20 80/25		Day [4] 2/5		
81/8 81/20 83/11	114/15 116/10 116/25		recognised [5] 40/6	17/10 18/5 145/10
103/1 130/11 146/12	117/1 117/8 117/21	reach [1] 143/4	77/23 103/8 121/2	145/12
1	119/21 123/23 132/10	reached [3] 49/4 86/4	121/4	regarded [2] 79/21
provisionals [1]	142/21	106/12	recognising [1] 7/17	91/6
80/23	questioned [1] 129/4	react [2] 16/16 125/2	recognition [2] 35/8	regarding [17] 65/14
<b>provisions [5]</b> 35/12	questioning [2]	read [8] 22/14 28/10	66/23	67/7 68/9 77/15 84/1
62/20 62/22 63/18	108/19 135/6	42/25 110/6 114/15		1
63/19			reconciliation [1]	85/9 85/21 86/4 88/21
<b>PSNI [27]</b> 20/11	questions [28] 7/12	116/1 119/23 130/6	138/9	97/16 99/14 99/20
20/23 20/24 22/12	34/8 36/7 37/17 38/1	reading [2] 110/10	record [7] 2/24 21/6	104/23 106/12 106/24
	85/21 90/5 101/14	130/7	25/5 36/20 90/19	107/20 134/4
22/15 24/17 24/23	108/20 112/6 112/17	ready [1] 97/9	123/1 129/2	Regardless [1] 144/9
25/5 25/20 26/10	113/8 113/10 115/12	real [35] 1/15 2/4	record-keeping [1]	regional [1] 57/3
26/12 27/10 43/2 43/3	115/24 116/13 116/15	3/20 4/5 13/12 14/2	90/19	
44/1 52/8 86/14 98/2				regions [1] 55/19
103/12 107/17 121/14	116/20 117/4 117/15	15/15 36/12 38/11	recording [2] 65/5	regret [1] 129/17
127/24 140/13 140/19	111124 119123 122120		66/9	regrettable [2] 5/14
	129/11 131/9 133/19	80/17 81/1 81/10	records [13] 16/4	26/9
140/24 141/6 141/16	139/16 139/20	81/15 81/22 81/25	23/22 44/2 100/5	regrettably [1] 24/7
<b>PSNI's [2]</b> 92/20	quickly [1] 5/25	84/1 84/3 84/6 84/6	100/10 101/5 101/11	regretted [2] 46/19
105/21	quite [4] 11/7 110/11	84/17 85/9 88/19	101/12 116/10 119/17	47/2
<b>public [25]</b> 3/16 12/1	111/7 131/9	100/7 102/22 102/25		
40/3 46/1 61/17 65/24			119/18 141/9 141/11	regular [3] 24/9
66/22 87/25 98/19	quotation [3] 10/20	103/6 113/23 116/17	recruit [1] 87/9	24/19 129/1
98/21 99/15 99/20	27/23 28/13	122/4 123/5 124/20	recruited [3] 83/14	regularly [3] 40/21
105/3 110/13 112/23	quote [28] 9/4 10/12	124/22	84/23 90/2	119/16 129/1
	10/22 11/8 13/4 13/22	realism [1] 117/12	recruiting [1] 57/8	regulated [1] 65/18
121/25 122/18 126/1	14/16 18/10 19/21	realities [1] 18/10	recruitment [2] 57/1	regulates [1] 65/12
126/3 134/8 134/9	24/16 25/4 26/6 26/16		86/20	<b>Regulation [1]</b> 65/11
134/15 137/11 141/21	26/17 27/25 42/19	reality [e]		
145/2		34/18 115/1 144/23	redaction [2] 17/5	regulatory [1] 67/16
publication [1]	55/3 59/3 59/7 60/8	really [3] 38/15 38/15	29/10	reinstated [1] 126/9
121/21	68/17 70/24 86/25	114/16	reduce [1] 69/24	related [9] 30/9 41/14
	94/18 100/13 123/3	reason [18] 22/4	reduced [4] 40/10	45/10 48/24 55/8 58/6
publicly [2] 102/17	137/19 147/1	37/22 38/20 45/15	52/17 76/19 94/25	94/4 97/12 98/7
113/9	quoting [1] 137/18	51/24 56/5 81/23	reduction [1] 77/21	relates [5] 11/13 15/1
published [2] 11/24		85/13 88/7 93/5 94/8	reduction/removal	15/17 61/8 142/1
89/5	R			
pudding [1] 27/8	race [1] 74/25	95/20 105/16 105/20	[1] 77/21	relating [18] 3/11
j	1466 [1] 77/20	106/14 110/10 121/24	redundant [1] 14/23	7/11 12/24 13/18

25/2 25/6 25/14 30/10 69/22 85/13 95/13 R remit [1] 63/23 retraction [1] 125/19 removal [2] 77/17 49/13 59/13 59/13 104/18 145/16 145/24 retrieval [1] 6/15 relating... [14] 22/18 resourcing [2] 70/12 | return [5] 3/6 15/22 77/21 61/16 66/4 72/24 24/2 24/5 24/9 26/5 61/1 80/11 93/1 remove [1] 36/11 88/24 96/3 96/18 144/7 39/22 64/16 94/16 removed [1] 7/20 96/20 96/23 106/3 respect [18] 1/16 returned [1] 84/25 100/5 116/11 118/21 removing [1] 73/6 106/5 106/6 106/8 1/18 1/19 1/21 1/22 reveal [2] 23/21 135/20 136/8 141/6 106/10 107/24 107/25 1/25 2/1 2/19 5/23 43/19 renew [1] 4/19 relation [34] 6/14 108/2 135/13 135/16 renewed [2] 19/22 9/16 11/13 23/17 reveals [1] 28/5 19/2 27/5 28/16 29/4 53/5 136/2 136/5 136/7 23/18 71/8 91/4 revelation [2] 20/9 30/4 34/9 45/8 50/12 repeat [2] 3/18 4/22 136/10 136/12 138/5 120/24 128/11 136/11 21/7 52/22 60/25 61/18 repeatedly [3] 68/7 138/11 148/24 149/8 respective [1] 143/17 review [19] 11/16 63/12 65/20 66/6 98/8 149/11 respond [3] 40/11 13/20 28/11 28/20 republican [17] 3/20 67/12 75/18 82/13 repeats [1] 38/24 6/20 17/12 19/12 40/19 138/5 37/13 37/23 38/21 82/18 84/6 86/8 88/8 33/17 33/23 34/7 42/8 45/11 45/12 repetition [1] 6/24 responders [1] 37/6 90/24 92/16 94/25 report [29] 11/6 55/18 75/6 78/15 responding [1] 39/7 46/23 46/24 46/25 96/16 96/19 99/11 11/24 12/18 19/19 78/21 78/25 80/3 response [31] 20/6 55/2 56/3 72/14 86/13 102/1 103/9 105/18 26/11 42/19 43/1 80/20 86/8 102/16 20/21 27/12 29/24 96/13 128/16 108/12 122/21 136/9 43/20 43/24 44/5 53/3 116/6 30/4 30/14 39/22 40/5 reviewed [3] 56/1 relationship [3] 53/21 57/23 59/21 40/12 49/25 50/3 50/6 56/4 85/20 republicanism [1] 86/24 87/1 87/6 60/21 62/7 63/16 58/22 60/4 68/14 78/21 reviewing [1] 49/25 relatively [4] 28/15 64/18 86/25 89/12 76/12 76/13 78/7 Republicans [10] reviews [1] 45/19 54/17 96/10 110/5 93/25 97/22 99/1 40/9 78/10 79/5 83/1 93/16 95/4 95/11 revisit [1] 146/18 relatives [2] 36/3 100/11 107/13 120/3 83/19 83/22 85/15 95/25 100/11 102/8 rewritten [1] 6/18 117/6 120/13 121/21 137/1 88/25 106/21 117/3 102/9 105/4 114/15 **Richard [1]** 1/18 relax [1] 77/4 reported [5] 50/24 120/8 139/1 147/2 reputation [1] 26/19 ridiculed [1] 112/19 relaxed [1] 76/14 right [8] 35/8 35/17 55/19 56/20 60/20 147/7 request [7] 14/6 relevance [5] 14/24 20/21 30/1 30/3 30/8 89/12 responses [4] 23/8 36/18 67/3 67/10 15/1 29/13 95/18 reporting [3] 19/19 135/9 140/24 26/25 27/19 146/3 67/11 109/15 122/9 140/7 30/12 72/10 requested [2] 11/11 responsibility [20] **rightly [3]** 36/16 relevant [39] 3/12 7/8 2/25 8/22 12/15 25/7 138/12 147/18 reports [10] 12/6 17/4 10/13 10/16 11/10 22/23 44/14 44/22 requests [9] 16/17 33/15 33/22 36/13 rights [8] 5/16 35/9 14/22 17/3 22/7 27/11 27/11 27/15 29/24 45/2 45/11 71/25 40/2 54/17 55/17 35/10 35/11 64/11 29/11 30/23 41/24 72/12 97/19 100/15 97/18 144/7 144/8 55/21 56/21 60/6 70/9 67/5 68/3 68/3 42/17 44/20 45/1 represent [35] 1/14 145/4 146/3 105/1 113/24 116/18 rigorous [3] 111/10 45/15 46/5 47/1 49/24 2/17 2/22 3/4 7/2 9/15 require [2] 19/2 116/19 128/14 133/12 140/1 148/12 53/14 66/10 69/13 13/7 18/17 21/17 responsible [9] 3/22 rigour [4] 39/17 21/15 71/1 85/7 89/20 93/5 31/19 33/9 42/6 45/20 required [8] 4/22 36/12 59/14 71/17 42/12 102/5 141/21 93/6 93/6 94/15 96/3 46/4 46/13 47/13 46/25 51/3 51/18 71/23 72/4 87/19 rise [2] 35/24 109/2 96/9 99/16 104/18 47/18 48/1 69/12 61/23 65/23 106/7 116/16 128/9 risk [22] 34/15 49/1 122/8 136/11 140/2 rest [5] 10/2 31/18 96/11 96/17 97/18 49/10 51/16 52/6 55/9 141/12 146/2 147/16 147/20 99/14 100/4 101/13 requirement [5] 28/1 33/8 110/17 138/13 61/23 79/9 85/14 reliable [2] 49/5 102/2 102/12 103/10 62/4 86/22 125/25 85/16 90/10 98/20 restored [1] 12/1 88/14 104/21 104/24 108/4 142/4 restrain [1] 23/14 98/21 99/6 116/20 reluctance [1] 21/18 108/7 108/9 108/14 requirements [1] restricted [2] 64/12 116/22 116/22 118/25 relying [1] 117/12 108/25 119/1 131/23 136/15 72/16 64/15 remain [7] 4/23 21/10 restriction [4] 29/5 142/15 representation [2] requires [2] 111/10 36/25 38/2 81/21 risks [4] 50/2 54/1 57/2 72/8 141/23 132/3 132/5 132/7 82/15 113/25 representatives [3] res [1] 133/21 restrictions [6] 58/17 61/22 98/18 remained [5] 75/15 rivalry [2] 87/3 87/5 20/14 72/17 143/9 rescuing [1] 4/13 65/14 65/16 65/21 76/7 78/18 80/23 represented [8] 1/6 reside [1] 136/11 66/6 66/12 road [5] 63/3 63/4 112/21 1/9 1/13 31/14 99/9 resigned [1] 80/14 rests [2] 4/18 33/16 76/22 121/12 126/21 remains [4] 17/5 44/3 146/9 150/4 150/8 resistance [2] 122/17 result [9] 33/7 56/1 roadblocks [1] 122/13 144/11 represents [4] 25/16 122/19 61/23 81/10 87/20 118/23 remarkable [1] 137/12 140/12 143/25 resolute [1] 13/11 90/13 96/8 136/25 robbery [1] 83/7 137/10 republic [70] 4/18 resolving [1] 78/14 141/5 Robert [1] 2/7 remarks [4] 30/25 4/21 4/25 5/3 5/5 5/8 resulted [13] 39/6 robust [3] 22/7 37/18 resonance [1] 104/16 146/1 149/3 5/14 5/22 8/19 8/23 45/11 56/17 69/17 138/15 135/17 remedy [1] 145/15 10/6 10/19 11/19 12/8 resonate [1] 39/14 73/19 74/6 74/10 Rocio [1] 32/20 remember [2] 37/2 78/15 80/1 83/6 86/12 rocket [1] 50/20 12/9 12/12 12/17 resourced [1] 33/17 137/16 12/25 13/10 14/1 14/3 resources [21] 6/7 103/24 121/11 role [16] 9/17 12/14 remind [1] 28/1 14/7 14/21 14/25 15/3 19/8 19/24 52/20 retained [2] 45/18 29/4 30/6 39/17 54/13 reminding [1] 123/1 15/4 15/14 16/11 52/24 53/2 53/7 53/10 79/11 56/12 57/5 57/9 57/13 reminds [1] 27/23 16/16 16/23 17/6 17/7 53/25 54/2 54/5 54/7 57/17 57/19 81/7 retention [1] 148/16 remiss [1] 2/9 17/13 18/3 19/5 21/20 59/12 61/17 61/18 retired [1] 18/8 81/25 102/21 137/21

R	120/11 120/22 121/3	13/7 23/15 25/10 27/4		Semtex [2] 81/11
roles [2] 54/24 56/20	121/5 121/9 121/13	49/21 91/15 115/24	sectarian [1] 17/12	103/1
Ronan [2] 33/12	121/22 122/5 122/13	118/5 119/10 124/4	section [4] 15/24	Semtex-based [1]
49/14	122/14 122/16 122/19	125/11 129/21 131/4	17/14 66/15 112/7	103/1
	122/23 123/22 123/24	131/5 131/10 131/16	section 2 [1] 66/15	senior [13] 12/20
Ronnie [9] 27/20	124/7 125/3 125/8	131/17 131/20 132/22		18/8 20/14 24/19
27/21 70/23 70/25	125/9 125/23 126/6	133/4 133/14 133/21	secure [2] 73/21	43/10 43/16 60/22
77/19 93/22 100/12	126/11 126/18 127/1	133/22 135/4 139/4	127/2	70/17 72/17 77/17
100/19 101/1	127/21 127/22 128/3	143/6 143/13 143/16	<b>Securicor [1]</b> 83/8	140/25 141/1 149/11
room [1] 2/13	128/15 128/19 129/3	145/18 147/22	security [85] 6/5 7/16	1
root [1] 128/15	129/13 129/15 130/17		8/3 8/17 12/15 12/22	70/21 110/14 113/15
<b>Rosemary [2]</b> 2/6		,		l .
32/25	132/10 134/1 134/5	116/18 119/10 122/7	15/24 18/20 19/6	115/21 116/17 120/13
Rountree [1] 109/23	134/10 134/14 134/23		19/18 19/22 20/13	120/21
route [1] 124/16	134/24 134/25 135/9	says [4] 128/8	20/17 21/3 21/15	sensitive [4] 29/7
routine [1] 55/6	135/11 136/13 136/18		22/18 22/24 23/7	101/20 112/17 127/14
<b>Roy [1]</b> 1/20	136/23 137/6 137/8	scale' [1] 57/25	23/25 24/12 25/22	sent [1] 93/8
Royal [2] 44/22 84/25	137/11 150/11	scare [1] 41/2	29/8 34/15 43/6 43/17	sentiments [2]
RUC [53] 4/7 4/11	<b>Rush's [1]</b> 110/16	scene [2] 4/8 4/12	43/17 44/25 45/3	110/20 127/8
11/9 12/20 16/1 17/21	9	sceptical [1] 149/3	52/16 53/3 53/5 53/14	
18/12 18/13 24/5		schedule [1] 144/18	54/13 54/20 54/22	102/18
24/13 24/21 25/1 25/5	sadly [1] 126/19	scheme [1] 67/24	54/25 57/15 57/15	separately [3] 27/14
	safe [1] 4/9	scientific [1] 67/17	58/20 59/5 59/14	59/19 146/4
26/19 43/8 52/10	safeguarding [1]	<b>scope [2]</b> 116/3	59/25 60/1 62/1 62/1	separation [1] 55/4
52/13 54/10 54/12	66/17	129/22	66/16 69/10 69/15	September [2] 42/21
55/16 56/6 56/13	safeguards [1] 66/2	scrutinised [1]	69/22 70/2 70/5 70/11	
56/24 70/15 72/8	safety [4] 98/19	101/23	70/14 70/18 70/19	September 2020 [1]
76/14 86/10 86/21	98/22 99/15 116/19	scrutiny [6] 12/7	71/2 71/3 71/7 71/8	42/21
87/1 87/7 87/12 87/12	said [52] 9/3 23/3	13/23 27/5 99/18	71/15 71/21 71/24	sequence [1] 7/6
87/18 87/23 88/2 90/4	24/15 24/23 29/23	130/13 148/12	76/12 76/13 76/18	sergeant [3] 12/13
92/16 92/18 92/22	30/18 31/12 33/24	<b>SDLP [1]</b> 73/8	76/23 77/4 77/14	49/15 100/22
92/23 93/23 95/3	34/7 35/11 36/9 37/14		83/16 85/23 89/24	series [3] 49/7
95/10 98/8 98/11	37/25 38/7 38/13	83/23	90/14 95/24 96/1	102/14 105/12
100/17 100/22 106/15	38/23 38/25 39/7 43/1	Sean [2] 32/24 44/6	97/23 99/2 117/19	
106/22 107/2 107/6	43/3 43/7 43/11 43/17			serious [8] 25/15
121/14 127/24	51/16 53/4 54/20	search [8] 16/19 63/8		66/16 79/14 82/1
<b>RUC's [1]</b> 56/12	55/22 75/11 77/20	63/11 63/12 63/25	140/8 140/24 141/2	85/14 125/1 131/8
<b>RUC/PSNI [1]</b> 127/24	82/6 93/9 94/17 99/1	113/22 114/12 140/23		140/12
rule [13] 27/11 27/15		searches [3] 104/12	see [11] 9/6 17/8	servants [3] 29/11
27/19 29/24 30/1 30/3	104/6 107/7 109/4	141/12 141/15	23/12 36/17 109/15	124/11 128/8
30/8 39/20 39/21 60/7	112/9 114/20 114/22	searching [2] 127/19		served [1] 128/4
70/7 137/21 138/16	122/11 123/2 124/15	134/20	131/4 134/3 146/10	serves [2] 21/7 30/20
Rule 9 [7] 27/11	126/12 130/21 136/23	seated [2] 8/13 21/11		service [25] 15/21
27/15 27/19 29/24	137/22 138/6 139/5	seats [1] 79/2	seek [7] 34/12 36/19	18/6 19/22 19/24
30/1 30/3 30/8	142/7 144/24 145/25	second [10] 37/22	38/20 48/3 62/9	20/17 23/21 26/5
ruled [2] 41/12 42/7	146/16	40/14 47/15 52/19	128/19 141/22	44/10 44/19 45/3 53/7
rules [4] 90/12 96/25	said the [1] 142/7	93/21 117/1 118/16	seeking [3] 16/8	54/8 54/20 57/15
97/15 98/14	Samantha [1] 1/22	128/10 142/1 144/7	108/7 141/5	57/16 59/16 59/23
ruling [3] 7/9 29/12	Samaritan's [1]	secondly [15] 4/6	seeks [1] 145/22	65/17 66/24 71/15
42/9	147/4	8/13 14/25 24/19	seem [2] 146/8	71/21 71/24 72/10
	same [7] 4/11 47/11	41/21 48/5 51/17 56/8	148/18	140/10 147/4
rump [3] 82/21 82/22	132/1 132/24 135/15	67/24 82/10 88/21	seems [2] 30/17	services [12] 12/22
82/23	141/5 142/18	90/18 102/6 108/20	94/13	25/13 34/16 34/17
running [6] 34/24	sample [1] 129/10	122/11	seen [4] 77/22 99/23	53/5 57/18 62/1 68/16
57/8 59/2 86/20 87/17	Sandy [1] 33/13	secret [4] 26/7 65/16	120/19 148/7	70/18 83/16 89/24
121/12	Sarjantson [1] 52/5	73/13 83/15	SEFF [1] 2/21	95/25
Rupert [9] 12/9 30/11	sat [1] 10/3		self [5] 18/1 73/18	serving [2] 18/1
58/24 83/14 83/20	satisfaction [1] 36/3	<b>Secretary [24]</b> 20/14	106/18 111/21 146/21	76/19
89/20 89/25 93/8	satisfied [3] 16/13	20/18 28/9 28/14	self-determination	set [19] 21/3 62/7
93/20	88/14 111/11	28/25 29/9 29/12	[ <b>1</b> ] 73/18	66/14 76/1 78/2 81/5
rush [66] 109/12	Saturday [2] 4/2	44/23 45/25 46/21	self-evidently [1]	86/18 97/19 111/1
109/17 109/25 110/23	31/17	65/22 66/25 70/8	146/21	111/3 111/14 124/2
111/5 111/9 111/17	save [5] 4/12 36/4	70/13 70/14 70/22	Self-help [1] 106/18	129/24 133/14 138/19
112/12 112/12 112/15	59/6 143/7 143/9	70/13 70/14 70/22 70/25 71/4 77/10		1
113/2 113/3 113/11	saw [1] 80/18		self-protection [1]	140/17 140/24 145/2
113/19 118/1 119/24	say [33] 2/11 6/24 7/8	141/3 143/24 144/12	111/21	146/23
	<b>3ay [JJ]</b>	145/9 145/14	self-serving [1] 18/1	setback [1] 126/6

100/12 100/19 101/1 34/13 72/25 113/20 S 49/8 31/12 31/14 68/24 **shut [1]** 131/16 109/2 109/11 113/1 **Society's [1]** 35/7 97/3 97/9 109/1 sets [1] 127/17 soldier [1] 74/21 **shy [1]** 112/18 124/3 128/15 129/19 118/12 123/12 135/5 setting [3] 143/17 sic [2] 90/12 94/23 139/4 139/15 140/14 soldiers [2] 76/21 146/19 150/9 144/15 145/13 sick [1] 13/8 141/14 141/19 141/24 76/23 Sovereignty [3] **settlement [3]** 73/22 sides [5] 13/24 55/5 143/4 143/6 143/12 solely [2] 15/11 24/2 79/19 80/19 82/13 75/21 76/17 107/10 135/11 136/14 Sir Anthony [1] **solicitor [1]** 112/2 Spanish [1] 34/24 seven [2] 25/23 26/1 sight [1] 28/7 27/24 solicitors [4] 1/6 1/10 speak [2] 91/3 91/24 Seventh [1] 84/15 sign [1] 80/10 Sir Gerald [1] 56/1 1/13 150/5 speaking [3] 69/2 several [6] 37/10 signatories [1] **Sir Ronnie [9]** 27/20 solid [1] 75/20 93/11 113/9 43/23 47/9 51/20 27/21 70/23 70/25 **solution [1]** 73/11 138/10 **speaks [2]** 13/13 57/25 146/24 77/19 93/22 100/12 **signature** [1] 14/9 **some [60]** 5/25 6/25 133/21 shall [1] 116/7 7/3 7/10 7/12 8/9 8/13 special [31] 3/7 signed [2] 72/22 100/19 101/1 **shame [1]** 5/5 75/10 sister [5] 32/4 32/13 9/13 11/2 11/5 12/1 24/13 26/7 34/16 **shaped [1]** 111/18 significance [7] 32/20 33/1 33/5 21/17 23/24 33/24 50/24 55/16 55/20 **share [4]** 50/9 55/9 11/21 19/17 51/8 58/5 sit [2] 97/5 115/23 38/8 38/9 44/21 47/22 55/22 55/25 56/9 60/5 90/21 100/2 48/4 48/6 48/13 49/23 88/11 93/15 137/19 site [2] 64/24 66/11 64/2 71/12 71/12 shared [18] 33/22 significant [22] 8/21 53/13 56/22 58/5 71/23 72/3 72/18 85/4 **sitting [2]** 117/5 41/20 55/7 66/19 90/6 15/3 18/16 42/16 44/1 58/15 62/25 65/15 85/5 86/9 87/7 88/17 117/6 91/24 92/1 92/14 93/7 45/23 51/5 58/7 63/23 situation [7] 7/19 69/9 70/21 71/3 76/8 90/3 93/24 94/1 98/3 94/1 94/6 94/7 94/8 67/5 68/5 68/12 72/19 100/10 100/17 100/25 19/9 36/14 37/8 52/17 79/25 80/7 82/19 94/17 98/18 102/7 75/13 78/5 79/11 73/23 98/11 96/14 106/16 110/9 108/21 135/5 107/19 146/8 79/18 80/21 82/20 situations [2] 67/6 110/11 113/7 119/13 specific [4] 16/17 shares [1] 147/21 94/1 95/15 143/23 126/7 120/5 120/23 121/20 71/19 88/9 118/4 **sharing [11]** 10/17 124/20 127/6 127/13 significantly [1] **six [1]** 30/1 specifically [2] 17/1 12/21 66/12 86/5 88/5 Sixth [2] 83/25 95/6 131/9 134/16 136/1 137/5 25/25 90/17 90/24 92/11 136/3 141/25 143/22 **Skelton [6]** 1/19 1/20 signing [2] 74/18 specified [2] 114/24 92/13 97/13 117/20 144/24 145/19 145/20 146/25 75/8 1/20 1/21 8/25 41/1 **Sharkey** [1] 2/7 silence [1] 111/21 skill [1] 81/5 146/21 148/3 148/25 speculation [1] 84/17 **Shaun [1]** 32/11 silos [4] 88/2 90/10 slow [2] 144/17 **spend [2]** 10/9 53/13 **Shauna [1]** 1/20 94/5 98/17 144/20 somebody [1] 119/4 **sphere [1]** 55/23 she [2] 114/11 120/7 similar [3] 26/22 29/5 smacking [1] 22/22 **something [11]** 39/1 **splinter [1]** 82/7 shed [3] 41/17 41/18 126/7 small [9] 11/4 19/17 61/1 88/20 91/10 split [8] 78/24 79/4 41/21 **Similarly [5]** 15/17 80/25 81/10 81/11 91/11 91/13 93/18 79/8 79/18 79/22 **sheet [1]** 100/9 38/7 57/13 77/19 98/2 81/11 81/22 87/8 100/8 114/2 131/12 80/18 80/22 102/24 **sheets [1]** 88/17 splits [2] 78/20 78/22 simple [1] 69/15 141/19 143/12 **shift [1]** 36/16 simply [4] 67/8 **Smith [1]** 33/13 **sometimes** [5] 85/5 **SPMs [1]** 20/25 **shining [1]** 35/1 120/21 140/18 147/24 Smithwick [8] 11/6 87/2 90/3 118/2 147/4 spoke [1] 50/15 **shocking [2]** 20/9 11/7 17/18 43/16 83/1 somewhere [1] 82/22 **spoken [1]** 39/10 simultaneously [1] 119/14 son [6] 31/21 31/25 14/4 84/21 100/24 107/10 staff [2] 2/18 72/12 **shooting [1]** 49/13 since [16] 6/10 11/23 **smugglers** [1] 50/25 32/8 32/10 32/14 stage [22] 8/8 10/23 **short [10]** 31/7 31/10 45/9 45/23 46/1 46/4 **so [57]** 3/23 4/2 6/9 32/17 20/8 26/24 37/1 39/23 34/25 69/5 69/7 75/20 46/22 54/10 62/2 84/3 6/25 11/12 13/6 22/10 sons [1] 113/16 44/17 46/21 61/2 69/5 96/10 109/8 110/5 86/4 103/10 103/12 93/10 115/8 117/13 34/2 36/19 39/16 **soon [2]** 84/13 126/15 118/3 144/11 144/14 53/20 63/4 64/11 115/18 108/5 108/7 113/4 shortened [1] 40/8 sorry [6] 9/5 114/24 76/20 90/6 91/23 122/22 129/18 132/22 **sincerely [1]** 38/3 **shortly [1]** 20/5 92/10 97/5 97/9 110/4 117/13 119/11 119/11 135/4 136/1 139/20 single [3] 40/2 shot [2] 74/21 75/1 141/19 147/4 111/14 111/17 111/18 133/23 staggering [1] 21/1 should [40] 4/22 22/2 singular [1] 138/15 112/10 112/10 113/10 **sort [3]** 16/8 16/8 **stake [1]** 119/6 22/3 22/11 30/21 Sinn [6] 19/14 73/9 115/17 116/16 116/19 148/2 **stance [1]** 113/19 36/16 36/18 36/25 73/14 78/25 79/1 117/25 118/3 118/14 sought [11] 29/6 46/6 stand [2] 112/15 40/12 41/8 45/13 81/20 118/19 118/23 118/24 48/2 87/9 97/19 131/8 45/21 46/25 47/12 119/2 119/6 119/7 Siobhan [1] 110/1 112/18 113/4 120/23 **standard [1]** 29/15 56/5 69/20 69/21 119/10 119/21 120/4 140/9 140/20 141/7 Siochana [11] 11/11 **standing [3]** 39/3 85/25 87/19 92/3 92/6 12/15 12/20 15/25 121/15 123/5 123/13 **sounds** [1] 131/3 80/4 110/20 92/8 95/9 96/16 99/21 source [4] 49/3 88/14 Stanley [2] 31/22 17/17 18/12 24/5 132/21 133/6 133/23 101/15 101/23 103/6 24/13 24/22 25/9 139/5 143/4 144/4 99/6 129/16 38/25 107/1 108/8 113/25 92/22 144/21 145/2 145/5 stark [1] 126/2 sources [3] 59/25 114/17 115/6 121/1 145/10 145/13 147/16 65/8 89/25 start [1] 120/19 sir [38] 1/4 1/11 2/8 124/6 127/8 131/18 2/18 3/6 13/7 22/6 148/17 south [9] 2/20 9/9 **starting [3]** 2/8 14/15 132/2 132/20 135/10 23/14 27/4 27/20 so-called [2] 123/5 9/10 9/11 9/11 89/11 22/2 **shouldn't [1]** 41/12 27/21 27/24 30/25 123/13 106/13 138/8 139/3 state [125] 4/17 4/18 showed [1] 139/1 31/7 56/1 70/23 70/25 8/23 10/6 10/15 10/16 **societies [1]** 35/15 **southern [1]** 81/3 **showing [2]** 12/2 77/19 86/13 93/22 society [4] 34/12 **Southey [12]** 31/8 10/18 12/11 13/10

46/19 47/5 47/7 47/16 Stormont [1] 72/8 49/16 76/15 S 130/14 52/9 70/23 73/16 story [3] 37/20 substantial [2] 29/2 superintendents [1] state... [116] 14/17 75/17 86/14 92/20 137/12 140/15 56/20 49/24 15/2 15/4 15/8 16/20 98/2 100/20 105/21 straightaway [1] **substantive [5]** 25/17 **superior [1]** 87/16 17/7 20/7 20/14 21/19 107/17 108/24 109/3 131/12 30/13 47/4 64/3 64/6 **supplied [2]** 12/13 24/3 25/15 25/19 109/17 110/5 110/10 strained [1] 87/6 142/25 subversives [2] 27/15 28/8 28/9 28/14 110/15 119/23 127/22 strategic [6] 71/3 18/14 92/24 **suppliers** [1] 65/3 28/25 29/10 29/17 128/18 132/1 132/16 71/7 72/15 72/15 succeeded [1] 6/1 supply [2] 58/4 30/22 34/9 34/13 132/17 133/2 133/25 87/10 87/13 **success [2]** 105/18 107/25 34/15 34/20 35/5 138/22 140/4 142/19 strategy [2] 70/12 126/15 supplying [1] 89/20 35/22 36/7 43/15 144/10 150/3 150/7 124/19 **successes [3]** 58/1 **support [10]** 2/18 44/23 45/22 45/25 150/11 **street [3]** 4/1 73/16 22/8 54/12 56/24 58/6 61/5 46/4 46/10 46/11 statements [24] 117/7 successful [1] 45/7 79/12 87/12 90/11 46/19 46/22 47/3 10/21 17/16 20/6 successive [1] 14/6 106/18 113/20 125/9 **streets [2]** 9/13 41/3 49/25 50/3 51/14 21/14 22/13 23/20 **strength [4]** 2/15 **succinct** [1] 9/3 **supported** [6] 50/8 51/18 51/20 52/6 27/10 34/4 34/6 47/21 23/11 136/20 137/10 such [53] 7/17 8/11 70/13 82/2 98/22 52/17 52/25 53/1 91/16 107/17 130/14 9/23 13/2 14/5 16/4 **strike [2]** 125/15 101/24 104/1 53/24 59/11 60/3 61/4 16/10 16/12 17/4 17/8 supporting [2] 89/13 139/15 142/8 142/12 125/21 62/5 65/22 66/25 68/1 142/25 143/1 143/3 Strong [1] 125/18 17/23 17/25 19/6 135/14 68/21 70/8 70/13 143/18 147/13 147/19 strongly [3] 22/6 19/12 20/22 21/7 supportive [1] 54/24 70/22 70/25 71/4 147/25 148/22 22/23 23/4 23/8 23/15 122/19 149/2 **supports [3]** 90/8 77/10 80/10 81/23 states [13] 10/11 struck [1] 126/5 25/15 28/24 29/6 92/6 137/6 81/24 84/7 85/9 85/17 11/24 20/23 35/18 structural [1] 56/5 30/19 33/19 34/16 Supreme [1] 36/1 85/23 85/24 92/7 42/19 43/21 44/7 structure [4] 27/9 35/9 35/18 39/12 sure [2] 38/14 39/1 92/11 99/10 99/12 57/20 63/17 92/20 48/14 54/16 55/25 41/22 51/9 52/1 55/9 surprising [2] 101/10 99/18 99/25 104/17 98/2 115/14 137/17 **structured** [1] 55/19 56/10 57/25 58/23 101/11 107/21 111/21 112/20 stating [2] 89/17 83/22 88/11 93/17 **structures** [1] 59/17 surrounding [5] 113/14 113/17 114/3 91/25 struggle [2] 80/12 95/5 96/1 105/5 37/13 37/24 38/22 114/7 114/16 115/2 **station [2]** 89/16 119/23 123/17 140/13 141/14 113/5 120/12 115/8 115/22 116/2 142/9 144/9 144/19 106/25 struggled [1] 125/9 surveillance [9] 19/7 116/4 116/16 117/18 struggling [1] 120/11 145/3 148/5 148/11 status [1] 137/20 59/15 62/9 64/21 122/10 124/5 130/1 **statute [1]** 55/14 stuff [1] 82/16 148/14 148/17 65/12 65/15 67/15 130/4 130/12 130/24 **Sub [4]** 50/25 51/3 sudden [1] 52/18 83/2 83/5 **statutory [2]** 55/14 131/5 131/22 132/11 122/1 95/10 106/23 suffered [1] 136/21 survived [2] 2/4 133/1 133/9 133/11 staunchly [1] 145/2 Sub-Divisional [4] suffering [3] 2/14 37/20 136/16 142/4 142/8 50/25 51/3 95/10 39/6 39/12 **stay [1]** 132/20 **survivor [3]** 1/12 142/14 142/22 142/24 stayed [1] 60/9 106/23 **sufficient [5]** 53/2 27/13 30/20 143/19 143/24 144/12 steadfast [1] 112/21 subcommittee [1] 107/7 123/10 123/15 survivors [48] 2/23 145/1 145/9 145/14 127/25 9/14 14/8 21/9 22/1 stenographer [1] 71/20 147/19 68/25 subject [5] 64/25 sufficiently [2] 22/9 23/16 26/22 33/7 state's [7] 29/13 47/6 step [1] 121/9 65/6 97/24 99/17 134/22 135/17 36/23 37/4 39/19 58/22 68/14 70/5 **Stephen [2]** 1/16 2/6 112/24 suggest [9] 18/1 28/3 39/24 41/6 42/6 42/11 85/13 147/2 subjected [2] 26/22 33/21 88/1 102/19 42/13 45/14 45/20 **stepping [1]** 121/19 stated [35] 3/9 13/3 105/21 107/18 112/8 steps [11] 8/2 36/8 148/12 46/3 46/10 46/13 13/21 15/22 17/20 **submission [5]** 17/19 119/16 52/1 52/6 64/17 68/6 47/11 47/13 47/17 19/20 23/4 25/4 25/24 76/11 82/2 92/7 98/21 suggested [4] 95/3 68/12 96/2 105/2 48/1 69/12 96/11 30/14 33/14 49/16 123/17 141/17 96/17 97/18 99/9 submissions [22] 95/4 102/21 102/24 50/15 50/19 75/19 **Stevens** [1] 43/6 10/23 17/18 45/5 46/8 suggesting [6] 40/1 99/13 100/4 101/13 75/22 76/15 77/1 77/7 still [13] 9/13 20/3 46/12 47/18 48/4 48/8 41/9 51/10 93/18 102/2 103/10 103/13 77/15 82/5 82/12 39/14 47/8 49/22 70/1 48/10 50/9 58/15 69/9 106/9 108/6 108/9 98/19 124/5 82/18 83/21 84/10 113/10 113/16 126/21 76/7 88/6 92/10 93/3 **suggestion [1]** 93/15 108/11 108/14 108/18 85/3 92/15 94/11 95/7 129/5 133/19 136/6 97/11 103/20 104/17 108/25 139/17 139/25 **suggests [5]** 27/25 97/21 104/4 104/14 125/7 146/15 146/18 140/16 141/21 149/16 76/13 78/3 106/6 105/10 106/19 147/9 stole [1] 82/8 **submit [10]** 45/20 107/11 **survivors' [1]** 108/20 **statement [69]** 1/5 **stolen [2]** 9/10 63/10 51/24 52/3 61/20 suitable [2] 69/3 69/4 suspect [2] 68/7 1/9 1/11 2/8 3/2 15/13 stone [2] 11/19 61/23 69/12 69/14 93/12 **summary [4]** 3/18 15/20 18/7 18/9 20/10 26/24 28/10 63/2 121/19 90/10 99/14 103/18 suspected [5] 59/20 20/12 20/20 21/1 stood [1] 98/11 submitted [7] 41/7 summer [3] 34/19 62/10 63/1 63/21 64/1 22/14 22/21 23/3 45/5 85/12 101/22 **stop [5]** 63/4 63/8 35/1 58/2 **suspecting [1]** 63/10 24/15 24/22 25/3 26/1 63/11 112/8 123/18 102/1 105/25 143/3 **summons [2]** 116/15 suspects [5] 7/9 26/4 27/21 27/21 28/9 stopped [1] 68/7 subsequent [2] 7/10 127/9 64/16 64/21 94/20 28/14 29/19 29/22 stopping [1] 76/22 93/17 104/13 **sun [1]** 35/1 29/23 29/25 30/16 storage [2] 6/8 sunny [1] 4/1 subsequently [4] suspension [1] 9/22 31/13 31/15 33/6 35/3 148/15 75/3 75/14 80/14 Superintendent [2] **suspicion [3]** 64/5

there's [7] 9/12 40/14 118/6 118/13 118/13 thank [14] 2/17 31/5 S techniques [2] 19/7 65/18 31/6 97/10 108/24 48/7 94/7 119/3 131/9 118/14 119/10 119/18 suspicion... [2] 99/6 technology [1] 6/8 109/1 109/16 109/19 146/17 121/17 121/17 121/18 114/3 127/3 127/3 128/25 telecom [1] 65/3 139/7 139/8 139/12 **thereafter [2]** 18/25 suspicions [2] 21/8 telecommunications 143/7 143/9 143/15 95/10 129/4 131/1 131/4 112/21 that [704] therefore [18] 15/5 131/7 131/8 131/8 **[1]** 65/21 **Suzanne [2]** 33/11 that's [8] 28/13 51/19 22/13 26/24 30/1 131/9 131/16 131/16 Telegraph [1] 89/5 33/25 113/25 116/25 131/12 132/17 132/18 132/19 telephone [14] 50/13 45/12 52/24 53/9 swiftly [1] 145/17 58/12 64/24 65/2 133/23 134/1 145/25 65/12 67/13 87/21 132/20 133/3 133/4 **swore [1]** 11/15 65/17 65/25 66/4 66/9 their [82] 2/15 3/2 4/9 88/1 89/22 101/11 133/5 133/5 133/6 sympathetic [1] 67/12 82/10 83/3 89/6 4/19 5/6 5/10 5/10 106/23 115/11 136/13 133/10 133/16 133/17 114/17 101/2 147/2 5/12 8/10 8/23 9/19 145/25 149/10 133/19 133/22 134/3 systems [2] 66/22 telephoned [1] 42/21 12/3 13/11 13/12 thereto [1] 22/15 134/17 134/18 134/19 66/23 13/14 14/8 17/11 these [83] 2/10 14/23 134/22 135/2 135/8 **Television [1]** 147/3 tell [2] 37/4 119/20 17/18 17/19 19/18 22/15 23/6 23/10 135/15 137/9 142/5 telling [1] 17/16 20/4 22/11 29/4 31/16 24/18 24/24 26/25 143/10 143/20 146/6 tactical [1] 87/14 32/10 33/2 33/4 33/23 30/19 36/6 39/16 147/14 147/18 149/13 **Temporary [3]** 62/20 **Taggart [1]** 33/13 62/22 63/19 36/3 36/20 37/2 37/3 44/13 44/22 47/9 they're [1] 82/20 take [23] 11/4 14/1 ten [2] 28/16 50/15 37/3 37/4 37/5 37/7 47/18 57/18 62/7 63/2 things [6] 48/4 91/5 15/19 22/7 31/7 36/8 term [1] 91/3 41/6 53/21 56/17 63/17 63/22 64/2 67/1 120/21 121/17 121/18 36/9 52/6 56/16 68/25 57/11 59/1 60/15 63/6 termed [1] 115/9 67/19 68/5 70/15 132/18 69/5 89/17 104/9 104/19 119/11 123/17 terminal [1] 65/5 63/23 64/8 64/22 67/8 70/19 71/7 76/24 think [11] 82/14 terms [24] 3/9 10/10 68/10 77/1 77/16 81/12 85/5 85/8 86/4 82/15 82/17 82/23 129/19 137/24 138/10 14/15 41/12 42/3 48/7 79/25 81/5 81/15 86/5 90/11 92/10 90/25 105/11 110/1 140/2 149/10 149/14 69/15 71/13 80/22 81/25 89/24 99/7 92/17 92/19 98/15 115/18 128/20 133/20 149/17 102/17 103/3 103/9 111/3 111/6 112/3 110/18 110/23 110/25 149/15 taken [18] 9/18 11/22 103/20 105/24 107/22 thinking [1] 144/25 115/14 115/22 119/2 115/25 116/3 116/22 52/12 64/17 68/6 120/8 120/23 120/24 129/4 130/5 130/8 110/19 112/3 113/9 third [5] 40/21 82/9 68/12 73/13 87/20 130/10 134/21 136/8 122/2 124/1 124/11 115/3 116/13 116/15 89/5 93/25 117/17 87/25 96/2 98/19 137/20 146/19 147/10 124/16 129/13 129/14 116/20 117/1 117/4 thirdly [7] 4/15 25/1 98/21 104/5 105/3 130/13 131/16 133/2 38/20 68/5 82/25 territorial [1] 5/20 117/15 117/24 119/7 117/2 121/7 121/23 terrorism [28] 6/7 136/20 137/6 142/8 120/16 123/1 124/4 102/7 108/22 133/24 6/11 19/25 20/4 25/9 142/25 143/17 145/2 125/7 127/13 127/15 this [250] taking [3] 79/2 99/22 127/17 130/9 130/16 40/16 53/8 54/1 58/1 148/15 148/20 thorough [4] 37/12 141/17 58/8 60/2 60/7 61/17 them [37] 3/7 9/6 130/21 130/22 131/5 37/18 37/23 38/21 talk [1] 129/23 62/20 62/22 63/12 9/12 9/13 15/6 15/6 131/9 132/4 132/8 thoroughness [1] talking [4] 82/16 36/8 36/9 42/22 53/1 132/19 135/21 138/15 39/17 63/19 64/1 66/20 114/21 117/14 118/22 67/21 67/25 68/6 54/24 64/23 68/22 138/15 140/9 140/19 those [88] 1/5 2/11 talks [6] 73/12 73/13 79/5 80/11 81/6 82/15 69/24 70/1 76/3 78/4 140/23 143/23 146/7 2/12 2/13 2/15 2/17 74/15 74/15 78/12 82/19 82/21 94/21 147/10 148/24 149/5 105/19 107/14 3/4 3/5 3/18 4/7 4/11 81/21 terrorist [26] 53/19 101/6 111/7 113/9 they [133] 3/21 4/10 5/11 6/25 7/2 7/18 Taoiseach [8] 12/17 55/18 55/24 57/7 57/9 116/1 116/16 118/1 4/21 5/1 5/7 5/18 6/1 7/18 7/22 7/24 7/25 82/4 82/5 82/6 82/11 58/21 58/24 59/5 59/9 118/2 123/14 123/19 6/18 7/13 8/9 8/16 9/7 12/10 13/1 13/7 18/3 82/12 82/18 92/15 12/3 12/7 13/8 14/12 21/6 25/8 26/1 30/4 59/20 60/16 62/3 123/23 127/25 130/7 target [7] 50/14 62/12 64/5 69/17 75/5 130/17 130/25 134/19 17/20 17/23 17/23 30/13 30/25 34/17 83/12 93/9 93/16 95/9 36/2 36/11 36/16 143/22 145/8 76/4 84/13 86/16 98/7 17/24 23/17 24/10 95/16 124/16 98/25 99/3 103/22 themes [3] 37/10 29/2 29/15 29/16 37/19 38/5 39/14 targeted [1] 83/6 107/3 122/3 135/22 47/16 48/6 34/23 36/12 36/13 39/22 43/1 53/22 54/2 targets [1] 93/13 themselves [7] 14/12 terrorist-related [1] 36/25 37/8 37/9 38/2 54/4 55/7 59/9 60/22 task [5] 3/12 6/1 6/5 17/23 38/5 59/10 38/3 38/8 38/9 40/24 61/18 62/10 63/25 98/7 31/1 144/20 terrorists [13] 3/20 116/3 116/10 144/25 42/23 43/3 43/4 43/14 64/6 64/15 66/8 66/12 tasked [1] 112/24 6/20 10/2 17/12 19/12 themselves in [1] 43/18 43/19 44/2 44/3 69/25 76/8 78/19 79/9 tasks [2] 37/9 145/24 46/20 48/2 53/24 54/5 81/4 82/6 82/8 85/17 33/17 33/23 34/7 38/5 team [20] 2/18 31/18 57/11 63/1 63/21 68/7 then [31] 6/23 7/7 9/7 58/10 64/5 68/8 71/22 91/4 94/19 104/6 33/8 43/3 59/20 95/6 116/6 10/4 14/19 22/12 23/1 77/18 80/10 80/16 104/16 127/7 128/22 104/12 105/15 106/16 106/25 110/22 110/24 test [3] 9/18 22/7 25/1 27/20 35/25 91/5 95/12 96/21 128/22 129/3 129/14 38/18 45/25 46/18 103/25 110/19 110/21 130/8 130/23 131/24 136/19 125/23 131/25 139/19 tested [1] 140/21 61/25 68/21 78/18 111/10 113/24 114/16 139/20 140/12 140/14 140/18 142/17 144/4 90/4 96/24 97/3 114/20 115/4 115/6 140/20 141/9 141/11 text [1] 27/11 146/11 146/15 than [15] 3/25 13/13 104/19 116/14 117/14 115/17 115/17 115/20 142/16 142/20 143/1 technical [2] 67/17 25/9 33/22 49/5 54/5 117/14 117/15 118/19 115/22 115/23 116/11 143/7 144/8 144/23 87/12 78/4 88/3 114/25 118/20 118/23 132/8 116/14 116/15 116/18 144/24 145/20 145/24 technically [2] 64/25 119/19 119/25 131/7 116/19 117/5 117/9 133/20 139/15 144/15 146/25 147/21 65/7 133/13 133/14 149/1 there [192] 117/10 117/14 118/3 though [4] 48/21

(65) suspicion... - though

121/17 121/19 127/17 treatment [1] 26/23 T U undertaking [3] 138/2 treats [1] 74/24 56/20 87/23 141/14 UK [12] 4/17 10/1 though... [3] 61/2 told [2] 9/20 82/20 trenchant [1] 149/1 undisclosed [1] 108/16 145/12 10/15 10/16 14/17 tolerance [3] 78/3 trespass [1] 66/25 21/10 threat [13] 8/10 15/2 21/20 52/19 56/2 98/25 103/22 trial [1] 83/20 undoubtedly [2] 59/9 34/14 40/1 40/4 41/10 116/4 117/18 147/2 toll [1] 122/15 trials [2] 45/10 45/10 110/20 51/4 58/20 67/25 76/4 **Ulster [2]** 44/23 **Tony [2]** 82/5 82/12 Tribunal [5] 17/22 unease [1] 120/12 101/15 105/5 116/5 147/3 83/1 84/22 100/24 **Tony Blair [2]** 82/5 unequivocal [1] 124/22 ultimately [4] 73/19 107/11 142/24 82/12 threaten [1] 79/13 80/6 114/10 123/24 too [7] 38/14 39/20 Tribunal's [1] 95/22 uneven [1] 79/3 umbrella [1] 60/5 threatened [1] 60/3 110/7 131/1 131/1 tried [4] 68/18 113/5 unfairly [1] 28/21 unable [6] 24/8 25/25 threats [7] 40/20 114/25 129/14 140/9 142/6 unfit [1] 9/24 52/10 87/10 95/5 44/1 46/20 133/19 took [9] 23/5 34/2 troops [1] 77/17 unfortunately [2] 101/16 102/10 105/5 141/16 36/7 36/12 39/11 66/9 **Troubles [16]** 39/13 34/12 61/11 three [7] 24/4 50/17 unacceptable [3] 106/5 112/15 113/2 53/18 55/8 55/12 unhappy [1] 98/11 69/13 70/14 90/10 15/2 23/11 100/13 topic [10] 51/19 56/13 58/23 59/8 62/2 **uniforms** [1] 64/3 91/4 130/6 unanswered [2] 8/12 53/13 96/24 97/14 68/1 68/14 73/2 73/2 **unilateral** [1] 17/5 threshold [1] 64/8 37/17 102/11 104/20 106/2 73/4 78/2 98/1 111/13 unimaginable [1] through [12] 37/3 unarguable [2] 118/15 118/16 142/1 true [3] 57/11 64/13 111/19 55/2 57/1 71/9 72/12 125/17 126/17 topics [3] 30/9 30/13 80/16 unionism [1] 75/5 83/3 91/13 101/8 unborn [1] 32/5 30/19 trust [2] 92/19 unionists [1] 81/21 118/16 122/23 124/11 unburdened [1] total [1] 24/1 145/25 unique [2] 113/1 149/4 149/6 totally [1] 82/14 truth [18] 3/11 13/5 138/8 throughout [3] 55/12 unclear [3] 87/22 touch [3] 69/1 69/17 13/5 39/4 43/4 108/15 unit [7] 57/2 59/15 93/19 116/8 62/23 123/22 97/15 110/21 111/20 112/22 59/18 60/4 60/5 60/9 Throughout the [1] uncomfortable [3] 113/3 113/11 113/22 60/14 touched [2] 51/19 43/15 113/10 134/14 123/22 121/10 127/19 134/13 united [16] 19/5 24/3 105/7 ties [1] 70/4 unconstitutional [1] touching [2] 21/4 134/16 139/5 139/6 58/14 62/23 64/13 time [61] 6/12 6/20 80/8 56/9 try [3] 4/9 92/2 65/12 66/4 66/17 8/5 8/7 10/9 18/10 unconvincing [1] 119/24 71/18 73/6 95/25 96/2 tour [1] 59/21 21/18 29/2 34/25 26/13 towards [4] 126/11 trying [8] 82/19 92/17 105/11 115/13 115/14 35/13 40/7 40/10 45/9 uncover [2] 121/10 139/4 144/14 144/15 114/2 117/11 133/4 137/17 45/23 47/7 52/16 53/3 134/16 Tower [1] 57/22 134/16 144/15 144/21 United States [2] under [17] 3/20 5/12 53/13 53/14 55/16 town [3] 34/22 34/24 tsunami [1] 2/12 115/14 137/17 56/7 56/12 62/1 62/14 15/4 16/13 16/22 41/3 Tuesday [1] 1/1 units [7] 55/20 56/18 64/14 67/3 67/13 17/19 18/20 35/14 turn [7] 6/23 20/5 56/22 57/2 57/4 61/20 town's [1] 4/1 52/21 60/4 62/9 63/13 67/17 72/19 75/8 trace [1] 144/21 46/18 92/2 96/24 90/14 79/12 79/23 83/17 63/23 67/4 96/13 99/6 Tracey [1] 1/19 139/13 148/8 university [1] 117/4 83/18 86/15 87/8 116/12 track [2] 58/11 74/7 TURNBULL [2] unjustifiable [1] 94/25 96/10 97/17 undercover [2] 60/9 tracking [3] 12/21 143/14 150/14 126/25 98/12 100/23 107/2 65/8 64/23 84/15 turning [5] 27/20 unknown [2] 50/21 111/15 113/15 115/23 underestimate [1] traditions [1] 138/2 54/7 61/25 112/1 80/16 117/13 119/11 120/7 5/24 124/7 traffic [1] 66/4 unlawful [1] 67/9 120/25 123/19 125/2 undermined [1] trails [1] 26/17 turns [1] 126/22 unless [3] 16/25 22/3 126/18 127/16 132/1 61/21 trajectory [1] 111/14 twin [1] 74/7 149/15 133/18 135/21 138/3 understand [6] 29/3 twin-track [1] 74/7 translated [1] 92/5 unlike [2] 5/25 72/21 141/5 142/18 145/18 30/2 114/2 130/1 translates [1] 2/25 twins [1] 32/5 unlikely [1] 49/20 147/23 143/21 144/23 **translation** [1] 91/12 twists [1] 126/22 unpopular [1] 125/8 times [10] 4/4 53/20 understandable [2] transmitting [1] two [36] 8/8 14/23 unpredictable [1] 54/17 112/19 114/7 140/15 148/25 22/16 48/4 50/18 125/5 52/18 114/8 130/22 139/5 understandably [2] transparency [6] 51/13 52/11 56/4 unqualified [2] 34/4 144/14 145/3 26/20 142/20 3/13 29/16 129/21 65/18 74/12 74/20 34/5 understanding [14] timing [4] 46/18 130/4 135/8 135/17 75/1 84/15 84/18 unregulated [1] 81/12 125/7 145/11 5/1 13/16 14/9 14/14 92/17 93/12 98/15 transparent [1] 64/20 tiny [1] 137/14 15/8 16/14 16/23 131/15 100/14 103/1 105/13 unreliable [2] 49/3 tired [1] 13/8 57/11 91/1 95/20 96/7 110/2 112/11 112/13 148/9 transparently [1] tirelessly [1] 134/18 96/13 96/15 135/16 126/4 112/25 113/16 114/14 unresolved [1] tiresome [1] 126/24 understood [1] 127/17 127/18 127/18 111/23 transportation [1] today [13] 1/4 96/22 118/18 135/18 138/1 139/18 unrest [1] 54/11 124/25 110/2 110/9 110/19 **undertake** [2] 6/2 **trauma [1]** 111/18 139/21 144/5 144/11 unsatisfactory [2] 112/9 114/24 118/12 37/9 traumatic [1] 53/23 147/2 5/3 26/14 119/13 123/9 138/16 undertaken [2] type [3] 13/25 18/12 unspecified [1] 50/16 travel [1] 126/1 142/10 146/1 102/18 141/13 unsustainable [2] Travis [2] 33/11 92/22 together [5] 109/23 undertakes [1] 39/17 33/25 **Tyrone [1]** 9/3 125/18 126/11

118/23 109/3 109/11 114/17 36/22 40/24 41/4 U **Wadham [3]** 62/7 vein [1] 29/5 63/16 64/19 114/18 115/2 115/7 41/19 43/25 44/3 until [8] 51/1 54/7 vernacular [1] 9/3 waited [1] 133/16 116/9 116/11 116/17 45/24 49/7 50/17 54/14 79/15 85/2 versa [1] 70/3 waits [1] 131/4 117/7 117/10 117/22 50/18 50/20 53/10 131/17 149/15 149/19 version [2] 30/15 Walker [3] 1/17 55/2 117/22 117/23 118/16 53/23 53/25 54/5 unturned [1] 11/20 43/4 86/13 118/16 118/17 118/17 54/11 55/1 55/11 up [13] 18/18 35/15 versions [1] 132/5 118/22 119/8 119/10 58/25 59/8 59/22 walking [1] 9/13 38/16 38/17 39/4 41/2 119/17 119/18 119/19 60/16 61/16 61/19 very [26] 10/8 18/14 wall [1] 111/21 43/5 67/13 80/10 19/15 27/22 31/5 wane [1] 114/10 119/23 122/21 122/25 62/5 62/7 62/18 63/17 126/8 135/21 144/15 43/25 67/4 69/4 79/3 124/3 124/4 125/11 64/5 64/15 64/20 want [16] 8/16 34/5 145/13 38/2 47/14 53/13 61/2 85/20 92/24 112/24 125/19 126/3 126/6 65/14 65/18 65/18 upcoming [1] 7/4 113/4 113/21 115/25 105/8 106/2 108/3 127/7 128/25 129/1 65/21 66/2 66/6 67/14 updated [1] 102/10 117/8 117/12 119/2 108/4 114/7 114/14 129/19 129/21 131/2 67/16 67/23 68/2 68/8 **upholding [1]** 138/18 119/19 129/24 131/3 127/3 128/21 132/13 131/5 131/10 131/17 70/4 70/15 70/19 **upon [17]** 8/1 21/4 137/18 139/12 145/3 137/19 131/20 132/10 132/12 70/20 71/4 71/22 31/1 39/15 40/21 145/3 147/15 wanted [3] 84/12 132/15 132/22 133/3 72/14 72/25 73/12 51/19 96/1 99/8 vexatious [2] 125/17 97/14 109/19 133/15 135/6 137/23 76/8 76/22 76/24 104/22 105/7 124/17 134/11 137/24 139/4 139/8 77/16 78/11 79/16 wanting [1] 34/3 132/8 139/21 141/24 via [1] 109/5 war [1] 53/22 139/18 139/21 139/21 80/2 80/3 80/5 80/10 142/1 145/8 145/21 139/24 139/25 140/11 81/10 81/13 82/9 84/3 viable [1] 93/12 warn [1] 51/21 upshot [1] 141/14 140/17 141/19 141/24 84/8 84/16 84/17 88/2 vice [1] 70/3 Warner [2] 56/1 upsurge [1] 52/18 victims [35] 38/20 56/11 142/4 142/7 143/4 88/17 89/3 89/24 urge [2] 22/6 96/11 38/24 39/18 39/24 warning [6] 39/22 143/6 143/12 145/10 90/12 92/13 95/13 urging [1] 73/22 41/6 42/11 42/13 40/5 40/8 40/18 94/25 145/10 98/3 98/16 99/19 us [8] 3/3 37/16 45/14 45/20 46/3 100/16 102/18 103/2 147/5 we're [4] 82/23 68/24 75/23 127/7 46/10 46/13 47/11 warnings [5] 40/25 109/24 112/8 127/5 110/16 110/18 111/1 139/9 143/21 144/23 47/13 47/17 48/1 74/23 118/16 118/18 114/20 114/23 116/20 we've [4] 110/4 use [16] 5/4 49/6 69/11 96/11 96/16 137/2 118/11 119/12 137/24 117/5 117/10 117/10 58/10 58/23 63/1 97/17 99/9 99/13 warrant [5] 12/6 weak [1] 67/4 117/14 118/6 118/10 63/21 63/23 64/8 100/4 101/13 102/2 63/13 63/13 63/14 118/13 118/18 118/22 weaponry [2] 79/14 65/14 81/17 97/1 103/10 103/13 106/9 65/22 81/9 119/7 119/15 119/16 97/16 97/20 97/23 108/6 108/8 108/10 was [346] weapons [3] 50/19 121/12 121/16 123/2 98/15 120/5 108/14 108/18 108/20 was intended [1] 74/6 81/13 124/9 124/23 125/14 used [9] 4/8 7/25 108/25 81/19 wearing [1] 64/3 125/23 127/13 127/16 40/6 49/18 60/13 67/2 Victor [1] 32/14 wasn't [1] 98/17 website [1] 57/20 128/24 128/25 129/12 81/13 84/16 91/19 video [1] 109/5 129/12 132/19 133/4 watch [1] 31/4 week [2] 105/13 useful [1] 94/18 view [8] 40/4 51/5 watching [1] 65/5 131/6 133/4 133/6 136/4 using [6] 20/4 64/23 92/1 113/17 121/9 140/25 143/3 144/10 weekly [1] 72/13 water [1] 9/8 65/1 65/7 71/24 125/25 134/14 140/14 watertight [1] 119/19 weeks [3] 22/16 71/1 145/4 149/3 110/10 viewed [10] 6/11 Watson [1] 2/7 124/21 were pursuit [1] usually [1] 23/15 43/15 56/11 59/2 73/1 way [15] 8/8 12/1 weight [2] 28/22 72/25 utmost [2] 9/16 12/3 80/7 85/25 92/8 33/24 34/3 34/5 38/16 41/24 weren't [1] 118/14 utter [1] 111/16 128/13 143/8 38/17 47/11 109/20 welcome [6] 3/5 7/8 Wharf [2] 61/8 61/9 110/11 118/9 135/10 views [2] 3/18 21/9 27/4 27/17 96/21 what [76] 3/24 7/14 143/10 148/20 149/5 135/15 7/21 14/21 17/23 vindication [1] vacuum [1] 77/24 17/24 19/11 20/13 ways [1] 115/5 welcomed [1] 47/23 120/14 valiantly [1] 4/12 violence [11] 34/14 we [133] 1/4 1/13 well [17] 19/13 28/7 28/5 34/7 36/17 36/17 valuable [4] 53/25 52/18 53/19 68/19 2/17 2/19 2/21 3/4 3/4 30/25 58/2 66/17 36/19 37/20 38/22 59/8 60/19 61/8 73/5 73/10 76/9 78/1 3/6 3/19 4/11 5/23 7/2 66/18 68/16 115/16 40/14 40/15 41/5 42/4 value [7] 91/21 78/8 82/1 103/22 7/8 7/12 9/15 18/17 43/1 43/12 46/12 48/2 115/19 115/21 115/25 107/23 108/1 140/19 violent [1] 102/16 19/11 20/6 21/16 22/6 117/12 117/21 119/18 48/3 51/16 53/20 55/2 144/3 147/12 149/12 virtually [1] 113/19 22/14 25/25 27/4 27/9 119/19 130/20 133/20 78/11 85/25 86/1 values [1] 35/15 27/17 28/3 30/25 31/2 well-being [1] 66/17 87/19 87/24 91/8 visibility [1] 27/14 van [1] 83/8 31/3 31/7 31/8 31/12 96/24 105/2 110/4 visitors [2] 5/10 well-known [1] 19/13 vans [1] 84/16 34/23 36/8 36/11 38/14 well-planned [1] 58/2 111/9 111/14 112/8 various [10] 47/22 vital [3] 57/9 129/21 43/12 43/12 43/13 113/6 114/14 115/17 Wendy [1] 2/6 57/2 59/25 97/18 went [5] 36/17 80/16 48/19 51/24 52/3 116/20 116/22 117/9 133/15 101/8 101/10 115/4 voluntary [1] 15/13 52/22 61/20 61/23 118/16 138/21 140/11 117/14 117/14 118/22 120/6 144/25 149/10 69/5 69/9 69/14 76/20 were [143] 1/15 2/4 119/22 120/19 130/14 **vote [1]** 75/14 vast [3] 19/2 79/5 76/22 82/14 82/15 3/17 4/3 4/10 5/10 6/1 131/4 132/13 132/24 vouch [1] 148/5 80/23 82/17 82/22 82/24 133/2 133/4 133/5 vulnerable [1] 77/18 7/16 8/2 8/14 9/10 vehicle [4] 9/18 10/7 90/10 93/10 94/20 10/1 16/11 17/21 133/5 133/5 133/10 63/9 118/25 W 97/2 97/5 97/10 17/23 18/10 19/4 133/10 133/14 133/17 vehicles [2] 65/2 **W71 [2]** 100/23 101/7 103/18 104/9 108/3 22/16 27/9 33/7 34/24 134/10 137/15 137/22

72/11 W **what... [10]** 138/6 138/18 138/19 141/11 144/24 146/11 146/20 146/21 147/22 147/25 whatever [3] 4/16 115/23 145/16 whatsoever [1] 17/14 when [42] 5/24 6/20 9/3 11/11 22/6 22/20 39/11 40/11 43/6 43/12 43/18 44/3 48/9 48/19 49/25 51/4 51/9 51/22 52/12 52/16 52/17 58/15 66/11 66/20 69/9 77/16 84/25 85/19 89/13 90/22 91/15 91/24 94/10 97/9 97/10 103/1 119/6 119/10 121/18 124/21 133/8 134/1 whenever [1] 22/10 where [31] 4/2 7/19 9/18 10/2 10/3 23/2 27/13 38/16 38/17 44/2 55/9 55/20 64/4 66/13 76/21 86/1 92/4 99/10 112/8 116/10 117/10 117/10 131/8 63/3 133/3 133/7 134/24 138/16 142/5 143/4 145/10 148/9 whereabouts [1] 101/14 whereby [3] 19/9 121/16 131/3 whether [37] 8/17 10/13 14/16 16/5 26/20 29/8 36/7 40/16 41/7 49/21 51/14 51/17 51/24 52/5 52/24 53/1 53/10 58/7 58/13 77/4 77/6 78/7 85/18 87/13 87/22 90/5 93/19 96/2 96/5 101/3 102/9 103/21 103/23 104/25 107/23 107/24 108/1 which [197] 64/6 while [21] 48/14 54/16 56/24 59/16 60/10 64/10 66/1 71/19 75/3 78/12 78/17 80/3 80/18 80/25 85/3 85/4 87/17 93/14 94/3 102/17 147/22 whilst [4] 3/9 43/9 114/1 144/23 White [6] 12/13 31/24 31/24 31/25 32/1 89/2 Whitehall [2] 57/23

who [85] 2/4 2/15 2/21 3/21 4/8 5/10 5/11 9/9 15/23 18/3 18/8 20/3 27/16 27/18 31/16 31/21 31/22 31/24 32/3 32/8 32/10 32/12 32/14 32/17 32/20 32/23 32/25 33/2 33/4 33/7 33/8 33/15 33/17 34/12 36/2 36/11 36/13 36/16 37/19 38/5 42/6 45/20 46/3 58/24 63/11 72/7 72/25 76/8 78/19 81/24 82/8 84/8 84/8 85/16 87/9 100/23 104/3 109/4 109/11 109/25 109/25 110/1 113/4 117/9 117/9 119/1 119/4 122/4 123/8 123/9 128/22 128/24 129/5 129/7 129/8 129/12 129/14 130/23 135/9 135/14 136/11 143/7 143/8 144/2 146/2 whole [5] 10/4 37/20 58/3 110/14 138/3 wholly [3] 5/3 23/11 whom [8] 3/4 5/18 7/2 9/15 18/17 31/17 145/7 145/21 whose [4] 1/14 2/23 8/25 80/15 why [25] 8/14 26/21 34/15 37/22 38/20 39/16 41/4 46/13 46/15 56/6 85/21 95/20 110/19 113/12 117/23 118/8 118/11 118/12 118/14 127/2 131/12 132/3 132/6 132/17 141/10 wicked [1] 34/2 Wicklow [1] 49/14 wide [5] 63/23 64/6 64/11 64/17 134/22 wide-ranging [1] wider [4] 38/1 77/25 119/25 141/21 widespread [1] 74/22 width [1] 2/13 wife [7] 8/25 31/23 32/3 113/24 114/11 121/23 137/3 wife's [1] 122/9 Wilkinson [1] 31/20 will [106] 1/5 1/6 3/5 6/12 6/19 6/24 6/25 7/3 7/5 7/7 7/10 10/11

11/5 13/5 13/5 13/6

13/23 15/21 17/6 18/19 20/5 21/14 21/22 23/13 23/15 27/8 29/6 29/15 30/15 131/17 31/3 31/3 31/12 34/11 witnesses [8] 6/15 36/11 37/18 40/14 41/10 43/5 43/18 47/16 48/3 48/10 48/19 49/21 50/9 51/11 52/15 53/15 60/25 61/11 68/24 69/5 75/23 81/24 82/22 85/19 90/11 90/18 91/21 91/23 93/1 96/8 96/9 96/18 97/5 106/11 109/3 109/5 109/11 109/12 110/4 110/6 111/6 111/11 112/7 115/16 115/18 115/19 118/1 118/2 121/2 125/12 125/20 126/4 127/6 131/13 134/24 134/25 136/8 136/10 138/5 139/11 140/18 140/20 workers [1] 2/19 141/20 141/22 143/21 working [3] 4/10 144/23 146/1 146/15 147/24 148/13 148/17 149/14 149/16 149/17 willing [2] 12/3 76/8 Wilson [4] 1/25 2/1 2/1 2/2 wing [1] 80/20 wish [17] 4/6 5/4 12/23 19/11 25/12 29/20 30/25 36/19 42/24 100/4 104/21 110/23 122/25 129/4 130/17 143/13 143/16 wished [1] 146/10 withheld [3] 42/17 99/8 112/23 withhold [1] 101/6 within [52] 4/4 5/21 6/6 7/4 13/25 15/11 16/20 20/17 21/21 23/7 25/2 25/6 30/15 51/14 59/1 59/9 59/16 59/16 60/23 61/15 70/17 71/16 71/18 72/3 75/5 78/20 78/21 80/8 80/19 80/23 81/1 81/12 81/21 81/22 81/25 83/19 84/7 84/7 86/10 88/2 91/2 92/11 wouldn't [1] 133/3 92/11 94/23 96/10 106/13 115/13 120/7 128/13 133/18 141/2 147/10 without [11] 12/5 25/10 34/3 47/5 48/23 142/17 63/13 63/14 86/10 114/3 129/16 139/6

witness [11] 15/20

23/20 29/22 83/21 15/19 16/10 43/23 91/13 96/9 108/19 136/11 women [1] 4/2 worded [1] 149/2 words [12] 13/9 13/14 39/9 39/14 65/8 years [30] 11/23 12/6 112/21 121/23 122/7 125/18 126/20 137/16 138/15 work [17] 3/7 5/23 9/17 19/25 25/17 27/2 28/22 31/2 59/18 60/7 85/1 88/22 96/14 117/4 138/2 141/23 143/7 worked [6] 59/16 60/5 85/1 85/4 85/4 90/4 77/22 77/24 workings [3] 17/14 55/25 56/9 world [2] 6/10 138/13 worries [1] 110/20 worse [1] 114/4 worst [2] 111/12 115/10 would [68] 2/8 2/11 5/11 9/23 10/4 11/20 16/7 17/23 18/1 18/12 19/15 28/3 28/6 34/18 40/3 46/5 50/16 51/25 55/9 58/12 64/10 64/12 66/21 67/4 67/6 67/8 69/3 69/4 69/12 77/9 78/7 79/6 80/11 84/24 87/22 88/1 88/4 89/17 89/22 90/16 91/15 92/22 93/12 95/2 95/11 98/5 99/7 100/4 101/10 102/19 103/24 104/21 105/13 105/14 109/2 117/8 122/21 123/17 124/3 125/6 132/14 133/9 134/11 139/19 143/16 145/5 146/17 147/22 Wright [2] 26/11 43/20 writ [2] 116/15 127/9 write [1] 23/13 writing [2] 131/25 written [11] 2/16 17/18 17/19 22/25 26/1 45/5 48/8 110/5

132/1 142/8 142/18 wrong [2] 28/4 36/17 wrongly [2] 28/21 101/4

18/7 20/10 20/20

22/12 22/14 22/21

year [14] 20/1 34/1 39/11 68/20 112/2 112/10 112/15 118/4 118/6 119/2 120/4 121/20 131/7 137/25 21/5 22/19 26/10 30/18 38/10 39/13 46/1 53/19 53/22 54/6 54/24 81/9 111/25 112/11 120/18 121/20 123/2 123/22 130/25 134/19 135/2 136/22 138/4 140/14 144/11 144/22 145/3 147/17 yes [4] 109/6 109/16 118/25 139/11 yesterday [18] 27/7 109/5 110/9 110/19 112/9 114/16 115/7 115/20 117/7 119/11 131/1 132/16 139/24 140/18 142/4 142/7 142/22 146/1 yet [4] 15/2 21/6 96/7 125/19 you [99] 1/4 2/17 3/1 3/3 3/6 6/5 7/9 13/5 13/5 22/6 30/25 31/1 31/2 31/5 31/6 38/15 38/16 38/16 38/17 38/18 39/7 49/19 49/20 49/21 61/6 69/1 69/2 77/9 82/20 97/9 97/10 105/12 108/24 109/1 109/2 109/12 109/16 109/16 109/19 109/19 109/20 109/23 110/4 110/8 110/12 110/13 110/22 110/24 111/11 112/4 112/6 113/1 113/7 114/17 115/5 117/3 117/5 117/8 117/21 118/2 118/24 118/25 119/1 119/3 119/4 119/9 119/20 120/2 121/4 123/8 124/3 125/12 126/4 127/5 128/15 129/24 129/25 130/3 130/12 130/21 131/1 132/11 132/12 132/17 132/18 133/14 134/17 134/24 135/15 139/4 139/4 139/7 139/8 139/8 139/12 142/2 143/12 143/13 143/15 you're [1] 38/18

pur [14] 2/18 3/7 /10 6/1 12/7 13/5 3/5 28/25 69/2 10/22 117/24 118/1 30/16 138/19 purself [4] 38/16 8/17 118/3 131/14  reann [1] 79/2
3/5 28/25 69/2 10/22 117/24 118/1 30/16 138/19 burself [4] 38/16 8/17 118/3 131/14
10/22 117/24 118/1 30/16 138/19 burself [4] 38/16 8/17 118/3 131/14
30/16 138/19 burself [4] 38/16 8/17 118/3 131/14
reann [1] 79/2
reann [1] 79/2
reann [1] 79/2
(69) your - Éireann